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Thesis	Summary:		UNIVERSITY	OF	SUSSEX		REINHARD	SCHWEITZER	PhD	in	MIGRATION	STUDIES		THE	MICRO-MANAGEMENT	OF	MIGRANT	IRREGULARITY	AND	ITS	CONTROL	A	qualitative	study	of	the	intersection	of	public	service	provision	with	immigration	enforcement	in	London	and	Barcelona		What	happens	in	institutions	like	schools	or	hospitals	when	local	service	provision	overlaps	 with	 the	 control	 of	 national	 borders?	 Such	 overlap	 is	 unavoidable	 if	unlawful	residents	are	to	be	excluded	from	mainstream	public	services.	With	this	explicit	 aim,	governments	not	only	modify	 the	 rules	and	established	practices	of	welfare	provision,	but	also	encourage	the	people	who	administer	and	deliver	these	services	to	incorporate	the	logic	of	immigration	control	into	their	everyday	work.		To	 identify	 and	 better	 understand	 the	 concrete	 mechanisms	 that	 either	 help	 or	hinder	 such	 internalisation	 of	 immigration	 control,	 this	 study	 systematically	compares	 three	 spheres	 of	 service	 provision	 –	 healthcare,	 education	 and	 social	assistance	 –	 across	 two	distinctive	 legal-political	 environments:	 Barcelona/Spain	and	 London/UK.	 Looking	 at	 official	 policies	 as	 well	 as	 their	 implementation,	 it	primarily	draws	on	a	total	of	almost	90	semi-structured	interviews	with	irregular	residents,	 providers	 and	 administrators	 of	 local	 services,	 and	 representatives	 of	NGOs	and	local	government.	Its	innovative	analytical	framework	helps	to	map	and	explain	the	significant	variation	in	how	immigration	control	works	within	different	institutions	 and	 how	 individual	 actors	 occupying	 key	 positions	 in	 these	 can	reproduce,	contest,	or	readjust	formal	structures	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.		While	the	way	in	which	national	–	but	also	sub-national	–	governments	frame	and	address	 irregular	 migration	 plays	 an	 important	 role,	 certain	 sectors	 of	 welfare	provision	 and	 some	 categories	 of	 ‘street-level-bureaucrats’	 are	 generally	 more	likely	to	internalise	immigration	control	than	others.	This	reflects	different	degrees	of	 professionalisation	 and	 individual	 discretion,	 but	 also	 attachment	 to	 different	institutional	logics	and	objectives.	Drawing	on	organisation	theory,	the	study	also	traces	 institutional	 responses	 to	 these	 external	 demands,	 which	 are	 key	 to	understand	the	varying	degrees	of	internal	resistance.		The	 thesis	 offers	 an	 original	 and	 empirically	 grounded	 perspective	 on	 the	consequences	and	 inherent	 limitations	of	 internalised	 control	 and	contributes	 to	general	debates	on	the	effectiveness	of	immigration	policy.		 	
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1. Introduction	“I	 think	 that	 we	 generally	 tend	 to	 simplify	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 whole	
migration	process...	but	then	sometimes	in	front	of	the	client,	in	your	workplace,	
you	as	a	person	have	to	respond	to	all	this	complexity.”	-	‘Street-level	bureaucrat’,	interviewed	in	Barcelona.		A	quick	glance	at	his	wristwatch	tells	him	that	his	lunch	break	will	start	in	less	than	fifteen	minutes.	It	has	been	a	particularly	busy	morning	and	he	can’t	wait	to	get	some	fresh	air.	When	he	looks	up,	a	middle-aged	woman	with	a	toddler	in	her	arm	just	entered	the	health	centre	and	somewhat	hesitantly	approaches	the	reception	desk.	There	 is	nothing	unusual	 about	her,	but	something	 tells	him	 that	 this	might	 take	longer	than	fifteen	minutes.	He	has	never	seen	the	woman	before	and	the	way	she	examines	the	billboards	and	signposts	on	the	walls	of	the	waiting	area	suggests	that	it’s	her	 first	visit.	She	probably	 just	moved	here,	he	thinks.	She	only	 looks	at	him	once	she	reaches	the	desk	and	it	quickly	becomes	clear	that	she	almost	doesn’t	speak	his	 language.	 Neither	 that	 is	 very	 unusual	 in	 this	 part	 of	 the	 city.	 The	 woman	repeatedly	points	at	the	child	–	which	he	assumes	is	her	son	–	and	indicates	that	it	has	a	fever	and	should	be	seen	by	a	doctor.	As	expected,	she	hastily	shakes	her	head	when	he	asks	her	whether	she	or	the	child	is	registered	as	a	patient.	When	he	asks	her	where	she	lives	she	hands	him	a	piece	of	paper	with	a	hand-written	address	that	he	knows	 is	 close	by;	but	she	doesn’t	 really	seem	 to	understand	what	exactly	he	means	by	‘official	proof	of	address’.	She	just	shakes	her	head	in	despair	and	the	look	on	her	 face	becomes	apologetic.	 ‘Please…	a	doctor’,	she	repeats	 in	a	 low	voice.	 In	order	to	at	least	put	a	name	and	date	of	birth	into	his	patient	registration	system	and	book	a	 same-day	appointment	he	asks	her	 for	 some	kind	of	 ID,	which	 to	his	surprise	makes	her	very	anxious.	‘OK	OK,	don’t	worry,	it’s	not	necessary’,	he	tries	to	calm	her	down,	although	he	knows	that	should	the	doctor	request	a	referral	to	the	hospital	or	want	to	prescribe	medication	he	will	need	to	know	these	details	and	see	at	least	some	documentation.	He	tells	her	to	take	a	seat	and	wait;	that	as	soon	as	one	of	the	doctors	is	free	they	will	examine	her	child.	‘It’s	a	child	after	all’,	he	convinces	himself;	‘I	cannot	just	send	her	away’.	But	it’s	already	too	late.	All	he	can	do	before	she	suddenly	turns	around	and	slowly	walks	towards	the	door	is	hand	her	one	of	the	flyers	that	someone	working	for	a	local	grassroots	organisation	brought	in	just	
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a	couple	of	days	ago.	He	vaguely	remembers	that	person	saying	something	about	certain	immigrants	who	are	excluded	from	public	healthcare	or	unable	to	register	because	they	lack	the	necessary	documentation	or	have	some	kind	of	immigration	problem.	He	is	not	sure	if	this	is	the	case	here	and	doesn’t	really	feel	it’s	his	job	to	find	out.	To	him,	the	child	didn’t	seem	to	need	any	urgent	treatment,	but	he	certainly	would	find	it	easier	to	enjoy	his	lunch	break	if	a	doctor	had	made	this	call.	On	his	way	out,	an	older	man	who	has	been	waiting	for	his	own	appointment	for	almost	an	hour	 looks	 at	 him	 sympathetically	 and	 says:	 ‘That’s	 the	 problem	 with	 lots	 of	immigrants	lately:	they	all	think	they	can	come	here	and	get	everything	for	free	and	straightaway’.	It’s	almost	exactly	what	some	politician	recently	said	on	the	radio,	in	relation	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 illegal	 migration	 and	 the	 need	 for	 more	 effective	immigration	control.	He	doesn’t	remember	exactly	what	her	suggestion	was,	only	that	to	him	it	sounded	a	bit	exaggerated	at	the	time.	‘But	what	if	this	woman	and	her	child	really	had	no	right	to	be	in	this	country’,	he	keeps	thinking	as	he	finally	steps	into	the	fresh	air	and	lights	his	well-deserved	cigarette1.		--	Irregular	migration	to	and	within	Europe	 is	not	a	new	phenomenon	but	has	 long	constituted	the	only	form	of	mobility	that	is	available	to	many	people	in	search	for	better	employment	opportunities	as	well	as	those	fleeing	violence	and	persecution.		Already	in	2008,	years	before	the	so-called	‘refugee	crisis’	and	in	spite	of	already	intensified	control	and	surveillance	of	the	European	Union’s	(EU)	external	borders,	between	1.9	and	3.8	million	people	were	estimated	to	be	residing	‘illegally’	within	them2	(CLANDESTINO,	2009).	Most	had	either	entered	 lawfully	and	subsequently	overstayed	their	tourist	visa	or	residence	permit,	or	for	different	reasons	did	not	(or	could	not)	return	to	their	country	of	citizenship	after	being	refused	asylum	or	other	right	 to	 remain	 in	 an	 EU	 Member	 State.	 Automatically	 assigned	 a	 legal-administrative	status	that	itself	constitutes	explicit	–	even	though	largely	invisible	–	evidence	of	the	failure	of	contemporary	migration	regimes,	they	thus	live	in	a	place	without	having	the	responsible	government’s	formal	permission	to	do	so.	The	only																																																									1	This	scene	is	entirely	fictional,	although	based	on	the	insights	and	understanding	I	have	gained	in	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	for	this	thesis.		2	Around	the	same	time	the	European	Commission	(2009a)	referred	to	an	estimated	number	of	“about	eight	million	illegal	immigrants	living	in	the	Union”.		
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factual	evidence	of	their	irregularity,	however,	consists	in	(the	lack	of)	a	stamp	in	their	passport	or	the	equivalent	data	on	a	chip	card.	This	has	significant	implications	for	how,	where	and	by	whom	migrant	irregularity	can	actually	be	controlled.		A	 good	 example	 are	 contemporary	 state	 efforts	 to	 ‘stop	 illegal	 immigration’	 by	preventing	 unlawful	 residents	 from	 accessing	 mainstream	 public	 services.	 The	underlying	rationale	is	to	thereby	not	only	encourage	their	 ‘voluntary’	return	but	also	dissuade	potential	newcomers	from	risking	to	end	up	in	the	same	irregular	–	and	 thus	 to	 be	 made	 uncomfortable	 –	 situation.	 In	 order	 to	 achieve	 effective	exclusion	 from	 these	 services,	 a	 government	 has	 to	modify	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	existing	 rules	 and	 established	 practices	 according	 to	 which	 they	 are	 generally	provided	to	the	local	population.	For	potential	service	users	this	often	means	having	to	 provide	 additional	 documentary	 evidence	 of	 the	 place,	 length	 and	 sometimes	legality	of	 their	residence.	 It	also	means	that	at	 least	some	of	 the	actors	working	within	the	corresponding	institutions	have	to	check	these	documents,	and	thus	be	encouraged	to	apply	the	logic	of	immigration	control	in	their	everyday	work,	where	it	 often	 conflicts	 but	 can	 also	 partly	 converge	 with	 their	 own	 administrative	 or	professional	duties	and	the	original	function	of	their	institution.	Ditta	Vogel	(2000,	p.416)	described	such	instances	as	‘cooperation	dilemmas’,	whereby	“the	agencies	which	 cooperate	 with	 the	 aliens'	 authorities	 must	 sacrifice	 part	 of	 their	 other	objectives”.	 This	 is	what	makes	 situations	 like	 the	 one	 described	 above	 not	 only	uncomfortable	for	potentially	irregular	migrants	but	also	for	people	like	the	fictional	receptionist.		Situations	of	that	sort	happen	every	day	in	many	parts	of	the	world	and	all	kinds	of	institutional	settings	and	partly	reflect	the	way	in	which	a	particular	state	reacts	to	migrant	irregularity.	In	fact,	as	I	show	in	this	thesis,	they	are	an	integral	part	of	this	reaction.	 The	 two	 locations	 I	 selected	 for	my	multi-level	 comparative	 analysis	 –	London	and	Barcelona	–	are	embedded	in	very	distinct	national	contexts.	In	chapter	
4	 I	will	discuss	 the	 different	ways	 in	which	 the	 issue	 of	 irregular	migration	 and	residence	 is	 being	 framed	 and	 addressed	 in	 Britain	 and	 Spain.	 The	 former	 has	become	emblematic	for	what	Matthew	J.	Gibney	(2008)	called	the	'deportation	turn',	and	the	UK	government’s	official	strategy	to	“create	[…]	a	really	hostile	environment	
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for	illegal	migration”3	has	determined	much	of	its	recent	policy	towards	unlawful	residents.	The	Spanish	approach,	on	the	contrary,	 is	characterised	by	a	relatively	accessible	mechanism	for	the	regularisation	of	 irregular	residents	on	the	basis	of	their	social	and	economic	ties	within	the	country,	indicating	a	much	more	pragmatic	attitude	towards	their	unlawful	presence.	At	least	to	a	certain	extent,	these	official	policy	approaches	not	only	shape	the	everyday	meaning	of	migrant	irregularity,	but	also,	and	accordingly,	the	local	provision	of	public	healthcare,	education	and	social	assistance	to	irregular	migrants.	In	each	of	these	spheres,	immigration	law	thereby	intersects	with	specific	logics,	existing	rules	and	established	practices	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.		In	chapters	5,	6	and	7	I	look	at	these	three	fields	of	service	provision	not	only	as	potential	 sites	 of	 everyday	 bordering	 and	 contestation	 of	 borders,	 but	 also	 as	everyday	workplaces,	within	which	immigration	status	can	be	anything	from	hugely	significant	to	almost	irrelevant.	I	thereby	draw	on	the	large	body	of	literature	that	highlights	the	possibility	of	irregular	migrants	being	included	in	some	spheres	or	aspects	of	social	life	but	simultaneously	excluded	from	many	others	(Castles,	1995;	Cvajner	&	Sciortino,	2010b;	Mezzadra,	2011;	Ruhs	&	Anderson,	2010;	Chauvin	&	Garcés-Mascareñas,	2012).	Most	empirical	studies	have	analysed	this	issue	from	the	perspective	of	formal	law	and	policy	or	the	people	that	these	directly	aim	to	exclude.	Instead,	my	 focus	 lies	 on	 those	 people	who	 are	 increasingly	 expected	 to	 do	 the	excluding.	 By	 adopting	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 different	 welfare	 institutions	 and	 their	various	 employees,	 my	 thesis	 offers	 a	 novel	 perspective	 for	 analysing	 the	internalisation	of	 immigration	control.	What	 interests	me	 in	particular	 is	 to	what	extent	and	under	which	conditions	individual	actors	occupying	key	positions	within	these	 venues	 (can)	 use	 their	 agency	 to	 contest,	 adjust	 or	 reproduce	 formal	structures	and	mechanisms	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.		Empirically,	 I	 draw	 on	 qualitative	 field	 data	 I	 collected	 between	 July	 2014	 and	October	 2015	 in	 London	 and	 Barcelona,	 where	 I	 conducted	 almost	 90	 semi-structured	interviews	with	irregular	residents,	local	providers	and	administrators	
																																																								3	T.	May,	cited	in	The	Telegraph,	25	May	2012:	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/9291483/Theresa-May-interview-Were-going-to-give-illegal-migrants-a-really-hostile-reception.html	
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of	 public	 services,	 and	 mediating	 actors	 like	 representatives	 of	 NGOs	 and	 local	authorities.	 More	 than	 half	 of	 my	 informants	 are	 what	 Michael	 Lipsky	 (1980)	famously	conceptualised	as	‘street-level	bureaucrats’:	Local	actors	who	implement	official	government	policy	through	their	own	interactions	and	everyday	relations	with	 the	 public,	 whereby	 they	 routinely	 exercise	 significant	 degrees	 of	 power,	autonomy	 and	 individual	 discretion.	 As	 doctors,	 teachers,	 social	 workers	 or	administrative	 personnel	 in	 local	 health	 centres,	 schools	 and	 social	 service	departments	 they	 are	 agents	 of	 the	 state	 and	 fulfil	 important	 control	 and	gatekeeping	functions.		People	 like	 them	 are	 also	 essential	 to	 the	 way	 Michel	 Foucault	 (2002a,	 p.337)	understood	power:	“If	we	speak	of	the	power	of	laws,	institutions,	and	ideologies,	if	we	speak	of	structures	or	mechanisms	of	power,	it	is	only	insofar	as	we	suppose	that	certain	 persons	 exercise	 power	 over	 others”.	 Since	 street-level	 bureaucrats	 are	given	significant	autonomy	in	exercising	their	power	over	potential	service	users,	their	actions	not	only	underpin	but	can	also	undermine	the	power	of	the	law.	For	Maurizio	Ambrosini	(2017)	they	therefore	constitute	one	of	various	categories	of	‘intermediary	 actors’	 whose	 involvement	 explains	why	 internalised	 immigration	control	often	remains	rather	ineffective.		Those	 street-level	 bureaucrats	 I	 personally	 spoke	 to	 did	 generally	 not	 see	themselves	 as	 particularly	 powerful,	 nor	 personally	 involved	 in	 immigration	control,	even	though	their	work	more	or	less	regularly	confronts	them	with	the	issue	of	irregular	migration	and	residence.	While	for	many	of	them	it	was	not	necessary	–	and	 would	 have	 been	 quite	 difficult	 –	 to	 systematically	 distinguish	 irregular	migrants	 from	other	 local	residents,	patients,	students	or	clients,	others	were	(or	felt	they	were)	obliged	to	take	immigration	status	into	account	when	establishing	a	potential	service	user’s	eligibility	or	providing	a	service.	Among	the	latter	were	also	some	who	not	only	(felt	they)	had	to	detect	migrant	irregularity,	but	also	inform	the	responsible	authority	in	case	they	did.		In	their	everyday	work	they	thus	experienced	different	variants	of	what	John	S.	W.	Park	 (2013)	 called	 the	 ‘Huckleberry	 Finn	 Problem’.	 He	 thereby	 referred	 to	 the	ambivalent	 situation	 that	 ‘Huck’	 Finn	 –	 the	 young	 protagonist	 of	 Mark	 Twain’s	famous	novel	The	Adventures	of	Huckleberry	Finn	–	is	facing	when	he	meets	Jim,	the	
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runaway	 slave.	 Huck	 immediately	 knows	 that	 he	 should	 return	 the	 slave	 to	 his	rightful	master	(who	he	personally	knows)	or	at	least	report	him	to	the	men	he	also	knows	are	looking	for	the	fugitive.	For	various	reasons,	however,	he	decides	not	to	do	so.	Instead	he	makes	Jim	his	trusted	companion	on	his	adventurous	voyage	on	a	raft	down	the	Mississippi	river,	thereby	ultimately	helping	him	to	escape	the	force	of	 the	 law.	The	 central	 idea	 that	Park’s	 (2013,	p.12)	 reading	of	Huckleberry	 Finn	transfers	 from	pre-Civil	War	 Illinois,	where	Twain’s	 story	 begins,	 to	our	 current	times,	is	that	of	a	law	that	creates		categories	of	people	with	disparate	rights	and	opportunities,	structuring	not	just	disabilities	for	the	people	who	suffer	the	law’s	force,	but	also	dilemmas	for	people	who	are	often	placed	 in	the	awkward	position	of	 triggering	the	law’s	force	when	they	come	face	to	face	with	an	‘unlawful’	person.	The	 question	 that	 Park	 (2013,	 p.12)	 poses	 to	 his	 readers	 seems	 particularly	pertinent	 for	many	 street-level	 bureaucrats:	 “What	 should	we	 do	now	 when	we	encounter	an	‘unlawful’	person?”,	whereby	he	refers	to	potential	encounters	with	irregular	migrants.		Departing	from	this	question	I	developed	a	simple	analytical	framework	for	a	close	comparative	analysis	of	how	the	people	directly	involved	in	the	public	provision	of	healthcare,	 education	 and	 social	 assistance	 deal	 with	 these	 encounters.	 This	framework	 is	 structured	 along	 two	 dimensions:	 (i)	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 are	supposed	to	(or	feel	they	should)	know	the	immigration	status	of	the	person	in	front	of	them,	and	(ii)	whether	or	not	they	are	supposed	to	(or	feel	they	should)	tell	the	relevant	state	authority	in	case	they	find	out	(or	suspect)	that	the	person	they	are	dealing	with	is	an	irregular	migrant.	Answering	these	questions	sheds	light	on	the	complex	 interplay	 between	 formal	 law	 and	 policy,	 the	 internal	 rules	 and	 logics	operating	within	 certain	 institutions,	 and	 the	ethical	 or	 practical	obligations	 and	constraints	attached	 to	particular	 roles	or	professions	 like	 that	of	 a	doctor,	head	teacher,	or	receptionist.		The	aim	of	employing	this	framework	is	three-fold:	firstly,	it	helps	to	situate	these	social	and	institutional	roles	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity	as	well	as	its	control.	Secondly,	it	allows	to	identify	instances	where,	and	the	mechanisms	through	which,	their	holders	are	encouraged	or	obliged	to	either	know	or	tell.	Thirdly,	it	provides	a	useful	perspective	to	look	for	pockets	of	resistance	against	having	to	either	know	or	
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tell	(or	both),	and	to	find	out	what	exactly	triggers	this	resistance.		The	micro-processes	 I	 analyse	 not	 only	 reflect	 the	 distinctive	ways	 in	which	 the	British	 and	 Spanish	 states	 officially	 frame	 and	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 irregular	migration,	but	also	play	out	differently	depending	on	where	they	occur	and	whom	they	 involve.	 In	each	case,	 the	 responsible	agents	of	 the	 respective	 state	have	 to	consolidate	a	distinct	logic	of	exclusion	towards	irregular	migrants	with	the	highly	context-dependent	 logics	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 that	 normally	 underpin	 the	entitlement	and	access	of	local	residents,	patients,	students	or	welfare	recipients.	This	is	the	micro-management	of	migrant	irregularity,	which	often	limits	but	can	also	increase	the	effectiveness	of	internal	border	control.		In	chapter	2	I	develop	the	theoretical	and	conceptual	framework	of	my	study,	which	combines	a	critical	understanding	of	internal	bordering	processes	with	Foucauldian	conceptualisations	of	power	and	governmentality	as	well	as	crucial	insights	 from	organisation	studies.	On	that	basis,	I	will	explain	my	analytical	framework	in	more	detail.	Chapter	3	describes	my	research	design	and	methodological	approach	and	
chapter	4	provides	the	necessary	context	for	my	analysis.	In	the	subsequent	three	chapters	 I	 systematically	 apply	my	 conceptual	 and	 analytical	 frameworks	 to	 the	institutional	spheres	of	healthcare	(chapter	5),	education	(chapter	6)	and	social	assistance	 (chapter	 7).	 Each	 of	 these	 empirical	 chapters	 closely	 examines	 the	relevant	laws	and	policies	enacted	at	various	administrative	levels,	as	well	as	their	local	implementation.	Through	the	invaluable	accounts	of	my	respondents	I	map	the	various	 ethical	 concerns,	 practical	 difficulties	 and	 organisational	 conflicts	 that	either	migrant	 irregularity	 itself,	 or	 the	 internalisation	 of	 its	 control,	 creates	 for	individual	welfare	workers	 and	 the	 institutions	 they	work	 for.	 In	 the	 concluding	
chapter	8	I	summarise	my	findings	and	draw	systematic	comparisons	across	the	three	sectors	and	between	the	two	field	sites.		The	results	of	my	study	help	to	explain	why	irregular	migrants’	claims	and	eligibility	for	 public	 services	 sometimes	 become	 highly	 contested	 and	 politicised,	 while	 in	other	cases	they	are	more	or	less	explicitly	accepted.	Overall,	my	study	contributes	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	concrete	mechanisms	that	either	help	or	hinder	the	internalisation	 of	 immigration	 control	 within	 specific	 institutional	 settings.	 It	thereby	not	only	highlights	the	intrinsic	limits	of	such	control,	but	also	shows	that	
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rather	 than	a	 solution,	 internal	 control	 is	often	part	of	 the	problem	 that	migrant	irregularity	poses	for	society.	The	so-called	‘management’	of	migration	is	therefore	always	also	a	management	of	migration	control.			 	
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2. The	‘management’	of	migration	–	and	of	the	resulting	
irregularities	In	a	press	release	outlining	its	“vision	for	the	area	of	freedom,	security	and	justice”	the	European	Commission	(2009b)	proposed	that	Member	States	should	“[e]nsure	a	flexible	immigration	policy	that	is	in	line	with	the	needs	of	the	job	market	whilst	at	 the	 same	 time	 support	 the	 integration	 of	 immigrants	 and	 tackle	 illegal	immigration.”	Two	related	assumptions	underlie	this	vision:	that	there	exists	a	neat	distinction	between	those	individuals	whose	integration	should	be	supported	and	those	whose	immigration	and	residence	must	be	‘tackled’;	and	that	both	goals	can	be	achieved	without	 interfering	with	each	other	nor	the	demands	of	 increasingly	transnational	labour	markets.		What	 it	 conceals	 are	 the	 potential	 conflicts	 and	 contradictions	 between	 the	 very	different	interests,	norms	and	logics	that	underlie	these	as	well	as	other	important	functions	of	the	state,	including	the	provision	of	welfare	services	to	the	population.	In	 spite	 (or	 precisely	 because)	 of	 these	 irrefutable	 contradictions,	 the	 various	policies	 related	 to	 the	 movement	 of	 people	 across	 national	 borders	 are	 often	subsumed	 under	 the	 term	 ‘migration	 management’ 4 ,	 which	 the	 International	
Organisation	for	Migration	(IOM,	2011)	defines	as	encompassing		numerous	governmental	functions	within	a	national	system	for	the	orderly	and	humane	management	of	cross-border	migration,	particularly	managing	the	entry	and	presence	of	foreigners	within	the	borders	of	the	state	and	the	protection	of	refugees	and	others	in	need	of	protection.	It	refers	to	a	planned	approach	 to	 the	 development	 of	 policy,	 legislative	 and	 administrative	responses	to	key	migration	issues.		The	formal	responsibility	for	the	management	of	migration	has	traditionally	been	attributed	almost	exclusively	 to	(migrant	receiving)	nation-states,	which	 in	order	for	migration	to	occur,	“must	be	willing	to	accept	immigration	and	to	grant	rights	to	outsiders”	 (Hollifield,	 2004,	 p.885).	 This	 also	means,	 however,	 that	 the	 entry	 or	residence	 of	 any	 ‘outsider’	who	 has	 not	 been	 formally	 accepted	 is	 automatically	rendered	 ‘irregular’	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 that	 state.	 If	 it	 still	 occurs,	 then	somehow	outside	of	the	rules.																																																										4	The	term	itself	was	coined	in	1993	by	Bimal	Ghosh,	upon	requests	from	the	UN	Commission	on	Global	Governance	and	the	Swedish	government	(Mezzadra	&	Neilson,	2013)	
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The	making	of	the	underlying	distinction	between	insiders	and	outsiders	as	well	as	regular	and	irregular	migrants	thereby	embodies	the	sovereign	power	of	the	state	over	a	 certain	 and	bounded	 territory	and	population.	The	 same	sovereignty	also	legitimises	the	closure	or	control	of	national	borders	as	well	as	the	deportation	of	unwanted	‘aliens’	from	within	the	territory;	but	also	the	granting	of	certain	rights	and	even	membership	to	outsiders,	whereby	the	same	distinction	can	effectively	be	unmade.	In	spite	of	their	sovereignty,	however,	states	have	never	been	able	(or	even	willing)	to	prevent	all	irregular	migrants	from	entering	their	territory,	nor	to	either	deport	or	regularise	all	those	already	present	at	any	particular	time.		Also	the	EU’s	official	policy	framework	for	managing	irregular	migration	strongly	focuses	 on	 the	 effective	 control	 of	 external	 borders	 and	 the	 encouragement	 of	unauthorised	 residents	 to	 leave	 ‘voluntarily’.	 What	 it	 does	 not	 contemplate,	however,	is	what	I	call	the	micro-management	of	migrant	irregularity.	That	is,	the	formal	and	informal	consolidation	of	a	governmental	logic	that	officially	demands	the	 exclusion	 of	 a	 person	 from	 the	 national	 territory	where	 s/he	 is	 an	 irregular	immigrant,	with	the	various	subjacent	pressures	for	the	same	person’s	inclusion	as	a	local	resident,	worker,	patient,	student,	and	so	on.	Much	of	this	management	takes	place	within	the	institutions	of	the	welfare	state.	These	often	struggle	to	meet	(or	otherwise	deal	with)	 the	 fundamental	needs	and	most	 legitimate	 claims	of	 those	irregular	migrants	who	have	 not	 yet	 been	 deported,	 regularised	 or	 convinced	 to	leave	 ‘voluntarily’.	 It	 is	 this	 rather	 indirect	 and	 obscure	 aspect	 of	 migration	management	that	I	am	most	concerned	with	throughout	this	thesis.		It	is	important	to	note	that	the	original	meaning	of	the	verb	‘to	manage’	was	not	to	be	 fully	 ‘in	 control’	 or	 ‘in	 charge’	of	 something	or	 someone	–	a	notion	 that	often	underpins	governments’	 efforts	or	 claims	 to	 ‘effectively	manage	migration’	 –	but	instead	‘to	handle	or	train	a	horse’5;	and	that	precisely	because	the	untrained	horse	cannot	(yet)	be	fully	controlled,	its	handling	used	to	take	place	in	the	manège	–	the	etymological	 precursor	 of	 the	 term.	 As	 a	 place	 initially	 created	 to	maximise	 the	safety	 of	 both	 the	 horse	 and	 its	 trainer,	 the	manège	 later	 also	 became	 a	 site	 of	spectacle	where	riders	display	their	horsemanship	as	well	as	the	discipline	of	their	horses	and	where	circuses	exhibit	their	spectacular	or	exotic	performances	for	the																																																									5	See:	https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/manage	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).	
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entertainment	 of	 their	 audiences.	 This	 can	 be	 related	 to	 certain	 practices	 of	migration	 management	 in	 that	 they	 too	 –	 even	 if	 not	 always	 made	 explicit	 or	presented	in	public	–	involve	the	handling	and	sanctioning	of	certain	irregularities	and	(miss-)behaviours.	The	more	or	less	visible	display	of	physical	violence	thereby	serves	as	evidence	of	the	government’s	‘being	in	control’.	De	Genova	(2013)	referred	to	 this	 aspect	 of	 immigration	 control	 as	 the	 ‘spectacles	 of	 migrant	 ‘illegality’’,	comprising	not	only	the	 ‘scene	of	exclusion’	but	also	 ‘the	obscene	of	 inclusion’	of	irregular	migrants	within	the	legal,	social	and	economic	structures	of	the	societies	in	which	they	live.		At	the	same	time,	the	very	terminology	also	invites	consideration	of	the	theoretical	and	empirical	parallels	between	the	management	of	migration	and	that	of	private	companies	 as	 well	 as	 public	 services.	 Both	 have	 experienced	 a	 ‘managerial	revolution’	of	their	own,	which	in	the	case	of	the	former	has	been	described	as	the	replacement	 of	 the	 ‘invisible	 hand’	 of	 market	 forces	 by	 the	 ‘visible	 hand	 of	management’	 (Chandler,	 1977).	 More	 recently,	 also	 the	 public	 service	 sector	 in	many	 Western	 European	 countries	 has	 seen	 the	 establishment	 of	 various	administrative	management	positions	interposing	direct	government	oversight	and	control	within	 bureaucratic	 structures,	 and	 thus	 reflecting	 an	 increasing	market	orientation	and	vision	of	the	citizen	as	a	consumer	of	public	services	(Walsh,	1994;	Webb,	 2006).	 In	 both	 cases,	 the	 managers	 –	 as	 the	 persons	 responsible	 for	controlling	or	administering	a	particular	set	of	resources,	processes	or	practices	–	assume	an	intermediary	role	within	a	certain	relationship	of	power:	they	manage	and	are	themselves	managed	at	the	same	time.		Scholars	critically	engaged	with	managerial	practices	within	businesses	and	other	organisations	(see	McKinlay	&	Starkey,	1998),	various	fields	of	social	policy	(McKee,	2009)	or	contemporary	immigration	regimes	(Walters,	2015)	have	therefore	often	drawn	on	the	ideas	and	concepts	of	Michel	Foucault.	What	makes	his	work	so	useful	as	the	basis	for	such	analyses	is	his	refined	understanding	of	the	exercise	of	power	not	as	absolute	domination	but	in	the	form	of	‘governmentality’,	by	which	he	means	“a	conduct	of	conducts”	as	well	as	“a	management	of	possibilities”	and	thus	a	way	“to	structure	the	possible	field	of	action	of	others”	(Foucault,	2002a,	p.341).	Such	power	relations	are	thus	characterised	by	significant	degrees	of	“informed	consent,	
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autonomy,	 voluntary	 action,	 choice,	 and	 nondirectiveness”,	 rather	 than	 complete	and	unidirectional	rule	and	authority	(Mezzadra	&	Neilson,	2013,	p.174).		Public	service	provision	is	one	of	many	spheres	where	the	state’s	sovereign	power	to	neatly	define,	control,	punish	and	exclude	irregularities	loses	at	least	some	of	its	grip,	and	the	‘governmental’	nature	of	internalised	immigration	control	comes	to	the	fore.	 Since	 rigorous	exclusion	 tends	 to	 create	 significant	 costs	 for	society	and/or	contradictions	within	the	implementing	institution,	migrant	and	other	irregularities	must	 instead,	 at	 least	 to	 some	 degree,	 be	 accommodated	 within	 existing	organisational	 structures	 and	 institutional	 logics.	 This	 chapter	 presents	 the	theoretical	 framework	 for	my	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	micro-management	 of	
migrant	irregularity	through	the	administration	and	provision	of	public	services	to	local	populations	that	include	irregular	migrants.		On	one	hand,	I	thereby	draw	on	the	longstanding	body	of	literature	concerned	with	conceptualising	the	role	of	‘the	state’	in	migration	policies	and	policymaking,	as	well	as	 more	 recent	 academic	 work	 on	 migrant	 irregularity	 as	 the	 product	 but	 also	mirror	of	these	policy	regimes.	On	the	other	hand,	I	look	at	some	of	the	theoretical	and	empirical	work	done	in	the	field	of	organisation	studies,	which	helps	to	explain	how	organisations	 themselves	 deal	with	multiple	 and	 often	 contradictory	 norms	and	 institutionalised	 logics	 originating	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 a	 particular	organisational	or	professional	 field.	The	two	strands	of	 literature	are	 linked	via	a	Foucauldian	 understanding	 of	 governmental	 power	 and	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	migrant	 irregularity	as	a	 ‘code’	 through	which	the	 logic	of	 immigration	control	is	inscribed	into	existing	power	relations	within	and	between	different	organisations.	This	theoretical	approach	helps	to	overcome	the	often	too	simplistic	understanding	of	‘the	state’	that	characterises	much	of	the	migration	studies	literature	(Gill,	2010);	to	 disaggregate	 the	 agency	 involved	 in	 the	 ‘management	 of	 migration’;	 and	 to	account	 for	 the	 multiple	 interests,	 rationales	 and	 constraints	 that	 underlie	 the	involvement	of	different	actors	at	various	administrative	levels.							
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2.1. The	state	as	the	‘manager’	of	migration?		“I	don’t	want	to	say	that	 the	sate	 isn’t	 important;	what	 I	want	to	say	 is	 that	
relations	 of	 power,	 and	 hence	 the	 analysis	 that	 must	 be	 made	 of	 them,	
necessarily	extend	beyond	the	 limits	of	 the	state	–	 in	 two	senses.	First	of	all,	
because	the	state,	for	all	the	omnipotence	of	its	apparatuses,	is	far	from	being	
able	to	occupy	the	whole	field	of	actual	power	relations;	and,	further,	because	
the	 state	 can	 only	 operate	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 other,	 already	 existing	 power	
relations”	(Foucault,	2002b,	p.122).	In	 principle,	 democratic	 governance	means	 that	 people’s	 ideas	 and	 opinions	 are	translated	into	formal	legal	frameworks	and	laws,	which	then	–	mediated	through	local	 implementation	 processes	 –	 determine	 actual	 policy	 outcomes	 (Deutsch,	1970).	In	this	way	the	rule	of	law	guides	the	actions	of	individuals	as	well	as	public	and	 private	 institutions.	 Particularly	with	 regard	 to	 policy-making	 in	 the	 field	 of	immigration,	 which	 has	 become	 a	 highly	 politicised	 and	much	 researched	 topic,	academic	 debate	 has	 long	 circled	 around	 the	 question	 of	 why	 these	 regulatory	processes	often	fail	to	achieve	the	desired	outcomes	or	declared	objectives	(Castles,	2004;	Joppke,	1998;	Soysal,	1994;	Lahav	&	Guiraudon,	2006;	Sassen,	1996;	Freeman,	1995;	 Sciortino,	 2000).	More	 specifically,	 scholars	 identified	 a	 ‘gap’	 between	 the	official	aims	of	 immigration	policies	–	which	 increasingly	reflect	 the	rising	public	pressure	to	restrict	 further	unwanted	 immigration	–	and	their	often	more	 liberal	outcome	regarding	not	only	the	admission	of	foreigners	to	the	country	but	also	their	access	to	various	social	and	economic	rights	(Hollifield,	1986;	Cornelius	et	al.,	1994).	Where	such	rights	are	extended	to	people	who	have	not	been	formally	admitted,	the	underlying	conflicts	are	particularly	pronounced.		While	 the	 claim	 that	 national	 governments	 are	 generally	 ‘losing	 control’	 over	unwanted	immigration	remains	contested	(cf.	Brubaker,	1994)	the	identified	‘gap’	has	been	related	to	a	wide	range	of	potential	causes	located	both	within	and	outside	the	 realm	of	 receiving	 states.	 One	 set	 of	 explanations	 points	 to	 the	 expansion	of	human	 rights	 and	 rights-based	 conceptions	 of	membership	 that	 increasingly	 cut	across	national	borders	and	citizenship,	and	thereby	contribute	to	an	alleged	decline	of	the	nation-state:	Soysal’s	(1994)	much-disputed	vision	of	a	post-national	model	of	citizenship	–	based	on	‘universal	personhood’	rather	than	national	belonging	–	derives	its	legitimacy	from	a	‘transnational	discourse	of	human	rights’	that	entails	certain	obligations	for	states	towards	not	only	their	own	nationals	but	also	aliens	
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who	 legally	 reside	within	 their	 borders,	 such	 as	 guest	workers	 or	 students.	 For	Jacobson	(1996,	p.2)	this	extension	of	‘rights	across	borders’	has	also	significantly	altered	the	legal	position	of	migrants	living	‘illegally’	within	the	borders	of	liberal	states,	 which	 increasingly	 have	 to	 accept	 and	 respond	 to	 at	 least	 some	 of	 their	claims.	While	human	rights	 themselves	“evolve	 from	the	nation-state”	(p.	3),	 it	 is	through	them,	he	argues,	 that	“[t]he	state	 is	becoming	 less	a	sovereign	agent	and	more	an	institutional	forum	of	a	larger	international	and	constitutional	order	based	on	human	rights”	(p.	2/3).		Others	 have	 related	 the	 state’s	 limited	 capacity	 to	 control	 immigration	 to	 the	complex	 and	 powerful	 macro-dynamics	 driving	 migration	 processes,	 including	transnational	networks	of	information,	people	and	communication,	and	the	highly	unequal	 distribution	 of	 wealth	 and	 opportunities	 (Castles,	 2004;	 Sassen,	 1996).	Looking	at	the	micro-level,	scholars	have	also	highlighted	migrants’	own	networks,	counterstrategies	 and	 agency	 in	more	 or	 less	effectively	 avoiding	 and	 contesting	state	 control	 (Broeders	&	Engbersen,	 2007;	 Vasta,	 2011),	 as	well	 as	 the	 various	formal	or	 informal	support	structures,	 including	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs)	and	advocacy	groups,	operating	within	and	across	countries	of	origin	and	destination	(Faist,	2014;	Ambrosini,	2017).		On	the	other	hand,	the	‘gap’	between	official	policy	goals	and	outcomes	has	also	been	related	 to	 domestic	 political	 forces	 in	 the	 form	 of	 either	 organised	 interests	(Freeman,	 1995),	 governments’	 own	 ‘hidden	 agendas’	 (Castles,	 2004),	 or	 ‘self-imposed’	constraints	enshrined	in	national	constitutions	(Joppke,	1998;	Guiraudon	&	Lahav,	2000).	Rather	than	the	international	human	rights	regime	imposing	limits	on	 the	 ability	 of	 states	 to	 reduce	 immigration,	 Joppke	 (1998)	 argues	 that	 liberal	states	 themselves	 ‘accept	 unwanted	 immigration’,	 and	 thus	 ‘self-limit’	 their	 own	sovereignty.	While	 his	 account	 specifically	 refers	 to	 legal	mechanisms	 for	 family	reunification	and	the	admission	of	refugees	–	both	of	which	are	unwanted	 in	the	sense	that	they	are	largely	not	‘in	line’	with	the	needs	of	national	labour	markets	–	Freeman	 (1995,	 2006)	 tried	 to	 explain	 the	 ‘expansionary	 bias’	 of	 policy	 regimes	governing	 the	 entry	 and	 stay	 of	 both	 regular	 and	 irregular	 migrant	 workers.	According	to	his	model	of	 ‘client	politics’,	 the	making	of	such	policies	 tends	to	be	driven	by	powerful	interest	groups	who	benefit	from	large-scale	immigration	(as	a	
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source	of	 cheap	 and	 flexible	 labour)	and	whose	 interests	prevail	over	 those	of	 a	more	restrictionist	but	poorly	organised	public	that	bears	its	rather	diffuse	costs	(in	the	 form	 of	 depressed	 wage	 levels	 and	 increased	 competition	 for	 jobs	 and	resources).		Importantly,	it	is	not	just	the	making	of	immigration	policy	that	is	underpinned	by	different	and	often	conflicting	interests	but	so	is	its	local-level	implementation.	The	latter	hinges	on	the	capacity	and	willingness	of	a	growing	number	and	variety	of	actors	to	enforce	exclusionary	practices	towards	certain	immigrants	(Jordan	et	al.,	2003;	Guiraudon	&	Lahav,	2000).	Based	on	a	detailed	mapping	of	the	various	‘actors	and	venues	in	immigration	control’,	Lahav	&	Guiraudon	(2006)	demonstrated	that	specific	constraints	operate	either	at	 the	 level	of	policy	 formation,	where	various	policy	‘inputs’	are	filtered	so	that	particular	policy	choices	(‘outputs’)	prevail,	or	the	implementation	 stage,	 where	 these	 ‘outputs’	 are	 translated	 into	 actual	 policy	‘outcomes’.	Joppke	(1998,	p.267)	suggested	a	similar	analytical	distinction	between	what	he	sees	as	“two	separate	aspects	of	sovereignty,	[namely]	formal	rule-making	authority	and	the	empirical	capacity	to	implement	rules”.	In	relation	to	the	latter,	he	notes	 that	 the	 capacity	 of	 states	 “to	 control	 immigration	 has	 not	diminished	 but	increased	–	as	every	person	landing	at	Schiphol	or	Sidney	airports	without	a	valid	entry	visa	would	painfully	notice”	 (p.	270).	This	seems	 to	suggest	 that	 states	are	more	constrained	in	establishing	the	rules	according	to	which	they	grant	entry	and	residence	titles	(as	in	the	case	of	family	migrants	or	recognised	refugees,	who	they	have	to	admit),	than	in	enforcing	those	rules	at	their	external	borders.		A	 second	 and	 cross-cutting	 distinction	 can	 be	 drawn	 between	 control	 policies	targeting	 those	 foreigners	 trying	 to	 enter	 and	 those	who	 already	 live	within	 the	country,	i.e.	between	constraints	to	external	versus	internal	immigration	control.	In	her	 case	 study	 of	 local	 immigration	 bureaucracy	 in	 Germany,	 Ellermann	 (2006)	shows	that	individual	enforcement	officers	often	face	significant	resistance	–	both	from	an	organised	public	and	elected	municipal	officials	–	against	the	deportation	of	local	residents.	Her	analysis	suggests	that	the	rationales	and	constraints	underlying	the	 making	 of	 these	 policies	 tend	 to	 be	 different	 from	 those	 shaping	 their	implementation:	Whereas	“at	the	legislative	stage,	demands	for	‘cracking	down’	on	immigrants	are	quickly	established,	policy	debates	are	 framed	 in	pro-regulatory,	
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rights-restricting	ways,	and	little	attention	is	paid	to	the	costs	of	regulation”,	these	costs	become	drastically	visible	to	the	public	and	can	easily	turn	into	an	obstacle	for	implementation	 where	 friends	 or	 neighbours	 face	 imminent	 deportation	(Ellermann,	2006,	p.296).	Put	in	De	Genova's	(2013)	terms,	resistance	arises	where	the	‘obscene	of	(everyday)	inclusion’	gives	way	to	the	‘scene	of	exclusion’,	and	where	migrant	‘illegality’	suddenly	becomes	a	human	face.		Another	 site	 that	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 for	 the	 constant	 (re-)negotiation	 of	(irregular)	migrants’	 inclusion	and	exclusion,	and	has	 thus	become	an	 important	venue	for	internalised	immigration	control,	is	the	liberal	welfare	state	(Bommes	&	Geddes,	2000).	As	“a	stratification	system	in	its	own	right”	(Esping-Andersen,	1990,	p.4)	it	not	only	addresses	problems	of	social	inequality	and	stratification,	but	also	(re-)produces	or	modifies	existing	social	inequalities.	While	its	protection	against	proclaimed	 ‘health	 tourists’	 and	 ‘benefit-scrounging	 foreigners’	 is	 a	 common	justification	 for	 restrictive	 and	 exclusionary	 policies	 towards	 actual	 or	 potential	newcomers,	the	welfare	state		has	 also	 been	 a	major	 factor	 driving	 the	 incorporation	of	 immigrants	 […]	because	 it	 follows	a	 logic	of	 inclusion:	 failure	 to	grant	 social	 rights	 to	any	group	of	residents	leads	to	social	divisions,	and	can	undermine	the	rights	of	the	majority	(Castles,	2004,	p.216).		All	 this	seems	to	suggest	 that	when	 it	comes	to	 internal	 immigration	control	and	enforcement,	 liberal	 states	are	more	 constrained	 in	 the	 implementation	than	 the	making	 of	 restrictive	 rules.	 Arguably,	 this	 has	 to	 do	with	 the	 type	 of	 actors	 and	venues	 involved	 in	 this	kind	of	 control,	 as	well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 those	who	are	 its	target	already	live	within,	and	thus	in	various	ways	form	part	of,	the	host	society.		Notably,	most	of	the	explanations	for	receiving	states’	failure	to	effectively	control	and	limit	unwanted	immigration	build	on	some	notion	of	inherent	contradiction	or	inconsistency,	 whether	 between	 competing	 (or	 simply	 different)	 normative	principles,	actors	and	their	interests,	or	institutional	logics.	According	to	Boswell's	(2007)	 influential	 conceptualisation	 of	 migration	 policy,	 states	 themselves	 are	constantly	 torn	 between	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 their	 various	 ‘functional	 imperatives’,	namely:	(i)	 to	promote	a	 just	distribution	of	resources	(‘fairness’),	 (ii)	 to	provide	‘security’	 for	 its	 subjects	 as	 well	 as	 (iii)	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 for	 the	‘accumulation’	 of	 wealth,	 and	 (iv)	 to	 respect	 the	 constitutional	 principles	 and	
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individual	 liberties	of	 those	affected	by	 its	 jurisdiction	(‘institutional	legitimacy’).	While	each	of	them	constitutes	an	essential	precondition	for	sustaining	the	state’s	“legitimacy	and	capacity	to	govern”	(p.	88),	they	tend	to	have	contradictory	policy	implications	 and	 are	 therefore	 difficult	 (or	 even	 impossible)	 to	 realise	simultaneously.	 In	her	view,	 the	best	 explanation	 for	 the	observed	 ‘gap’	between	(restrictionist)	policy	goals	and	(more	liberal)	outcomes	is	that	“a	state	unable	to	simultaneously	 meet	 all	 functional	 requirements	 may	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 the	persistence	of	contradictions	and	inefficiencies	in	policy”	(p.	93).	For	Jordan	and	his	colleagues	 (2003,	 p.211)	 it	 is	 precisely	 because	 legislation	 often	 reflects	 a	compromise	 between	 competing	 interests	 that	 “the	 dilemmas	 of	 policy-making	remain,	at	least	partly,	unresolved	and	are	transferred	to	the	implementation	stage”.	The	 last	 two	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 therefore	 focus	 on	 how	 public	organisations	and	the	 individuals	acting	within	them	deal	with	these	ambiguities	when	tasked	with	implementing	such	policies.		Another	theoretical	perspective	that	seems	helpful	for	the	study	of	how	immigration	policies	 work	 within	 society	 is	 offered	 by	 political	 sociology,	 as	 suggested	 by	Sciortino	 (2000).	 Instead	 of	 the	 state,	 he	 takes	 society	 itself	 as	 the	 basic	 unit	 of	analysis	and	understands	 it,	 following	Niklas	Luhmann	(1982b),	as	an	entity	 that	“has	no	head,	no	base	and	no	center,	but	is	articulated	in	a	plurality	of	specialized	subsystems	that	have	their	own	set	of	symbolic	codes,	leading	values,	operational	programs	 and	 regulative	 means”	 (Cvajner	 &	 Sciortino,	 2010b,	 p.392).	 Such	 a	perspective	 allows	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 different	 organisational	 cultures	 and	logics,	shared	norms,	professional	identities,	values	and	codes	of	conduct	that	guide	the	 actions	 and	 shape	 the	 interests	 of	 professionals	 working	 in	 those	 societal	subsystems	that	only	recently	are	becoming	part	of	the	immigration	regime	(Jordan	et	al.,	2003).	It	is	thereby	well	suited	to	identify	the	various	contradictions	that	arise	where	 the	 particular	 logic	 of	 immigration	 control	 –	 based	 on	 the	 fundamental	distinction	between	regular	and	irregular	status	–	intersects	with,	for	example,	the	imperatives	of	local	governments	to	manage	housing	and	administer	mainstream	services	to	local	residents,	or	that	of	a	doctor	to	treat	a	patient,	or	a	social	worker	to	meet	the	needs	of	a	homeless	person.		Sciortino	(2000,	p.220)	asked	a	significant	question	about	the	role	and	motivation	
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of	individual	actors:	“Has	the	person	who	hires	an	undocumented	immigrant	really	also	lobbied	in	favour	of	a	weak	enforcement	of	border	controls?”	Since	the	answer	will	often	be	‘no’,	it	very	well	illustrates	the	need	to	shift	the	focus	of	analysis	away	from	the	often	simplistic	and	rather	abstract	idea	of	competing	‘powerful	interests’	that	make	these	policies,	 to	 the	subsequent	and	much	more	subtle	re-negotiation	and	bending	of	 the	resulting	rules	and	regulations,	which	may	even	 involve	their	partial	or	selective	transgression	by	individual	actors.		Another	question	could	then	be:	‘What	risk	does	the	person	who	hires	(or	provides	a	service	to)	an	undocumented	immigrant	assume	in	doing	so;	and	where	does	this	risk	 come	 from?’	 I	 thereby	 want	 to	 point	 at	 a	 potential	 shortcoming	 of	conceptualising	migration	policy	based	on	Luhmann’s	“fully	horizontal	perspective,	where	each	differentiated	functional	context	sees	‘the	world’	according	to	its	own	code	and	treats	all	the	other	contexts	as	its	external	environments”	(Sciortino,	2000,	p.221).	The	danger	here	 is	 to	automatically	assume	that	external	 influences	have	little	or	no	meaning	and	thus	authority	within	a	particular	subsystem,	and	hence	to	lose	sight	of	the	actual	power	relations	that	link	the	various	subsystems	and	thereby	define	how	(and	which)	meanings	and	logics	are	transferred	from	one	to	another.		What	is	required,	therefore,	is	a	theoretical	approach	that	recognises	the	functional	differentiation	of	society	without	reducing	the	role	of	the	state	to	that	of	a	passive	and	neutral	‘broker’	between	competing	societal	interests	(Boswell,	2007).	First	of	all,	such	approach	must	understand	‘the	state’	itself	not	as	a	unified	and	monolithic	entity	but	a	fragmented	aggregation	of	various	administrative	bodies	that	are	partly	driven	 by	 their	 own	 interests	 and	 functional	 imperatives	 (Gill,	 2010).	 Such	 an	understanding	is	reflected	in	the	notion	of	an	‘assemblage’	of	governance	(Walters,	2015)	 or	 state	 power	 (Allen	 &	 Cochrane,	 2010),	 but	 also	 in	 post-Foucauldian	scholarship	that	understands	‘the	state’	not	as	an	absolute	concentration	of	power,	but	rather	a	“site	at	which	power	condenses”	(Cowan	&	McDermont,	2006,	p.	182,	cit.	in	Mckee,	2009,	p.	476).	Also	Foucault’s	own	interpretation	of	power	in	terms	of	‘governmentality’,	as	Fassin	(2011,	p.217)	has	noted,		does	not	so	much	focus	on	the	power	of	the	nation-state	as	on	the	limits	of	its	ideal-typical	 representation	 as	 coherent,	 impartial,	 and	 effective.	 On	 the	contrary,	it	shows	its	illegality	and	illegibility,	demonstrates	its	partiality	and	ineffectiveness,	 but	 also	 establishes	 the	 functionality	 of	 these	 apparent	
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dysfunctions.		Secondly,	 then,	more	 attention	 needs	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 power	 relations	 at	work	between	 (and	 within)	 the	 various	 interests	 of	 central	 and	 lower	 levels	 of	government	as	well	as	different	state	and	non-state	agencies;	and	to	understand,	like	Boswell	(2007),	the	influence	of	liberal	institutions	not	only	as	a	function	of	their	relative	autonomy,	but	also	the	 ‘resonance’	of	 their	own	interests	with	(some	of)	those	of	‘the	state’.	What	emerges	are	various	‘assemblages	of	power’,	within	which	–	as	Mezzadra	&	Neilson	(2013)	show	–	both	‘governmental’	and	‘sovereign’	forms	of	power	overlap	and	interact	with	each	other,	rather	than	the	former	having	largely	replaced	the	latter,	as	Foucault	suggested.		Thirdly,	it	also	requires	a	more	dynamic	and	nuanced	understanding	of	the	varying	degrees	of	autonomy	and	margins	of	discretion	given	to	those	individual	actors	who	ultimately	 implement	 policy	 within	 such	 ‘assemblages	 of	 power’.	 Both	 are	determined	not	only	internally	–	by	the	professional	identity	and	institutional	logic	dominating	a	particular	field	of	work	(such	as	healthcare),	but	also	externally	–	via	binding	regulations	through	which	the	government	tries	to	ensure	a	more	effective	implementation	of	its	rule	regarding	other	policy	areas	(such	as	immigration).		Accordingly,	 my	 study	 focuses	 on	 the	 intersection	 of	 not	 only	 sovereign	 and	governmental	forms	of	state	power	but	also	the	internal	and	external	imperatives	that	 trigger	 individual	 and	organisational	 action	on	 the	ground.	The	even	partial	convergence	 of	 internal	 and	 external	 logics	 can	 thereby	 be	 expected	 to	 enhance	compliance	with	a	particular	set	of	rules,	while	contradictions	between	the	two	are	likely	 to	 trigger	 resistance	 against	 their	 implementation.	 By	 highlighting	 these	processes	of	 re-negotiation	and	contestation,	my	approach	helps	 to	explain	 local	policy	outcomes	without	framing	them	in	terms	of	either	‘success’	or	‘failure’.	From	this	 perspective,	 receiving	 states	 appear	 less	 as	 the	 ‘managers’	 of	 migratory	processes	as	such,	 than	of	 the	challenges	that	migration	–	but	also	the	control	of	migration	–	poses	to	their	own	functioning,	legitimacy	and	sovereignty.		One	increasingly	important	way	for	the	state	to	manage	the	contradictory	interests	and	imperatives	triggered	by	immigration	is	what	Morris	(2002,	p.19)	called	‘civic	stratification’,	whereby	“the	rights	and	protections	afforded	by	the	state	to	different	‘entry’	 categories	 constitute	 a	 system	 of	 stratified	 rights	 closely	 associated	with	
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monitoring	and	control”.	This	system	–	which	places	irregular	migrants	at	the	very	bottom	of	the	hierarchy	–	thereby	relies	on	various	‘dividing	practices’,	similar	to	those	described	by	Foucault	(2002a,	p.326)	as	the	‘objectivizing	of	the	subject’:	“The	subject	 is	 either	 divided	 inside	 himself	 or	 divided	 from	 others.	 This	 process	objectivizes	him.	Examples	are	the	mad	and	the	sane,	the	sick	and	the	healthy,	the	criminals	and	the	“good	boys”.”	As	I	will	discuss	in	the	following,	also	the	control	of	migrant	 irregularity	 first	of	 all	 requires	 the	 separation	 of	 the	 irregular	 from	 the	regular	migrant.			
2.2. The	‘unmanaged’:	Irregular	migrants	as	the	exception	to	the	rule		Preventing	illegal	entry	and	residence	is	one	of	the	key	issues	addressed	within	the	migration	 management	 discourse,	 which	 thereby	 tends	 to	 suggest	 that	 within	 a	perfectly	 managed	 migration	 system	 irregularity	 would	 simply	 cease	 to	 exist.	Historically,	 however,	 migrant	 irregularity	 has	 always	 been	 directly	 linked	 to	national	 frameworks	 of	 immigration	 regulation	 and	 restriction,	 and	 thus	 only	became	a	major	policy	issue	in	the	aftermath	of	World	War	I,	when	the	consolidation	of	 these	 regimes	gave	 rise	 to	 the	 emergence	of	what	Hollifield	 (2004)	 called	 the	‘migration	state’.	Early	examples	of	systematic	immigration	restrictions	imposed	by	modern	nation-states	were	usually	directed	against	particular	groups	of	foreigners,	whose	 entry	 and	 presence	 were	 deemed	 undesirable	 based	 on	 rather	 specific	characteristics	(Düvell,	2006).	Today,	in	contrast,	immigration	restrictions	target	all	those	who	do	not	fulfil	the	ever	more	complex	and	selective	requirements	for	legal	entry,	 stay	 and	 employment	 in	 a	 particular	 country.	 In	 most	 cases,	 those	 to	 be	excluded	are	thus	negatively	defined,	so	that	“the	contours	of	illegality	mirror	those	of	 legality,	 [and]	 the	 meaning	 of	 illegality	 depends	 on	 that	 of	 [other]	 migrants’	legality”	(Garcés-Mascareñas,	2010,	p.80).		Hence,	 in	 their	endeavour	to	effectively	manage	migration,	liberal	states	not	only	create	 specific	 patterns	 of	 ‘legal’	 immigration	 according	 to	 their	 economic	 and	political	needs,	but	they	also,	though	less	explicitly,	produce	‘illegal’	immigration	(De	Genova,	2002;	Samers,	2004;	Goldring	et	al.,	2009).	On	one	hand,	this	perspective	relates	the	empirical	increase	of	irregular	migration	to	the	growing	restrictiveness	
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of	migrant	receiving	states’	policies	on	immigration.	In	Europe	this	has	been	the	case	since	 the	 1970s,	 when	 the	 active	 recruitment	 of	 foreign	 workers	 was	 suddenly	stopped	and	gradually	replaced	by	a	stricter	policing	and	externalisation	of	borders,	ever	more	restricted	access	to	asylum	as	well	as	family-related	migration,	and	highly	selective	policies	on	(mostly	temporary)	labour	migration.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 ever-increasing	 complexity	 and	 diversification	 of	 these	various	 policy	 regimes	 also	 explains	 some	 of	 the	 conceptual	 and	 terminological	difficulties	surrounding	contemporary	migrant	irregularity.	For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	 irregular	 migrants	 are	 defined	 as	 non-EU	 citizens	 who	 according	 to	 the	immigration	law	of	the	country	in	which	they	reside	lack	the	formal	permission	to	do	 so.	 Their	 condition	 vis-à-vis	 the	 host	 state	 and	 its	 (local)	 institutions	 is	 thus	characterised,	on	one	hand,	by	their	irregular	immigration	status	and,	on	the	other,	by	 being	 local	 residents.	 I	 therefore	 also	 refer	 to	 them	 as	 irregular	 residents	 and	specifically	speak	of	migrant	irregularity	where	I	want	to	remind	the	reader	that	the	problems	I	describe	are	not	caused	by	(the	actions	of)	particular	human	beings	but	follow	from	their	administrative	situation6.	Critical	migration	and	border	scholars	have	 intensely	debated	the	terminology	to	best	 be	 used	 when	 describing	 and	 analysing	 the	 meaning	 of	 irregularity	 (or	‘illegality’)	as	well	as	the	processes	through	which	it	is	produced	and	imposed	on	individuals	 (Bauder,	 2014).	 Unlike	 others,	 I	 prefer	 the	 term	 ‘irregular’	 over	‘undocumented’	 or	 ‘illegalised	 (im)migrants’:	 Over	 the	 former	 because	‘undocumented’	literally	suggests	a	lack	of	any	documentation	that	could	certify	the	person’s	identity.	Almost	all	of	the	irregular	migrants	I	met,	however,	did	possess	a	passport	or	other	ID,	although	many	of	them	were	reluctant	to	use	it	for	any	or	at	least	 any	 official	 purpose.	 As	 I	 will	 show,	 the	 difficulty	 for	 local	 authorities	 and	welfare	 institutions	 is	 often	 precisely	 the	 lack	 of	 documentary	 evidence	 –	 of	 a	person’s	identity,	age,	income,	family	relationship,	or	address	–	but	not	necessarily	their	 irregular	 immigration	status	as	such.	 It	 therefor	makes	sense	to	analytically	differentiate	between	genuinely	‘undocumented’	and	‘irregular’	migrants	in	general.			That	said,	there	are	also	very	good	reasons	for	academics	to	speak	of	migrants	as																																																									6	Arguably,	the	factually	correct	(though	rather	bulky)	terminology	–	which	is	often	used	in	the	Catalan	context	–	would	be	‘migrants	in	administratively	irregular	situations’.		
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being	‘illegalised’	instead	of	 ‘irregular’.	For	example,	Bauder	(2014,	p.229)	argues	that	 “’irregular’	 still	 implies	 that	migrants	somehow	are	not	 ‘regular’”	 and	 that	 it	describes	“the	outcome	of	the	process	of	illegalization	and	thereby	conceal[s]	the	process	itself”	(see	also	Squire,	2011b).	My	study,	however,	focuses	on	the	effects	of	irregularity	(not	the	process	of	its	production)	and,	more	specifically,	the	different	ways	 in	which	 it	 functions	and	 is	 thereby	re-negotiated	within	various	social	and	institutional	 settings.	 What	 interests	 me	 is	 the	 precise	 sense	 in	 which	 a	 lack	 of	immigration	 status	 renders	 someone	 ‘not	 regular’	 from	 the	 perspective	 of,	 for	example,	the	healthcare	system;	and	thus,	what	exactly	distinguishes	the	person	that	has	been	assigned	this	status	from	a	‘regular’	patient	(or	resident,	student,	welfare	recipient,	etc.).		The	 remainder	 of	 this	 section	 looks	 at	 migrant	 irregularity	 from	 various	perspectives:	 first	 as	 a	 theoretical	 concept	 and	 device	 of	 both	 sovereign	 and	governmental	power	 (2.2.1),	 then	as	a	 condition	 that	 states	 try	 to	 ‘manage’	both	directly	 –	 through	 measures	 of	 deportation	 and	 regularisation	 (2.2.2)	 –	 and	indirectly	–	by	compelling	various	actors	and	 institutions	to	 identify	and	exclude	irregular	migrants	from	services	they	provide	to	other	local	residents	(2.2.3).			
2.2.1. Migrant	irregularity	as	a	theoretical	concept,	a	gesture	of	state	
sovereignty	and	a	device	of	governmentality	Scholars	working	in	the	fields	of	migration	and	critical	border	studies	have	always	questioned	the	strict	dichotomy	between	‘legal’	and	‘illegal’	migratory	status.	Often,	this	was	done	with	the	help	of	alternative	concepts	capable	of	describing	a	certain	continuum	of	 in-between	 statuses	 (Kubal,	 2013;	 Ruhs	&	Anderson,	 2010),	 or	 by	emphasising	the	increasing	diversity	of	potential	paths	into	and	out	of	irregularity	(Cvajner	&	Sciortino,	2010a;	Düvell,	2011;	Black	et	al.,	2006).	A	closer	look	at	this	growing	body	of	literature	allows	distinguishing	further	dimensions	of	complexity	that	 go	 well	 beyond	 the	 notion	 of	 mere	 diversity.	 Some	 scholars	 emphasise	 the	
fluidity	of	migrant	status:	not	only	do	individuals	repeatedly	move	between	‘legality’	and	 ‘illegality’	 (Calavita,	 2003),	 but	 also	 the	 underlying	 legal	 categories	 tend	 to	change	over	time	(Düvell,	2006;	Couper	&	Santamaria,	1984).	Others	highlighted	a	certain	 stratification	 or	hierarchy	 that	 exists	 even	within	 irregularity	 (Chauvin	&	
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Garcés-Mascareñas,	2012;	Morris,	2003;	Cvajner	&	Sciortino,	2010a),	as	well	as	the	chance	of	migrants	becoming	more	or	less	‘illegal’	through	incorporation	(Chauvin	&	Garcés-Mascareñas,	2014).		A	third	set	of	conceptualisations	suggest	a	degree	of	simultaneity	of	regularity	and	irregularity,	and	thus	the	possibility	of	irregular	migrants	being	incorporated	into	some	areas	of	 society	but	at	 the	 same	 time	excluded	 from	others	 (Castles,	1995;	Mezzadra,	 2011;	 Ruhs	 &	 Anderson,	 2010;	 McNevin,	 2006).	 This	 is	 possible,	 as	Cvajner	&	 Sciortino	 (2010b)	 suggest,	 because	 immigration	 status	 is	 immediately	relevant	only	in	some	social	and	institutional	contexts	or	spheres	of	everyday	life,	while	being	rather	irrelevant	in	others.	From	a	more	critical	perspective,	De	Genova	(2013)	 speaks	of	 ‘inclusion	 through	exclusion’,	while	Mezzadra	&	Neilson	 (2013,	p.159)	employ	the	notion	of	‘differential	inclusion’	to	describe	how	some	migrants’	inclusion	“can	be	subject	to	varying	degrees	of	subordination,	rule,	discrimination,	and	 segmentation”.	 They	 thus	 attribute	 a	 certain	 function	 and	 intentionality	 to	migrants’	ascribed	irregularity,	which	thereby	appears	as	a	tool	to	perpetuate	and	codify	their	subordinate	position	within	local	and	global	labour	markets.		Through	 these	 various	 and	 crosscutting	 processes	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion,	irregular	 residents	 become	 enmeshed	 in	 a	 range	 of	 social	 and	 power	 relations,	which	 can	 trigger	 formal	 or	 informal	 bordering	 practices	 as	 well	 as	 their	contestation.	 Their	 being	 part	 of	 a	 local	 community,	 sports	 club	 or	 parents’	association,	 for	example,	 can	be	a	 source	of	 empowerment,	while	working	 in	 the	informal	economy	or	even	the	use	of	public	transport	might	increase	their	risk	of	detection	and	deportation.	Given	this	complexity,	Mezzadra	&	Neilson	(2013,	p.168)	argue	that	“neither	sovereign	nor	governmental	conceptions	of	power	are	adequate	to	account	for	current	border	politics	and	struggles”.	In	their	book	Border	as	Method,	they	show	that		[b]orders	 are	 becoming	 increasingly	 governmentalized	 or	 entangled	with	governmental	 practices	 that	 are	 bound	 to	 the	 sovereign	 power	 of	 nation-states	and	also	flexibly	linked	to	market	technologies	and	other	systems	of	measurement	and	control	(2013,	p.176).		Arguably,	this	is	particularly	true	for	internal	borders,	such	as	those	regulating	the	access	to	most	public	services	and	institutions	of	the	welfare	state.	Although	their	original	function	is	not	immigration	control,	they	are	becoming	crucial	sites	for	the	
		
24	
management	 of	 (irregular)	 migration.	 This	 is	 possible	 because	 immigration	legislation	not	only	renders	the	entry	or	presence	of	certain	migrants	‘illegal’,	but	thereby	 also	 prescribes	 the	 range	 of	 actions	 that	 others	 can	 or	 must	 (not)	 take	towards	 them	 without	 potentially	 breaking	 the	 same	 law	 themselves.	 Sciortino	(2004,	p.37)	therefore	argues	that	the	“significance	of	the	irregular	status	is	highly	correlated	to	the	scope	of	states’	controls	over	the	interactions	and	exchanges	taking	place	 on	 their	 territories.”	 At	 a	 more	 general	 level,	 this	 also	 reflects	 Foucault’s	(2002b,	 p.123)	 suggestion	 to	 understand	 the	 state	 itself	 as	 ‘consisting’	 in	 “the	codification	 of	 a	 whole	 number	 of	 power	 relations	 that	 render	 its	 functioning	possible”.		Seen	 from	 this	 perspective,	 migrant	 (ir)regularity	 operates	 as	 a	 code	 that	 is	attributed	to	a	person	by	the	 immigration	system	and	manifests	 itself	only	 in	 the	lack	of	 a	 legal	 immigration	 status.	As	 such,	 it	 is	neither	 readable	nor	meaningful	within	 most	 other	 subsystems	 or	 power	 relations.	 Only	 through	 specific	 laws,	regulations	 and	 the	 corresponding	 documentation	 and	 identification	 systems	(Torpey,	2000;	Bigo,	2011;	Torpey,	1998)	can	the	meaning	of	migrant	irregularity	be	transferred	to,	or	imposed	upon,	other	spheres	of	social	life	and	interaction.	This	is	what	I	generally	refer	to	as	the	internalisation	of	immigration	control.		The	person	who	hires	an	irregular	migrant	–	to	return	to	the	example	of	before	–	can	only	be	aware	of	doing	so	after	checking	the	worker’s	passport	or	residence	card.	If	he	then	decides	to	go	ahead	it	is	probably	either	because	he	wants	to	help	the	other	or	 because	 he	 knows	 he	 can	 pay	 a	 lower	wage.	 If	 he	 refrains	 from	 hiring	 after	discovering	 the	 other’s	 irregularity,	 then	 probably	 because	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 being	checked	and	punished	by	the	same	authority	that	might	also	initiate	a	procedure	to	deport	 the	 worker.	 Neither	 of	 the	 two	 outcomes	 can	 be	 fully	 explained	 by	 the	internal	 logic	of	 the	 labour	market	 (i.e.	 the	decisions	or	organisational	processes	that	 normally	 assign	 a	 particular	 person	 to	 a	 certain	 job),	 nor	 the	 fact	 that	 the	worker	 has	 no	 legal	 immigration	 status.	 Instead,	 whatever	 the	 outcome	 of	 this	situation,	it	follows	from	the	particular	way	in	which	the	government	in	question	enforces	its	immigration	regulations	upon	the	labour	market.	Generally	speaking,	whenever	a	particular	logic	is	transferred	to	another	sphere,	its	specific	codes	have	to	be	‘translated’,	whereby	their	meaning	can	change,	or	new	meanings	be	added.	
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Here,	the	worker’s	potential	exploitability	and	the	employer’s	risk	of	having	to	pay	a	 certain	 fine	 (or	 face	 a	 prison	 sentence)	 are	 the	 new	 meanings	 that	 migrant	irregularity	 –	 as	 the	 most	 fundamental	 code	 of	 the	 immigration	 control	 logic	 –	acquires	when	transferred	to	the	sphere	of	employment.		This	 example	 also	 shows	 that	 the	 meaning(s)	 that	 migrant	 irregularity	 has	 or	acquires	through	translation	can	either	be	in	line	or	contradiction	with	the	interests	and	 institutional	 logics	 that	 otherwise	 dominate	 the	 respective	 sphere	 or	subsystem.	In	the	case	of	employment,	this	relationship	is	rather	straightforward:	it	might	be	lucrative	but	is	undoubtedly	against	the	law	and	thus	entails	a	concrete	risk	to	employ	an	irregular	migrant.	As	I	will	show,	the	situation	often	becomes	more	ambiguous	in	the	area	of	public	service	provision,	where	the	logic	of	immigration	control	 confronts	 powerful	 normative	 entitlements	 combined	 with	 intrinsic	functional	 logics	and	particularly	strong	professional	 ethics.	Together,	 they	often	demand	 at	 least	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 inclusion	 irrespective	 of	 immigration	 status.	Before	focussing	on	this	issue	in	more	detail,	however,	I	provide	an	overview	of	the	concrete	 policies	 through	 which	 states	 generally	 try	 to	 ‘solve	 the	 problem’	 of	irregular	migration.			
2.2.2. Managing	irregular	migration	through	deportation	and	regularisation		“Irregularities	 often	 evoke	 anxiety,	 and	when	 they	 do	 they	 are	 usually	met	with	demands	 for	 their	 remedy	 or	 outright	 elimination”	 (Nyers,	 2011,	 p.186).	 In	principle,	 the	policy	options	available	 to	states	 facing	sizeable	(although	typically	uncertain)	numbers	of	 irregular	migrants	already	 living	within	 their	borders	are	rather	limited:	On	one	hand,	they	can	(and	quite	often	do)	tacitly	accept	the	unlawful	presence	of	some	of	these	foreigners.	This,	however,	limits	the	extent	of	control	they	effectively	 and	 symbolically	 exercise	 over	 their	 own	 territory	 and	 population.	Precisely	in	order	to	‘stay	in	control’,	on	the	other	hand,	states	can	either	legalise	irregular	migrants’	presence	in	the	country,	or	physically	remove	them	from	both	their	territory	and	jurisdiction.	Potential	policy	measures	to	‘eliminate’	or	at	least	reduce	 irregularity	 can	 thus	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 a	 continuum	 that	 ranges	 from	
		
26	
regularisation,	i.e.	offering	possibilities	of	ex	post	legalisation	of	immigration	status7,	to	deportation,	which	can	broadly	be	defined	as	the	expulsion	of	a	person	from	state	territory	 by	 threatened	 or	 actual	 use	 of	 force	 (Anderson	 et	 al.,	 2011).	While	 the	extension	of	certain	rights	to	migrants	in	irregular	situations	lies	at	the	inclusionary	end	 of	 this	 spectrum,	 policies	 of	 ‘voluntary’	 or	 'assisted'	 return	 as	well	 as	 those	aiming	to	‘discourage’	irregular	stay	are	closer	to	the	opposite	extreme.		Both	regularisation	and	deportation	are	part	and	parcel	of	'migration	management'	and	 serve	 pragmatic	 as	well	 as	 symbolic	 functions.	Both	 have	 been	 described	 as	constitutive	elements	of	 citizenship	 (De	Genova,	2002,	2010;	Walters,	2002)	and	nation-building	(McDonald,	2009),	and	thus	provide	evidence	of	the	persistence	of	state	sovereignty		(Gibney	&	Hansen,	2003;	Castles	&	Miller,	2009).	Particularly	the	practice	 of	 deportation	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 reinforcing	 the	 legal	 and	 normative	boundaries	of	membership	and	belonging	to	a	national	community	(Anderson	et	al.,	2011;	 De	 Genova,	 2010).	 Although	 regularisation	 at	 least	 questions	 these	boundaries	 by	 offering	 formal	 possibilities	 to	 transcend	 the	 strict	 dichotomy	between	 'legal'	 and	 'illegal'	 residence	 status,	 it	 always	 only	 does	 this	 for	 certain	kinds	 of	 irregular	 subjects,	who	 are	 framed	 as	 relatively	more	 deserving	 or	 less	unwanted	than	others.	In	policy	discourses,	deportation	is	often	justified	as	a	simple	necessity	 for	 maintaining	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 credibility	 of	 the	 immigration	system	 (cf.	 Anderson	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Fekete,	 2005),	 while	 regularisation	 has	 been	criticised	 for	 undermining	 the	 legal	 framework	 and	 is	 frequently	 seen	 as	 a	consequence	 (or	 even	 instance)	 of	 policy	 failure	 (cf.	 Finotelli	 &	 Arango,	 2011;	Levinson,	2005).	Many	governments	justify	their	reluctance	to	grant	an	‘amnesty’	with	the	fear	that	it	might	attract	further	irregular	immigration	and	thus	could	have	a	so-called	'magnet	effect'	(OECD	Secretariat,	2000).		In	spite	of	these	drawbacks,	offering	opportunities	for	regularisation	to	persons	who	have	either	entered	a	country	unlawfully,	overstayed	their	visa,	or	for	other	reasons	find	themselves	in	irregular	situations	has	become	a	widespread	practice	within	and	beyond	Europe	(Apap	et	al.,	2000;	OECD	Secretariat,	2000;	Levinson,	2005;	Finotelli	&	 Arango,	 2011).	 Between	 1973	 and	 2008,	 more	 than	 4.3	 million	 people	 were																																																									7	The	terms	‘regularisation’,	‘legalisation’,	‘amnesty’	and	(in	the	Spanish	case)	‘naturalisation’	broadly	describe	the	same	set	of	practices	(Sunderhaus,	2007;	Brick,	2011).		
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‘regularised’	 within	 the	 EU8	through	 a	 total	 of	 68	 national	 programmes	 (Kraler,	2009).	 Such	 regularisation	 exercises	 can	 either	 take	 the	 form	 of	 a	 permanent	
procedure,	i.e.	an	on-going	process	open	to	an	infinite	number	of	claims,	or	that	of	
one-off	procedures,	which	are	carried	out	within	a	fixed	timeframe	and	often	target	a	specific	category	and	therefore	finite	number	of	people	(Apap	et	al.,	2000).	While	the	 former	 are	 part	 of	 the	 regular	 policy	 framework	 for	 the	 management	 of	migration,	the	latter	are	often	based	on	extraordinary,	or	ad	hoc	legislation,	as	both	Brick	(2011)	and	Kraler	(2009)	noted.		Regularisation	 can	 be	 justified	 in	 various	ways:	 Apap	 and	 her	 colleagues	 (2000)	argued	that	such	policies	are	put	in	place	either	for	reasons	of	fait	accompli,	whereby	a	 right	 of	 residence	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 recognition	 that	 a	 person	 has	 de	 facto	(although	'illegally')	been	present	since	a	specific	date;	or	for	reasons	of	protection	against	certain	risks	that	a	particular	person	would	be	subjected	to	if	not	granted	legal	 status.	 The	 way	 (and	 extent	 to	 which)	 these	 objectives	 are	 effectively	translated	into	policy	outcomes	depends	on	the	set	of	criteria	that	have	to	be	met	by	immigrants	 in	 order	 to	 become	 eligible	 for	 regularisation 9 .	 From	 a	 critical	perspective,	McDonald	 (2009,	p.71)	argued	 that	by	 “[d]istinguishing	 the	 criminal	from	the	good,	the	diseased	from	the	healthy,	the	lazy	from	the	hard-working,	the	newly	 arrived	 from	 the	 loyal,	 […]	 the	 regularization	 process	 is	 a	 nation-building	practice”,	 which	 by	 itself	 contributes	 to	 the	 reproduction	 of	 migrant	 'illegality'	instead	of	reducing	it.	By	choosing	the	underlying	criteria	and	setting	the	thresholds	the	government	can	regulate	both	the	scale	and	scope	of	any	regularisation	exercise.	Actually	drawing	these	distinctions,	however,	often	requires	assessments	by	social	workers,	doctors	and	other	street-level	bureaucrats	who	are	in	direct	contact	with	potential	beneficiaries.	The	effectiveness	of	regularisation	thus	also	depends	on	the	involvement	and	agency	of	the	people	who	are	at	the	centre	of	my	analysis.		Policies	of	deportation	 represent	 the	opposite,	 explicitly	 exclusionary	 side	of	 the	
																																																								8	Until	1993	the	European	Community	(EC).		9	The	comparative	Odysseus	study	shows	that	apart	from	being	present	on	the	territory	(geographical	criterion),	the	eligibility	for	regularisation	can	also	depend	on	economic	(to	be	employed	or	holding	a	job	offer),	humanitarian	(in	need	of	protection),	health	or	family	related	criteria.	Moreover,	criteria	directly	related	to	the	asylum	process,	or	based	on	either	the	applicants'	
nationality,	level	of	integration	or	professional	qualification	were	distinguished,	while	in	most	cases	applicants	also	had	to	prove	a	clean	criminal	record	(Apap	et	al.,	2000).	
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spectrum	 of	 available	 measures	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 unlawful	 residents.	Traditionally	 seen	 as	 “the	 state's	 ultimate	 and	most	 naked	 form	 of	 immigration	control”	 (Gibney	&	Hansen,	2003,	p.1),	deportation	has	nowadays,	 as	De	Genova	(2010,	p.34)	argued,	“achieved	an	unprecedented	prominence	[…and]	seems	to	have	become	a	virtually	global	regime”.	With	the	notable	exception	of	foreign	nationals	convicted	for	committing	a	crime	in	the	host	country,	the	groups	targeted	by	this	regime	very	much	resemble	those	who	may	also	qualify	for	regularisation,	including	visa-overstayers,	 clandestine	 entrants,	 irregular	 workers	 and	 rejected	 asylum	seekers.		For	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 reasons,	 however,	 only	 a	 relatively	 small	 fraction	 of	 all	individuals	who	are	theoretically	eligible	for	deportation	is	actually	deported,	a	fact	that	 Gibney	 (2008)	 described	 as	 the	 'deportation	 gap'.	 On	 one	 hand,	 there	 are	several	 practical	 constraints	which	 render	 deportation	 a	 difficult,	 expensive	 and	time-consuming	measure:	most	importantly,	it	requires	appropriate	documentation	linking	the	deportee	to	a	particular	‘home’	state,	as	well	as	that	state's	cooperation	and	willingness	to	recognise	and	readmit	the	person	to	its	territory.	By	absconding	or	obscuring	their	identity	or	origin,	individuals	threatened	by	deportation	can	thus	actively	delay	or	even	prevent	their	expulsion.		On	the	other	hand,	forceful	removal	of	certain	individuals	is	often	constrained	by	governments'	 obligations	 under	 human	 rights	 treaties,	 and	 as	 a	 coercive	 state	practice	 it	 has	 increasingly	 come	 under	 scrutiny	 and	 critique	 by	 NGOs,	 migrant	advocacy	 groups	 and	 human	 rights	 activists	 (Fekete,	 2005).	 One	 of	 the	 main	challenges	that	states	confront,	arises	from	individual	immigrants’	social	integration	into	 the	 host	 society,	 which	 over	 time	 can	 “form	 a	 moral	 basis	 for	 remaining”,	independent	 of	 formal	 entitlements	 (Gibney,	 2008,	 p.150;	 Paoletti,	 2010).	 Social	relations	 such	 as	 those	 established	within	 the	 neighbourhood,	 school	 or	 church	community,	for	example,	often	trigger	considerable	resistance	against	deportations,	which	in	turn	tends	to	render	them	unpopular	with	local	politicians	(Anderson	et	al.,	2011;	Ellermann,	2006).		For	De	Genova	(2002,	2010)	deportation	also	fulfils	a	clearly	disciplinary	function,	whereby	 it	 is	not	so	much	the	act	of	deportation	 itself	 that	 is	decisive,	but	rather	immigrants'	 constant	 'deportability',	 i.e.	 the	 sheer	 possibility	 (and	 uncertain	
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likelihood)	 of	 being	 deported.	 This	 specific	 condition	 can	 again	 be	 seen	 as	 a	continuum	that	ranges	from	facing	immediate	expulsion	to	being	under	very	little	threat	of	actually	being	deported	ever.	While	it	also	extends	to	‘legal’	immigrants	–	thereby	 radically	 reinforcing	 the	distinction	between	 ‘native’	 citizens	and	 ‘aliens’	(Anderson	et	al.,	2011;	Paoletti,	2010)	–	the	actual	risk	of	being	deported	is	most	relevant	to	those	lacking	a	legal	residence	status	or	other	right	to	remain.	For	them	in	particular,	 “the	possibility	of	removal	 [...]	casts	a	 long,	dark	shadow	over	their	daily	lives,	threatening	at	any	moment	to	take	away	from	them	the	little	they	have	gained	by	residence	in	the	host	country”	(Gibney,	2011,	p.43).		At	the	other	extreme	there	are	individuals	who	for	whatever	reason	and	although	facing	 a	 formal	 deportation	 order	 cannot	 be	 deported	 in	 practice	 and	 are	 thus	effectively	‘non-deportable’,	as	Paoletti	(2010)	argued.	What	makes	this	observation	particularly	relevant	for	my	study,	is	that	for	her,	“[t]he	complex	net	of	rights	and	duties	 that	 link	 the	 state	 and	 the	 non-deportable	 opens	 up	 a	 more	 fluid	conceptualisation	of	membership”	(Paoletti,	2010,	p.13).	According	to	her	analytical	framework,	 the	 intersection	 of	 irregular	 migrants’	 ‘relative	 desirability’	 (within	certain	social	spheres)	with	the	state’s	limited	capacity	to	enforce	their	deportation	leads	to	various	forms	of	quasi-membership.	What	she	does	not	explicitly	take	into	account,	however,	is	what	could	then	be	called	irregular	migrants’	regularisability;	that	 is,	 their	 actual	prospects	of	 fulfilling	all	 the	 requirements	set	by	 the	 state	 in	question	 for	 ex-post	 legalisation.	 The	 latter	 often	 reflect	 the	 same	 notions	 of	desirability	 and	 deservingness	 that	 can	 also	 render	 irregular	 migrants	 less	deportable,	like	having	close	family	or	other	social	ties	or	being	seen	as	contributing	to	the	host	community.		Although	not	everyone	who	is	‘non-deportable’	can	be	regularised,	or	vice	versa,	it	is	 always	 between	 these	 two	 poles	 that	 migrants	 in	 irregular	 situations	 must	negotiate	 and	 construct	 their	 fragile	 position	 and	 claims	 for	 incorporation	 and	membership	 in	 the	 host	 country.	 For	 Garcés-Mascareñas	 (2010)	 it	 is	 therefore	precisely	 the	 quite	 often	 simultaneous	 possibility	 of	 being	 either	 regularised	 or	deported,	which	defines	the	condition	of	 irregularity.	Seen	from	this	perspective,	regularisation	 and	 deportation	 are	 more	 than	 two	 functionally	 opposed	 policy	approaches	through	which	states	can	reduce	the	number	of	irregular	migrants	living	
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within	their	territory.	They	are	also	the	carrots	and	sticks	through	which	irregular	residents	can	be	disciplined	even	without	being	in	direct	contact	with	‘the	state’	or	its	 immigration	 regime.	Particularly	 for	 those	 living	 ‘under	 the	 radar’,	 taking	 the	necessary	 steps	 towards	 a	 possible	 regularisation	 of	 their	 status	 might	 in	 fact	increase	their	deportability	(by	becoming	known	to	the	authorities,	for	example);	whereas	successfully	evading	deportation	long	enough	(and	without	breaking	any	other	law)	will	usually	better	their	chances	to	eventually	qualify	for	regularisation	(Schweitzer,	2017).		In	 various	 ways,	 regularisation	 and	 deportation	 thus	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 for	 the	
micro-management	of	migrant	 irregularity.	While	 it	 lies	within	the	competence	of	the	state	to	establish	the	formal	legal	frameworks	for	both	measures,	these	can	have	significant	 consequences	 for	other	actors	and	their	 interactions	with	migrants	 in	irregular	situations.	On	one	hand,	and	specifically	in	relation	to	their	access	to	public	services,	 irregular	 migrants’	 real	 and	 perceived	 deportability	 and	 prospects	 for	regularisation	will	have	an	obvious	 impact	on	the	 claims	 they	might	be	able	and	willing	 to	make.	 Inversely,	 the	 imperatives	 to	provide	 them	with	 at	 least	 certain	services	and	thus	to	accommodate	some	of	these	claims	in	spite	of	their	irregularity	can	be	more	pressing	where	they	are	unlikely	to	be	deported	or	regularised	any	time	soon.		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 lower	 levels	 of	 government	 as	 well	 as	 public	 institutions	themselves	 can	 become	more	 or	 less	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	these	policies.	This	 can	be	by	attesting	 the	 fulfilment	of	 certain	 requirements	 for	regularisation,	such	as	continuous	residence,	school	attendance	or	other	instances	of	 local-level	 ‘integration’;	 or	 by	 helping	 the	 immigration	 authorities	 to	 identify	potential	 deportees.	 Both	 kinds	 of	 involvement	 indicate	 an	 increasing	internalisation	of	immigration	control,	whereby	national	governments	transfer	part	of	 their	 own	 responsibility	 to	 various	 non-state	 actors	 and	 local	 institutions,	including	those	that	provide	public	services	to	the	local	population.	As	I	will	discuss	in	the	following	subsection,	this	gives	rise	to	various	degrees	of	internal	exclusion,	but	also	localised	forms	of	inclusion	towards	irregular	residents.			
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2.2.3. Managing	irregular	migration	through	internal	exclusion	and	
inclusion	Many	 Western	 governments	 increasingly	 try	 to	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 irregular	migration	through	policies	of	 internal	control,	 that	 is,	by	restricting	the	access	of	unlawful	residents	to	employment,	housing,	healthcare	and	other	services,	rather	than	 that	of	potential	unlawful	 immigrants	 to	 the	 territory	of	 the	 state	 (Lahav	&	Guiraudon,	 2006;	 Broeders	 &	 Engbersen,	 2007;	 Van	 Der	 Leun,	 2006;	 Spencer	 &	Hughes,	 2015;	 Squire,	 2011b;	 Guiraudon	 &	 Lahav,	 2000).	 Facing	 a	 growing	permeability	of	its	external	borders,	it	is	argued,	the	state	“raises	a	protective	wall	of	legal	and	documentary	requirements	around	the	key	institutions	of	the	welfare	state	and	‘patrols’	it	with	advanced	identification	and	control	systems”	(Broeders	&	Engbersen,	2007,	p.1595).		As	a	way	to	regain	control	and	increase	the	effectiveness	of	the	policies	they	enact,	governments	thereby	tend	to	shift	some	of	the	burden	of	immigration	enforcement	to	a	wide	range	of	actors	beyond	the	level	of	the	nation-state	and	hitherto	detached	from	its	immigration	authorities.	These	often	include	the	local	police	and	employers,	and	 sometimes	also	banks,	 landlords,	welfare	officers	or	other	public	officials,	 as	well	as	private	citizens.	Walsh	(2014,	p.242)	describes	this	development	as	a	form	of	‘deputization’,	which	he	generally	defines	as	“the	activation	and	empowerment	of	certain	 individuals	 to	 participate	 in	 preventing	 and	 controlling	 legal	transgressions”.	 Building	 on	 Marrow’s	 (2011)	 earlier	 conceptualisation	 of	‘bureaucratic	and	civil	cross-deputization’,	Walsh	distinguishes	‘deputization’	from	‘responsibilization’	–	whereby	third	party	participation	is	encouraged	but	voluntary	–	as	well	as	‘autonomization’	–	which	happens	spontaneously	and	often	against	the	will	of	the	authority.		Whatever	the	underlying	motivation,	internal	immigration	control	always	implies	agency:	In	order	for	someone’s	(irregular)	immigration	status	to	become	a	barrier	when	 trying	 to	 access	 a	 particular	 service	 or	 engage	 in	 a	 certain	 activity	 or	interaction,	someone	else	has	to	exercise	a	specific	kind	of	control.	More	and	more	people	thereby	become	engaged	in	what	Torpey	(1998)	described	as	the	‘techniques	of	identification’	of	persons	based	on	documents	like	the	passport,	through	which	states	codify	not	only	the	identity	but	also	the	national	belonging	of	their	subjects.	
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In	the	context	of	public	service	provision,	 it	 is	often	primarily	 the	receptionist	or	other	 front-line	 staff	 who	 are	 obliged	 or	 encouraged	 to	 base	 their	 actions	 or	decisions	regarding	any	particular	service	user	on	the	 immigration	status	of	 that	person.	This	is	what	I	refer	to	as	deputisation.	Other	welfare	workers	are	more	or	less	 explicitly	 prevented	 or	 discouraged	 from	 considering	 immigration	 status	 in	their	regular	dealings	with	service	users,	which	I	refer	to	as	shielding.		In	practice,	deputisation	can	either	lead	to	irregular	migrants	simply	being	excluded	from	a	particular	site	or	service	(without	further	consequences	for	their	stay	in	the	country),	or	effectively	render	the	‘deputies’	part	of	the	deportation	regime	by	also	requiring	or	encouraging	them	to	share	any	knowledge	or	suspicion	of	irregularity	with	the	relevant	state	authority.	Such	information	sharing,	whether	systematic	or	sporadic,	indicates	a	lack	of	what	is	often	called	a	firewall	(FRA,	2013;	OHCHR,	2014;	Carens,	2013).	The	latter	can	be	understood	as	any	mechanism	or	rule	that	prevents	individuals	or	organisations	from	sharing	this	kind	of	information	with	immigration	authorities	and	thereby	effectively	hinders	immigration	enforcement.	In	this	regard,	Broeders	&	Engbersen	(2007,	p.1595)	noted	that	“[w]hether	or	not	governments	connect	 and	 combine	 different	 bodies	 of	 information	will	 increasingly	 become	 a	matter	of	legal	constraints,	as	the	technological	constraints	are	quickly	losing	their	relevance”.		Policy	approaches	that	focus	on	internal	control	have	been	criticised	for	putting	a	disproportional	 burden	 on	 several	 ‘key	 social	 transactions’	 (Cvajner	&	 Sciortino,	2010b)	 and	 for	 pushing	 irregular	 migrants	 even	 further	 underground,	 thereby	increasing	their	reliance	on	informal	and	sometimes	criminal	networks	or	activities	(Broeders	&	Engbersen,	2007).	In	some	cases,	the	rearrangement	and	dispersal	of	control	functions	has	“incorporated	new	actors	whose	own	interests	coincided	with	those	of	national	control	agencies”,	as	Guiraudon	&	Lahav	(2000,	p.177)	argued.	But	there	are	also	instances	and	sites	where	quite	the	opposite	is	true,	in	that	the	logic	of	control	that	underlies	state	efforts	to	reduce	irregular	migration	conflicts	with	the	own	interests	or	professional	duties	of	the	new	‘deputies’	instead	of	converging	with	them.	Hence,	policies	of	 internal	control	not	only	encounter	resistance	 from	local	residents,	civil	society	and	activist	groups,	but	also	from	professionals,	civil	servants	and	local	government	officials	who	(sometimes)	“put	their	professional	ethics	above	
		
33	
state	 policies”	 (Broeders	 &	 Engbersen,	 2007,	 p.1606;	 Ellermann,	 2006;	 Van	 Der	Leun,	2006).		The	two	principal	grounds	for	criticism	raised	against	these	policy	approaches	are	that	they	violate	irregular	migrants’	human	rights	and	have	negative	effects	on	the	communities	in	which	they	live	(PICUM,	2010;	Carens,	2013).	The	former	is	because	such	policies	often	build	on	bordering	practices	that	either	consist	in,	or	(can)	lead	to,	the	effective	exclusion	of	irregular	residents	from	services	that	are	underpinned	by	humanitarian	values	and	norms.	The	latter	reflects	the	fact	that	in	spite	of	their	irregular	status,	they	are	embedded	within	various	social	structures	in	both	public	and	private	domains,	such	as	the	neighbourhood	in	which	they	live	or	work,	a	church	community,	sports	club,	parent	association,	or	their	own	family	network.	And	in	fact,	both	of	these	issues	–	rights	and	membership	–	are	closely	related	in	that	they	also	constitute	the	two	basic	dimensions	of	citizenship	(Joppke,	2007;	Bauböck,	1994).		For	Paoletti	(2010,	p.19),	“[t]he	stripping	from	such	individuals	of	basic	rights	and	access	 to	 essential	 services	 can	 be	 in	 itself	 considered	 not	 only	 a	 human	 rights	infringement	but	a	deliberate	act	of	exclusion	from	society”.	While	this	is	certainly	true,	the	crucial	question	is	whether	the	opposite	is	too:	Does	the	granting	of	such	rights	or	access	to	(some)	services	constitute	a	‘deliberate	act	of	inclusion’?	While	in	many	cases	the	answer	to	this	will	probably	be	no,	it	could	still	be	argued	that	many	of	irregular	migrants’	everyday	interactions,	claims	and	decisions	–	including	their	accessing	of	even	basic	health	or	educational	systems	–	premise	but	also	reflect	their	being	(at	least	partially)	recognised	as	de	facto	members	of	society.	They	could	thus	be	 seen	 as	 ‘acts	 of	 citizenship’,	 which	 Isin	 (2008,	 p.16)	 famously	 defined	 as	“practices	 of	 becoming	 claim-making	 subjects	 in	 and	 through	 various	 sites	 and	scales”.	As	the	empirical	chapters	of	this	thesis	will	show,	these	acts	can	range	from	seeing	 a	 doctor	 to	 claiming	 financial	 support	 from	 a	 local	 authority,	 and	 are	 not	always	based	on	strictly	humanitarian	but	also	membership	rights.		In	rephrasing	Isin’s	concept	and	applying	it	specifically	to	irregular	migrants,	Rigo	(2011)	speaks	of	‘acts	of	illegal	citizenship’.	For	her,		[t]he	 limits	 encountered	 by	 undocumented	 migrants	 in	 accessing	membership	need	to	be	understood	[…]	in	light	of	the	ambivalence	between	the	 prescriptive	 and	 descriptive	 dimensions	 of	 citizenship,	 between	 a	
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conception	 of	 citizenship	 intended	 as	 the	 complex	 of	 rules	 that	 regulate	access	to	certain	rights	and	a	conception	of	citizenship	intended	as	the	sum	of	individuals	subject	to	the	jurisdiction	of	the	polity	(2011,	p.203/4).		It	 is	this	ambivalence	that	requires	those	who	implement	the	rules	–	and	thus,	 in	practice,	have	to	decide	whether	or	not,	and	if	yes	then	how	to	respond	to	the	claims	of	formally	irregular	subjects	–	to	carefully	weigh	the	meaning	of	this	irregularity	against,	for	example,	the	imperatives	that	come	with	their	profession	or	a	particular	human	rights	norm.		The	next	section	will	theorise	these	negotiation	processes	in	more	detail,	but	what	already	becomes	clear	 is	 that	 the	sites	where	they	often	take	place	–	classrooms,	welfare	offices	and	reception	desks	–	represent	what	Squire	(2011b,	p.6)	described	as	 ‘borderzones’:	 “dispersed,	 multi-dimensional	 and	 contested	 sites	 of	 political	struggle”.	 	 For	 Bowen	 and	 her	 colleagues	 (2013,	 p.3),	 it	 is	 in	 these	 "varied	 and	relatively	autonomous	social	contexts	[of	public	 institutions]	 that	boundaries	are	created	or	reaffirmed	in	ways	that	have	the	sanction	of	the	state	behind	them”.	This	brings	me	back	to	the	issue	of	governmentality,	which,	as	a	mode	of	analysis,	and	“[b]y	highlighting	how	government	is	ubiquitous	in	all	social	relationships”,	allows	to	discover	 “multiple	sites	of	 governing	beyond	 the	 traditional	boundaries	of	 the	state	apparatus”	(McKee,	2009,	p.469).		The	governmental	nature	of	 internal	 control	policies	 themselves	 is	obvious	 in	at	least	three	ways:	Firstly,	in	that	they	aim	at	encouraging	return,	that	is,	to	persuade	unlawful	residents	that	 they	themselves	actually	want	to	 leave	rather	than	facing	marginalisation;	 secondly,	 in	 how	 they	 help	 to	 delegitimise	 or	 even	 criminalise	various	ways	 in	which	 ordinary	 citizens	may	 interact	with,	 or	 support	 irregular	migrants	in	everyday	contexts	(Broeders	&	Engbersen,	2007);	and	thirdly,	in	that	the	state	exercises	its	sovereign	power	to	exclude	(or	include)	through	the	actions	of	various	‘street-level	bureaucrats’	(Lipsky,	1980),	thereby	exploiting	the	fact	that	their	position	within	public	institutions	quite	often	already	involves	some	kind	of	gate-keeping	function.	Together	with	the	rendering	of	certain	individuals	or	groups	as	 more	 or	 less	 deportable	 or	 worthy	 of	 regularisation,	 these	 forms	 of	 indirect	control	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 part	of	what	 Foucault	 (2002a,	 p.328)	 called	 “the	 political	management	of	society”,	an	endeavour	that	simultaneously	involves	multiple	cross-cutting	 bordering	 practices	 to	 be	 employed	 by	 different	 agents	 within	 various	
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organisational	fields.				
2.3. The	micro-management	of	migrant	irregularity:	Public	sector	
organisations	and	street-level	bureaucrats	as	local	mediators	of	
competing	functional	imperatives	and	institutional	logics	One	particularly	 influential	 strand	 of	 literature	 trying	 to	 explain	 the	 discrepancy	between	officially	declared	government	objectives	and	the	actual	outcomes	of	the	policies	 they	 underpin	 focuses	 on	 the	 intermediary	 role	 of	 (liberal)	 institutions	(Joppke,	1998;	Guiraudon,	2003).	For	Boswell	(2007,	p.83)	these	neo-institutional	approaches	are	based	on	two	crucial	assumptions:	That	institutions	“have	sufficient	independence	from	the	political	system	and	rival	administrative	agencies”	and	that	“the	actors	within	these	institutions	operate	according	to	interests	and	norms	that	are	 at	 variance	 with	 those	 predominating	 politics	 or	 rival	 agencies”.	 Both	assumptions	 are	 highly	 relevant	 for	 understanding	 the	 role	 that	 public	 welfare	systems	 as	 well	 as	 individual	 actors	 working	 within	 them	 routinely	 play	 when	tasked	 with	 implementing	 state	 policies	 that	 aim	 to	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 migrant	irregularity.	In	order	to	explore	them	in	more	detail	and	be	able	to	draw	systematic	comparisons	across	different	local	contexts	and	organisational	fields,	I	particularly	draw	on	some	important	theoretical	concepts	and	empirical	insights	from	the	field	of	organisation	studies.		I	 thereby	 depart	 from	 Brunsson’s	 (1993,	 p.489)	 interpretation	 of	 the	 possible	relationships	“between	the	ideas	of	constituencies	and	leaders	on	the	one	hand	and	organizational,	and	societal	actions	on	the	other”:	Whereas	most	understandings	of	rational	decision-making	assume	that	ideas	always	precede	and	control	action,	he	argues	 that	 this	does	not	necessarily	have	 to	be	 the	 case	where	 it	would	 lead	 to	unresolvable	 conflicts	 at	 the	 level	 of	 policy	 implementation.	 Instead,	 certain	necessary	actions	can	either	determine	ideas	or	be	systematically	inconsistent	with	them.	Both,	I	will	argue,	is	likely	to	be	the	case	where	irregular	migrants	are	to	be	granted	 some	 form	of	 access	 to	various	public	 services	 in	spite	of	 their	unlawful	residence.	Brunsson’s	(1993,	1989)	theory	thus	provides	a	good	starting	point	for	understanding	 how	 (and	 why)	 organisations	 respond	 to	 contradictory	 external	demands	 and	 pressures	 by	 accepting	 and	 internalising	 certain	 inconsistencies	
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between	what	 is	officially	declared	 (‘talk’),	what	 is	put	 into	 law	 (‘decisions’)	 and	what	 is	 effectively	 done	 (‘actions’).	 While	 it	 is	 relatively	 easy	 for	 politicians	 to	declare	that	foreigners	without	permission	to	stay	should	be	unable	to	benefit	from	the	provision	of	publicly	funded	services,	the	idea	of	fully	excluding	them	–	even	if	popular	among	the	public	–	would	create	significant	conflicts	if	it	was	to	completely	control	organisational	action	within,	for	example,	the	healthcare	system.		It	is	for	such	instances	that	Brunsson	(1993)	proposes	two	alternative	theoretical	relationships	 between	 ideas	 and	 actions,	 which	 he	 calls	 ‘justification’	 and	‘hypocrisy’.	The	former	means	that	“planned	or	accomplished	actions	are	defended	in	order	to	convince	people	that	they	are	the	right	ones”	(Brunsson,	1993,	p.500).	If	successful,	 it	 thus	 adjusts	 the	 constituency’s	 ideas	 to	 actions,	 thereby	 restoring	consistency	at	the	expense	of	control	(of	ideas	over	action).	For	example,	people	may	be	 convinced	 that	 the	 necessity	 to	 provide	 healthcare	 even	 in	 certain	 non-emergency	 cases	 can	 prevail	over	 the	 need	 to	 limit	 unwanted	 immigration	or	 to	encourage	the	voluntary	departure	of	unlawful	residents.	Where	decision-makers	find	 it	 impossible	 to	 openly	 justify	 the	 formal	 inclusion	 of	 irregular	 migrants,	however,	 they	 have	 to	 resort	 to	 ‘hypocrisy’;	 that	 is,	 accepting	 inconsistencies	between	what	is	said,	decided,	and	effectively	done:		Actions	 that	 are	 difficult	 to	 justify	 can	 be	 compensated	 for	 by	 talk	 in	 the	opposite	 direction.	 Decisions,	 too,	 can	 be	 part	 of	 hypocrisy;	 they	 can	 be	contrary	 to	 actions,	 compensating	 for	 action	 rather	 than	 controlling	 or	justifying	 it.	Through	hypocrisy,	 the	 ideas	of	 the	 constituency	are	 isolated	from	action	(Brunsson,	1993,	p.501).		What	according	to	Brunsson	(1989,	p.38)	theoretically	links	‘talk’	and	‘action’	are	‘decisions’,	 which	 “are	 fundamental	 to	 organisations	 in	 which	 politics	 play	 an	important	part”.	When	it	comes	to	the	provision	of	public	services	in	general	and	its	extension	to	irregular	migrants	in	particular,	somebody	has	to	decide	under	which	circumstances	to	offer,	deny,	or	require	payment	for	any	particular	service.	These	are	inherently	political	decisions	and	should	thus	ideally	be	taken	by	democratically	legitimated	 decision	 makers,	 who	 then	 enact	 more	 or	 less	 explicit	 laws	 and	regulations.	 As	 Hall	 and	 Perrin	 (2015,	 p.132)	 argued	 for	 the	 area	 of	 healthcare,	however,	 “drawing	 administrable	 lines	 that	 define	 the	 limits	 of	 a	 shared	humanitarian	ethic	can	prove	difficult”.	For	example,	 the	 legal	 framework	for	the	
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provision	of	public	healthcare	has	to	leave	enough	room	for	individual	doctors	to	fulfil	their	professional	duties,	such	as	those	demanded	by	the	Hippocratic	oath.	In	everyday	 practice,	 such	 decisions	 therefore	 often	 also	 depend	 on	 a	 case-by-case	assessment	by	the	individual	welfare	workers	that	either	administer	or	provide	a	service	to	the	population.		These	 ‘street-level	bureaucrats’	are	not	 just	 implementing	the	 law	but	effectively	become	 policy-makers	 themselves,	 as	 famously	 argued	 by	 Lipsky	 (1980,	 1987).	According	 to	 him,	 it	 is	 their	 particular	 position	 within	 certain	 organisations	 –	characterised	by	“relatively	high	degrees	of	discretion	and	relative	autonomy	from	organizational	authority”	–	that	“regularly	permits	them	to	make	policy	with	respect	to	significant	aspects	of	their	interactions	with	citizens”	(Lipsky,	1987,	p.121).	These	micro-level	decisions	can	have	significant	impacts	on	individual	lives	and	futures	(of	pupils,	patients,	benefit	claimants,	and	so	on)	and	are	at	the	same	time	difficult	to	control	by	state	or	other	authorities.		The	 individual	 discretion	 exercised	 by	 street-level	 bureaucrats	 in	 their	 everyday	work	(as	teachers,	doctors	or	social	workers,	for	example)	is	necessary	because	the	issues	 they	 deal	 with	 tend	 to	 be	 “too	 complicated	 to	 reduce	 to	 programmatic	formats”	 and	 “often	 require	 responses	 to	 the	 human	 dimensions	 of	 situations”	(Lipsky,	1987,	p.122).	Importantly,	this	discretion	is	precisely	what	allows	them	to	deal	 with	 certain	 irregularities	 that	 more	 or	 less	 routinely	 arise	 in	 their	 daily	encounters	with	service	users	and	often	demand	customised	solutions.	The	ability	of	those	who	are	governed	to	still	choose	from	a	variety	of	possible	actions	is	also	what	according	 to	Foucault	 (2002a,	p.340)	differentiates	 ‘relationships	of	power’	from	‘relationships	of	violence’:		A	power	relationship,	on	the	other	hand,	can	only	be	articulated	on	the	basis	of	 two	 elements	 that	 are	 indispensable	 if	 it	 is	 really	 to	 be	 a	 power	relationship:	 that	 “the	 other”	 (the	 one	 over	whom	 power	 is	 exercised)	 is	recognised	and	maintained	to	the	very	end	as	a	subject	who	acts;	and	that,	faced	with	 a	 relationship	 of	 power,	 a	whole	 field	 of	 responses,	 reactions,	results,	and	possible	inventions	may	open	up.	Both	 of	 these	 elements	 characterise	 the	 ambivalent	 relationship	 of	 street-level	bureaucrats	to	the	government	(who	‘employs’	them)	and	the	population	(who	they	help	to	‘control’):	As	bureaucrats	they	have	to	adhere	to	a	set	of	official	rules,	follow	
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formal	procedures	and	apply	established	criteria,	 all	 of	which	 circumscribe	 their	possible	 actions	 towards	 their	 clients;	 as	 professionals	 they	 are	 “expected	 to	exercise	discretionary	judgement	in	their	field	[of	expertise]”	and	to	be	able	to	deal	with	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 individual	 cases	 and	 human	 circumstances	 (Lipsky,	 1987,	p.121).	As	 I	will	show,	 the	balance	between	both	aspects	of	 their	 job	depends	on	their	position	within	the	organisation	as	well	as	 that	of	the	organisation	vis-à-vis	‘the	 state’,	 but	 also	 reflects	 whether	 their	 specific	 role	 mainly	 involves	administrative	or	professionalised	tasks.		The	various	roles	within	an	organisation	can	broadly	be	defined	as	“conceptions	of	appropriate	 goals	 and	 activities	 for	 particular	 individuals	 or	 specified	 social	positions”	(Scott,	2001,	p.55).	In	modern	bureaucracies	these	organisational	roles	are	separated	from	the	person	that	performs	them,	which	“has	resulted	in	a	capacity	to	constitute	agency	and	identity	in	more	segmented	and	piecemeal	ways,	according	to	 the	 demands	 of	 distinct	 institutional	 realms”	 (Webb,	 2006,	 p.34).	 One	 of	 the	aspects	 that	 the	 otherwise	 very	 diverse	 roles	of	 street-level	 bureaucrats	have	 in	common	 is	 precisely	 the	 significant	 degree	 of	 individual	 discretion,	 whether	perceived	 as	 a	 source	 of	 (professional)	 freedom	 and	 autonomy	 or	 a	 practical	requirement	for	the	effective	(administrative)	processing	of	cases.	It	thus	forms	part	of	 these	 workers’	 professional	 identity10 ,	 and,	 in	 general,	 tends	 to	 be	 defended	against	limitation	by	a	government	or	supervisor.	In	situations	where	it	is	perceived	as	a	burden,	however,	discretion	can	also	be	strategically	denied	in	order	to	limit	the	own	responsibility,	as	Lipsky’s	(1980,	p.149)	ground-breaking	study	has	shown:		Workers	seek	to	deny	that	they	have	influence,	are	free	to	make	decisions,	or	offer	 service	 alternatives.	 Strict	 adherence	 to	 rules,	 and	 refusals	 to	make	exceptions	when	exceptions	might	be	made,	provide	workers	with	defenses	against	the	possibility	that	they	might	be	able	to	act	more	as	clients	would	wish.			In	order	to	operationalise	this	multifaceted	concept,	a	basic	distinction	can	be	drawn	between	 ‘formal’	 and	 ‘informal’	 discretion,	 as	 suggested	 by	 Jordan	 et	 al.	 (2003,																																																									10	According	to	Jordan	et	al.	(2003,	p.216),	“professional	identity	is	derived	partly	from	the	process	through	which	solidarity	and	membership	of	the	occupational	group	as	a	whole	are	sustained,	partly	through	education	and	training,	and	partly	through	the	organisational	cultures	and	practices	of	the	organisations	that	employ	‘professionals’”.	
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p.214),	who	describe	the	former	as	practices	that	“are	foreseen	or	at	least	allowed	by	 the	 law,	 administrative	 provisions	 or	 internal	 service	 rules	 because	 of	 the	incompleteness	or	flexible	nature	of	policy	design”;	and	the	latter	as	those	that	“are	developed	through	daily	routines	and	may	run	against	the	formal,	legal	provisions”.	This	distinction	becomes	blurred,	however,	where	the	available	resources	(usually	in	terms	of	time	and	money)	are	limited	and/or	the	formal	rules	for	their	utilisation	so	vague,	complex,	or	even	contradictory	that	“they	can	only	be	enforced	or	invoked	selectively”	(Lipsky,	1987,	p.121/2).	Such	instances	of	 ‘selective	enforcement’	can	fall	 within	 or	 beyond	 the	 legal	 boundaries	 of	 legitimate	 discretionary	 power	attached	to	a	particular	role,	but	are	often	simply	unavoidable	given	the	practical	constraints	of	the	working	environment.	At	least	conceptually,	they	thus	have	to	be	distinguished	from	‘deliberate	non-compliance’	with	certain	rules	and	regulations	by	street-level	bureaucrats,	whether	as	individuals	or	collectively.	The	latter	tends	to	be	the	case	where	they	either	do	not	share	the	underlying	aims	or	preferences	held	by	superiors	or	the	government,	or	perceive	the	rules	themselves	as	contrary	to	their	professional	or	organisational	role	(Lipsky,	1987).		A	particularly	strong	professional	status,	such	as	 that	of	a	doctor,	and	the	 lack	or	inefficiency	 of	 sanctioning	 mechanisms	 makes	 non-compliance	 more	 likely.	Together,	these	concepts	describe	circumstances	in	which	street-level	bureaucrats	exercise	some	form	of	political	agency,	whether	by	contesting	or	circumventing	the	implementation	of	 a	 particular	 policy	 or	 by	 neglecting	 or	 re-interpreting	 certain	aspects	 of	 it.	 This	 allows	 them	 to	 deal	 with	 particular	 situations	 as	 they	 see	appropriate	from	their	perspective	within	an	organisation.	In	this	sense,	the	issue	of	delegating	immigration	control	can	thus	essentially	be	conceptualised	as	a	principal-
agent-problem,	 in	 that	 it	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 how	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 the	government	(as	the	‘principle’)	is	able	to	enforce	and	monitor	compliance	with	its	rules	by	those	‘agents’	who	are	supposed	to	implement	them	(Lahav	&	Guiraudon,	2006;	Torpey,	1998).		Another	concept	that	has	gained	considerable	traction	in	the	field	of	organisation	studies	is	that	of	(multiple)	institutional	logics,	within	which	organisational	actors	and	their	actions	are	embedded	(Meyer	&	Rowan,	1977;	Scott,	2001;	Reay	&	Hinings,	2009;	 Lindberg,	 2014;	 Besharov	 &	 Smith,	 2013).	 They	 have	 been	 described	 as	
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providing	“a	coherent	set	of	organizing	principles	for	a	particular	realm	of	social	life”	(Besharov	&	 Smith,	 2013,	 p.366)	 and	 defined	 as	 “the	 belief	 systems	 and	 related	practices	that	predominate	in	an	organizational	field”	(Scott,	2001,	p.139),	such	as	healthcare	or	social	work.	They	are	similar	to	what	Bowen	et	al.	(2013,	p.3)	describe	as	“repertoires	of	‘practical	schemas’	for	action”,	and	as	such	“are	not	reducible	to	a	national	model	or	 ideology”	but	proper	 to	 certain	 institutional	 settings.	While	 in	principle	 organisational	 action	 within	 any	 such	 field	 is	 organised	 by	 only	 one	institutional	 logic	 that	 is	 dominant	 at	 any	 particular	 time,	 several	 other	 logics	constantly	tend	to	coexist	and	compete	with,	and	sometimes	replace,	the	dominant	one	 as	 the	 guiding	 principle	 –	 a	 process	 that	 also	 helps	 to	 explain	 institutional	change	(Scott	et	al.,	2000;	Lindberg,	2014).	Besharov	&	Smith	(2013,	p.365)	argued	that	 the	 concrete	 “implications	 of	 logic	 multiplicity	 depend	 on	 how	 logics	 are	instantiated	 within	 organizations”	 and,	 more	 precisely,	 on	 what	 they	 call	 the	‘compatibility’	of	a	competing	logic	with	the	dominant	one,	and	its	‘centrality’	to	the	functioning	of	the	organisation.		What	is	crucial	to	my	analysis	is	that	organisations	can	actively	reduce	the	risk	of	competing	logics	generating	internal	conflicts	through	structural	adjustments	that	either	make	compliance	with	a	new	set	of	(conflicting)	rules	more	 likely,	or	non-compliance	less	visible.	According	to	Besharov	&	Smith	(2013,	p.376),	this	can	be	achieved	by	“[a]ltering	the	degree	of	logic	compatibility	or	centrality	–	for	example,	by	developing	a	cadre	of	organizational	members	who	are	less	strongly	attached	to	particular	 logics	 or	 by	 buffering	 members	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 those	 logics”	(emphasis	 added).	 In	 contrast	 to	 this,	 Reay	 &	 Hinings	 (2009,	 p.645)	 posit	 that	“actors	guided	by	different	logics	my	manage	the	rivalry	by	forming	collaborations	that	 maintain	 independence	 but	 support	 the	 accomplishment	 of	 mutual	 goals”	(emphasis	added).		On	one	hand,	both	of	 these	accounts	 recognise	 the	 idea	 that	 in	order	 to	have	an	actual	effect	on	organisational	practice,	institutional	logics	have	to	be	‘enacted’	or	‘performed	 into	 being’	 by	 individual	 actors	 working	 within	 the	 organisation	(Lindberg,	2014).	On	the	other	hand,	they	reflect	one	of	the	central	premises	of	neo-institutionalism,	which	posits	that	organisations	constantly	strive	for	legitimacy	and	in	order	to	be	seen	as	legitimate	by	their	environment	need	to	effectively	fulfil	their	
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ascribed	function	for	society	(Meyer	&	Rowan,	1977;	Scott,	2001).	Some	structural	elements	 are	 thereby	 incorporated	 because	 of	 their	 resonance	 with	 certain	‘institutionalised	 myths’	 that	 reflect	 what	 their	 environment	 sees	 as	 proper	functioning	and	successful	performance,	even	if	in	practice	they	do	not	help	or	even	hinder	 the	efficient	 realisation	of	 the	organisation’s	own	specific	 goals	 (Meyer	&	Rowan,	 1977).	 This	 often	 requires	 their	 formal	 structure	 to	 be	 ‘decoupled’	 from	organisational	action,	for	example	by	delegating	central	activities	to	professionals:	“decoupling	 enables	 organizations	 to	maintain	 standardized,	 legitimating,	 formal	structures	while	their	activities	vary	in	response	to	practical	considerations”	(Meyer	&	Rowan,	1977,	p.357).		My	 own	 empirical	 analysis	 supports	 the	 argument	 that	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	public	service	provision,	migrant	irregularity	often	represents	an	‘institutionalised	myth’11.	Based	on	this	myth,	it	is	often	formally	decided	that	access	to	public	services	must	 be	 contingent	 on	 legal	 residence	 status	 in	 order	 to	 not	 undermine	 the	sovereignty	 of	 the	 state,	 the	 efficiency	 of	 its	 immigration	 regime	 or	 the	 overall	sustainability	 of	 the	 welfare	 system.	 Almost	 unavoidably,	 some	members	 of	 the	organisations	 providing	 these	 services	 will	 thereby	 become	 responsible	 for	exercising	some	form	of	immigration	control,	and	thus	to	‘enact’	a	new	institutional	logic	 within	 these	 organisations.	 While	 probably	 seen	 as	 legitimate	 or	 even	necessary	 by	 a	majority	 of	 the	 population	 (and	 thus	 the	 organisations’	 ‘regular’	clients),	 this	 may	 for	 various	 reasons	 contradict	 service	 providers’	 individual	interests,	 professional	 ethics	 or	 the	 particular	 logic	 that	 dominates	 the	 legal-institutional	structure	in	which	their	actions	and	decisions	are	embedded.	Through	their	routine	face-to-face	interactions	with	their	clients,	and	given	the	discretionary	nature	of	their	jobs,	these	micro-level	actors	often	“develop	private	conceptions	of	the	agency's	objectives”	(Lipsky,	1980,	p.144).		At	the	macro-level,	a	certain	‘hypocrisy’	in	what	politicians	say	and	decide	not	only	increases	 the	 scope	 for	 individual	 discretion	 but	 thereby	 also	 makes	 these	inconsistencies	less	visible	to	the	public:	“If	decisions	are	ambiguous	it	is	easier	to																																																									11	This,	of	course,	is	not	to	say	that	immigration	status	and	regimes	are	not	‘real’	in	terms	of	their	meaning	and	regulative	force,	but	that	they	are	incorporated	into	other	organisational	fields	not	because	that	makes	practical	sense,	but	because	it	is	expected	by	political	leaders	and/or	the	public	they	represent.		
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interpret	them	as	consistent	with	ideas,	both	when	the	decision	is	made	and	when	the	 action	 is	 completed”	 (Brunsson,	 1993,	 p.499).	 The	 underlying	 (political)	conflicts	are	thereby	not	solved	but	delegated	to	the	implementing	agency,	where	they	have	to	be	managed	through	“the	actions	of	micro-level	actors	[…]	developing	localized	structures	and	systems	that	[enable]	day-to-day	work”,	as	Reay	&	Hinings	(2009,	 p.630)	 have	 shown.	Only	 in	 cases	where	 “the	 rivalry	 between	 competing	logics	 is	 resolved	 through	 collaboration	 at	 micro	 levels,	 macro-level	 actors	 will	develop	field-level	structures	to	support	the	coexistence	of	multiple	logics”	(Reay	&	Hinings,	 2009,	 p.647).	 As	 my	 empirical	 data	 and	 analysis	 will	 show,	 such	reconciliation	 can	 have	 inclusionary	 as	well	 as	 exclusionary	 effects	 for	 irregular	migrants’	access	 to	public	services.	 In	order	to	allow	a	systematic	examination	of	these	 processes,	 the	 final	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 incorporates	 the	 concepts	 and	arguments	established	so	far	into	a	simple	analytical	framework.			
2.4. A	framework	for	the	comparative	analysis	of	the	micro-management	of	
migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	Immigration	status	 is	sometimes	described	as	a	 ‘master	status’	 (Gonzales,	2015);	that	is,	a	status	that	overshadows	all	other	aspects	of	a	person’s	identity.	This	would	mean	 that	 independent	 from	 the	 social	or	 institutional	 context	 and	of	whether	a	person	is	sick	or	healthy,	old	or	young,	rich	or	poor,	a	criminal	or	a	‘good	boy’,	she	will	 always	 first	 of	 all	 be	 defined	 by	 her	 immigration	 status	 and	 then	 treated	accordingly.	This	 is	 certainly	 true	 for	any	direct	 encounter	with	 the	 immigration	system	as	well	as	many	other	situations	in	which	(irregular)	migrants	directly	face	‘the	state’.	A	much	more	nuanced	picture	emerges,	however,	when	we	 look	more	closely	 and	 from	 a	 comparative	 perspective	 at	 their	 various	 encounters	 within	particular	spheres	or	subsystems	of	society.	According	to	Luhmann	(1995)	these	subsystems	have	to	a	large	degree	become	‘self-referential’	as	a	consequence	of	(and	requirement	 for)	 their	 functional	 differentiation	 and	 specialisation.	 This	 allows	them	 to	 “tolerate	 indifference	 toward	everything	except	very	 specific	 features	of	their	 respective	 environments”	 (Luhmann,	 1982b,	 p.237).	 For	 example,	 the	educational	 system	 accepts	 pupils	 based	 on	 their	 age	 (in	 compliance	 with	mandatory	 school	 attendance	 rules),	 doctors	 treat	 patients	 according	 to	 how	
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serious	 their	 illness	 (as	 demanded	 by	 the	 Hippocratic	 oath),	 and	 social	 services	assess	cases	according	to	the	urgency	of	social	needs	or	the	degree	of	destitution.		The	framework	I	present	here	will	help	to	understand	what	exactly	happens	–	both	at	the	level	of	organisational	fields	and	that	of	individual	workers	assuming	different	roles	 within	 these	 –	 where	 the	 logic	 of	 immigration	 control	 interferes	 with	otherwise	 dominant	 institutional	 logics.	 This	 brings	 me	 back	 to	 Park’s	 (2013)	essential	question	of	what	we	(as	ordinary	citizens)	“should	do	when	we	encounter	an	‘unlawful’	person”.	I	will	 look	for	answers	by	embedding	the	question	in	more	specific	social	contexts	and	by	adopting	the	perspective	of	street-level	bureaucrats,	who	are	not	only	 citizens	but	also	 ‘citizen-managers’.	 For	Park,	 it	 is	primarily	an	issue	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 one	 should	 report	 the	 ‘unlawful	 person’	 he	 or	 she	 has	encountered	to	the	relevant	state	authorities	(‘Should	 I	 tell?’).	Given	that	migrant	irregularity	is	a	largely	invisible	marker,	however,	the	question	that	one	will	face	before	that	is	whether	and	how	to	actually	find	out,	and	thus	even	come	to	know,	the	immigration	status	of	that	person	(‘Should	I	know?’).		These	two	questions	constitute	the	basis	and	simple	way	to	operationalise	my	two-dimensional	framework,	which	situates	individual	actors	according	to	whether	or	not	 they	 normally	 will	 (or	 should	 or	 have	 to)	 detect	 and/or	 report	 migrant	irregularity	in	their	everyday	dealings	with	other	people.	Figure	1	 illustrates	this	framework:	 The	 horizontal	 dimension	 of	 the	 diagram	 encompasses	 what	 I	introduced	as	deputisation	versus	shielding.	That	is,	whether	or	not	individual	actors	will	need	(or	want)	to	know	potential	service	users’	immigration	status	in	order	to	take	it	into	account	in	their	interactions	with	them.	The	vertical	dimension	reflects	the	lack	or	presence	of	a	firewall,	i.e.	whether	welfare	workers	will	(or	are	expected	to)	share	such	knowledge	with	 immigration	authorities.	The	combination	of	both	dimensions	results	 in	a	 field	of	possibilities	 that	can	be	divided	 into	 four	sectors:	Sector	‘A’	represents	the	position	of	actual	agents	of	immigration	control,	whose	job	it	is	to	both	know	and	tell.	Actors	placed	in	the	opposite	sector	‘D’,	on	the	contrary,	operate	 under	what	 is	 sometimes	 called	 a	 ‘don’t	 ask,	 don’t	 tell’	 policy.	 Sector	 ‘C’	encompasses	roles	and	positions	that	require	systematic	checking	of	immigration	status	 but	 whose	 holders	 are	 not	 expected	 to	 share	 any	 such	 information	 with	immigration	authorities.	Arguably	the	least	obvious	positions	are	those	in	sector	‘B’,	
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where	actors	do	not	specifically	have	to	check,	but	are	required	or	encouraged	to	report	any	irregularity	they	may	encounter	or	suspect12.													In	Foucauldian	terms,	already	the	knowledge	of	someone’s	irregularity	is	likely	to	increase	the	disciplinary	power	that	street-level	bureaucrats	routinely	exercise	over	their	clients.	Such	knowledge	therefore	modifies	existing	power	relations,	like	that	between	doctor	and	patient,	teacher	and	pupil	(or	parent),	social	worker	and	benefit	claimant,	 administrator	 and	 applicant,	 and	 so	 on.	 Since	 it	 rests	 on	 the	 sheer	
possibility	of	being	reported,	this	power	operates	even	in	the	absence	of	any	formal	obligation	or	moral	expectation	to	report.	Its	concrete	force	can	thus	depend	on	the	real	or	perceived	likelihood	that	being	reported	would	actually	lead	to	detention	or	deportation,	 and	 thus	on	 the	 individual	 as	well	 as	 contextual	 circumstances	 that	render	a	person	more	or	less	deportable.	In	addition,	more	power	can	be	exercised	over	migrants	who	would	potentially	be	deported	to	a	country	where	they	fear	for	their	life	or	livelihood.																																																										12	Arguably,	this	would	encompass	local	police	(unless	they	are	required	to	routinely	check	immigration	status	as	part	of	their	dealings	with	citizens),	or	members	of	the	general	public	who	are	explicitly	encouraged	by	the	government	to	report	any	suspected	immigration	offence	(as	is	the	case	in	the	UK).		
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Figure	1:	Potential	positions	of	individual	actors	or	organisational	roles	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	
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At	the	same	time,	only	by	receiving	information	on	somebody	who	is	deportable	is	‘the	state’	enabled	to	exert	its	sovereign	power	to	exclude,	which	in	addition	to	other	constraints	is	thus	always	contingent	on	having	this	kind	of	knowledge.	This	also	means	that	by	making	use	of	the	varying	degrees	of	discretionary	power	attached	to	their	roles,	street-level	bureaucrats	can	sometimes	actively	contest	and	resist	the	power	 of	 ‘the	 state’.	 In	 instances	where	 irregular	migrants	 should	 (or	 could)	 be	excluded,	offering	a	service	and	thus	not	excluding	them	can	be	seen	as	a	form	of	resistance,	which	for	Foucault	(2002a)	is	always	endemic	to	power	relations.		Importantly,	the	two	questions	underlying	my	framework	can	not	only	be	answered	for	 individual	 actors	 or	 particular	 roles	 within	 organisations	 but	 can	 also	 be	transposed	 to	 the	 level	 of	 particular	 kinds	 of	 organisations	 (such	 as	 schools	 or	hospitals)	 as	 well	 as	 organisational	 fields	 (like	 the	 healthcare	 or	 educational	system).	As	figure	2	illustrates,	these	can	be	placed	in	essentially	the	same	diagram,	according	to	(i)	whether	or	not	access	formally	depends	on	immigration	status,	and	(ii)	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 structural	 firewall	 separates	 them	 from	 immigration	authorities.														
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Figure	2:	Potential	institutional	arrangements	for	the	inclusion	or	exclusion	of	irregular	residents	and	likely	outcomes	for	the	latter		
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Here	again,	the	combination	of	both	questions	results	in	four	sectors,	each	of	which	can	be	linked	to	a	certain	outcome	for	irregular	migrants	trying	to	access	the	service	provided:	They	are	excluded	where	access	hinges	on	legal	residence	(‘A’	and	‘C’),	but	only	 where	 there	 is	 no	 firewall	 in	 place	 will	 even	 the	 attempt	 to	 access	 trigger	immigration	 enforcement	 (‘A’).	Where	 access	 is	 formally	 granted	 irrespective	 of	immigration	status	(‘B’	and	‘D’),	the	lack	of	a	firewall	implies	a	tangible	risk	that	still	acts	as	a	deterrent	and	thus	leads	to	informal	exclusion	(‘B’),	while	the	existence	of	a	firewall	permits	the	formal	inclusion	of	irregular	migrants,	which	I	conceptualise	as	micro-regularisation	(‘D’).		The	various	positions	within	the	 framework	also	have	 important	 implications	 for	the	 overall	 effectiveness	 of	 internal	 immigration	 control	 as	well	 as	 the	 “routine	interactions	 among	 the	 institutional	 personnel	 and	 its	 ‘publics’	 through	 which	constraints,	core	beliefs,	and	role	assignment	are	constantly	negotiated,	rearranged,	and	 reinvented”	 (Bowen	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 p.13/4).	 Apart	 from	 mapping	 the	 various	positions	that	 individual	actors,	organisations	or	systems	that	deal	with	 irregular	migrants	are	assigned	 through	 formal	 rules	and	 regulations,	 this	 framework	also	helps	 to	 register	 and	 compare	 the	underlying	motivations	 and	 tensions	 between	these.	On	one	hand,	I	am	interested	in	how	 individuals	or	organisations	are	being	incentivised	or	pushed	to	identify	and/or	report	migrant	irregularity.	By	looking	for	individual	interests	and	institutional	pressures	or	logics	that	tend	to	converge	with	the	logic	of	(internal)	immigration	control,	my	analysis	highlights	the	various	forms	of	governmentality	through	which	the	government	encourages	compliance	with	its	rule.	On	the	other	hand,	the	framework	allows	identifying	different	instances	and	forms	 of	 resistance	 (by	 individual	 actors,	 professional	 groups	 or	 organisations)	against	 having	 to	know	 or	 tell.	 These	will	 be	 related	 to	 institutionally	 embedded	interests	 or	 logics	 that	 conflict	 with	 that	 of	 internal	 immigration	 control.	 Such	resistance	can	be	performed	at	various	organisational	levels,	through	either	formal	or	informal	discretion	but	also	deliberate	non-compliance	with	explicit	rules.		By	facilitating	a	systematic	and	comparative	analysis	of	these	issues,	my	framework	contributes	 to	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 how	 immigration	 control	works	within	society	and	what	that	means	for	some	of	the	core	institutions	of	the	welfare	state.	For	 Luhmann	 (1982a,	 p.237),	 not	 only	 ‘system	 boundaries’	 but	 also	 territorial	
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borders	 fulfil	 a	 crucial	 role	 for	 the	 increasing	differentiation	of	modern	 societies	because	they	too	function	as	a	“means	of	production	of	relations”	(cit.	in	Rigo,	2011,	p.207).	Foucault’s	analysis	of	the	‘microphysics	of	power’,	on	the	other	hand,	reflects	his	 interest	 in	 “showing	 that	 power	 ‘comes	 from	 below’,	 that	 is,	 that	 global	 and	hierarchical	 structures	 of	 domination	 within	 a	 society	 depend	 on	 and	 operate	through	more	local,	low-level,	 ‘capillary’	circuits	of	power	relationships”	(Gordon,	2002,	p.xxiv/v).	Based	on	the	work	of	Foucault,	Jones	(2013)	described	the	way	in	which	 street-level	 bureaucrats	 are	 implicated	 in	 these	 power	 relations	 as	 ‘the	conduct	 of	 conduct	 of	 conduct’,	 whereby	 the	 government	 acts	 on	 the	 actions	 of	others	who	themselves	act	towards	others.		Seen	from	this	perspective,	states	do	not	directly	regulate	the	quantity	of	migrant	irregularity	as	such,	nor	 the	various	effects	 it	has	on	 (irregular)	migrants’	 rights,	opportunities	 and	 power	 to	 make	 claims.	 Yet,	 by	 defining	 and	 constraining	 the	actions	that	street-level	bureaucrats	as	well	as	other	citizens	may	legitimately	take	towards	them,	the	government	provides	the	framework	for,	and	thereby	exercises	some	control	over	what	 I	call	 the	micro-management	of	migrant	 irregularity.	The	following	chapter	provides	an	overview	of	the	research	design	and	methodology	I	have	employed	to	collect	and	analyse	the	relevant	empirical	data.		 	
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3. Research	design,	case	selection	and	methodology	Migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	are	complex	and	far-reaching	phenomena	that	have	 profound	 –	 although	 not	 always	 very	 visible	 –	 implications	 for	 individuals,	institutions,	and	society	as	a	whole.	The	social	problems,	legal	contradictions	and	moral	dilemmas	they	create	can	be	felt	by	a	wide	range	of	actors,	and	are	difficult	to	trace	back	to,	or	pin	down	in	any	particular	site	or	point	in	time.	In	order	to	capture	and	investigate	this	complexity	I	have	chosen	a	comparative	approach	that	allows	my	analysis	to	shift	between	various	levels	and	combine	different	methodological	tools,	while	keeping	the	overall	research	design	as	simple	and	‘elegant’	as	possible	(Hakim,	2000).		According	to	Grimshaw	(1973,	cit.	in	Hantrais,	2009,	p.5),	one	of	the	core	tasks	of	comparative	 sociology	 is	 “to	 distinguish	 between	 those	 regularities	 in	 social	behaviour	that	are	system-specific	and	those	that	are	universal”.	With	regard	to	the	study	of	irregular	migration,	Black	(2003)	has	noted	that	the	increasing	number	of	individual	case	studies	has	not	been	matched	by	efforts	to	compare	and	build	theory	beyond	and	across	specific	empirical	contexts.	In	order	to	contribute	to	the	latter,	it	is	 necessary	 to	 transcend	 the	 idea	 of	 irregularity	 as	 a	 mirror	 of	 one	 specific	(national)	 policy	 framework.	 Instead,	 the	 aim	 must	 be	 to	 gain	 a	 better	understanding	 of	 its	 meaning	 and	 consequences	 across	 different	 cases	 and	administrative	 levels.	 Independent	 of	 whether	 these	 are	 countries,	 cities,	neighbourhoods	 or	 more	 specific	 sites	 of	 social	 interaction,	 such	 analyses	 must	always	involve	both:	in-depth	case	study	and	systematic	comparison.		In	 the	 fields	 of	 social	 sciences	 and	 humanities,	 research	 has	 been	 described	 as	comparative	when	“carried	out	with	the	intention	of	using	the	same	research	tools	to	 compare	 systematically	 the	 manifestations	 of	 phenomena	 in	 more	 than	 one	temporal	 or	 spatial	 sociocultural	 setting”	 (Hantrais,	 2009,	 p.2).	 Rather	 than	 a	distinctive	methodology	in	its	own	right,	a	comparative	approach	is	thus	a	holistic	‘research	 strategy’	 (Lijphart,	 1971)	 or	 ‘logic	 of	 inquiry’	 (Labovitz	 et	 al.,	 1971)	affecting	 every	 single	 step	 from	 research	 design	 to	 data	 collection	 and	 the	interpretation	of	findings.	Most	importantly,	however,	for	a	research	project	to	be	truly	 comparative	 it	 must	 not	 just	 investigate	 the	 same	 issue	 in	 two	 or	 more	different	contexts,	but	also	systematically	relate	the	social	phenomenon	under	study	
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to	the	relevant	contextual	characteristics	of	each	case	(Hantrais,	2009;	FitzGerald,	2012;	Labovitz	et	al.,	1971).	In	this	sense,	my	study	does	more	than	merely	contrast	the	formal	entitlements	and	effective	access	of	irregular	migrants	to	various	public	services	 provided	 in	 different	 places.	 It	 also	 highlights	 how	 certain	 contextual	features	 of	 each	 field	 site	 significantly	 shape	 the	 roles	 that	 various	 public	institutions	and	 individual	street-level	bureaucrats	 (can)	play	when	 local	 service	provision	overlaps	with	immigration	control.		Contextualisation	is	particularly	important	in	order	to	“understand	how	a	particular	phenomenon	has	been	socially,	culturally	and	politically	constructed”,	as	argued	by	Hantrais	 (2009,	p.118).	For	her,	 a	 systematic	 comparison	of	 actual	policies	must	therefore	 include	 a	 “fine-grain	 analysis	 of	 policy	 environments”,	 in	 order	 to	“produce	 evidence	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 policies	 implemented	 in	 different	spatiotemporal	environments	in	response	to	similar	socioeconomic	trends”	(ibid.).	At	the	same	time,	policy	analysis	cannot	but	take	into	account	local	implementation	practices	and	outcomes.	A	full	understanding	of	how	and	why	policies	work	(or	not)	in	 practice	 can	 thus	 only	 be	 gained	 by	 also	 looking	 at	 how	 individual	 actors	experience,	interpret,	implement	or	contest	them	within	these	environments	(Wight	2004,	cit.	in	Hasselberg,	2012).		This	is	what	my	study	tries	to	achieve	in	relation	to	national,	local,	institutional	and	individual	responses	to	migrant	irregularity.	This	chapter	gives	a	brief	overview	of	the	units,	levels	and	dimensions	of	my	analysis,	the	variety	of	data	sources	it	is	based	on,	the	research	methods	I	have	used	to	collect	and	analyse	this	data,	as	well	as	the	ethical	concerns	and	methodological	difficulties	I	thereby	encountered.			
3.1. The	study:	research	design	and	case	selection	My	study	is	based	on	a	systematic	comparison	of	three	different	spheres	or	sectors	of	public	service	provision	(healthcare,	education	and	social	assistance)	across	two	local	settings	(London	and	Barcelona)	that	are	each	embedded	in	specific	regional	(England	and	Catalonia)13	and	national	(the	UK	and	Spain)	contexts.	Accordingly,																																																									13	Given	the	different	degrees	of	regional	autonomy,	this	level	is	significantly	more	relevant	in	the	Spanish	than	the	UK	context.		
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the	investigation	covers	a	total	of	six	cases,	as	represented	in	figure	3,	which	also	provides	an	overview	of	the	empirical	chapters	to	follow:			
			
3.1.1. Comparing	(two)	different	‘environments’	for	the	local	provision	of	
public	services	to	irregular	residents		In	his	Comparativist	Manifesto	for	International	Migration	Studies,	FitzGerald	(2012,	p.1725/6)	advocated	for	“building	migration	theory	through	fieldwork	in	multiple	sites	 chosen	 for	 their	 theoretical	 variation”.	 I	 have	 selected	 the	 UK	 and	 Spain	primarily	 because	 they	 represent	 very	 dissimilar	 national	 contexts	 for	 the	integration	of	 irregular	migrants	and	their	access	 to	public	services.	A	secondary	reason	was	my	familiarity	with	the	broader	policy	frameworks	and	fluency	in	the	languages	 of	 both	 countries.	 They	 differ	 quite	 significantly	 in	 terms	 of	 their	geographical	location,	constitutional	structure	of	the	state,	the	size	of	their	informal	economies,	as	well	as	their	immigration	histories	and	current	legal-political	contexts	for	 the	 broader	 management	 of	 migration.	 Most	 importantly,	 as	 I	 will	 show	 in	chapter	4,	 they	employ	very	different	policy	approaches	to	reduce	the	number	of	people	 residing	 unlawfully	 within	 their	 territories.	 These	 national	 policy	frameworks	not	only	 reflect	different	overall	perceptions	of	migrant	 irregularity,	but	 also	 determine	 its	 institutionalisation	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 All	 this	 creates	distinctive	 conditions	 for	 the	 micro-management	 of	 migrant	 irregularity,	 which	takes	place	within	various	spheres	of	everyday	 life	and	 interaction,	 including	the	institutions	of	the	welfare	state.		While	 the	 two	 selected	 countries	 thus	 represent	 rather	 dissimilar	 (national)	contexts	for	the	provision	of	public	services	to	irregular	residents,	the	selected	cities	
	 Healthcare	 Education	 Social	Assistance	
UK	>	England	>	London	 Case	1		 Case	3	 Case	5	
Spain	>	Catalonia	>	Barcelona	 Case	2	 Case	4	 Case	6	
Figure	3:	Case	overview	and	comparative	design	
Chapter	5	 Chapter	7	Chapter	6	Chapter	4	
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have	several	things	in	common.	Both	London	and	Barcelona	are	located	within	parts	of	 the	country	that	are	economically	dominant	and	grow	faster	(demographically	and	economically)	than	the	national	average.	They	are	home	to	some	of	the	largest	and	oldest	immigrant	communities	present	in	each	country,	and	(unlike	other	cities	and	 regions)	 continue	 to	 experience	 a	 further	 expansion	 and	 particularly	 rapid	diversification	 of	 their	 foreign	 populations.	 They	 are	 also	 estimated	 to	 harbour	particularly	high	concentrations	of	irregular	foreign	workers	and	residents	(Gordon	et	al.,	2009;	Pajares	et	al.,	2004).	I	deliberately	chose	Barcelona	instead	of	Madrid,	which	may	 seem	 the	more	 obvious	 comparator	 to	 London.	 Barcelona	 is	 Spain’s	second-largest	city	and	the	capital	of	Catalonia,	which	is	one	of	the	country’s	most	autonomous	regions	and	currently	the	strongest	opponent	to	central	government	power	 and	 policies14 .	 Looking	 at	 Barcelona	 thus	 more	 explicitly	 highlights	 the	significant	influence	that	both	regional	and	local	administrations	can	have	when	it	comes	to	the	 local	provision	of	public	services	to	 irregular	migrants.	The	Catalan	government’s	refusal	to	implement	the	restrictive	national	health	reform	of	2012	is	a	good	example	for	this	(see	chapter	5).		Regarding	the	level	of	(comparative)	analysis,	FitzGerald	(2012,	p.1729)	points	at	“the	 difficult	 question	 of	 how	 to	 distinguish	 between	 the	 effect	 of	 being	 in	 a	particular	locality	[and	that	of]	being	in	a	particular	country”.	Precisely	in	order	to	avoid	this	inherent	problem,	I	decided	to	compare	what	I	call	environments	for	the	
local	provision	of	public	services	to	irregular	migrants.	Glick	Schiller	&	Çağlar	(2016,	p.19)	recently	argued	that	“[c]ities,	understood	not	as	bounded	units	of	analysis	but	as	entry	points,	can	be	useful	 in	constructing	a	multiscalar	analysis”.	Rather	than	fixing	the	level	of	analysis	to	either	cities	or	states,	my	research	design	allows	it	to	shift	between	various	 levels,	 including	the	regional	as	well	as	that	of	 institutions.	What	matters	is	where	the	specific	rules,	incentives,	constraints	or	contradictions	that	 determine	 my	 research	 participant’s	 reactions	 to	 migrant	 irregularity,	ultimately	originate.	As	Bloemraad	(2013,	p.35)	maintains,		[c]omparing	cities	makes	sense	if	what	is	of	interest	involves	institutions	or																																																									14	While	the	recent	‘referendum’	about	Catalan	independence	and	the	accompanying	political	conflict	is	not	about	the	rights	and	treatment	of	irregular	migrants	or	immigration	in	general,	it	is	indicative	of	the	deep-seated	antagonism	between	the	Spanish	government	and	the	‘Generalitat	de	Catalunya’;	whereas	the	city-region	of	Madrid	is	governed	by	the	same	party	(Partido	Popular)	that	also	forms	the	central	government	since	2011.		
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resources	 that	 are	 determined	 by	 politicians	 or	 other	 actors	 within	identifiable	 city	 boundaries.	 But	 for	 those	 interested	 in	 inter-personal	interactions,	neighborhoods	might	be	the	right	case,	or	for	those	interested	in	labor	markets,	a	comparison	of	metropolitan	areas	or	sub-national	regions	might	be	more	important.	The	 wide-ranging	 effects	 of	 migrant	 irregularity	 as	 well	 as	 its	 control	 could	 be	observed	at	any	of	these	levels.	I	therefore	followed	Przeworski	&	Teune’s	(1971,	p.36)	suggestion	to	keep	“the	question	of	at	which	level	the	relevant	factors	operate	[…]	open	throughout	the	process	of	enquiry”,	which	 in	my	case	departs	 from	the	perspective	 of	 individual	 actors	 occupying	 similar	 organisational	 roles	 within	different	sectors	of	public	service	provision.		I	 thus	 selected	 the	 UK-England-London	 and	 Spain-Catalonia-Barcelona	 as	 two	
environments	that	arguably	represent	the	opposite	ends	of	a	continuum:	the	former	explicitly	hostile,	 the	 latter	relatively	accommodating	towards	irregular	residents	and	many	of	their	claims	(see	chapter	4).	Flyvbjerg	(2006,	p.229)	argued	that	such	“[a]typical	or	extreme	cases	often	reveal	more	 information	because	they	activate	more	actors	and	more	basic	mechanisms	in	the	situation	studied”.	At	the	same	time,	it	helps	me	to	demonstrate	that	my	research	design	and	analytical	framework	can	be	operationalised	across	multiple	levels	of	government	and	allow	comparisons	to	be	drawn	between	cases	embedded	in	rather	distinctive	administrative	structures15.		
3.1.2. Comparing	(three)	different	spheres	of	public	service	provision	The	second	dimension	of	my	analysis	is	the	comparison	between	different	service	sectors,	 namely	 healthcare,	 education	 and	 social	 assistance.	 Each	 of	 them	 is	provided	to	the	local	population	through	a	specific	set	of	institutions	that	operate	within	a	certain	legal	framework	in	order	to	fulfil	a	particular	function	for	society	as	a	whole.	At	the	same	time,	many	of	these	institutions	are	becoming	more	and	more	involved	in	processes	of	everyday	bordering.	At	least	at	certain	moments	and	with																																																									15	In	this	sense,	the	analysis	would	certainly	benefit	from	including	additional	cities	in	each	country,	ideally	Madrid	and	Edinburgh.	However,	more	than	two	in-depth	case	studies	would	exceed	the	research	capacity	of	a	single	researcher	as	well	as	the	scope	of	a	doctoral	thesis.	Moreover,	several	authors	explicitly	advocate	for	a	systematic	comparative	analysis	of	a	small	number	of	cases,	which	“permits	more	careful	process-tracing	and	the	identification	of	causal	mechanisms	that	come	together	to	produce	social	phenomena”	(Bloemraad,	2013,	p.29;	see	also	FitzGerald,	2012).	
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regard	to	certain	groups	of	people	they	are	thus	part	of	the	same	expanding	border	regime,	which	according	to	Walters	(2015)	has	to	be	disaggregated	in	order	to	be	fully	 understood:	 He	 therefore	 argues	 that	 only	 a	 close	 observation	 of	 specific	‘border	elements’	allows	to	“move	beyond	static	and	monolithic	conceptions	of	a	border	 regime,	 and	 register	 the	 many	 little	 lines	 of	 force	 that	 run	 in	 multiple	directions,	constituting	the	border	regime	as	a	complex	and	dynamic	multiplicity”	(2015,	p.7).		As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 different	 institutional	 spheres	 tend	 to	 be	characterised	by	different	organisational	 cultures	and	 logics.	Although	particular	countries,	 regions	or	even	cities	might	develop	 some	kind	of	overarching	 ‘public	service	culture’	of	their	own,	the	variation	between	different	welfare	sectors	can	be	expected	to	remain	noticeable	across	geographical	settings.	To	a	significant	extent	these	 disparities	 reflect	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 people	 who	 work	 in	 the	 respective	institutions	have	different	backgrounds	and	professions,	and	thus	tend	to	develop	their	 own	 set	 of	 values,	 standards	 and	 expectations	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 work	environment	and	clientele.		Importantly,	it	is	always	by	these	actors	and	within	these	institutions	that	services	are	 actually	 provided	 to	 the	 population	 and	 any	 policy	 of	 internal	 immigration	control	is	to	be	implemented	in	order	to	become	effective.	Jordan	and	his	colleagues	(2003,	p.212)	argued	that	treating	local	policy	implementation	as	a	process	helps	to	“trace	the	multi-directional	links	between	policy	mandates,	implementation,	street-level	 bureaucrats’	 motivations	 and	 wider	 socio-economic	 interests	 in	 the	 host	society”.	Depending	on	the	sector,	such	policies	thus	encounter	–	and	will	be	more	or	 less	 likely	 to	 conflict	 with	 –	 different	 sets	 of	 organisational	 logics,	 functional	imperatives	and	professional	norms.	More	precisely,	policy	implementation	is	thus	always	a	process	of	on-going	negotiation.	What	is	important	for	the	structure	of	my	analysis	 is	 that	 the	 various	 ‘street-level	 bureaucrats’	 who	 are	 involved	 in	 these	negotiations	 occupy	 rather	 similar	 (kinds	 of)	 organisational	 roles	 within	 their	respective	 sectors	 and	 institutions;	 and	 can	 thus	 be	 grouped	 into	 basic	 role-
categories,	as	I	will	outline	in	the	following	sub-section.			
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3.1.3. Looking	at	similar	kinds	of	‘roles’	across	the	six	cases		Every	area	of	service	provision	depends	on	a	wide	range	of	actors	who	carry	out	more	or	less	specific	tasks	within	the	larger	organisation.	Whereas	some	of	these	roles	are	typical	 for	one	particular	sector	or	kind	of	 institution	(such	as	 that	of	a	university	lecturer	or	doctor),	others	are	much	more	generic	and	can	be	found	in	many	different	institutional	settings	(like	receptionists	or	accountants).		In	 order	 to	 facilitate	 a	 systematic	 and	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 how	 various	organisations	deal	with	migrant	irregularity	within	each	of	the	two	environments,	I	differentiate	between	three	broader	role-categories:	administrators,	professionals,	and	what	I	call	the	managers	of	irregularity.	The	first	category	includes	workers	who	carry	out	 clerical	duties,	 like	 receptionists,	 accountants	and	other	administrative	staff;	 whereas	 the	 second	 one	 comprises	 professional	 roles	 and	 responsibilities,	such	as	 those	performed	by	doctors	and	nurses,	 teachers	or	 social	workers.	The	third	 category	 includes	 those	 actors	 who	 more	 specifically	 manage	 migrant	irregularity	 within	 the	 respective	 organisation.	 As	 I	 will	 show	 in	 the	 empirical	chapters	 on	 healthcare	 (chapter	 5),	 education	 (chapter	 6)	 and	 social	 assistance	(chapter	7),	the	various	actors	within	each	of	these	role-categories	tend	to	perform	similar	gatekeeping	functions,	have	equivalent	degrees	of	power	and	discretion,	and	are	comparable	in	terms	of	their	proximity	to	immigration	control	or	enforcement.		This	approach	allows	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	causal	relationships	between	certain	structural	or	contextual	features	that	characterise	each	case	(including	laws	and	regulations,	institutional	frameworks,	or	political	rhetoric)	and	the	perceptions,	decisions	and	behaviours	of	individual	actors,	which	in	turn	significantly	determine	policy	 outcomes.	 At	 the	 institutional	 level,	 comparisons	 can	 be	 drawn	 between	actors	 occupying	 different	 organisational	 roles	 within	 the	 same	 sectors	 or	institutions,	as	well	as	between	the	same	organisational	roles	 in	different	sectors	and	institutions.	Looking	at	these	issues	in	two	different	national	and	local	settings	thereby	helps	to	distinguish	the	contextual	particularities	of	each	sector	from	those	that	are	specific	to	each	environment.				
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3.2. The	methodology:	data	sources,	data	collection	and	data	analysis	Any	study	that	aims	to	encompass	various	levels	of	analysis	and	to	focus	on	both	social	structures	and	individual	agency	needs	to	be	able	to	integrate	different	types	of	evidence	drawn	from	a	variety	of	sources.	From	the	outset,	this	opens	a	broad	choice	of	potential	research	methods.	Methodological	tools	or	methods	have	been	defined	as	“the	means	whereby	evidence	is	collected	and	analysed,	with	a	view	to	achieving	research	objectives”	(Hantrais,	2009,	p.57).	Choosing	the	right	method(s)	thus	involves	at	least	three	interrelated	decisions:	(i)	Which	type(s)	of	evidence	will	the	investigation	draw	on,	(ii)	what	is	the	specific	purpose	that	this	information	can	and	should	fulfil,	and	(iii)	which	method	is	most	appropriate	to	collect	and	analyse	such	data?		Irregular	migration	and	residence	are	intrinsically	characterised	by	a	lack	of	official	data	and	reliable	statistical	evidence	(Black,	2003;	Düvell	et	al.,	2010;	Singer,	1999).	In	trying	to	describe,	understand	and	explain	the	effects	of	migrant	irregularity	and	its	 control,	 my	 study	 therefore	 mostly	 relies	 on	 original,	 qualitative	 field	 data	collected	in	London	(from	July	2014	until	the	end	of	February	2015)	and	Barcelona	(between	 the	 beginning	 of	March	 and	mid-October	 2015).	Within	 both	 cities	my	fieldwork	concentrated	on,	but	was	not	strictly	limited	to,	districts	where	the	effects	of	past	and	current	immigration	are	(perceived	as)	particularly	strong,	namely	the	London	Boroughs	of	Hackney	and	Lewisham;	and	the	districts	of	Ciutat	Vella	and	Sant	Martí	in	Barcelona.			
3.2.1. Semi-structured	interviews	The	 core	 of	 this	 data	 comes	 from	 an	 overall	 number	 of	 86	 semi-structured	interviews	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 local	 actors	 more	 or	 less	 directly	 involved	 in	negotiating	the	provision	of	public	services	to	irregular	residents	and	thereby	also	the	 implementation	and	effectiveness	of	 internal	 control	measures.	They	 include	representatives	 of	 civil	 society,	members	 of	 the	 local	 administration,	 street-level	bureaucrats	with	various	professional	backgrounds,	as	well	as	 irregular	migrants	themselves.	A	complete	list	of	interviews	can	be	found	in	the	appendix	(10.2).		
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In	 London	 I	 conducted	 33	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 a	 total	 of	 35	 ‘non-migrant’	respondents16.	Half	of	them	were	representatives	of	relevant	civil	society	organisations,	 including	 charities,	 advocacy	 groups,	 migrant	 associations	 and	church	 communities.	 The	 other	 half	 were	 professionals	 and	 administrative	 staff	working	in	the	fields	of	healthcare	(5),	education	(6)	and	social	assistance	(4),	as	well	as	representatives	of	the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	and	different	local	Councils	(3).	I	also	interviewed	twelve	migrants	in	irregular	situations	–	six	males,	six	 females;	 aged	 between	 20	 and	 50	 –	who	 had	migrated	 from	 various	 non-EU	countries	 and	 been	 living	 in	 London	 for	 between	 1.5	 and	 20	 years,	 experiencing	different	kinds	and	degrees	of	irregularity.	At	the	time	of	the	interview	none	of	them	had	a	 formal	right	 to	reside	 in	 the	UK	but	some	had	previously	held	a	visa	while	others	were	awaiting	the	outcome	of	outstanding	applications	for	LTR.		In	 Barcelona,	 where	 I	 subsequently	 collected	 equivalent	 data,	 I	 conducted	 32	interviews	with	 a	 total	of	 35	 ‘non-migrant’	 informants	 and	 nine	 interviews	with	migrants	in	irregular	situations.	The	latter	included	six	males	and	four	females,	aged	between	 19	 and	 42,	 who	 had	 immigrated	 from	 Uzbekistan,	 Morocco,	 Gambia,	Senegal,	 the	 US,	 the	 Philippines	 or	 Honduras.	 Of	 the	 ‘non-migrant’	 respondents,	eleven	were	civil	society	representatives	(mostly	NGO	workers);	six	were	members	of	 the	 local	 or	 regional 17 	administration,	 and	 the	 rest	 were	 professionals	 and	administrative	 staff	 working	 in	 public	 healthcare	 (7),	 education	 (6)	 and	 social	assistance	(5).		In	 both	 cities,	 interviews	with	 equivalent	 respondents	 followed	 the	 same	 rough	structure	(see	example	interview	guides	in	the	appendix),	and	also	my	strategy	of	selecting	 and	 approaching	 potential	 respondents	 was	 largely	 the	 same:	 First	 I	contacted	 relevant	 NGOs,	 advocacy	 groups	 and	 other	 civil	 society	 organisations	(mostly	 by	 email)	 and	 usually	 managed	 to	 arrange	 a	 formal	 interview	 within	 a	couple	 of	 days,	 sometimes	 weeks.	 These	 interviews	 mainly	 served	 to	 better	understand	the	context	and	to	identify	the	major	difficulties	and	barriers	in	relation	to	irregular	migrants’	access	to	various	public	services.	Questions	were	adapted	on																																																									16	Some	of	these	obviously	had	a	migrant	background	themselves,	but	that	was	of	no	particular	relevance	for	my	study	or	the	information	they	provided;	two	of	these	interviews	were	conducted	with	two	respondents	at	the	same	time.		17	One	of	them	was	a	representative	of	the	Catalan	government.		
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a	case-by-case	basis	to	fit	the	particular	area	of	work	or	field	of	expertise	of	each	organisation.		Since	this	access	strategy	proved	rather	unsuccessful	in	the	case	of	other	institutions	like	hospitals,	health	centres,	schools	(in	particular),	social	service	departments	or	other	Council	offices,	I	had	to	approach	these	in	person	and	explain	the	aim	of	my	research	and	 the	questions	 I	was	most	 interested	 in.	The	persons	who	 I	 initially	spoke	 to	 would	 then	 usually	 refer	 me	 to	 a	 department	 or	 specific	 colleague	(sometimes	 also	 another	 institution	 or	 even	 a	 different	 local	 area),	 who	 they	perceived	 as	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 aware	 of,	 get	 in	 contact	 with,	 or	 have	 specific	knowledge	or	experiences	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity.	It	often	took	more	time	than	 I	 expected	 and	 sometimes	 several	 approaches	 to	 convince	 the	 various	‘gatekeepers’	 that	 it	 was	 really	 their	 perspective	 (from	within	 a	 local	 school	 or	housing	department,	 for	example)	 that	was	most	 important	 for	my	research.	The	fact	 that	 I	was	 less	 interested	 in	 the	perspective	of	 the	 immigration	authority	or	national	government	even	though	“that’s	where	they	make	these	rules”,	as	several	people	reminded	me,	seemed	to	make	some	of	them	more	curious	but	sometimes	also	 raised	a	kind	of	 suspicion.	 In	 some	cases,	 it	 took	 several	weeks	and	a	 lot	of	persistence	to	identify	suitable	respondents	and/or	persuade	them	to	participate.		The	 resulting	 interviews	with	 street-level	 bureaucrats	mainly	 focussed	 on	 three	aspects:	(i)	their	perception	of	the	meaning	and	relevance	of	(irregular)	immigration	status	and	 the	 treatment	and	 rights	of	 irregular	migrants	within	 their	respective	institutional	domain;	(ii)	the	extent	to	which	they	felt	implicated	in	implementing	specific	policies	of	internal	control	or	immigration	legislation	more	generally;	and	(iii)	 potential	 contradictions	 or	 convergence	 of	 the	 primary	 function	 of	 their	organisation	or	their	own	professional	role	and	responsibilities	with	immigration-related	duties,	rules	and	regulations.		Meetings	 and	 interviews	 with	 local	 politicians	 and	 representatives	 of	 the	 local	administration	were	arranged	by	email	and	mainly	examined	the	role	of	the	city	or	district	authority	with	regards	to	public	service	provision	–	both	generally	and	in	relation	 to	 irregular	 residents;	 as	well	 as	 immigration	 legislation	and	policy,	 and	particularly	their	involvement	in	or	concerns	about	internal	control	measures.	All	non-migrant	 participants	 were	 given	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 official	 information	 sheet	
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explaining	my	research	and	signed	a	written	consent	form	ahead	of	the	interview	(see	 appendix).	 At	 this	 point	 I	 also	 asked	 all	 of	 them	 to	 indicate	 whether	 they	preferred	 to	 stay	 anonymous.	 Even	 though	 in	 both	 cities	 the	 majority	 of	interviewees	 told	me	 they	would	not	mind	being	named	personally,	 I	decided	 to	generally	 not	 identify	 them	 by	 name	 but	 rather	 specify	 –	 as	 far	 as	 possible	 and	appropriate	–	their	organisation	and/or	particular	function	within	it.		Contact	with	irregular	migrants	themselves	was	mostly	made	or	at	least	facilitated	via	a	number	of	dedicated	NGOs	and	migrant	associations,	but	also	with	the	help	of	friends	 and	 other	 personal	 contacts.	 These	 interviews	 mainly	 focused	 on	 when,	where,	and	under	which	conditions	they	perceived	their	ascribed	irregularity	as	a	particular	barrier	or	risk	factor;	and	more	specifically,	how	it	affected	their	position	vis-à-vis	 the	 local	 authority	 and	 public	 welfare	 institutions.	 I	 thereby	 generally	focused	on	their	(irregular)	residence	in	the	city,	rather	than	why	they	had	decided	to	migrate	 and	 how	 they	 entered	 the	 country.	 As	 suggested	 by	 Cornelius	 (1982,	p.395),	the	interviews	were	generally	structured	along	several	loosely	related	and	open-ended	questions	“which	give	the	respondent	an	opportunity	to	‘tell	his	story’	[…]	with	as	little	encumbrance	or	interference	by	the	researcher	as	possible”.		With	several	of	my	respondents	I	have	maintained	contact	(via	social	media,	email	or	telephone)	beyond	the	end	of	my	main	fieldwork	period,	which	allowed	me	to	conduct	 several	 follow-up	 interviews	 and	 informal	 conversations	 during	subsequent	 visits	 to	 both	 cities.	 This	 was	 helpful	 in	 order	 to	 complete	 my	understanding	of	their	accounts	and	increase	the	overall	consistency	of	the	data	and	information	obtained.	Throughout	the	interview	process	I	tried	to	triangulate	the	data	obtained	from	the	different	sets	of	respondents,	in	order	to	make	sense	of	and	corroborate	their	various	accounts	(see	Ellermann,	2006).	This	exposed	several	(if	minor)	 inconsistencies	between	some	of	 the	accounts	of	welfare	bureaucrats	and	professionals	and	the	migrants’	own	experiences;	and	between	representatives	of	the	local	authority	and	those	of	third	sector	organisations.	 The	interviews	conducted	in	both	cities	and	with	both	sets	of	respondents	typically	lasted	 around	 45	 minutes	 (all	 of	 them	 between	 30	 minutes	 and	 two	 hours).	Wherever	possible,	and	given	the	 interviewee’s	explicit	consent,	 interviews	were	
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voice-recorded	and	 fully	 transcribed18.	All	but	 two	 interviews	 in	Barcelona	were	conducted,	 transcribed	and	coded	 in	Spanish,	and	only	 those	 segments	 I	 actually	quoted	subsequently	translated	into	English.	The	analysis	of	close	to	1.000	pages	of	interview	transcripts	was	done	with	the	help	of	the	software	NVivo,	and	followed	the	logic	of	what	Gomm	(2008,	p.244)	called	‘thematic	analysis’,	whereby	the	analyst	–	based	on	his/her	theoretical	assumptions	–	“looks	for	themes	which	are	present	in	 the	 whole	 set	 or	 sub-set	 of	 interviews	 and	 creates	 a	 framework	 of	 these	 for	making	 comparisons	and	contrasts	between	 the	different	 respondents”.	Both	my	analytical	framework	and	the	structure	of	the	empirical	chapters	arose	in	the	course	of	the	initial	coding	process,	which	took	two	and	a	half	months	to	complete.		After	importing	all	transcripts	into	NVivo,	I	coded	any	potentially	relevant	interview	segment	 according	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 respondent	 (migrant/non-migrant),	 which	environment	 and	 welfare	 sector	 it	 pertained	 to,	 and	 whether	 the	 specific	 issue	raised	was	either	related	to	the	access	to	or	the	actual	provision	of	services.	Although	this	certainly	does	not	constitute	a	clear-cut	distinction,	it	provided	the	basis	for	my	differentiation	between	administrators	and	providers	of	public	services,	which	was	necessary	 in	 order	 to	 attribute	 concrete	 agency	 to	 both	 of	 these	 aspects.	 I	 also	created	what	NVivo	 calls	nodes	 for	 each	 of	 the	 central	 elements	 of	my	 analytical	framework,	including	‘deputisation’,	‘shielding’	and	‘lack	of/firewall’;	as	well	as	for	other	 concepts	 that	 are	 essential	 to	 my	 analysis,	 such	 as	 ‘conflicting	 logic’,	‘converging	 logic’,	 ‘individual	 discretion’,	 ‘professional	 roles’,	‘resistance/contestation’,	etc.	 In	addition,	 I	created	contextual	nodes	that	capture	some	of	the	effects	of	irregularity	(e.g.	‘deportability’,	‘fear/uncertainty’,	‘isolation’,	‘criminalisation’,	etc.),	specific	 features	of	state	and	 local	policy	(e.g.	 ‘detention	&	deportation’,	‘regularisation’,	‘local	registration’,	‘documentary	requirements’,	etc.)	and	the	various	justifications	for	inclusion	or	exclusion	(e.g.	‘public	funds’,	‘human	rights’,	‘integration’,	etc.).		A	 series	 of	 more	 and	 more	 systematic	 coding	 queries	 based	 on	 my	 research	questions	 helped	 me	 to	 identify	 and	 make	 sense	 of	 relevant	 patterns	 and	relationships	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	data	 (Bazeley,	2007).	The	 resulting	data	 set	constituted	the	basis	 for	my	comparative	analysis	and	discussion	of	 the	different																																																									18	Only	three	interviewees	(one	in	London,	two	in	Barcelona)	preferred	not	to	be	voice-recorded.		
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cases.	Throughout	the	subsequent	empirical	chapters	I	draw	extensively	on	original	interview	data	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 the	 processes	 and	mechanisms	 that	 help	 or	hinder	the	internalisation	of	immigration	control	in	various	settings	and	from	the	perspective	 of	 different	 actors.	 Wherever	 quoted,	 interviews	 are	 identified	 by	 a	unique	code	(e.g.	‘lonA03’)	that	contains	information	about	where	the	interview	was	conducted	(lon/bcn)	and	whether	respondents	were	‘non-migrant’	(‘A’)	or	migrant	participants	 (‘B’),	 followed	 by	 a	 consecutive	 number.	 Quotes	 from	 informal	conversations	 are	 labelled	 with	 a	 code	 containing	 ‘C’	 instead	 of	 ‘A’	 or	 ‘B’	 (e.g.	‘lonC01’).			
3.2.2. Other	kinds	of	data	Apart	from	these	in-depth	interviews	I	also	collected	other	kinds	of	information	and	contextual	data:	A	review	of	the	existing	academic	literature,	policy	documents,	legal	provisions	 and	 relevant	 reports	 from	 government	 as	 well	 as	 non-governmental	sources	 helped	 me	 to	 comprehend	 and	 start	 to	 compare	 the	 overall	 scope,	predominant	forms	and	causes	of	migrant	irregularity	in	each	context,	and	the	way	both	 national	 governments	 define	 and	 have	 reacted	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 irregular	migrants.	Media	 reports	 and	 press	 statements	 gave	me	 an	 idea	 of	 the	 dominant	political	discourses	surrounding	the	issue	of	irregular	immigration	and	residence,	which	also	have	a	significant	bearing	on	irregular	migrants’	effective	access	to	public	services.		I	 also	 gained	 crucial	 insights	 and	 understanding	 through	 non-participant	 and	participant	observation	in	a	variety	of	social	and	institutional	settings.	On	one	hand,	I	spent	a	lot	of	time	in	places	where	mainstream	public	services	are	provided	(like	hospitals),	 or	 relevant	 information	 about	 where	 and	 how	 to	 access	 them	 (or	potential	 service	 alternatives)	 can	 be	 obtained,	 including	 official	 contact	 points,	local	 community	 centres	 or	 migrant	 advice	 agencies.	 This	 led	 to	many	 informal	conversations	with	receptionists	and	other	members	of	staff,	migrants	in	more	or	less	precarious	situations	and	the	people	who	accompanied	them	to	these	sites,	as	well	as	other	service	users.	Also,	several	interviews	resulted	from	these	by-chance	encounters.		
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On	the	other	hand,	I	was	a	regular	volunteer	(once	a	week)	at	a	local	migrant	advice	and	 support	 centre	 during	my	 fieldwork	 in	 London,	 and	 an	 active	member	 of	 a	migrant	 collective	 and	 advocacy	 group	 in	 Barcelona.	 Experiences	 from	 other	researchers	 show	 that	 voluntary	work	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 engagement	with	 local	NGOs	or	migrant	organisations	can	be	very	helpful	in	terms	of	facilitating	access	and	establishing	trust	with	potential	research	participants	(Hasselberg,	2012;	Staring,	2009;	Gonzales,	2011).	 In	my	case,	 this	was	true	not	only	 in	relation	to	 irregular	migrants	 themselves	 but	 also	 a	 range	 of	 other	 people,	 including	 personal	supporters,	advocates	for	the	rights	of	(irregular)	migrants	or	other	marginalised	groups,	 or	 professionals	 confronted	 with	 migrant	 irregularity	 in	 their	 everyday	work.		The	 conversations	 and	 connections	 that	 arose	 from	 these	 longer-term	 personal	engagements	 thus	 often	 constituted	 the	 start	 of	 ‘referral	 chains’	 that	 would	eventually	lead	to	crucial	information,	further	contacts	or	interviews	with	migrant	as	well	as	‘non-migrant’	informants.	The	whole	research	process	was	guided	by	a	cumulative	logic,	whereby	the	contacts	and	information	gathered	at	earlier	stages	and	different	levels	of	analysis	was	drawn	upon	in	subsequent	steps,	as	suggested	by	Cornelius	(1982).			
3.3. Crossing	legal	boundaries:	Methodological	challenges	for	qualitative	
research	in	the	context	of	irregularity	One	of	the	initial	assumptions	of	my	thesis	is	that	irregularity	represents	a	barrier	and	creates	more	or	less	imminent	risks	or	challenges	not	only	for	the	people	who	are	rendered	‘irregular’,	but	also	those	who	have	(or	choose)	to	interact	with	the	former.	The	same	irregularity	thereby	also	poses	a	problem	for	qualitative	research,	particularly	if	it	draws	primarily	on	the	perceptions,	experiences,	and	interactions	of	both	kinds	of	respondents.	Also	here,	a	crucial	question	 is	how	to	ensure	their	cooperation.		Even	 though	 my	 study	 focussed	 on	 the	 perspective	 of	 street-level	 bureaucrats,	answering	some	of	my	research	questions	also	required	insights	and	information	that	could	only	be	gained	through	face-to-face	interviews	with	irregular	residents	
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themselves.	The	most	obvious	challenge	thus	consisted	in	locating,	identifying	and	gaining	access	to	potential	interviewees	and	to	establish	a	relationship	of	trust	with	this	particular	group	of	 informants.	Mainly	due	 to	 the	precarious	nature	of	 their	relationship	to	the	state	in	which	they	live,	irregular	migrants	clearly	constitute	a	‘hard-to-reach’	 or	 ‘hidden’	 population	 (Singer,	 1999;	 Atkinson	 &	 Flint,	 2001;	Gonzales,	2011),	a	concept	that	entails	two	different	aspects:		On	the	one	hand,	it	refers	to	populations	that	are	comparatively	difficult	to	find	and	recruit	into	a	research	project,	and	on	the	other	hand,	it	designates	populations	 whose	 boundaries,	 characteristics,	 and	 distribution	 are	 not	known	(Singer,	1999,	p.130).		The	very	fact	that	their	immigration,	residence	and/or	employment	occur	outside	of	the	legal-political	framework	significantly	troubles	the	study	of	these	populations	(Cornelius,	1982;	Düvell	et	al.,	2010;	Staring,	2009)	–	just	as	it	troubles	an	increasing	variety	of	other,	much	more	mundane	 social	 interactions.	As	already	mentioned,	immigration	 status	 is	 not	 only	 an	 invisible	 marker,	 but	 also	 a	 highly	 ‘unstable’	analytical	 concept,	 given	 that	 individuals	 frequently	 move	 between	 different	administrative	statuses	and	in	and	out	of	irregularity	(Hakim,	2000;	Düvell,	2011;	Gonzales,	 2011,	 2015).	 This	 holds	 practical	 as	well	 as	 conceptual	 difficulties	 for	defining	the	target	group	and	identifying	potential	research	participants.		My	 non-representative	 samples	 of	migrant	 respondents	 in	 both	 cities	 comprised	only	 ‘unapprehended	undocumented	migrants’19	(Cornelius,	1982)	who	had	been	living	within	the	city	for	more	than	a	year	(typically	between	two	and	five	years,	but	in	some	cases	for	decades).	This	included	people	whose	presence	in	the	country	was	officially	 known	 to	 the	 immigration	 authority.	 In	 the	UK	 context,	 this	was	 either	because	they	had	made	an	unsuccessful	asylum	claim	and	subsequently	‘absconded’	or	had	an	on-going	application	for	a	non-asylum-related	right	to	remain;	whereas	several	of	my	respondents	in	Barcelona	had	received	a	deportation	order	that	was	simply	not	enforced.	Others	had	never	been	in	contact	with	any	state	authority	and	were	thus	living	‘under	the	radar’	of	the	immigration	regime,	even	though	in	Spain	(in	 contrast	 to	 the	 UK)	 they	 were	 nonetheless	 officially	 registered	 with	 the	municipality	(see	section	4.2).		
																																																								19	That	is,	those	not	in	detention	or	facing	immediate	deportation	at	the	time	of	the	interview.		
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Ultimately,	the	success	of	any	qualitative	research	project	in	terms	of	gaining	access	to	informants	and	ensuring	the	reliability	of	the	information	they	offer	depends	on	the	 level	 of	 trust	 between	 the	 researcher	 and	 the	 researched.	 Especially	 when	focusing	on	marginalised	populations,	however,	“we	have	to	face	the	fact	that	they	will	 be	 suspicious	 of	 our	 research”,	 as	 Empez	 (2009,	 p.164)	 put	 it.	 Whenever	 I	explained	or	even	mentioned	my	research	to	migrants	in	irregular	situations,	I	made	every	effort	to	help	them	understand	why	exactly	I	was	interested	in	the	condition	of	irregularity.	I	also	emphasised	that	rather	than	their	personal	situation	or	story,	I	 needed	 to	understand	 and	will	 be	 trying	 to	portray	 their	 collective	 experience,	struggle	and	perspective.		Giving	potential	interviewees	enough	time	to	decide	whether	or	not	they	wanted	to	take	part,	as	well	as	considerable	leverage	in	terms	of	which	topics	to	focus	on	and	what	to	leave	out,	also	proved	helpful	in	winning	and	maintaining	their	trust	and	confidence	(Bilger	&	Van	Liempt,	2009).	For	the	same	reason,	and	in	contrast	to	all	other	informants,	I	did	not	ask	migrants	in	irregular	situations	to	fill	out	and	sign	a	written	consent	form,	but	instead	obtained	their	verbal	consent	after	making	sure	that	they	had	read	and	understood	the	information	sheet	provided.	As	experiences	from	previous	studies	have	shown,	written	consent	could	risk	to	undermine	(or	be	perceived	 as	 undermining)	 the	 anonymity	 of	 vulnerable	 interviewees	 and	 create	additional	suspicion	(Finch	&	Cherti,	2011).		A	similar	challenge	also	arises	in	relation	to	potential	informants	who	are	not	in	an	irregular	situation	themselves,	but	(try	to)	help,	work	with,	or	otherwise	encounter	people	who	are.	My	own	experience	with	public	welfare	workers	has	shown	very	clearly	that	such	encounters	often	cause	(but	happen	in	spite	of)	serious	doubts	or	even	anxiety	about	the	limits	of	legitimate	commitment	and	possible	engagement.	The	question	of	 ‘am	I	acting	against	 the	 law	 by	helping	a	person	who	I	know	(or	suspect)	 has	 no	 residence	 permit?’	 was	 quite	 pervasive	 throughout	many	 of	my	interviews	–	and	became	central	to	my	analysis.			In	such	cases	I	always	made	clear	that	I	was	trying	to	understand	my	respondents’	role	and	thus	to	put	myself	into	their	position	within	a	certain	institutional	context.	Interviews	 and	 conversations	 usually	 departed	 from	 the	 specific	 difficulties	 that	(potential)	 irregularity	could	create	 for	 them	as	workers.	Quite	often	I	suggested	
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speaking	 of	 hypothetical	 cases	 (‘If	 you	 had	 a	 suspicion	 that	 one	 of	 your	 clients	
might…’),	rather	than	asking	how	often	they	had	dealt	with	the	issue	or	what	exactly	they	had	done.	In	posing	my	questions	I	thus	always	treated	them	as	representatives	of	a	certain	professional	group,	since	what	I	wanted	to	get	at	were	not	their	personal	views	and	opinions,	but	their	perspective	as	a	teacher,	social	worker	or	health	centre	receptionist.	Making	this	clear	from	the	outset	often	facilitated	their	agreement	to	participate	and	seemed	to	enhance	their	confidence.		At	the	same	time,	the	widespread	uncertainty	among	potential	research	participants	in	combination	with	the	relative	ease	of	refusal	–	by	denying	any	knowledge	and	previous	experience	or	contact	with	irregular	migrants	–	also	creates	an	undeniable	selection	bias.	On	one	hand,	since	actual	respondents	were	largely	self-selected,	they	probably	tended	to	be	more	aware	of	and/or	concerned	about	irregular	migration	and/or	its	control	–	which	arguably	helps	the	investigation.	On	the	other	hand,	and	given	 the	 quite	 explicitly	 critical	 orientation	 of	 my	 research,	 it	 might	 also	 have	attracted	 participants	 who	 are	 more	 open-minded	 and	 welcoming	 towards	immigrants	 than	 some	 of	 their	 colleagues.	 This	might	have	 distorted	 the	 overall	picture	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 collective	 views	 and	 perceptions,	 but	 not	 the	 basic	mechanisms	and	difficulties	underlying	their	behaviour.		The	latter	kind	of	bias	might	have	been	reinforced	by	the	fact	that	also	several	of	my	‘non-migrant’	respondents	were	contacted	via	 referral	chains	 leading	back	to	my	participation	 in	migrant	support	organisations	and	advocacy	groups.	While	 these	personal	referrals	as	well	as	my	involvement	with	several	research	subjects	not	just	as	a	researcher	but	also	a	volunteer,	supporter	or	even	friend	have	been	crucial	for	winning	 their	 trust	 (see	Atkinson	&	 Flint,	 2001;	 Empez,	 2009),	 it	 obviously	 also	implies	 a	 certain	 risk	 of	 getting	 ‘too	 close’.	 Qualitative	 research	 has	 often	 been	criticised	 for	 employing	 “insufficient	 safeguards	 for	 preventing	 the	 biases	 of	 the	researcher	influencing	the	results	and	that	pressures	towards	bias	are	likely	to	arise	from	the	more	personal	involvement	with	research	subjects”	(Gomm,	2008,	p.18).	This	indicates	that	the	issues	of	trust	and	mutual	understanding	between	researcher	and	informant	or	gatekeeper	ultimately	entail	important	ethical	implications,	which	I	address	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter.			
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3.4. 	Ethical	considerations	Precisely	because	scientific	research	is	not	conducted	in	a	social	vacuum,	its	effects	ramify	into	other	spheres	of	value	and	interest.	Insofar	as	these	effects	are	 deemed	 socially	 undesirable,	 science	 is	 charged	 with	 responsibility	(Merton,	1973,	p.263).		Investigating	social	relations	across	legal	boundaries	can	have	significant	negative	effects.	These	can	be	direct	or	indirect	consequences	of	the	research	process	itself	or	the	way	in	which	results	are	disseminated;	and	might	be	felt	at	the	individual	level	(by	one	or	more	participants	of	the	research)	or	that	of	political	discourse	and	public	opinion.	This	inevitably	raises	important	questions	of	research	ethics.		First	of	all,	 individuals	or	groups	of	persons	who	live	 in	“a	dependent	or	unequal	relationship”	(ESRC,	2010,	p.8)	or	 in	situations	characterised	by	a	general	 lack	of	choice	 and	 self-determination	 (Bilger	&	Van	 Liempt,	 2009)	must	 be	 regarded	 as	‘vulnerable’.	 According	 to	 this	 definition,	 irregular	 immigration	 status	 clearly	renders	a	person	vulnerable	and	in-depth	research	into	their	lives	and	interactions	will	almost	certainly	touch	upon	particularly	sensitive	topics	like	their	‘illegal’	entry	or	employment	and	might	reveal	their	involvement	in	related	criminalised	practices	such	 as	 the	 falsification	 of	 documents.	 This	 gives	 the	 researcher	 a	 fundamental	responsibility	 to	 carefully	 balance	 the	 potential	 social	 benefits	 of	 the	 research	project	against	any	potential	harms	that	might	 incur,	especially	 for	 those	directly	involved	as	the	subjects	of	research	(Düvell	et	al.,	2010).		In	principle,	Gomm	(2008,	p.370)	distinguishes	two	positions	regarding	the	role	of	researchers	studying	structurally	marginalised	or	otherwise	disadvantaged	groups:	“The	more	orthodox	position	is	that	researchers	should	behave	so	as	to	do	subjects	no	harm,	while	critical	researchers	prescribe	that	researchers	should	behave	so	as	to	do	some	good	to	categories	of	people	they	favour”.	I	certainly	hope	that	my	study	will	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	of	the	problems	and	contradictions	it	tries	to	highlight	and	thus	help	to	achieve	changes	in	behaviour	and/or	the	legal-political	frameworks	that	determine	or	constrain	this	behaviour.	In	this	sense,	my	research	might	have	a	positive	(even	if	rather	diffuse	and	long-term)	effect	on	the	conditions	under	which	irregular	foreign	residents	live	and	work.	My	primary	ethical	concern	while	I	conducted	this	research,	however,	was	to	minimise	any	potential	risks	for	all	
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my	research	participants,	rather	than	to	better	their	individual	situation.	In	practice	this	 made	 it	 necessary	 to	 carefully	 select	 appropriate	 strategies	 and	 sites	 for	identifying	 and	 approaching	 vulnerable	 informants,	 to	 subsequently	 conduct	 all	interviews	in	places	that	were	confidential,	safe	and	familiar	to	them,	and	to	make	sure	that	any	personal	data	obtained	was	stored	securely	(see	Cornelius,	1982).		As	mentioned	earlier,	a	considerable	level	of	mutual	trust	and	understanding	must	exist	between	the	researcher	and	the	researched	in	order	to	afford	reliable	results.	At	the	same	time,	however,	researchers	must	be	aware	that	this	relationship	is	never	equal,	but	“clearly	influenced	by	inequalities	of	rights,	legal	and	economic	position,	gender	and/or	psychological	position”,	 as	argued	by	Bilger	&	Van	Liempt	 (2009,	p.128).	 	Under	these	 conditions,	 a	 (too)	 close	and	 trustful	 relationship	 can	easily	create	 hopes	 or	 expectations	 on	 the	 part	 of	 research	 participants,	 that	 the	researcher	might	(be	able	to)	help	them	to	better	their	socio-economic	or	even	legal	situation	(Staring,	2009).		I	have	experienced	various	such	situations	in	the	course	of	my	fieldwork	and	had	to	deal	with	them	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	In	the	case	of	one	migrant	family	to	which	I	had	developed	a	particularly	close	relationship,	I	subsequently	provided	continuous	financial	support	over	a	period	of	one	and	a	half	years20.	In	three	other	cases	I	either	covered	my	participants	transport	costs	to	and	from	our	meeting	or	interview,	or	gave	 them	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 money	 to	 cover	 other	 specific	 immediate	 needs	(telephone	top-up,	postal	 fees,	other	transport	costs,	etc.).	 In	all	 these	 instances	 I	was	very	clear	that	payments	were	completely	independent	of	their	participation	in	my	 research,	 and	 that	 I	 had	 no	 intention	 to	 generally	 offer	 any	 financial	remuneration	for	participation,	since	this	could	ultimately	jeopardise	the	reliability	of	the	information	obtained.	That	said,	it	must	of	course	be	kept	in	mind	that	in	any	case,	 “a	narrative	may	not	 simply	be	 the	story	of	 a	 life	but	rather	a	 conscious	or	unconscious	strategy	for	self-representation	and	legitimisation	of	projects	for	the	future”	(Bilger	&	Van	Liempt,	2009,	p.135).	In	the	absence	of	‘one-fits-all’	solutions,	the	 knowledge	 and	 experiences	 of	 other	 researchers	 and	 previous	 studies	constituted	a	valuable	source	of	guidance	and	inspiration.																																																										20	The	money	was	used	to	ensure	that	the	child’s	special	educational	needs	could	be	met	by	a	private	organisation,	and	thus	without	interruption.		
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Ultimately,	care	must	also	be	taken	 in	relation	to	possible	misuse	of	 the	research	findings	 once	 they	 are	 published.	 For	 Bilger	 &	 Van	 Liempt	 (2009,	 p.131),	 the	researcher’s	“power	over	the	distribution	of	knowledge”	i.e.	the	power	to	decide	on	how	findings	will	be	used	and	disseminated,	further	aggravates	the	already	unequal	relationship	between	researcher	and	researched.	This	power	imbalance	reaches	far	beyond	the	end	of	the	research	process,	since	significant	harm	to	both	participants’	privacy	and	their	broader	interests	can	also	arise	at	a	later	stage.	I	have	made	every	effort	to	prevent	such	harm.	On	one	hand,	the	identity	of	all	vulnerable	participants	(but	also	others	who	specifically	made	this	request)	are	protected	by	changing	and	usually	 not	 even	 recording	 their	 real	 (full)	 names,	 as	 well	 as	 any	 recognisable	locations	 or	other	 details	which	might	 allow	 their	 personal	 identification	 (ESRC,	2010;	Singer,	1999).		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 anticipate	 and	 deflect	 potential	miss-interpretations	of	my	results	and	underlying	arguments.	One	fundamental	danger	with	this	kind	of	research	is	that	highlighting	how	much	social	interaction,	access,	participation	and	thus	‘integration’	(Schweitzer,	2017)	is	still	possible	under	current	conditions	 of	 irregularity	might	 help	 to	 identify	 further	 potentialities	 or	 sites	 of	control.	It	must	be	noted,	however,	that	most	spheres	of	mainstream	public	service	provision	already	are	potential	sites	for	immigration	control,	and	that	the	aim	of	my	study	is	precisely	to	highlight	the	inherent	limits	of	such	control.	Ultimately,	it	is	the	combination	 of	 the	 various	 internal	 conflicts	 and	 context-specific	 contradictions	that	 are	 triggered	by	 the	 internalisation	of	 immigration	 control	 that	 renders	 this	approach	incompatible	with	not	only	fundamental	liberal	norms	but	also	the	well-functioning	of	society	and	some	of	its	core	institutions.			 	
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4. The	making,	unmaking	and	internal	control	of	migrant	
irregularity	in	Britain	and	Spain	–	and	its	local	
institutionalisation	in	London	and	Barcelona	The	 management	 of	 international	 migration	 requires	 various	 layers	 of	governmental	 regulation	 and	 always	 also	 involves	 the	 irregularisation	 of	 the	movement	and/or	settlement	of	certain	categories	of	migrants.	According	to	the	EU	
Returns	 Directive	 ‘illegal	 stay’	 is	 defined	 as	 “the	 presence	 on	 the	 territory	 of	 a	Member	State,	of	a	third-country	national	who	does	not	fulfil,	or	no	longer	fulfils	the	conditions	[...]	for	entry,	stay	or	residence	in	that	Member	State”21.	It	is	therefore	primarily	a	matter	of	each	individual	state	government	to	establish	these	conditions	and	thereby	determine	the	scope	of	irregularity.	While	migrant	irregularity	is	thus	produced	 by	 (mostly	 national	 but	 increasingly	 also	 supra-national)	 immigration	legislation,	it	becomes	particularly	apparent	and	sometimes	problematic	at	the	local	level,	 where	 it	 can	 intervene	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 policy	 areas	 and	 spheres	 of	 social	interaction.		The	local	level	is	also	where	many	of	the	policies	specifically	aiming	to	reduce	the	phenomenon	of	irregular	migration	and	residence	are	being	implemented.	As	noted	in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 both	 national	 and	 regional	 contexts	 and	 institutional	frameworks	significantly	shape	the	local	implementation	of	such	policies.	According	to	Jordan	and	his	colleagues	(2003,	p.211),	the	latter	is	thus	always	“pre-determined	to	a	certain	extent	by	the	prior	stage	of	policy	formulation	and	is	a	continuation	of	the	social	and	political	environment	in	which	policy	decisions	were	taken”.		In	this	sense,	also	the	discursive	level	is	highly	relevant.	Although	my	study	did	not	include	 systematic	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 policy	 documents,	 speeches	 or	 media	content,	clear	differences	between	the	two	environments	became	apparent,	both	in	terms	of	rhetoric	and	terminology.	For	example,	politicians,	the	mainstream	media	and	policy	documents	 in	 the	UK	quite	often	 refer	 to	 irregular	migrants	and	 their	mobility	or	 residence	 in	 the	 country	as	 ‘illegal’,	 thereby	 reinforcing	 the	 idea	 that	their	 presence,	 claims	 and	 actions	 are	 fully	 illegitimate,	 if	 not	 criminal.	 In	 Spain,	
																																																								21	Directive	2008/115/EC	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council,	of	December	2008,	on	common	standards	and	procedures	in	Member	States	for	returning	illegally	staying	third-country	nationals,	Brussels,	OJ	L	348	of	24.12.2008	
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official	 documents	 and	 statements	 mostly	 use	 the	 term	 ‘irregular’	 and	 often	specifically	attribute	the	irregularity	to	a	particular	administrative	situation	rather	than	the	person	in	that	situation22.	Similarly,	foreigners	whose	permission	to	reside	in	the	UK	has	expired	are	officially	categorised	as	‘visa	overstayers’,	which	clearly	depicts	their	condition	as	the	result	of	their	own	wrongdoing.	In	the	Spanish	context,	the	technically	equivalent	situation	of	foreign	residents	who	failed	to	renew	their	residence	 permit	 is	 officially	 called	 ‘irregularidad	 sobrevenida’,	 meaning	 an	irregularity	that	has	‘overcome’	or	‘happened	to’	them.		How	 the	 issues	 of	 irregular	 migration	 and	 migrant	 irregularity	 are	 framed	 and	addressed	in	public	and	political	discourses	ultimately	reflects	not	only	the	legal	and	policy	 frameworks	 in	 place,	 but	 also	 the	 political	will	 and	 financial	 capacity	 of	 a	government	to	either	regularise	or	deport	irregular	migrants.	In	this	respect,	as	I	will	 show	 in	 the	 following,	 the	 two	 countries	embody	 the	 stark	 contrast	 in	 how	northern	and	southern	EU	Member	States	have	traditionally	tended	to	respond	to	irregular	migration	(Broeders	&	Engbersen,	2007).	Spain,	on	one	hand,	has	often	served	 as	 the	 prime	 example	 for	 the	 so-called	 'cheap	 model'	 of	 managing	(im)migration	 by	 accepting	 sizeable	 proportions	 of	 ‘illegal’	 entry	 and	 stay	 in	combination	 with	 repeated,	 large-scale	 regularisation	 programmes	 (González-Enríquez,	2009a;	Arango	&	Finotelli,	2009).	The	UK,	on	the	other	hand,	has	become	emblematic	for	what	Gibney	(2008)	called	the	'deportation	turn',	which	emphasises	the	explicitly	exclusionary	thrust	of	its	immigration	regime	(Anderson	et	al.,	2011;	Paoletti,	2010;	Fekete,	2005).		In	chapter	2	 I	have	suggested	that	migrant	(ir)regularity	 functions	as	a	code	 that	more	or	less	effectively	extends	the	reach	of	immigration	law	into	many	spheres	of	everyday	life	and	social	policy;	and	that	although	a	person’s	immigration	status	has	no	immediate	relevance	for	public	welfare	institutions	themselves,	they	are	often	expected	 to	 incorporate	 immigration	 checks	 into	 their	 own	 structure	 and	operations.	In	the	following	sections	I	will	develop	this	line	of	argument	further	by	looking	at	how	exactly	migrant	 irregularity	 is	framed	and	 institutionalised	at	 the	
																																																								22	I	was	surprised	how	often	people	I	spoke	to	in	Barcelona	–	in	interviews	but	also	everyday	conversations	–	used	the	very	bulky	expression	‘migrants	in	administratively	irregular	situations’	(‘inmigrantes	en	situación	administrativa	irregular’).		
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national,	local	and	welfare	state	level	of	the	two	environments	I	am	comparing.			
4.1. State	responses	to	migrant	irregularity:	Deportation,	regularisation	
and	internal	control	in	the	UK	and	Spain	Irregularity	 is	 primarily	 the	 result	 of	 an	 active	 and	 sometimes	 intentional	 legal-political	construction	by	state	authorities	rather	than	the	consequence	of	individual	migrants’	actions	in	neglect	or	violation	of	immigration	restrictions	(Düvell,	2011;	De	Genova,	2002;	Goldring	et	al.,	2009;	Calavita,	1998).	I	have	already	argued	that	in	 order	 to	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 irregular	migrants	 living	within	 their	 borders,	states	 can	 legalise	 their	 presence,	 physically	 remove	 them	 from	 the	 territory,	 or	exclude	 them	 from	 social	 and	 economic	 relations	 and	 fundamental	 services	 (in	order	to	encourage	their	‘voluntary’	return).	Here	I	briefly	discuss	the	role	that	each	of	these	policy	elements	plays	within	the	British	and	Spanish	immigration	regimes.			
4.1.1. Regularisation	in	Spain	and	the	UK	In	the	Spanish	context,	like	in	many	other	countries,	ad-hoc	regularisations	have	for	several	decades	provided	the	main	way	out	of	irregularity	and	thus	a	major	pathway	to	 ‘legal’	 settlement	 (González-Enríquez,	 2009b).	 Since	 the	 first	 regularisation	program	was	carried	out	in	1985-86,	Spanish	authorities	have	regularised	the	status	of	around	1.2	million	immigrants	through	similar	programs	enacted	in	1991,	1996,	2000,	 2001	 and	 2005,	 each	 of	 which	 was	 presented	 as	 an	 exceptional	 one-off	measure	 (Finotelli	 &	 Arango,	 2011).	 In	 addition,	 an	 on-going	 regularisation	procedure	was	established	in	2000	and	since	2006	effectively	replaced	the	previous	policy	 of	 periodic	 mass	 regularisation.	 This	 so-called	 Settlement	 Program	 offers	foreign	nationals	in	irregular	situations	the	possibility	to	legalise	their	status	if	they	have	lived	in	the	country	for	three	years	and	can	prove	either	a	parental	relationship	with	 a	 Spanish	 citizen	 (‘arraigo	 familiar’)	 or	 other	 ‘social	 rootedness’	 (‘arraigo	
social’)	(Sabater	&	Domingo,	2012).	What	 characterises	 all	 these	 measures	 is	 that	 they	 essentially	 target	 irregular	migrants	in	their	capacity	as	workers.	In	order	to	be	eligible	they	have	to	prove	not	
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only	their	prior	residence	in	the	country	as	well	as	a	clean	criminal	record,	but	in	most	 cases	also	 their	previous	and/or	on-going	employment	 (Finotelli	&	Arango,	2011).	This	explicit	labour	market	orientation	became	most	apparent	in	the	case	of	the	 largest	 (and	 so	 far	 last)	 extraordinary	 regularisation	 exercise	 of	 2005,	applications	for	which	had	to	be	made	by	the	employers,	who	had	to	confirm	an	on-going	work	relationship	and	job	offer	for	at	least	six	more	months	(Sandell,	2005).	Also	 under	 the	 current	 Settlement	 Program	 all	 applicants	 (except	 those	 with	parental	ties)	have	to	prove	that	they	have	been	offered	a	work	contract	for	at	least	one	 year.	 By	 ensuring	 that	 the	 Spanish	 labour	market	will	 absorb	 all	 those	who	qualify	for	regularisation,	these	policies	thus	help	to	reduce	informal	employment	practices,	 which	 have	 traditionally	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 within	 the	 Spanish	economy.	 Importantly,	 they	thereby	 fill	 the	gaps	between	fluctuating	demands	of	agriculture,	hospitality	and	other	business	sectors	for	low-skilled	and	flexible	labour	and	 the	 insufficient	 entry	 channels	 for	 foreign	workers	 provided	 by	 the	 Spanish	immigration	regime	(Sabater	&	Domingo,	2012).		This	 possibility	 of	 regularisation	 thus	 plays	 a	 fundamental	 role	 within	 the	‘pragmatic’	 Spanish	 approach	 to	 managing	 (labour)	 migration,	 as	 the	 following	account	of	the	director	of	the	Department	for	Immigration	and	Interculturality	of	the	Barcelona	City	Council	clearly	illustrates:		The	arrival	of	people	 is	linked	to	economic	cycles:	 if	 the	economy	is	going	well	people	come,	when	the	economy	goes	bad,	as	it	has	been	in	recent	years,	not	so	many	people	come.	In	2005,	50,000	people	arrived	in	Barcelona	alone,	in	one	year.	[…]	And	now	that	the	unemployment	rate	is	very	high,	not	many	people	arrive	and	some	even	leave	and	go	back.	[...]	So	the	law	of	‘rootedness’	[arraigo	social]	is	a	good	thing;	I	think	it’s	good	because	it’s	a	mechanism	to	‘puncture’	 irregularity,	right?	Because	otherwise	a	whole	balloon	 is	blown	up,	so	we	puncture	it	through	our	‘integration’	reports,	which	we	do	here	[in	his	department].	In	the	year	2009/2010	we	produced	12,000	reports,	now	we	are	doing	5,000.	It	has	dropped	a	lot	(bcnA28).	He	 thereby	 refers	 to	 the	 important	 fact	 that	 apart	 from	 fulfilling	 economic	requirements,	 applicants	 for	 regularisation	 also	 have	 to	 prove	 their	 prior	 local	residence	and	‘rootedness’	in	a	particular	place.	The	latter	is	done	on	the	basis	of	an	assessment	and	official	‘integration	report’	compiled	by	the	municipality.	I	will	come	back	to	this	issue	in	section	4.2,	since	it	very	well	exemplifies	the	level	of	competence	and	routine	involvement	of	lower	levels	of	government,	including	municipalities,	in	
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the	management	of	migrant	irregularity.		While	 under	 conditions	 of	 economic	 growth	 this	 mechanism	 of	 on-going	regularisation	has	proved	 fairly	effective	and	was	accessible	 to	 large	numbers	of	migrants,	the	financial	and	economic	crisis	suddenly	rendered	it	much	more	difficult	to	 access.	 Almost	 all	 migrants,	 city	 officials	 and	 NGO	 workers	 I	 interviewed	 in	Barcelona	 confirmed	 that	 finding	 a	 job	 (offer)	 that	 fulfils	 the	 legal	 requirements	(full-time,	one-year	contract)	is	now	by	far	the	biggest	barrier	to	regularisation.	“It’s	like	requiring	them	to	speak	14	 languages”	one	city	official	noted	(bcnA07).	As	a	result,	 irregular	migrants	 increasingly	depend	on	 the	goodwill	of	 their	 (often	 co-ethnic)	employers,	as	well	as	friends	or	acquaintances	willing	to	ostensibly	‘employ’	them	as	domestic	workers,	for	example.	As	a	representative	of	a	migrant	workers’	association	 told	me,	 this	 situation	 also	 created	 an	 underground	market	 for	 fake	employment	offers:		Nowadays	there	are	people,	for	example	Pakistanis	and	also	some	Spaniards,	who	sell	this,	and	normally	for	a	work	contract	you	pay	9000€.	But	they	pay	only	six	months	of	social	security,	so	of	these	9000	it	will	be	like	1800,	more	or	less,	that	they	pay	in	social	security.	[…]	And	they	don’t	pay	any	salary;	that's	how	they	can	earn	almost	7000€.	And	this	now	happens	often,	and	the	government	knows	it	too	(bcnA11).	Several	of	my	interviewees	also	mentioned	that	after	coming	to	power	in	December	2011,	the	conservative	government	of	Mariano	Rajoy	considered	phasing	out	or	at	least	tightening	access	to	regularisation	via	‘arraigo	social’	but	never	presented	any	concrete	proposal	(bcnA18,	bcnA22).		Also	the	British	government	is	well	aware	of	the	negative	effects	of	irregularity	in	terms	of	both	the	expansion	of	informal	employment	and	the	exploitative	working	conditions	 it	often	 implies.	Already	 in	2002	 the	House	of	Lords	Committee	on	 the	
European	Union	recognised	that	“[s]ome	form	of	regularisation	is	unavoidable	if	a	growing	 underclass	 of	 people	 in	 an	 irregular	 situation,	 who	 are	 vulnerable	 to	exploitation,	is	not	to	be	created”	(cit.	in	Levinson,	2005,	p.31).	However,	various	UK	governments	have	on	several	occasions	officially	rejected	the	idea	of	a	large-scale	amnesty	 or	 visible	 mechanism	 of	 regularisation	 (Papademetriou	 &	 Somerville,	2008).	 The	 policy	 director	 of	 the	 Migrants’	 Rights	 Network,	 a	 London-based	advocacy	organisation,	explained	me	why:		
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What	they	have	a	strong	allergic	reaction	to	is	any	policy	measure	that	would	suggest	they	are	soft	on	irregular	migration,	and	the	biggest	concern	is	about	the	 pull	 factors.	 […]	 Because	 the	 main	 way	 that	 people	 become	undocumented	in	the	UK	is	by	overstaying	their	visas,	the	government	still	isn’t	confident	enough	that	they	wouldn’t	continue	to	do	that	in	the	future.	So	they	don’t	want	to	go	there	(lonA02).		This	 does	 not	 mean,	 however,	 that	 the	 country	 has	 no	 experience	 with	regularisation	at	all.	Papademetriou	and	Somerville	(2008)	estimated	that	between	1997	and	2008	a	total	of	60,000	to	100,000	persons	have	been	granted	some	form	of	legal	status	through	regularisation	in	the	UK.	In	some	cases,	such	measures	were	introduced	following	changes	within	the	wider	 immigration	regime;	 for	example,	when	 the	 immigration	 reform	 of	 1971	 suddenly	 extended	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘illegal	entry’	to	also	include	Commonwealth	citizens	(Lenoel,	2009;	Levinson,	2005).		More	 recently,	 regularisation	 mostly	 aimed	 at	 clearing	 the	 huge	 backlogs	 that	started	 to	 accumulate	within	 the	British	 asylum	 system	since	 the	mid-1990s,	 by	focusing	on	asylum	seekers	whose	claims	had	been	pending	for	an	‘unreasonable’	amount	of	time.	In	1998,	facing	a	backlog	of	over	100,000	asylum	cases,	a	special	policy	was	 introduced	 to	grant	 Indefinite	Leave	 to	Remain	 (ILR)	 to	most	asylum	applicants	 whose	 case	 decisions	 were	 outstanding	 since	 1993,	 while	 for	 claims	received	between	1993	and	1995,	 family	and	community	ties	as	well	as	previous	employment	were	taken	into	account23	(Lenoel,	2009;	Papademetriou	&	Somerville,	2008).	In	2003,	a	similar	policy	targeted	asylum-seeking	families	with	at	least	one	dependent	child	under	the	age	of	18,	who	had	claimed	asylum	before	October	2000.		While	humanitarian	concerns	have	obviously	played	a	role	in	the	context	of	asylum	backlogs,	this	very	logic	became	most	apparent	in	the	case	of	a	one-off	regularisation	programme	for	domestic	workers	carried	out	in	1998-9.	Following	the	revision	of	the	Overseas	Domestic	Workers	Concession	in	July	1998,	this	regularisation	offered	an	exceptional	twelve-month	leave	to	domestic	workers	(mostly	women)	who	had	ended	up	in	an	irregular	situation	after	having	left	their	original	employer	as	a	result	
																																																								23	These	rules	were	applied	to	close	to	21,500	asylum	cases	in	1999	and	2000	(Papademetriou	&	Somerville,	2008).	
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of	abuse	or	exploitation24	(Levinson,	2005;	Lenoel,	2009).		Apart	from	these	rather	small-scale	one-off	regularisations,	the	British	immigration	regime	also	relies	on	permanent	mechanisms	of	regularisation,	whereby	eligibility	is	defined	much	more	narrowly	than	in	Spain.	Drawing	on	the	European	Convention	
of	Establishment,	ratified	by	the	UK	in	1969,	migrants	who	have	continuously	lived	in	the	country	for	20	years25,	regardless	of	their	immigration	status,	can	make	an	application	 for	 Leave	 to	 Remain	 (LTR)	 under	 the	 so-called	 ‘long	 residence	 rule’	(Lenoel,	2009;	Levinson,	2005).	Similarly,	families	with	children	under	the	age	of	18	who	had	lived	in	the	UK	continuously	for	seven	years	are	also	eligible	for	LTR	(ibid.).	Both	categories	 include	large	numbers	of	rejected	asylum	seekers	who	cannot	be	removed	because	of	on-going	conflict	in	their	country	of	origin	or	other	practical	or	humanitarian	constraints.	For	many	of	them	the	comparatively	high	cost	of	applying	for	 regularisation	 –	 around	 600£	 compared	 to	 about	 35€	 under	 the	 Spanish	
Settlement	Program	–	represents	a	significant	additional	barrier.		Another	significant	difference	between	the	two	national	contexts	is	the	relationship	between	 irregular	 residents’	 (unlawful)	 employment	 and	 their	 prospects	 of	legalising	 their	 stay.	 Since	 July	 2016,	 working	 in	 the	 UK	 illegally	 constitutes	 a	criminal	offence	and	 is	generally	perceived	as	an	additional	risk	of	apprehension	and	deportation,	as	the	following	accounts	of	two	migrants	I	interviewed	in	London	indicate:		When	they	refused	my	application	[for	LTR],	they	said	that	it’s	because	[…]	I	had	 been	 working	 illegally,	 so	 they	 refused	 the	 application.	 So	 I	 stopped	working,	from	that	time	I	didn’t	work	anymore	(lonB12).		I	know	people	that	have	been	deported.	[…]	Some	went	to	work	and	they	got	them	where	 they	were	working;	 and	 some	put	 in	 an	 application	 but	 they	denied	them…	they	refused	them	and	told	them	to	go	back	to	their	country,	just	like	they	did	to	me.	And	when	they	didn’t	go	they	traced	their	address…	and	went	to	their	house	early	in	the	morning,	and	they	picked	them	from	the	house	and	sent	them	home.	That’s	what	I	know	(lonB11).		The	 crippling	 fear	 of	 detection	 and	 deportation	 thus	 usually	 outweighs	 the	 very	
																																																								24	Before	1998,	the	Domestic	Workers'	Concession	legally	tied	foreign	domestic	workers	to	their	initial	employer,	so	that	resigning	or	changing	employer	automatically	revoked	their	residence	permit	and	left	them	irregular.	25	In	July	2012,	this	period	was	extended	from	previously	14	to	20	years.	
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remote	prospects	of	qualifying	for	regularisation	in	the	UK.	As	an	NGO	worker	and	migrant	rights	activist	noted	in	an	interview,	irregular	residents	are	generally	being	discouraged	from	even	trying	to	find	a	legal	way	to	regularise	their	situation:	 So	no	one	has	got	any	incentive	to	regularise	their	status,	or	to	claim	asylum	if	they	need	to,	or	to	keep	in	touch	with	the	authorities…	all	these	kinds	of	models	 that	 have	 worked	 in	 other	 countries,	 like	 engagement	 case-work	models	 rather	 than	 using	 detention,	 which	 show	more	 engagement	 with	people’s	immigration	cases	and	actually	led	to	high	numbers	of	people	going	home,	 choosing	 to	 go	 home.	 So	 […]	 forcing	 people	 away	 from	 any	 kind	 of	formal	system	doesn’t	actually	help	the	government’s	own	priorities	and	is	very	damaging	for	community	life	(lonA01).		As	 mentioned	 before,	 policies	 of	 deportation	 and	 the	 broader	 politics	 of	deportability	represent	the	opposite,	exclusionary	end	of	the	spectrum	of	available	measures	for	states	to	reduce	the	number	of	irregular	residents.			
4.1.2. Deportation	and	deportability	in	the	UK	and	Spain	The	power	of	the	British	government	to	deport	unwanted	foreigners	started	to	grow	significantly	during	the	1960s	and	70s,	along	with	increasing	restrictions	placed	on	non-European	 immigration.	 The	 steady	 growth	 in	 removals	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	1980s	thereby	coincided	with	a	sharp	increase	of	asylum	applications,	and	rejected	asylum	seekers	made	up	a	significant	share	of	overall	removals	carried	out	by	the	Home	Office:	according	to	official	statistics,	in	the	decade	between	1993	and	2003,	the	 number	 of	 persons	 removed	 following	 negative	 asylum	 decisions	 rose	 from	1,820	to	13,500	(Gibney,	2008,	p.149),	after	which	it	continuously	declined	to	reach	just	over	5000	by	2014,	and	3,200	in	2016.	Overall,	the	number	of	removals	and	so-called	‘voluntary	departures’	of	individuals	facing	a	removal	order	increased	from	around	30,000	in	1997	to	a	peak	of	68,000	in	2008	(Anderson	et	al.,	2011).	Between	2010	and	2015	their	number	remained	fairly	constant	at	around	60,000	per	year,	according	to	Home	Office	statistics26.	Importantly,	between	70	and	75	per	cent	of	these	were	removals	of	people	apprehended	within	the	country,	rather	than	those	returned	at	the	port	of	entry.		
																																																								26	See:	https://data.gov.uk/dataset/immigration-statistics-removals	(last	accessed	08/12/2017).		
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This	development	was	accompanied	by	an	unprecedented	politicisation	of	the	issue	of	 deportation	 as	 an	 indispensable	 means	 to	 regain	 control	 over	 unwanted	immigration.	In	2008,	for	example,	then	immigration	minister	Liam	Byrne	officially	promised	to	“remove	an	immigration	offender	every	8	minutes”	(Daily	Mail,	2008,	cit.	in	Anderson	et	al.,	2011,	p.550).	Also	in	practice,	the	British	state	progressively	extended	and	improved	its	deportation	capacity	by	introducing	policy	innovations	that	 “have	 been	 highly	 successful	 in	 enabling	 officials	 to	 bypass	 legal	 and	 social	constraints	to	boost	the	rate	of	removals”	(Gibney,	2008,	p.158/9).	These	include	measures	to	speed	up	the	asylum	procedure	itself,	the	increased	use	of	(potentially	indefinite27)	detention	to	prevent	potential	deportees	from	absconding,	and	severe	cuts	 to	 legal	 aid	 for	 people	 trying	 to	 challenge	 their	 deportation.	 Together	with	measures	 of	 internal	 immigration	 control,	 which	 I	 will	 outline	 in	 the	 next	 sub-section,	detention	and	 (the	 fear	of)	deportation	are	essential	 elements	of	 the	UK	government’s	approach	of	creating	a	‘hostile	environment’	for	irregular	migrants.		In	Spain,	on	the	other	hand,	detention	and	deportation	play	a	comparatively	smaller	role	within	 the	 public	 and	 political	 discourse	 on	 unwanted	 immigration	 and	 the	official	policy	approach	 towards	 irregular	 residents.	 In	 fact,	 for	a	 short	period	of	time	in	2000,	Spanish	immigration	legislation	explicitly	ruled	out	deportation	as	a	legitimate	 answer	 to	migrant	 irregularity,	 by	 stipulating	 that	 unlawful	 residence	alone	does	not	justify	expulsion	(Calavita,	2003).	Even	though	the	formal	possibility	to	 deport	 a	 foreigner	 ‘just’	 for	 breaching	 immigration	 rules	was	 re-instated	 only	several	months	later,	a	report	by	the	Spanish	Commission	for	Refugees	(CEAR)	and	
Migrant	 Rights	 International	 (MRI)	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 Spanish	courts	has	continued	to	follow	the	principle	whereas	“the	sanction	that	should	be	applied	to	an	irregular	migratory	status	is	a	fine,	and	not	deportation	(CEAR	&	MRI,	2010,	p.31).	Spain	is	also	one	of	very	few	EU	Member	States	where	irregular	entry	constitutes	an	administrative	misdemeanour	but	 is	not	considered	a	crime,	while	UK	 legislation	 treats	 both	 unlawful	 entry	 and	 residence	 as	 criminal	 offences	punishable	with	imprisonment	(FRA,	2014).		At	the	same	time,	however,	the	EU	Returns	Directive	requires	all	Member	States	to																																																									27	Notably,	the	UK	is	the	only	country	in	Europe	that	does	not	establish	a	maximum	time	limit	for	immigration	detention	(MRN,	2014).		
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issue	 a	 return	 decision	 to	 any	 third-country	 national	 who	 they	 know	 is	 in	 an	irregular	 situation,	 unless	 they	 formally	 regularise	 his	 or	 her	 stay.	 In	 practice,	apprehension	by	the	Spanish	police	or	immigration	authority	might	trigger	a	formal	expulsion	 procedure,	 but	 this	 can	 usually	 be	 avoided	 by	 paying	 a	 fine	 of	 around	500€.	Not	paying	the	fine	and/or	being	apprehended	multiple	times,	however,	not	only	 increases	 the	 risk	of	deportation	but	 can	also	become	a	barrier	 to	eventual	regularisation,	as	several	of	my	interviewees	including	lawyers	and	NGO	workers	told	me	 (bcnA01,	 bcnA19,	 bcnA23).	 As	Garcés-Mascareñas	 (2010,	 p.85)	 noted	 in	relation	 to	 the	Spanish	 case,	 “[t]he	aim	of	deportation	policies	 is	not	so	much	 to	reduce	illegal	immigration	as	to	delimit	a	symbolic	precinct	of	illegality”.		As	a	result,	and	although	the	overall	number	of	people	deported	from	Spain	has	risen	during	the	first	half	of	the	2000s,	the	‘deportation	gap’	has	generally	remained	very	large:	In	the	years	prior	to	2000,	around	15,000	deportation	orders	where	issued	per	year,	 but	 fewer	 than	5,000	deportations	actually	 carried	out	 (Calavita,	2003,	p.407).	In	2009,	according	to	Eurostat	data,	of	more	than	100,000	irregular	migrants	ordered	 to	 leave	 the	 country	 only	 29,000	 actually	 left	 (EMN,	 2011,	 p.43).	 After	reaching	a	peak	of	almost	56,000	in	2007,	the	overall	number	of	deportations	from	Spain	 continuously	 decreased	 to	 just	 over	 20,000	 in	 2015,	 according	 to	 official	government	statistics28.		In	addition,	and	in	contrast	to	the	British	context,	the	deportations	that	are	carried	out	by	Spanish	authorities	largely	focus	on	would-be	‘illegal’	entrants	apprehended	in	the	border	areas	(López	Sala,	2013),	whereas	only	around	40	per	cent	of	actual	deportees	are	foreigners	who	already	resided	on	the	territory.	Official	statistics	also	show	 that	 deportation	 efforts	 primarily	 target	 those	 who	 apart	 from	 living	 and	working	in	the	country	‘illegally’	also	committed	a	criminal	offence.	In	2012,	these	so-called	 ‘qualified	expulsions’	made	up	87%	of	 all	deportations	 from	within	 the	country.	In	the	same	year,	so-called	‘foreign	national	offenders’	made	up	just	over	11%	of	all	removals	and	‘voluntary	departures’	from	within	the	UK29.		The	perceptions	and	personal	experiences	of	many	people	I	informally	spoke	to	or																																																									28	See:	http://www.interior.gob.es/en/prensa/balances-e-informes/	(last	accessed	08/12/2017).	29	Own	calculations	based	on	annually	published	official	government	statistics	(Spain:	‘Balance	lucha	contra	la	inmigración	irregular’;	UK:	Home	Office	statistics	on	removals	of	foreign	national	offenders,	see:	http://data.gov.uk/dataset/immigration-statistics-removals	(25/11/2013)).	
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interviewed	 in	 Barcelona	 reflect	 the	 underlying	 legal	 ambiguities,	 as	 do	 the	following	accounts	of	a	representative	of	 the	Cepaim	Foundation	 (1)	and	a	young	migrant	from	Gambia	(2):	(1)	There	are	many	people	who	are	 caught	without	papers,	 and	 they	 take	them	to	the	police	station,	they	identify	them,	but	as	long	as	they	do	nothing	illegal...	well,	[they]	remain	here.	Why?	Because	there	is	no	money	to	[deport]	everyone,	it's	an	economic	question.	And	imagine	how	much	police	would	be	needed	if	everyone	was	to	be	kicked	out	(bcnA31).			(2)	I	know	a	person	[…]	whom	they	always	send	the	letter	that	says	they	don’t	want	him	here	[an	expulsion	order],	but	he	is	still	here.	But	they	send	him	letters	that	he	is	being	expelled...	that	he	has	to	leave	the	country...	that	they	cannot	give	him	a	residence	permit	or	anything,	[…]	but	they	themselves	don’t	
get	him	and	send	him	home	(bcnB02).		These	 and	 previous	 quotes	 also	 underline	 the	 important	 fact	 that	 in	 contrast	 to	measures	of	regularisation,	the	effectiveness	of	a	deportation	regime	always	hinges	on	 a	 series	 of	 accompanying	 measures	 of	 in-country	 immigration	 control	 and	enforcement,	as	well	as	legal	and	practical	barriers	 to	exclude	unlawful	residents	from	public	and	other	services.			
4.1.3. Internalised	immigration	control	and	enforcement	in	the	UK	and	Spain		In	October	2013,	then	home	secretary	Theresa	May	publicly	defended	the	British	government’s	‘hostile	environment’	approach	by	claiming	that	it	can’t	be	fair	for	people	who	have	no	right	to	be	here	in	the	UK	to	continue	to	exist	as	everybody	else	does	with	bank	accounts,	with	driving	licences	and	with	access	to	rented	accommodation.	[…]	What	we	don’t	want	is	a	situation	where	people	think	that	 they	can	come	here	and	overstay	because	they’re	able	to	access	everything	they	need30.	Accordingly,	the	three	main	objectives	of	the	2014	Immigration	Act	were	“to	make	it	(i)	easier	to	identify	illegal	immigrants	[…],	(ii)	easier	to	remove	and	deport	illegal	immigrants	 […	 and]	 (iii)	more	 difficult	 for	 illegal	 immigrants	 to	 live	 in	 the	 UK”	(Home	Office,	2013).	The	latter	in	particular	should	be	achieved	by	introducing	an	
																																																								30	T.	May,	speaking	on	BBC	Radio	4’s	‘Today’	programme,	cited	in	The	Guardian,	10	October	2013:	http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/oct/10/immigration-bill-theresa-may-hostile-environment	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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obligation	for	private	landlords	and	certain	National	Health	Service	(NHS)	staff	to	check	the	immigration	status	of	their	tenants	and	patients,	a	prohibition	on	banks	opening	accounts	for	irregular	migrants	and	new	powers	to	check	driving	licence	applicants’	 immigration	 status	 and	 revoke	 the	 licences	 of	 those	 who	 have	overstayed.	The	clear	aim	of	these	policies	is	to	combat	irregular	migration	through	the	 curtailment	 of	 social	 rights	 and	 the	 control	 and	 sanctioning	 of	 unlawful	residents’	 social	 and	 economic	 relations	 with	 others	 (Walsh,	 2014;	 Cvajner	 &	Sciortino,	2010b).	As	I	will	show	in	chapters	5,	6	and	7,	this	has	shifted	part	of	the	central	 government’s	 responsibility	 for	 immigration	 control	 to	 a	 range	 of	 local	actors	and	institutions.		In	combination	with	 increasing	restrictions	and	control	placed	on	their	access	 to	basic	welfare	 services	 as	well	 as	 stiffer	 sanctions	 imposed	 on	 anyone	willing	 to	employ	them,	these	measures	make	irregular	migrants’	everyday	lives,	housing	and	working	 conditions	 even	 more	 precarious,	 and	 push	 them	 even	 further	‘underground’	(Broeders	&	Engbersen,	2007).	Almost	all	of	my	migrant	respondents	in	London	had	experienced	(or	at	least	heard	of)	immigration	raids	in	public	places,	private	homes	or	work-sites	that	often	led	to	deportations.	The	account	of	a	40-year-old	 woman	 from	 Nigeria	 who	 had	 been	 living	 in	 London	 since	 2006	 after	 she	overstayed	a	six-months	visitor	visa	is	just	one	example:		I	had	worked	for	ages	there,	but	because	I	don’t	have	papers	I	had	to	stop.	[…]	 I	 used	 my	 [real]	 name	 there…	 but	 when…	 I	 think	 it	 was	 this	administration	 that	 started	 checking	 the	 papers,	 and	 so	 they	 see	 that	my	National	Insurance	Number	is	not…	that	I	am	not	legally	allowed	to	work,	so	I	had	to	stop.	But	I	even…	I	was	so	lucky	because	some	of	my	colleagues	were	arrested,	one	was	even	deported,	[…]	but	I	wasn’t	at	work	that	day,	so	they	didn’t	arrest	me	(lonB09).	Not	being	able	to	work	nor	to	rent	accommodation	or	access	basic	services	increases	not	 only	 their	 dependence	 on	 friends	 and	 family	 members	 but	 also	 their	exploitability	 by	 unscrupulous	 employers,	 landlords	 and	 criminal	 networks,	 as	 a	migrant	rights	advocate	noted:		All	that	is	going	to	have	a	very	detrimental	impact,	both	the	housing	and	the	healthcare	issues	are	going	to	push	undocumented	migrants	into	a	far	more	vulnerable	position,	where	instead	of	engaging	with	responsible	landlords	or	registered	[doctors],	people	will	find	themselves	looking	for	accommodation	from	criminal	landlords	who	don’t	care	what	the	law	is	and	will	make	them	
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pay	inflated	prices	for	poor	accommodation	and	potentially	exploit	them	in	other	ways	as	well;	and	when	it	comes	to	healthcare,	potentially	be	forced	to	seek	 healthcare	 from	 unqualified	 people	 within	 the	 community	 who	 can	make	some	money	out	of	them.	I	mean,	it’s	much	easier	to	get	a	bit	of	cash	borrowed	 from	someone	 to	pay	 for	 something	 than	 it	 is	 to	engage	with	a	
system	that	doesn’t	want	you	to	be	there	(lonA02).	It	has	also	been	shown	that	the	increasing	criminalisation	of	various	dealings	with	persons	 whose	 presence	 in	 the	 country	 is	 unlawful	 does	 not	 only	 blur	 the	 line	between	 support	 and	 exploitation	 (Engbersen	 et	 al.,	 2006),	 but	 also	 generates	uncertainty	 among	 public	 servants	 and	 furthers	 discrimination	 against	 non-European	(looking)	 immigrants	but	also	citizens	(MRN,	2015;	Spencer	&	Hughes,	2015).		While	 the	 UK	 government	 has	 quite	 openly	 declared	 a	 “war	 against	 illegal	immigration“,	 as	 Green	 and	 Grewcock	 (2002)	 argued,	 the	 current	 and	 previous	governments	of	Spain	opted	for	a	much	more	pragmatic	approach.	When	I	asked	my	respondents	 in	 Barcelona,	 how	 they	would	 describe	 the	 ‘Spanish	 alternative’	 or	equivalent	to	the	‘hostile	environment’	approach,	many	of	them	said	that	the	central	government	would	essentially	avoid	dealing	with	the	issue	in	the	first	place.	One	city	official	called	 it	 the	 ‘ostrich	strategy’,	 referring	to	 the	 folktale	according	to	which	ostriches	tend	to	bury	their	heads	in	the	sand	to	avoid	danger	or	pretend	it	does	not	exist.	Although	some	central	government	policies	such	as	the	healthcare	reform	of	2012	have	broadened	the	scope	for	internal	immigration	control	(see	chapter	5),	the	majority	of	my	 interviewees	stressed	the	general	absence	of	 immigration	control	and	enforcement	from	most	public	spaces	and	institutions	within	the	city:		The	burden	of	border	control	is	on	the	part	of	the	[national]	police,	and	it’s	the	police	who	have	to	find	a	way	to	exercise	this	control.	But	the	rest	of	the	administration,	and	especially	at	the	municipal	and	[regional]	levels,	doesn’t	participate	in	this	'dirty'	job,	let's	say.	It's	not	that	you	go	to	social	services	and	when	you	leave	the	centre	they	pick	up	the	phone	and	notify	the	police	[…].	On	the	contrary,	I	think	that	social	and	educational	services	try	to	help	the	
person	 get	 regularised	 as	 soon	 as	 possible	 (Lawyer	 and	 Human	 Rights	advocate,	bcnA23).		Some	years	ago…	5,	6,	7	years	ago,	you	could	see	random	checks	on	the	street	[...]	and	you	would	find	police	at	the	subway	exits	identifying	people	who	they	supposed	to	be	[irregular]	immigrants.	That	doesn’t	happen	in	recent	years,	there	 is	no	such	pressure	on	 the	street.	And	 I	believe	 that	 it	 is	because	 in	recent	years	net	migration	to	Spain	has	been	negative,	 [...]	 there	are	many	
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people	who	have	also	been	returning	to	their	countries.	So,	I	imagine	that	it’s	also	 because	 of	 this	 that	 there	 is	 no	 such	 pressure.	When	 the	 migratory	
balance	was	positive,	there	was	more	need	to	control	(Project	Coordinator	of	an	association	called	EICA,	bcnA06).	A	recurring	theme	was	the	fact	that	the	economic	crisis	seems	to	have	much	more	‘effectively’	 reduced	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 Spain	 as	 a	 country	 of	 destination	 and	irregular	 residence,	 than	 the	 explicit	 efforts	 of	 the	 UK	 government	 to	 achieve	precisely	that.	In	addition,	respondents	in	Barcelona	pointed	to	the	lack	of	detention	and	 deportation	 capacities	 as	well	 as	 the	 (opposite)	 possibility	 of	 regularisation,	when	trying	to	explain	the	absence	of	internalised	control.	The	vice-president	of	the	
Barcelona	 Municipal	 Immigration	 Council,	 a	 local	 advisory	 body	 representing	 all	migrant	communities,	put	it	this	way:		The	system	doesn’t	work	like	this	because	the	police	don’t	look	for	people	without	 papers.	 [...]	 Why	 would	 they	 be	 looking	 for	 someone	 without	papers...?	 It	 would	 obviously	 be	 impossible	 to	 manage	 so	 many	 people	without	papers,	and	there	would	be	so	many…	where	do	you	put	them?	What	do	 you	 do	 if	 the	 detention	 centre	 here	 [the	 only	 one	 in	 Catalonia]	 has	 a	capacity	of	200?	So	obviously	they	just	turn	a	blind	eye	on	the	topic	and	the	
undocumented	are	left	there	and	wait	until	the	three	years	pass	so	they	can	get	
their	papers	(bcnA01).	Ultimately,	 several	 of	 the	 people	 I	 spoke	 to	 also	 tried	 to	 explain	 the	 absence	 or	ineffectiveness	of	internal	control	measures	with	reference	to	either	the	country’s	relatively	recent	experience	of	totalitarianism;	or	the	(related)	deep-seated	aversion	of	many	Catalan	people	against	the	Spanish	state,	which	has	recently	been	fuelled	by	 the	 central	 government’s	 refusal	 to	 even	 acknowledge	 their	 wish	 for	independence.	The	following	quotes	of	a	lawyer	(1)	and	a	doctor	(2)	exemplify	these	arguments:		(1)	[You	have	to]	think	that	the	police	we	have,	especially	the	Guardia	Civil	[state	police],	still	has	that	air	of	Francoism,	of	the	dictatorship,	and	that	is	difficult	 to	 take	away.	The	people	don’t	 trust	 the	police	very	much	either,	[…they]	don’t	like	the	police	very	much	[…].	And	the	people...	think	that	this	is	[a	matter]	of	the	police	and	that	the	police	should	take	care	of	it,	but	the	rest	of	us	are	not	going	to	be	cops.	[…]	The	mind-set	is	like	this	(bcnA23).		(2)	Here	in	Catalonia	we	have	laws	that	are	imposed	by	Spain,	and	others	that	are	Catalan	[laws],	and	you	know	that	if	in	a	country	there	are	laws	made	by	certain	people	[the	population]	has	to	agree	a	little	bit	with	the	worldview	of	these	 people.	 If	 a	 law	 is	 imposed	 on	 you	 from	 outside,	 and	 you	 have	 a	different	vision,	then	you	easily	disregard	it.	But	when	it’s	your	country	and	
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you	make	your	own	laws,	you	will	always	agree	a	little	bit	more.	Catalonia	is	an	interesting	case	for	this	reason	(bcnA14).	Whatever	 the	 best	 explanation,	 it	 can	 certainly	 be	 argued	 that	 third-country	nationals	living	and	working	irregularly	in	Barcelona	are	significantly	less	likely	to	be	 targeted	 by	 immigration	 enforcement	 or	 even	 face	 deportation,	 while	 their	chances	of	eventually	qualifying	for	regularisation	are	considerably	higher	than	for	those	who	live	in	London.	As	I	will	suggest	in	the	next	section,	this	has	important	implications	for	how	their	situation	is	perceived	and	addressed	by	local	authorities.			
4.2. City	responses	to	migrant	irregularity	and	its	localised	control	
They	live	in	the	city;	and	that’s	the	discrepancy:	[…]	whatever	state	law	says,	in	the	end	these	people	live	in	some	place.	They	don’t	live	in	non-places.	And	some	 place	 is	 the	 city,	 right?	 And	 so	 it’s	 the	 city	 that	 faces	 these	 legal	
contradictions	(bcnA18).		This	 quote	 from	 an	 interview	 with	 the	 director	 of	 Barcelona’s	 Department	 of	
Immigration	 and	 Interculturality	 clearly	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 cities	 and	 their	institutions	 are	 sites	 where	 irregular	 migrants’	 claims,	 but	 also	 their	 social,	economic	and	cultural	contributions	often	become	most	visible.	Migrant	irregularity	itself	–	and	the	associated	lack	of	rights	and	opportunities	to	participate	and	access	services	–	thereby	carries	different	meanings	and	warrants	different	responses	on	the	part	of	local	(as	opposed	to	national)	authorities.	Although	in	some	cases	city	ordinances	have	been	shown	to	reinforce	rather	than	challenge	exclusionary	state	practices	 towards	 unwanted	 immigrants	 (Varsanyi,	 2008),	 numerous	 studies	suggest	that	local	authorities	generally	address	the	issue	of	irregular	residence	in	a	more	pragmatic	way	and	highlighted	the	rather	inclusionary	effects	of	local	policy	(Marrow,	2012;	de	Graauw,	2014;	Gebhardt,	2015;	Leerkes	et	al.,	2012;	McDonald,	2012;	de	Graauw	&	Vermeulen,	2016;	Lundberg	&	Strange,	2016;	Wilmes,	2011;	Price	&	Spencer,	2014).		Arguably,	this	pragmatism	has	a	lot	to	do	with	the	fact	that	since	irregularity	is	made	and	 can	 only	 be	 unmade	 through	 state	 legislation,	 cities	 have	 to	 deal	 with	 its	immediate	effects	without	themselves	having	the	means	to	address	the	source	of	the	problem,	as	various	of	my	interviewees	in	both	cities	noted.	The	following	accounts	
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of	 a	 Council	 worker	 I	 interviewed	 in	 London	 (1)	 and	 a	 representative	 of	 the	municipality	of	Barcelona	(2)	both	reflect	this	feeling	of	impotence:	(1)	The	problem	we	have	as	a	[local]	authority	is	that	we	are	not	the	Home	
Office.	 We	 are	 not	 responsible	 for	 whether	 we	 grant	 you	 a	 visa,	 what	conditions	we	attach,	or	what	action	we	take	to	enforce	that;	we	don’t	decide	that	you	have	a	right	to	stay	or	have	to	go,	or	how	long	it	takes	to	do	any	of	those	things.	We	don’t	decide	any	of	that.	The	problem	is	we	bear	all	the	costs	of	 that	decision,	and	that	separation	between	responsibility	and	control	 is	hugely	difficult	(lonA30).			(2)	 I	 understand	 that	 a	 state	 does	 not	 want	 to	 greatly	 facilitate	 the	legalisation	 of	 people	 coming	 from	 abroad	 because	 of	 the	 ‘magnet	 effect’	[‘efecto	llamada’],	but	to	have	a	person	living	here	[illegally]	and	not	expelling	him/her	[…]	is	to	say	'hey,	city	of	Barcelona,	or	Madrid,	or	Seville:	here	you	have	a	person	that	we	don’t	recognise,	and	who	we	don’t	expel,	but	who	is	not	allowed	to	work’.	[…]	Well,	what	are	we	supposed	to	do	with	this	person?	(bcnA07)		Given	 that	 local	 authorities	 (LAs)	 inevitably	bear	many	of	 the	direct	 and	 indirect	costs	of	social	exclusion,	they	generally	tend	to	be	more	immediately	concerned	with	maintaining	 community	 cohesion	and	 the	 inclusiveness	of	public	 institutions.	On	one	 hand,	 this	 means	 that	 controlling	 or	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	 unwanted	immigrants	 by	 curtailing	 their	 rights	 and	 access	 to	 basic	 services	 might	 be	 a	convenient	strategy	for	the	state	but	not	the	city,	as	a	representative	of	Caritas	 in	Barcelona	suggested:		The	 closer	 an	 administration	 is	 to	 the	 population,	 the	 more	 it	 feels	responsible	for	the	welfare	of	its	citizens;	because	of	course	if	I	am	deciding	from	Madrid…	how	much	do	I	care	in	the	end	if	there	are	10	families	[living]	in	the	street	in	Barcelona	or	Terraza	or	any	town	of	Catalonia?	But	if	you	are	the	local	administration	your	responsibility	is	that	this	small	nucleus	–	not	all	of	Spain!	–	but	 this	nucleus	works,	and	that	 there	 is	social	cohesion,	and	a	good	 sense	 of	 community.	 So	 obviously	 you	will	 worry	 a	 lot	 about	 these	people	being	on	the	street	and	[make	sure]	that	their	children	go	to	school	and	have	the	resources	they	need,	because	obviously	your	goal	[…]	as	a	public	
service,	 is	 that	 things	work,	 and	 for	 them	 to	 work	 requires	 the	 inclusion	 of	
everyone,	regular	and	irregular,	of	course	(bcnA03).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 same	 proximity	 also	makes	 cities	 more	 attentive	 to	 the	potentially	disintegrative	effects	of	localised	immigration	control	and	enforcement	measures.	It	is	thus	not	surprising	that	both	of	these	concerns	were	also	mentioned	by	many	of	the	people	I	interviewed	in	London,	including	another	Council	worker	(1)	and	a	local	politician	(2):		
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(1)	If	you	do	things	like	stopping	people	from	getting	any	medical	treatment	at	all	you	cause	health	and	safety	problems	and	public	health	problems,	so	we	are	not	actually	for	that.	We	also,	as	local	authorities,	get	annoyed	if	the	Home	Office,	 you	 know,	 kind	 of	 chases	 the	 people	 within	 our	 communities	when	we	are	already	giving	them	information	on	cases	which	we	are	already	engaged	with	or	providing	 financial	 support	 to.	 So,	 you	know,	 the	blanket	kind	of	scare	tactics	we	don’t	like	so	much	(lonA15).			(2)	I	am	here	to	represent	anyone	in	my	ward	and	at	a	public	meeting	we	had	with	 the	 high-street	 traders,	 people	 raised	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 amount	 and	frequency	of	raids	by	the	Immigration	Enforcement	Service,	and	it’s…	there	
is	no	way	I	can	support	any	illegal	activity,	but	equally	when	local	residents	and	local	traders,	who	are	completely…	all	their	activities	are	legal,	when	they	are	 raising	 issues	 with	 me	 as	 a	 local	 Councillor	 […	 then]	 obviously	 I	 am	concerned	to	hear	that,	and	I	am	actively	investigating	whether	there	have	been	any	abuses	or	heavy-handedness	or	anything	oppressive	(lonA33).	The	Councilman’s	statement	clearly	reveals	that	he	understands	his	responsibility	to	potentially	 take	action	against	 such	practices	as	a	duty	he	exclusively	owes	 to	‘legal’	residents	of	the	area,	but	not	those	who	are	the	actual	target	of	these	raids.	This,	 in	 turn,	 is	 in	 line	with	the	general	attitude	of	 the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA),	 which	 as	 a	 largely	 strategic	 body 31 	has	 no	 official	 policy	 on	 irregular	migration:	A	senior	advisor	of	former	mayor	Boris	Johnson	told	me	in	an	informal	conversation	 that	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 administrative	 competences	 in	 the	 field	 of	immigration,		we	do	nothing	explicit	about	irregular	migrants,	but	we	also	don’t	explicitly	
exclude	them	from	what	we	do.	[Our	policy	initiatives]	often	target	the	most	vulnerable	 populations…	 and	 irregular	 migrants	 are	 obviously	 [among	these]	…	but	we	would	never	address	them	directly	(lonC04).		Overall,	this	suggests	that	in	spite	of	their	limited	role	and	competence	in	the	field	of	 (irregular)	migration,	 local	 governments	have	 legitimate	 reasons	 for	 trying	 to	contest	 or	 even	 undermine	 at	 least	 some	 of	 the	 exclusionary	 effects	 of	 national	immigration	 law.	 Their	 responsibility	 for	 planning	 and	 providing	 fundamental	services	to	all	their	residents	not	only	helps	to	justify	more	inclusionary	policies	but	also	entails	a	certain	degree	of	control	over	the	population.			
																																																								31	Other	than	the	municipal	government	of	Barcelona,	the	GLA’s	primary	aim	and	function	is	to	facilitate	and	convene	discussions	and	meetings	among	the	relevant	stakeholders	and	bodies,	whereas	the	actual	planning	and	delivery	of	municipal	services	is	the	responsibility	of	each	Borough.		
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4.2.1. The	city	as	sanctuary,	source	of	membership	and	site	for	population	
control	In	 several	 other	 countries,	most	 notably	 the	US	 and	Canada,	 some	 cities	 present	themselves	as	‘places	of	sanctuary’	and	take	a	much	more	open	stand	and	sometimes	even	 concrete	 steps	 against	 local	 enforcement	 action	 by	 central	 government	agencies	 targeting	 ‘their’	 irregular	 residents	 (McDonald,	 2012;	 Bauder,	 2017;	Varsanyi,	 2007;	 de	 Graauw,	 2014).	 One	 of	 the	 fundamental	 ideas	 behind	 the	
Sanctuary	 Cities	 Movement	 in	 the	 US	 and	 Canada	 is	 precisely	 that	 of	 a	 clear	separation	between	immigration	enforcement	and	public	service	provision,	often	by	committing	 local	 police	 forces	 and	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 city	 administration	 to	 an	explicit	‘Don’t	Ask,	Don’t	Tell’	policy	(Bauder,	2017).	In	the	terminology	I	introduced	in	 section	2.4,	 this	means	 that	 firstly,	 city	employees	are	generally	 shielded	 from	having	to	know	or	check	the	immigration	status	of	service	users	and	secondly,	that	an	 effective	 firewall	 prevents	 them	 from	 sharing	 such	 information	with	 relevant	state	authorities.		Similar	 commitments	 by	 local	 governments	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 Spain	 have	 been	significantly	less	ambitious	in	both	of	these	respects.	Rather	than	specifically	aiming	to	protect	and	thereby	improve	the	living	conditions	of	already	established	irregular	residents,	 they	are	mostly	 focused	on	creating	a	welcoming	atmosphere	 towards	newly	arrived	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.	Unlike	its	precursor	in	the	US,	the	City	
of	Sanctuary	Movement	in	the	UK,	which	started	in	Sheffield	in	2005,	does	not	aim	to	protect	unlawful	residents	against	deportation	nor	to	openly	challenge	the	national	immigration	regime	by	refusing	cooperation	with	enforcement	agencies	(Squire	&	Bagelman,	 2012;	 Darling,	 2010;	 Bauder,	 2017).	 Similarly,	 the	 Refugee	 Cities	initiative,	which	was	initiated	in	September	2015	by	Barcelona’s	leftist	mayor	Ada	Colau,	is	mostly	focussed	on	inter-city	support	and	exchange	of	knowledge	and	best	practices	 regarding	 the	 reception	 and	 accommodation	 of	 asylum	 seekers32.	 The	initiative	has	been	criticised	by	local	NGOs	and	advocacy	groups	for	not	addressing	the	situation	and	specific	claims	of	irregular	residents	who	already	established	their	
																																																								32	Not	to	be	confused	with	the	International	Cities	of	Refuge	Network	(ICORN),	of	which	Barcelona	is	a	member	since	2006	and	that	aims	even	more	narrowly	at	offering	a	safe	haven	and	work	environment	for	politically	persecuted	writers.	
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lives	in	the	city.		While	 these	 rather	 symbolic	 but	 nonetheless	 official	 commitments	 of	 city	administrations	 can	 significantly	 disrupt	 the	 negative	 portrayal	 of	migrants	 and	refugees	in	the	national	media	and	political	discourse	(Squire,	2011a),	they	hardly	challenge,	 let	 alone	 change,	 exclusionary	 state	 policies	 and	 practices	 (Bagelman,	2013).	 That	 said,	 the	 city	 government	 of	 Barcelona,	 backed	 by	 a	majority	 of	 the	members	of	the	Catalan	parliament,	officially	demanded	the	region’s	only	detention	centre	(which	 is	located	 in	the	outskirts	of	Barcelona)	to	be	closed,	and	has	even	initiated	legal	steps	to	achieve	this	aim	(Carranco,	2017;	França,	2015).		Another,	although	arguably	less	immediate	aim	of	the	Sanctuary	Cities	Movement	is	to	extend	or	at	 least	 allow	a	 sense	of	belonging	or	even	effective	membership	 to	formally	still	unlawful	residents.	What	underlies	this	idea	is	an	understanding	of	the	city	as	“a	social	and	political	space	that	is	productive	of	active	forms	of	citizenship”,	as	 argued	 by	 McDonald	 (2012,	 p.129),	 among	 many	 others.	 By	 giving	 unlawful	residents	access	to	municipal	services	or	simply	allowing	them	to	move	within	the	city	without	 fear	of	deportation,	 ‘sanctuary	policies’	 enable	migrants	 in	 irregular	situations	 to	 participate	 in	 urban	 life	 and	 enact	 themselves	 as	 “members	 of	 the	urban	community”	(Bauder,	2017,	p.181).	The	crucial	question	of	whether	bodily	presence	 or	de	 facto	 residence	within	 a	 community	 can	 or	 should	 constitute	 the	basis	for	rights	and	membership	has	been	at	the	centre	of	recent	academic	debates	around	the	notion	of	‘urban	citizenship’	(Varsanyi,	2006;	Hammar,	1994;	Bauböck,	2003;	Nyers,	2010;	Darling,	2017).		Both	in	London	and	Barcelona,	I	thus	often	asked	or	alluded	to	this	question	during	my	 interviews	 with	 city	 representatives	 as	 well	 as	 people	 who	 work	 in	 local	institutions.	According	to	the	then	Commissioner	for	Immigration	and	Social	Action	of	the	municipality	of	Barcelona,	it	is	an	obvious	social	fact	that	migrants	in	irregular	situations	are	nonetheless	‘citizens’	of	Barcelona:			All	the	people	who	live	in	the	city	live	in	the	city,	and	take	the	subway	and	go	to	the	hospital,	and	take	their	children	to	school.	So...	we	have	them	living	in	
the	city	every	day	and	using	the	same	things	as	those	who	have	been	in	the	city	for	three	or	more	generations.	And	that's	why	I	say:	the	state	does	not	consider	them	his	but	as	a	city	we	have	no	choice	but	to	consider	them	ours,	because	that’s	what	they	are	(bcnA07).		
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While	 such	 pragmatic	 interpretations	 of	 belonging	 were	 surprisingly	 common	among	my	 interviewees	 in	Barcelona,	most	of	their	counterparts	 in	London	were	much	more	 careful	 and	 ambiguous	 in	 answering	 such	 questions.	 The	 following	extracts	from	interviews	with	two	local	councillors	show	how	closely	the	question	of	membership	is	related	to	whether	or	not	a	foreigner	contributes	to	the	national	economy	and	welfare	system,	which	ultimately	requires	a	formal	and	legal	status:		I	think	there	is	a	national	issue	over	[what	to	do]	when	people	are	here	and	want	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	economy	and	pay	 tax,	how	we	 let	 them	do	 that,	because	actually	they	want	to	be…	they	have	come	here	to	work.	I	am	very	relaxed	about	that,	and	partly	my	view	would	be…	a	lot	more	liberal	on	it.	But	I	actually	would	be	very	strict	on	the	idea	of	people	getting	benefits	from	the	country	they	haven’t	contributed	to,	while	 I	am	delighted	with	the	 idea	of	people	 wanting	 to	 come	 to	 Britain	 and	 work.	 London	 especially	 is	 just	 a	fantastic	city,	but	the	idea	of	coming	here	to	get	something	for	free	makes	me	angry	(lonA21).				If	you	are	here	illegally,	you	won’t	be	contributing	in	any	way,	but	you	will	be…	 causing	 a	 drain	 on	 the	 resources	 that	 everybody	 else	 has	 to	make	 a	contribution	 towards.	 And	 if	 we	 don’t	 know…	 I	 think	 even	 national	governments	have	struggled	to	account	for	people	coming	in	and	out	of	the	country,	so	 locally,	 if	we	talk	about	London	and	the	London	Boroughs,	 it’s	problematic	 to	 [have]	 an	 unknown	 number	 of	 people	 not	 contributing	 and	
making	use	of	resources	(lonA33).	In	 spite	 of	 their	 different	 understandings	 of	 (local)	membership,	 however,	most	respondents	in	both	cities	were	very	aware	that	the	actual	problem	is	not	the	people	that	come,	but	the	condition	under	which	they	subsequently	reside	in	the	city.	It	is	precisely	the	condition	of	irregularity	that	makes	it	impossible	for	some	newcomers	to	formally	‘contribute’	and	for	the	administration	to	account	for	these	newcomers	and	their	needs.		According	to	Broeders	&	Engbersen	(2007,	p.1595),	“[i]rregular	migrants,	who	are	anxious	to	stay	out	of	sight,	pose	a	fundamental	problem	for	bureaucracies	that	are	mapping	 the	 population	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 administration	 and	 control”.	 This	 is	particularly	 true	 for	 local	 government,	 which	 is	 often	 responsible	 not	 only	 for	providing	fundamental	services	including	housing	and	longer-term	spatial	planning,	but	 also	 the	maintenance	 of	 public	 order	 and	 safety	 via	 local	 policing	 and	 crime	control.	 Darling	 (2017,	 p.185)	 therefore	 argued	 that	 “through	 enabling	undocumented	 migrants	 to	 access	 services	 and	 support,	 cities	 can	 be	 seen	 to	
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‘manage’	 an	 undocumented	 population”,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 “interpreting,	reshaping	and	creating	modes	of	enforcement”	(ibid.,	p.	184).	Hence,	while	formal	status	determination	happens	at	the	national	level,	“the	realm	of	service	provision	is	a	 location	in	which	migrant	 illegality	can	be	reproduced	and/or	circumvented”	(McDonald,	2012,	p.134).	The	examples	I	will	provide	in	the	following	will	show	how	local	administrations	can	facilitate	the	circumvention	of	migrant	irregularity	within	local	institutions,	and	thereby	play	a	crucial	role	for	its	micro-management.				
4.2.2. Local	administrations	helping	to	‘circumvent’	migrant	irregularity		One	crucial	difference	between	the	two	environments	 I	compare	 is	 that	 irregular	migrants	living	in	Spain	are	–	like	any	other	resident	–	required	to	officially	register	their	residence	in	one	of	more	than	8.000	Spanish	municipalities.	Inscription	in	the	municipal	register	(‘padrón’)	gives	access	to	most	of	the	services	provided	locally,	from	public	libraries	and	sports	centres	to	healthcare	and	education	facilities.	The	only	 documentary	 requirements	 are	 a	 valid	 identification	 document	 and	 official	proof	 of	 address.	 Recognising	 the	 difficulties	 that	 irregular	migrants	 (as	well	 as	other	 marginalised	 groups)	 often	 face	 in	 providing	 a	 permanent	 address,	 some	municipalities,	 including	 that	 of	 Barcelona,	 also	 offer	 the	 possibility	 to	 register	‘without	 fixed	 abode’ 33 .	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 simple,	 as	 the	 director	 of	 the	
Department	for	Immigration	and	Interculturality	explained	to	me:		
The	Municipality	has	an	interest	in	knowing	if	a	person	exists	or	doesn’t	exist	and	those	that	do,	have	to	be	registered	and	accounted	for…	in	order	to	know	who	they	are,	where	they	live,	etc.	[…]	So	what	we	have	is	a	policy	of	active	registration:	[…]	we	actively	facilitate	that	people	register	in	the	city	as	soon	as	possible.	 […]	 It	 is	very	easy,	and	the	requirements	are	very	simple;	and	there	 are	 two	 important	 benefits:	 Firstly,	 those	 who	 register	 cease	 to	 be	invisible	but	become	visible;	they	are	someone;	they	become	a	resident.	The	moment	 someone	 registers	 […]	 s/he	 legally	acquires	 the	 status	of	 a	 [city]	resident	[‘ciudadano’],	like	you	and	me	and	everyone	who	is	registered;	and	secondly,	 registration	 gives	 access	 to	 basic	 services,	 including	 all	 the	municipal	services	(bcnA28).	The	underlying	logic	is	thus	similar	to	what	provoked	city	governments	in	the	US	to	
																																																								33	In	the	case	of	Barcelona,	either	social	services	or	the	Red	Cross	can	thereby	confirm	the	person’s	‘habitual	residence’	in	a	certain	district	of	the	city.		
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issue	municipal	ID	cards	for	their	irregular	residents.	While	the	latter	can	thereby	obtain	‘local	bureaucratic	membership’,	as	De	Graauw	(2014)	has	argued,	the	same	policy	also	has	important	benefits	for	individual	street-level	bureaucrats:		To	city	officials,	the	municipal	ID	card	was	a	legitimate	administrative	tool	
they	could	use	to	[…]	facilitate	the	workings	of	the	local	bureaucracy,	not	to	shift	 membership	 boundaries	 or	 reconstitute	 the	 formal	 citizenship	 for	undocumented	 immigrants	 who	 reside	 in	 their	 cities	 (de	 Graauw,	 2014,	p.324).		That	such	tools	can	be	necessary	for	city	workers	to	effectively	serve	a	population	that	 is	 significantly	 being	 shaped	 by	 immigration	 also	 becomes	 clear	 from	 the	following	account	of	a	social	worker	I	interviewed	in	Barcelona:		I	don’t	know,	 for	me	 the	whole	 issue	of	 immigration	 is	 a	dilemma.	 I	don’t	know	 if	 a	 country...	what	 capacity	we	have	 to	welcome	how	many	people,	under	which	conditions,	at	the	expense	of...	what	it	will	mean	for	the	quality	of	life	of	those	who	are	already	living	here.	These	are	very	big	dilemmas.	And	
I	don’t	have	the	answer.	But	what	I’m	sure	about	is	that	if	a	person	is	already	here	you	cannot	look	the	other	way	[…].	And	I	firmly	believe	that	what	gives	you	rights	is	being	a	citizen,	and	that	means	to	be	living	here	(bcnA21).		Her	 account	 not	 only	 reproduces	 the	 understanding	 of	 local	 ‘citizenship’	 as	 the	legitimate	basis	for	certain	rights,	but	also	suggests	that	local	registration	can	be	a	way	to	prevent	these	‘dilemmas’	from	getting	in	the	way	of	street-level	bureaucrats	doing	their	job.	Like	municipal	ID	cards,	it	thus	makes	it	easier	for	city	officials	and	irregular	migrants	alike	to	confront	and	deal	with	each	other,	although	neither	of	the	two	measures	changes	the	position	of	 irregular	migrants	vis-à-vis	 the	nation-state.	As	the	following	quote	of	an	irregular	resident	of	Barcelona	shows,	they	thus	still	have	to	carefully	weigh	the	benefits	of	registration	against	the	potential	risks	it	might	imply:		
The	City	Council	is	also	the	authority,	it’s	part	of	the	government,	and	if	they	have	all	your	information	they	can	do	whatever	they	want	with	it.	That's	why	there	are	people	who	are	afraid	to	register	at	City	Hall.	But	I	don’t	know,	I'm	not	afraid	to	do	it	because	here	in	Spain	everyone	who	is	here	needs	to	do	the	
registration.	 That's	why	 it’s	 necessary	 to	 register	with	 your	normal	 [true]	identity,	and	they	will	ask	you	for	a	photocopy	of	the	passport	or	whatever	allows	them	to	know	who	you	are	(bcnB09).		He	was	aware	that	municipal	registration	helps	to	normalise	his	situation	but	could	also	 quite	 easily	 become	 an	 effective	 tool	 of	 internal	 immigration	 control	 if	
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municipalities	 would	 (be	 required	 to)	 pass	 this	 information	 to	 the	 immigration	authority.	 Several	 of	 the	 local	 authority	 and	 NGO	 representatives	 I	 interviewed	noted	that	this	possibility	has	in	fact	been	discussed	in	the	past	(for	example,	when	Spanish	 immigration	 law	 was	 reformed	 in	 2009),	 but	 partly	 due	 to	 the	 strong	opposition	from	municipalities	remained	strictly	limited	to	cases	of	individuals	who	represent	an	imminent	threat	to	the	public	(bcnA03,	bcnA06,	bcnA18,	bcnA23).	The	local	administration	thus	not	only	 incentivises	 irregular	residents	 to	register,	but	also	protects	the	identity	of	those	who	do	so,	from	being	(ab)used	for	the	purpose	of	immigration	control.		In	addition	to	this,	municipal	registration	is	also	how	irregular	migrants	can	prove	the	 required	 three	 years	 of	 residence	 in	 the	 country	 when	 they	 apply	 for	regularisation	on	the	basis	of	their	‘rootedness’	(‘arraigo’).	Only	in	exceptional	cases	will	the	national	immigration	authority	accept	other	evidence	of	uninterrupted	local	presence,	as	an	NGO	worker	told	me:	“For	example	if	it’s	a	child	who	[…]	has	gone	to	school,	or	an	elderly	person	who	has	gone	to	the	doctor	regularly	[…]	these	kinds	of	things…	could	save	you”	(bcnA03).	This	also	highlights	how	important	it	can	be	for	migrants	in	irregular	situations	to	accumulate	more	but	also	less	official	proofs	of	their	presence	and	contacts	with	the	authority	and	welfare	state,	 as	Chauvin	and	Garcés-Mascareñas	 (2012)	 argued.	 In	 the	 following	 chapters	 on	 healthcare,	education	and	social	assistance	I	will	show	that	also	in	the	British	context	officially	registered	interactions	with	local	institutions	can	sometimes	strengthen	irregular	residents’	claims	for	membership.		What	the	UK	lacks,	however,	is	a	mainstream	system	of	municipal	registration.	In	order	to	register	with	a	library,	doctor	or	school,	or	access	another	service	provided	locally,	applicants	thus	have	to	provide	other	–	including	less	official	–	documents	proving	 their	 residence	 within	 a	 particular	 area.	 Commonly	 accepted	 ‘proofs	 of	address’	include	Council	Tax	letters,	utility	bills,	bank	statements,	or	letters	from	a	mobile	 phone	 or	 Internet	 provider.	 One	 of	my	 interviewees	who	had	 previously	worked	 for	 a	 local	 Council	 mentioned	 that	 local	 service	 providers	 increasingly	encounter	 (or	 suspect)	 the	use	of	 counterfeit	documents	of	 this	 sort	 (lonA20).	A	simple	Google-search	lists	several	webpages	where	so-called	‘imitations’	are	openly	
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sold	for	25-30£	each	and	irrespective	of	the	client’s	immigration	status34.	In	relation	to	 this,	 several	 people	 I	 interviewed	 in	 London	 schools	 noted	 that	 also	 legal	residents	have	been	found	or	suspected	to	‘fake’	their	address	in	order	to	increase	their	children’s	chances	for	a	place	in	a	particular	school,	which	are	usually	allocated	(among	other	things)	on	the	basis	of	residential	proximity	(lonA26,	lonA28).		Also	another	important	task	of	local	governments	in	the	UK	–	the	registration	of	all	births	(as	well	as	deaths)	–	 is	officially	performed	without	regard	to	 immigration	status:	 Local	 registry	 offices	 do	 not	 systematically	 pass	 potential	 knowledge	 of	irregularity	 to	 the	 immigration	authority;	and	the	responsible	actors	are	shielded	from	having	to	check	immigration	status,	as	the	registrar	of	a	London	Borough	was	eager	to	assure	me	in	an	informal	conversation:	“The	immigration	status	has	nothing	to	do	with	us	or	the	registration	process.	We	have	a	duty	to	register	all	births	that	happen	 in	 [the	Borough],	 and	 that’s	what	we	do”	 (lonC03).	 Such	 instances	might	qualify	as	what	the	Sanctuary	City	Movement	in	Toronto	called	‘regularization	from	below’	(McDonald,	2012),	i.e.	an	effort	to	include	irregular	migrants	at	the	local	level	(Bauder,	2017).	While	this	can	challenge	the	common	meaning	attributed	to	migrant	irregularity,	it	certainly	does	not	reduce	the	number	of	irregular	residents.		In	Spain,	on	the	other	hand,	local	as	well	as	regional	authorities	also	play	a	direct	role	 in	 the	process	of	 individual	regularisation;	 the	 former	by	gathering	evidence	and	 compiling	 a	 report	 that	 confirms	 the	 social	 ‘rootedness’	 of	 individuals	 living	within	their	area35.	Based	on	these	‘integration	reports’,	the	regional	government	–	in	 this	 case	 the	Generalitat	de	Catalunya	 –	 approves	 that	 the	applicant	has	made	sufficient	 efforts	 to	 be	 part	 of	 society	 and	 thus	 ‘earned’	 his	 or	 her	 right	 to	 be	regularised.	 In	 the	 following	 interview	 extract,	 two	 bureaucrats	 working	 in	 the	relevant	 department	 of	 the	 municipality	 of	 Barcelona	 discuss	 this	 devolved	competence:		[Bureaucrat	 1:]	 In	 the	 area	 of	 immigration	 we	 only	 have	 competence	 in	relation	to	the	‘integration	reports’,	and	there	are	very	clear	rules	so	it’s	not	
really	[the	municipality’s]	decision	either…		[Bureaucrat	2:]	...	it’s	a	proposal.	It	is	a	proposal	and	then	it’s	the	Generalitat																																																									34	See	for	example:	http://www.replaceyourdocs.co.uk/	(last	accessed	7/06/2017).		35	These	reports	(‘informes	de	arraigo‘)	usually	confirm	applicants’	(at	least	basic)	knowledge	of	Spanish	and	Catalan,	their	participation	in	language	classes,	job	trainings	and	involvement	in	local	associations.		
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who	says	yes	or	no.	It’s	true	that	the	vast	majority	of	times	they	corroborate	our	proposals,	so	if	the	municipality	says	yes,	they	say	yes,	normally	[…]	[Bureaucrat	 1:]	Yes,	 but	 in	 principle	 the	 proposal	 is	made	 on	 the	 basis	of	things	that	are	clearly	defined	by	the	regulations.	The	law	says	very	clearly	
which	things	can	be	considered	and	which	cannot.	For	someone,	for	example,	who	doesn’t	understand	Catalan	or	Spanish,	and	didn’t	do	any	course	[…]	we	are	not	going	to	make	a	favourable	proposal	(bcnA18).	Apart	 from	 this	 formal	 yet	 rather	 limited	 responsibility,	 the	 municipality	 of	Barcelona	also	provides	direct	support	for	migrants	wanting	to	regularise	their	stay	in	the	city,	as	the	director	of	the	same	department	specifically	emphasised:		We	have	a	dedicated	[municipal]	service	that	is	called	SAIER36	and	what	we	
do	[there]	is	basically	to	regularise	people.	There	are	dozens	of	lawyers	and	others	doing	paperwork	[…]	to	help	people	with	their	legal	status	–	following	the	Spanish	law,	eh!	We	don’t	 invent	[these	rules]	ourselves...	no.	We	take	Spanish	law	and	we	help	people	to	get	their	papers.	Why?	Well,	because	if	you	 have	 papers	 you	 will	 find	 a	 job	 and	 pay	 taxes	 and	 start	 to...	 give	something	back	to	society.	It’s	the	most	profitable	we	can	do.	[...]	So	one	of	the	ideas	we	have	here	in	the	city	–	and	in	practice	it’s	like	that	in	the	end	–	is	that	today's	 irregular	 [resident]	 is	 tomorrow’s	regular	 [resident].	Therefore,	the	sooner	we	work	on	their	integration	the	better	(bcnA28).		In	various	occasions,	the	municipality	of	Barcelona	has	also	taken	more	radical	steps	to	actively	facilitate	the	legalisation	of	long-term	irregular	residents.	For	example,	in	2015	City	Hall	provided	270.000€	to	support	 the	creation	of	a	co-operative	of	workers	who	collect	recyclable	materials37,	with	the	explicit	aim	of	creating	jobs	for	irregular	migrants	who	had	previously	been	evicted	from	an	informal	settlement	in	the	outskirts	of	the	city	(Fernández	Guerrero,	2015).	The	initiative	thereby	provided	a	 long-term	 solution	 –	 even	 though	 only	 for	 a	 very	 small	 fraction	 of	 the	 city’s	irregular	population	(initially	15	persons)	–	by	helping	them	to	overcome	the	major	barrier	of	finding	a	job	offer	in	order	to	regularise	their	situation	(bcnA31,	bcnA07).		Also	in	the	British	context,	support	for	regularisation	has	mostly	come	–	even	though	much	less	explicitly	–	from	the	local	level.	In	his	former	role	as	the	mayor	of	London,	Boris	 Johnson	 has	 repeatedly	 expressed	 his	 support	 for	 a	 so-called	 ‘amnesty’,	including	a	concrete	proposal	made	by	the	Strangers	into	Citizens	Campaign	in	2006	(Squire,	 2011a).	 One	 of	 his	 senior	 policy	 advisors	 told	 me	 in	 an	 informal																																																									36	‘Service	Centre	For	Immigrants,	Emigrants	And	Refugees’,	see:	http://www.bcn.cat/novaciutadania/arees/en/saier/saier.html	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).	37	The	cooperativa	ALENCOP,	see:	http://alencop.coop/	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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conversation	 that	while	 “some	 time	 ago”	 the	mayor	 had	 spoken	 quite	 openly	 in	support	of	regularisation,	he	later	changed	direction	and	“certainly	wouldn’t	do	so	now”,	which	was	shortly	before	the	mayoral	elections	 in	May	2016	(lonC04,	also	lonA15).	Much	like	city	officials	in	Barcelona,	my	informant	also	noted	that	the	only	thing	that	the	GLA	“can	do”	in	this	regard	is	to	“promote	some	of	the	rules	that	are	put	 in	 place	 by	 national	 legislation”	 (lonC04).	 As	 an	 example,	 she	 mentioned	 a	project	 to	support	migrant	 families	 in	precarious	legal	situations	but	with	a	child	that	might	qualify	for	British	Citizenship	to	make	the	corresponding	application	to	the	Home	Office.	Another	example	would	be	the	GLA’s	explicit	information	campaign	regarding	all	migrants’	access	to	free	primary	healthcare	irrespective	of	their	status	(see	chapter	5.1).	The	same	informant	also	mentioned	a	recent	initiative	in	the	area	of	 (adult)	 education	 that	did	not	explicitly	 include	 irregular	migrants	as	a	 target	group,	but	“somehow	made	sure	that	they	didn’t	check	the	participants’	immigration	status”	(lonC04).		The	way	these	policies	are	implemented	suggests	that	the	immense	politicisation	of	unwanted	immigration	to	Britain	has	not	spared	the	municipal	level,	as	also	a	local	(Labour)	Councillor	explicitly	noted:		I	am	not	sure	whether…	even	 if	 locally	we	would	have	the	 flexibility	to	do	anything	differently…	maybe	we	wouldn’t	want	to.	I	think	it	would	either	be	a	brave	or	reckless	Council	–	depending	on	your	political	view	–	that	would	go	ahead	 and	 try	 to	 make	 conditions	 easier	 for	 irregular	 migrants.	 You	 see	immigration	 is	 now	 […]	 the	 number	one	 issue…	 ahead	 of	 the	 economy	 as	people’s	number	one	issue	of	concern	(lonA21).		Also	 the	 aforementioned	 complaints	 by	 high-street	 traders	 about	 excessive	immigration	raids	disrupting	their	business	do	reflect	public	concerns	that	have	to	do	with	immigration,	but	without	identifying	the	migrants	as	the	problem.	The	same	Councillor	 who	 mentioned	 this	 issue	 also	 described	 internal	 immigration	enforcement	more	generally	as	problematic,	and	particularly	from	the	perspective	of	local	policing,	which	lies	within	his	political	responsibility:		The	fact	is	that	all	the	agencies	–	including	the	[…]	local	police,	the	London-wide	Metropolitan	police,	and	the	local	administration	here	in	[the	Borough]	–	need	to	engender	the	trust	and	confidence	of	our	local	residents	and	the	wider	 community.	 And	 the	 real	 point	 is:	 even	 in	 dealing	 with	 illegal	immigration,	but	also	 in	dealing	with	terrorism	and	serious	and	organised	crime,	and	even	dealing	with	anti-social	behaviour	in	our	neighbourhoods,	
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we	actually	need	the	local	community	to	have	confidence	in	us,	and	to	feel	able	to…	provide	us	with	information,	intelligence	and	evidence.	So	that	is	what	we	have	to	bear	in	mind	whatever	operation	we	embark	on	(lonA33).		Several	of	the	NGO	representatives	I	interviewed	also	pointed	at	existing	evidence	of	 under-reporting	 of	 serious	 crimes	 –	 including	 domestic	 and	 sexual	 violence,	human	 trafficking	 and	 slavery-like	 conditions	 –	 among	 (irregular)	 migrant	communities.	 One	 of	 them	 emphasised	 that	 “the	 police	 usually	 tries	 to	 do	 quite	proactive	work	about	that,	trying	to	make	sure	that	these	things	do	get	reported	[…]	but	the	kind	of	language	coming	from	the	Home	Office	completely	undermines	that	all”	(lonA01).		Similarly,	any	direct	involvement	or	cooperation	with	the	immigration	enforcement	agency	can	easily	undermine	other	functions	of	the	local	administration,	as	a	Council	housing	officer	pointed	out	to	me:		We	do	 a	 lot	 of	 operations	where	we	 raid	 properties	 in	 the	 private	 rental	sector	and	we	often	find	people	who	are…	what	you	are	calling…[irregular].	And	 actually,	 on	 some	 occasions	 we	 have	 worked	 with	 the	 UK	 Borders	Agency	to…	you	know,	to	try	and	pick	up	people	through	that.	But	actually,	sometimes	the	difficulty	for	us	as	the	Council	is	that	if	you	do	things	like	that,	you	 are	 focusing	 on	 the	 victims	 of	 what	 is	 going	 on	 rather	 than	 the	perpetrator,	 which	 is	 the	 landlord.	 So	 actually,	we	 are	 now	 trying	 to	 re-
calibrate	the	work	that	we	are	doing.	[…]	We	have	stopped	inviting	them	along,	
mainly	because	it	changed	the	whole	nature	of	what	we	were	doing,	that	was	the	difficulty.	So	what	we	do	[now]	is	if	we	find	people	then	we	talk	to...	we	work	closely	with	the	immigration	office	around	it,	but	[these	raids]	are	not	designed	to	find	illegal	immigrants,	they	were	designed	to	find	landlords	who	are	exploiting	these	people	(lonA30).		Given	both	the	lack	of	an	effective	firewall	and	the	limited	space	for	negotiating	more	inclusive	solutions,	it	is	not	surprising	that	local	authorities	(LAs)	in	the	UK	leave	much	of	 this	work	to	the	Third	Sector.	Several	NGO	representatives	told	me	that	their	 core	 funding	 comes	 from	 the	 local	 Council	 and	 often	without	 explicit	 rules	attached	as	to	who	can	benefit	(or	not)	from	the	services	they	provide.	The	response	of	a	local	Councillor	who	I	confronted	with	this	issue,	confirms	this:		Those	groups	must	be	pleased	because	they	have	more	flexibility,	and	that	
might	be	intentional.	[…As	a	Council]	maybe	you	don’t	want	to	put	something	in	 there	that	says,	 ‘this	money	can	only	go	to	certain	people’.	 It’s	probably	
better	 to	 leave	 it	 a	 bit	 open-ended	 so	 that	 these	 organisations	 have	 that	flexibility,	 because	 then	 they	 can	 respond	 to	 general	 need,	 rather	 than	 us	saying…	Because	actually	if	we	had	to	put	something	down	it	would	probably	
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be	more	restrictive	to	people	who	are	irregular	immigrants	(lonA21).			Also	 in	 the	Spanish	 context,	where	LAs	can	 directly	provide	 services	 to	 irregular	residents,	certain	internal	boundaries	that	follow	from	national	immigration	law	do	significantly	 limit	 the	scope	and	effectiveness	of	 inclusionary	 local	practices,	as	a	member	of	the	Barcelona	city	government	expressed:		As	a	City	Council	we	are	forced	to	apply	projects	and	proposals	that	can	at	best	alleviate	their	vulnerable	situation	through	social	assistance.	But	this	is	real	 nonsense,	 a	 contradiction.	 Because	 these	 people...	 we	 cannot	
permanently	provide	social	assistance	to	a	person	who	is	young	[…]	and	wants	
to	work.	So	the	basic	problem	that	we	encounter	is	this:	that	beyond	social	assistance	measures	we	 have	 no	 instruments;	 or	we	 have	 very	 few,	 only	those	 established	 by	 immigration	 law,	 and	 the	 problem	 is	 that	 it’s	 so	restrictive	that	we	have	almost	no	margin	to	act	(bcnA07).		This	brings	me	back	to	McDonald’s	(2012,	p.129)	observation	that	“when	services	are	made	accessible	to	people	with	precarious	status,	[…]	internal	borders	can	be	circumvented,	and	migrant	illegality	can	be	‘unmade’”.	Turning	this	argument	on	its	head,	 the	 examples	 I	 have	 provided	 here	 suggest	 that	 internal	 borders	 and	 the	irregularity	that	triggers	them	sometimes	need	to	be	circumvented	or	‘unmade’	in	order	for	local	public	service	provision	to	be	effective.	These	partial	and	temporary	circumventions	thereby	disrupt	the	internal	control	of	migrant	irregularity,	but	at	the	 same	 time	 constitute	 a	 crucial	 precondition	 for	 its	 successful	 micro-
management.	The	balance	between	(state)	control	and	(local)	management	depends	not	only	on	the	context	and	kind	of	service	to	be	provided,	but	also	the	dominant	logic	that	underpins	public	welfare	provision	more	generally.	Before	zooming	into	the	 different	 spheres	 of	 this	 provision,	 I	 therefore	 briefly	 compare	 some	 of	 the	rationales	 that	 have	 traditionally	 underpinned	 the	 British	 and	 Spanish	 welfare	states.			
4.3. Migrant	irregularity	and	the	British	and	Spanish	welfare	states	It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 one	 function	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 is	 to	 “bind[…]	 people	effectively	to	the	state”	(Halfmann,	2000,	p.36).	While	it	seems	obvious	that	unlawful	residents	should	precisely	not	be	effectively	bound	to	the	state,	their	exclusion	from	
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welfare	 services	 is	 not	 always	 straightforward	 and	 depends	 significantly	 on	 the	principles	 underlying	 their	 provision.	 Ever	 since	 Esping-Andersen’s	 (1990)	differentiation	between	a	liberal,	a	conservative-corporatist	and	a	social-democratic	‘world	of	welfare’,	much	of	the	welfare	state	literature	has	tried	to	define	distinctive	clusters,	kinds,	or	models	of	welfare	systems	(Ferrera,	1996;	Korpi	&	Palme,	1998;	Bonoli,	1997;	for	an	overview	see:	Arts	&	Gelissen,	2002).	Others	have	examined	the	interactions	of	such	welfare	models	with	different	immigration	and	incorporation	regimes,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 inclusionary	 or	 exclusionary	 outcomes	 in	 relation	 to	various	categories	of	immigrants	(Sainsbury,	2006,	2012;	Hemerijck	et	al.,	2013).		At	the	same	time,	also	the	migration	literature	increasingly	recognises	the	selective	limitation	of	immigrants’	access	to	social	services	and	benefits	as	a	novel	form	of	internalised	 immigration	 control	 and	 restriction	 (Hollifield,	 2000;	 Morris,	 2002;	Söhn,	2013).	Such	limitations	frequently	occur	in	the	context	of	a	broader	welfare	retrenchment	but	are	not	necessarily	imposed	by	national	governments	but	often	(re-)negotiated	or	specifically	enacted	at	the	regional	or	municipal	level	(Bommes	&	Sciortino,	2011a;	Price	&	Spencer,	2014).	Given	the	multi-level	nature	of	welfare	governance	 and	 the	 empirical	 fact	 that	 contemporary	 welfare	 regimes	 almost	always	combine	elements	of	more	than	one	‘regime	type’	(Arts	&	Gelissen,	2002),	my	comparative	analysis	does	not	simply	presuppose	two	overall	distinctive	models	characterising	the	British	(‘Liberal’)	and	Spanish	(‘Mediterranean’)	welfare	regime.	Rather,	 it	 follows	 the	 functional	 distinction	 between	 two	 broader	 logics	 that	underlie	public	welfare	in	general	and	the	provision	of	social	protection	and	care	services	 in	 particular:	 the	 ‘Beveridgean’	 welfare	 logic	 on	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	‘Bismarckian’	 approach	 on	 the	 other	 (Hemerijck	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Esping-Andersen,	1990).		The	former	aims	at	providing	a	minimal	but	‘universal’	safety	net	through	targeted	social	 assistance	 measures	 that	 cover	 the	 whole	 population	 –	 though	 only	 in	situations	 of	 exceptional	 hardship	 –	 and	 are	 funded	 through	 general	 taxes.	Eligibility,	 while	 in	 principle	 related	 to	 citizenship	 status,	 is	 primarily	 based	 on	individual	 need	 and	 thus	 has	 to	 be	 established	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 through	systematic	or	ad-hoc	means	testing.	In	contrast	to	that,	the	Bismarckian	approach	predominantly	 relies	 on	 employment-related	 contributions	 to	 a	 social	 insurance	
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scheme	 and	 thereby	 links	 individual	 entitlement	 much	 more	 closely	 to	 the	claimant’s	occupational	position	and	sometimes	also	 family	 status.	Full	 access	 to	these	comparatively	generous	provisions	is	gained	only	on	the	premise	of	full-time	and	long-term	participation	in	the	formal	labour	market.		The	crucial	relevance	that	this	distinction	has	for	my	analysis	is	that	the	two	welfare	logics	 –	 needs-based/means-tested	 vs.	 employment/contribution-based	 –	 have	different	implications	for	irregular	residents	as	well	as	those	local	service	providers	confronted	with	their	claims.	For	Esping-Andersen	(1990,	p.22),	one	of	the	major	differences	 between	 the	 two	 principles	 is	 that	 “[i]n	 social-assistance	 dominated	welfare	 states,	 rights	 are	 not	 so	 much	 attached	 to	 work	 performance	 as	 to	demonstrable	need”.	This,	in	turn,	determines	the	mechanism	through	which	such	systems	 more	 or	 less	 automatically	 exclude	 irregular	 migrants:	 Even	 where	eligibility	 is	 not	 a	 direct	 function	 of	 immigration	 status	 per	 se,	 someone’s	irregularity	still	invalidates	his	or	her	work	performance	but	can	also	make	it	more	difficult	or	even	impossible	to	demonstrate	a	specific	need.		In	 the	 case	 of	 welfare	 provisions	 that	 follow	 the	 Bismarckian	 logic	 –	 like	 state	pensions	 or	 traditional	 unemployment	 benefits	 –	 the	 (automatic)	 exclusion	 of	irregular	migrants	is	a	direct	corollary	of	their	exclusion	from	formal	employment.	As	I	will	discuss	in	chapter	7,	this	also	means	that	welfare	bureaucrats	themselves	do	not	have	to	determine	a	claimant’s	irregularity	in	order	to	effectuate	his	or	her	exclusion.	The	Beveridgean	logic,	on	the	other	hand,	underpins	those	forms	of	social	assistance	 –	 like	 free	 school	meals	 (see	 chapter	 6)	 –	 that	have	 been	 designed	 to	mitigate	 social	 inequality	 by	 addressing	 specific	 risk-factors	 and	 are	 therefore	
means-tested;	 that	 is,	 triggered	 by	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 claimant’s	 insufficient	financial	means38.	They	are	thus,	at	least	in	principle,	not	directly	linked	to	formal	employment	or	membership	status,	but	often	to	household	income.	In	this	case,	it	is	only	where	such	assessment	presupposes	the	claimant’s	income	and/or	fiscal	status	to	be	officially	recognised	by	the	state	–	usually	through	an	income	or	tax	declaration	–	 that	 migrant	 irregularity	 becomes	 an	 automatic	 barrier,	 whether	 that	 is	
																																																								38	Although	such	measures	are	most	characteristic	for	Esping-Andersen’s	(1990)	‘liberal’	welfare	regime,	they	also	play	an	increasingly	substantial	role	within	‘Mediterranean’,	and	particularly	the	Spanish	welfare	state	(Guillén	&	León,	2011).		
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specifically	intended	or	not.		Over	the	last	decades,	both	the	British	and	Spanish	welfare	systems	have	undergone	profound	 reforms	 and	 restructuring.	 This	 involved	 a	 significant	 ‘recalibration	 of	inclusion	 and	 exclusion’	 towards	 various	 categories	 of	 people,	 both	 citizens	 and	non-citizens,	 as	 Hemerijck	 and	 his	 colleagues	 (2013)	 have	 argued	 from	 a	comparative	perspective.	In	Britain,	so	their	assessment,	this	has	led	to	a	situation	where	 “for	 those	 who	 remain	 for	 whatever	 reasons	 outside	 the	 reach	 of	employment,	activation	measures	and	tax	credits,	poverty	and	relative	deprivation	are	imminent	threats”	(Hemerijck	et	al.,	2013,	p.18;	see	also	Bradshaw,	2015;	Butler,	2016).	 Likewise,	 the	 comparatively	 under-developed	 and	 porous	 public	 welfare	system	of	Spain	–	with	its	traditionally	strong	reliance	on	Third	Sector	organisations	(particularly	the	Catholic	Church)	and	the	family	as	the	ultimate	social	safety	net	–	also	leaves	various	sectors	of	society	with	no	or	insufficient	protection	against	social	and	 economic	 marginalisation	 (Guillén	 &	 León,	 2011;	 Rodríguez-Cabrero,	 2009;	Rodríguez-Cabrero	et	al.,	2015).	This	became	particularly	apparent	in	the	wake	of	the	 latest	 economic	 crisis	 and	 even	 more	 pronounced	 by	 the	 ensuing	 fiscal	consolidation	 measures	 (Secretería	 de	 Estado	 de	 Servicios	 Sociales	 e	 Igualdad,	2012).		An	 earlier	 shift	 (since	 the	 mid	 1990s)	 towards	 tax-funded	 social	 assistance	measures	(of	the	Beveridgean	type)	had	significantly	increased	the	reliance	of	the	Spanish	welfare	regime	on	taxes,	particularly	for	what	Hemerijck	et	al.	(2013,	p.35)	have	 called	 the	 “financing	 of	 ‘outsider’	 social	 protection”.	 Later	 ‘welfare	recalibrations’,	like	the	national	healthcare	reform	of	2012,	therefore	rather	aimed	at	excluding	various	kinds	of	‘outsiders'.	Apart	from	(irregular)	migrants,	this	also	affected	 'natives'	who	were	either	 long-term	unemployed,	had	never	entered	 the	labour	market	or	worked	in	the	country’s	large	informal	economy	(Hemerijck	et	al.,	2013).		A	comparative	study	by	Schneider	et	al.	(2010)	estimated	that	even	before	the	crisis,	between	1999	and	2007,	 Spain's	 informal	economy	accounted	 for	22.5%	of	 total	GDP	(compared	to	12.5%	in	the	case	of	Britain).	This	not	only	 lowers	overall	 tax	revenues	and	thus	heightens	budgetary	pressures,	but	it	also	complicates	the	very	implementation	of	means-tested	welfare	provision	(Stephens	et	al.,	2010).	According	
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to	the	vice	president	of	the	Barcelona	Municipal	Immigration	Council,	the	problem	of	undeclared	 income	 is	 often	 being	 conflated	 with	 that	 of	 migrant	 irregularity	although	it	equally	applies	to	‘native’	citizens	in	irregular	employment:		All	 the	people	who	work	 informally	[‘en	negro’]	do	not	declare	the	money	they	 earn,	 but	 of	 course	 people	 here	 say:	 'Ah,	 these	 immigrants	 work	informally	because	they	don’t	have	papers,	and	then	when	they	go	to	[social	services]	 they	 say	 they	 have	 no	 income	 and	 so	 they	 give	 them	 support'	(bcnA01).		This	again	suggests	that	the	underlying	problem	is	not	that	irregular	migrants	are	living	in	the	city	‘as	everybody	else	does’,	nor	that	they	usually	work	and	sometimes	use	public	services;	but	 that	because	of	 their	ascribed	 irregularity	many	of	 these	relations	 have	 to	 happen	 outside	 the	 corresponding	 rules.	 Instead	 of	 their	employment	being	effectively	governed	by	existing	labour	market	regulations	and	their	use	of	services	being	based	on	the	same	principles	that	apply	to	the	rest	of	the	population,	 these	 and	 many	 other	 exchanges	 and	 everyday	 encounters	 become	subject	to	immigration	control.		Seen	 from	 this	 perspective,	 raising	 an	 additional	 “protective	 wall	 of	 legal	 and	documentary	 requirements	 around	 the	 key	 institutions	 of	 the	 welfare	 state”	(Broeders	 &	 Engbersen,	 2007,	 p.1595)	 cannot	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 irregular	migration	but	might	even	aggravate	some	of	its	symptoms.	More	importantly,	as	I	will	show	 in	 the	 following	 three	 chapters,	 this	 ‘protective	wall’	 tends	 to	not	only	
surround	the	key	institutions	of	the	welfare	state	but	increasingly	runs	right	through	them	and	thereby	critically	interferes	with	some	of	their	most	important	functions.				 	
		
100	
5. Managing	irregularity	through	the	provision	of	public	
healthcare		Good	 health	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 every	 human	 being’s	 autonomy,	 self-fulfilment	 and	dignity,	 which	 is	 why	 access	 to	 healthcare	 is	 generally	 underpinned	 by	 strong	individual	entitlements	and	protected	through	international	human	rights	treaties	as	well	as	national	constitutions	(da	Lomba,	2011;	MdM,	2014;	OHCHR,	2014).	The	corresponding	 duty	 to	 provide	 healthcare	 services	 to	 the	 population	 has	 been	described	as	one	of	the	core	functions	of	the	welfare	state	and	an	important	“aspect	of	modern	citizenship”	(Aasen	et	al.,	2014,	p.162).	Put	 in	Boswell’s	(2007)	terms,	healthcare	provision	thus	constitutes	one	of	the	‘functional	imperatives	of	the	state’,	whether	it	is	regarded	as	the	fulfilment	of	a	basic	and	equal	right	(and	thus	an	issue	of	fairness)	or	a	necessary	measure	against	potential	threats	to	public	health	(and	thus	a	question	of	security).		Any	 concrete	 entitlement	 to	 access	 a	 particular	 nation-state’s	healthcare	 system,	however,	 is	 underpinned	 by	 both	 a	 human	 and	 a	membership	 right	 (da	 Lomba,	2011;	Hall	&	Perrin,	2015).	In	many	migrant-receiving	countries	the	regulation	of	healthcare	access	has	thus	become	increasingly	linked	to	the	issue	of	immigration	and	its	control.	By	restricting	the	access	of	(certain)	foreigners	on	the	basis	of	their	immigration	 status,	 governments	 seek	 to	 not	 only	 prevent	 so-called	 ‘health	tourism’39	but	also	to	render	a	country	less	attractive	as	a	potential	destination	for	irregular	 migrants	 and	 other	 unwanted	 newcomers.	 Almost	 unavoidably,	 such	measures	also	exclude	those	irregular	migrants	from	effective	health	screening	and	treatment	who	already	form	part	of	the	resident	population,	which	is	problematic	from	a	public	health	perspective.		By	the	same	logic,	also	the	potential	inclusion	of	irregular	migrants	is	not	a	purely	humanitarian	issue	but	reflects	their	at	least	partial	recognition	as	de	facto	members	of	 society.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 their	 accessing	 of	 such	 services	 not	 only	constitutes	an	‘act	of	citizenship’	(Isin,	2008),	but	also	an	instance	of	 ‘integration’	(Schweitzer,	2017).	Formal	entitlements	to	even	basic	care	and	services	can	create																																																									39	‘Health	tourism’	refers	to	people	who	enter	another	country	with	the	primary	intention	of	receiving	a	particular	treatment	that	is	unavailable	or	more	expensive	in	their	own	country	of	residence.		
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a	sense	of	inclusion,	belonging	or	even	a	right	to	remain	in	the	country	of	unlawful	residence,	while	serious	health	issues	or	the	attested	need	for	a	particular	treatment	can	 strengthen	 legal	 claims	 for	 regularisation	 and	 effectively	 impede	 or	 delay	deportation	(PICUM,	2009;	Kraler,	2011).		This	 and	 the	 subsequent	 two	 chapters	 (dealing	 with	 the	 provision	 of	 public	education	 and	 social	 assistance)	 will	 follow	 the	 same	 structure:	 After	 a	 brief	discussion	of	the	underlying	contradictions	and	some	of	their	recent	manifestations	in	 the	 Spanish	 and	 British	 context,	 I	 will	 outline	 the	 respective	 legal	 and	 policy	frameworks	within	which	these	various	services	are	provided	locally.	In	a	second	step,	I	will	examine	if	and	how	the	institutional	roles	and	individual	responsibilities	assigned	 to	 different	 kinds	 of	 actors	 coincide	 or	 conflict	 with	 the	 logic	 of	immigration	control.	Finally,	I	will	employ	the	analytical	framework	I	developed	at	the	end	of	chapter	2	in	order	to	summarise	and	visualise	the	findings	from	each	of	the	three	sectors	of	welfare	provision.		
 
5.1. Between	hostility	and	pragmatism:	Ambivalent	legal-political	contexts	
for	the	provision	of	public	healthcare	services	to	irregular	migrants	Both	in	the	UK	and	in	Spain	healthcare	is	delivered	within	predominantly	tax-based	national	 health	 systems	 that	 were	 originally	 founded	 –	 in	 1948	 and	 1986,	respectively	 –	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 universal	 coverage	 and	 free	 and	 equal	 access	(Aasen	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 but	 have	 recently	 undergone	 significant	 reforms	 and	restructuring	(Legido-Quigley	et	al.,	2013;	Department	of	Health,	2010;	MdM,	2014).	While	mainly	aiming	at	increasing	overall	cost	efficiency,	these	reforms	also	linked	access	 rules	 to	 immigration	 status	 and	 thus	 allow	 for,	 or	 even	 require,	 a	 more	effective	internal	control	of	migrant	irregularity.		In	 Spain,	 the	 national	 health	 reform	 of	 201240 	categorically	 excluded	 irregular	migrants	–	with	the	exception	of	emergencies,	minor	children	and	pregnant	women	–	 from	free	public	health	care	by	 invalidating	the	health	cards	(‘Tarjeta	Sanitaria	
Individual’,	TSI)	to	which	they	had	been	entitled	automatically	and	irrespective	of																																																									40	Enacted	through	Royal	Decree-Law	16/2012,	of	20	April,	on	urgent	measures	to	ensure	the	
sustainability	of	the	national	health	system	and	improve	the	quality	and	safety	of	its	provisions.	
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their	immigration	status	once	registered	as	local	residents	(MdM,	2014).	In	March	2015,	however,	the	Spanish	minister	of	health	announced	in	an	interview	that	the	central	 government	 was	 planning	 to	 restore	 the	 right	 of	 migrants	 in	 irregular	situations	to	access	primary	healthcare	services	provided	within	the	national	health	system.	This	move	has	become	necessary,	so	the	minister,	for	a	number	of	“practical	reasons”	such	as	 to	“avoid	saturating	the	emergency	services”	 that	 these	persons	otherwise	tend	to	 fall	back	on	(El	Diario,	2015).	While	 thus	recognising	a	certain	necessity	 to	 provide	 them	 with	 some	 form	 of	 access,	 however,	 the	 central	government	 did	 not	 foresee	 irregular	 migrants’	 formal	 re-inclusion	 into	 the	mainstream	 system.	 In	 fact,	 the	minister	made	 very	 clear	 that	 he	 is	 “completely	against”	making	 them	holders	of	 the	TSI,	which	 “would	give	 them	a	 right	 that	 in	Europe	does	not	exist	in	any	other	country”.	Instead,	they	should	be	given	a	special	type	of	health	card	–	valid	only	within	a	limited	timeframe	and	specific	locality	–	the	exact	specifications	of	which	are	still	to	be	established	(Rejón,	2015).		Irregular	migrants	 living	 in	 the	 UK,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 currently	 entitled	 to	access	 free	 primary	 healthcare	 provided	 by	 local	 family	 doctors	 (‘General	Practitioners’,	GPs)	within	the	British	National	Health	Service	(NHS).	Like	all	other	‘Overseas	Visitors’41,	however,	they	are	to	be	charged	the	full	cost	of	accessing	any	secondary	(i.e.	hospital)	care	(Department	of	Health,	2013a,	2013b).	This	charging	regime,	 first	 introduced	 in	 2004,	 has	 been	 further	 extended	 by	 the	 2014	Immigration	 Act,	 which	 brings	 significant	 changes	 regarding	migrants’	 access	 to	healthcare	(Home	Office,	2013).	One	of	its	main	objectives	was	that	“those	persons	who	 are	 here	 unlawfully	 should	 not	 remain	 and	 should	 have	 no	 entitlement	 to	benefits	 or	 public	 services”	 (Department	 of	 Health,	 2013b,	 p.27).	 This	 declared	policy	goal	clearly	reflects	the	UK	governments’	official	strategy	of	creating,	“here	in	Britain,	a	really	hostile	environment	for	illegal	migration”,	as	was	first	announced	by	then	home	secretary	Theresa	May	(cit.	in	Kirkup	&	Winnett,	2012)	in	May	2012.		In	 November	 2013,	 however,	 during	 a	 parliamentary	 debate	 on	 the	 proposed	immigration	 bill	 and	 its	 potential	 effects	 on	migrants’	 access	 to	 healthcare,	 then	immigration	minister	Mark	Harper	also	emphasised	that	the	government																																																											41	The	official	category	used	for	all	foreigners	who	are	not	‚ordinarily	resident’	in	the	UK,	including	those	holding	tourist	or	visitors’	visa,	as	well	as	those	residing	in	the	country	without	authorisation.	
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[…]	 will	 not	 do	 anything	 that	 will	 worsen	 public	 health.	 Of	 course	 it	 is	important	for	those	who	are	in	the	United	Kingdom,	even	if	they	are	not	here	legally,	to	have	access	to	public	health	treatment,	because	it	has	an	impact	not	just	on	them,	but	on	the	rest	of	the	community.42		The	 ministers’	 statements,	 both	 in	 Britain	 and	 Spain,	 reflect	 the	 inherent	contradictions	 between	 the	 pressure	 to	 restrict	 the	 access	 to	 these	 often	 scarce	public	 resources	 to	 ‘legitimate’	 members	 of	 the	 community	 and	 the	 need	 for	pragmatic	solutions	with	respect	to	those	who	do	reside	within	a	given	locality	but	lack	 the	 national	 government’s	 formal	 consent.	 In	 both	 countries	 the	 restrictive	reforms	 have	 been	 accompanied	 by	 intense	 debates	 and	 critique	 from	 health	professionals	 and	 civil	 society	 organisations.	 Critics	 frequently	 highlighted	 that	universal	health	coverage	not	only	helps	preventing	the	spread	of	communicable	diseases	but	also	plays	a	critical	role	for	the	detection	of	other	societal	ills,	such	as	domestic	 violence	 and	 abuse	 (MdM,	 2014;	 semFYC,	 2012).	 From	 an	 economic	perspective,	it	has	been	argued	that	early	and	preventive	treatment	is	cheaper	than	long	intensive	care,	which	often	becomes	necessary	as	a	result	of	excluding	patients	from	regular	screening	and	primary	care	(FRA,	2015;	Steele	et	al.,	2014;	Aspinall,	2014;	Wind-Cowie	&	Wood,	2014).		While	in	both	countries	the	formal	responsibility	for	the	provision	of	healthcare	is	partly	 devolved	 to	 the	 regional	 level,	 it	 was	 only	 in	 Spain	 that	 the	 national	government’s	 intention	 to	 restrict	 the	 access	 of	 irregular	 migrants	 has	 been	effectively	prevented	through	legislation	enacted	by	several	regional	governments.	Although	 it	 explicitly	 aimed	 at	 a	 better	 coordination	 and	 overall	 consistency	 of	service	provision,	the	reform	of	2012	thus	provoked	very	different	responses	across	the	 country,	 whereby	 resistance	 was	 particularly	 strong	 in	 the	 Autonomous	Communities	 of	 Andalucía,	 Asturias,	 the	 Basque	 Country	 and	 Catalonia	 (DOTW,	2013).		Only	four	months	after	the	entry	into	force	of	the	new	state	law,	the	government	of	Catalonia	established	 its	own	administrative	norms	according	 to	which	 irregular	migrants	explicitly	continue	to	have	access	to	free	healthcare	provided	through	the	
																																																								42	House	of	Commons	Public	Bill	Committee:	Immigration	Bill	Deb,	12	November	2013,	c310:	http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmpublic/immigration/131112/am/131112s01.htm#13111257000035	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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Catalan	 public	 health	 service	 CatSalut.	 This	 conflict	 is	 reflected	 both	 in	 political	rhetoric	and	everyday	practice	and	has	contributed	to	a	climate	of	misinformation	and	 confusion	 among	 healthcare	 professionals	 (MdM,	 2014)	 but	 also	 migrants	themselves.	The	 following	quote	 from	an	 interview	with	a	Moroccan	citizen	who	spent	most	of	his	life	in	Barcelona	but	unlike	the	rest	of	his	family	never	regularised	his	situation,	reflects	this	uncertainty:		I	 have	 heard	 that	 CatSalut	 said	 that	 it	 would	 not	 invalidate	 irregular	migrants’	 health	 cards;	…that	 the	Ministry	of	Health	 said	 that	 they	would	invalidate	them,	but	Catalonia	said	no:	that	it	would	not	implement	that.	But	as	 I	said:	right	now	I	wouldn’t	be	able	 to	 tell	you.	Maybe	 if	 I	go	[my	card]	wouldn’t	work,	I	don’t	know…	(bcnB04).		Also	 several	 other	 respondents	 explicitly	 referred	 to	 the	 apparent	 disagreement	between	 different	 levels	 of	 government	when	 trying	 to	 explain	 the	 complex	 and	somewhat	 contradictory	 rules	 and	 procedures	 of	 access.	 A	 representative	 of	 the	
Catalan	Refugee	Aid	Commission	(‘Comissió	Catalana	d'Ajuda	al	Refugiat’,	CCAR)	put	it	this	way:		Well	that's	where	you	see	the	clash:	it’s	the	central	government	that	wants	to	limit	 the	 services	 and	 attention	 to	 immigrants	 in	 irregular	 situations,	whereas	 I	 think	 at	 the	 [lower]	 levels	 –	 for	 example	 in	 the	municipality	 of	Barcelona	–	they	are	more	aware	[of	the	social	consequences]	(bcnA04).			Also	in	the	UK	context,	the	Greater	London	Authority	(GLA)	–	which	has	no	formal	competence	in	the	area	of	health	–	has	occasionally	taken	a	more	pragmatic	position	than	the	national	government.	A	senior	advisor	to	former	mayor	Boris	Johnson	told	me	 in	an	 informal	 conversation	 that	when	 talking	about	health	 issues	 internally,	such	as	the	need	to	raise	awareness	about	Tuberculosis,	“we	obviously	don’t	exclude	irregular	migrants,	but	we	also	don’t	explicitly	include	them”	(lonC04).	Already	in	January	2012,	as	part	of	the	Mayor’s	Integration	Strategy,	the	GLA	had	published	a	pamphlet	available	in	20	languages	to	make	migrants	and	asylum	seekers	aware	of	their	 entitlement	 to	 register	 with	 a	 GP.	 A	 representative	 of	 the	 London-based	
Migrants’	Rights	Network	(MRN),	which	collaborated	with	the	Mayor’s	Office	on	this	issue,	recalls	that	there	was	a	big	concern	among	the	London	authorities,	[in	spite	of]	what	the	national	 government	was	 saying,	 […]	 that	not	 enough	migrants,	 including	
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undocumented	migrants,	were	going	to	see	a	GP	or	where	in	touch	with	the	health	authorities	when	they	should	be,	especially	pregnant	women.	So	they	were	 taking	 some	steps	 to	actually	encourage	people	 to	access	 the	health	system	(lonA02).		The	leaflet	particularly	emphasises	that	applicants	are	not	legally	required	“to	prove	their	identity	or	immigration	status	to	register	with	a	practice”	and	that	GPs	cannot	refuse	registration	on	discriminatory	grounds.	The	campaign	was	a	reaction	to	the	frequent	 misinterpretation	 of	 existing	 norms	 regarding	 (particularly	 irregular)	migrants’	 access	 to	 NHS	 services,	 and	 has	 been	 heavily	 criticised	 by	 right-wing	pressure	groups	for	further	encouraging	‘health-tourism’	(Johnson,	2012).	Around	the	same	time,	and	more	in	line	with	this	criticism,	an	official	poster	campaign	in	NHS	facilities	specifically	reminded	those	“visiting	the	UK,	or	not	living	here	on	a	lawful	and	settled	basis”	that	they	“may	have	to	pay”	for	their	healthcare.	As	shown	in	figure	4,	some	of	the	posters	clearly	emphasised	that	access	to	public	healthcare	is	 closely	 linked	 to	 immigration	 (status)	 and	 that	 NHS	 staff	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	controlling	both.	From	 the	perspective	of	 irregular	migrants,	such	 information	 is	likely	 to	 further	 increase	 uncertainty	 or	 even	 fear	 of	 being	 detected	 and	apprehended	as	a	result	of	accessing	these	services.			
		 									
Owe cash to the NHS?
Your visa application may
be at risk
Outstanding debt to the NHS might mean that you 
are refused entry into the UK. Before you travel make 
sure you have health insurance.
For more information go to 
www.nhs.uk/visitingengland
NHS hospital
treatment is not 
free for everyone
If you are visiting the UK, or not living 
here on a lawful and settled basis, 
you may have to pay for your healthcare. 
Please ask reception for details.
Figure	4:	NHS	poster	campaign	–	‘Healthcare	is	not	free	for	everyone’	
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These	examples	suggest	that	not	only	(irregular)	migrants	themselves	but	also	the	public	employees	who	administer	or	provide	healthcare	services	to	the	population	are	exposed	to	contradictory	signals	and	information	regarding	the	relevance	that	a	patient’s	immigration	status	should	have	for	them.	In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	I	will	focus	on	the	roles	and	perspectives	of	different	kinds	of	healthcare	workers	as	well	as	the	legal	and	institutional	structures	in	which	their	actions	and	decisions	are	–	more	or	less	firmly	–	embedded.	What	interests	me	in	particular	are	the	different	ways	and	varying	degrees	to	which	they	thereby	become	implicated	in	immigration	control.		
5.2. Legal	frameworks,	formal	entitlements	and	practical	barriers	for	
irregular	migrants’	access	to	public	healthcare	in	London	and	
Barcelona	
5.2.1. Irregular	migrants’	access	to	primary	and	emergency	healthcare	According	 to	 the	 legal	 frameworks	 currently	 in	 place,	 third-country	 nationals	residing	unlawfully	 in	either	London	or	Barcelona	are	 formally	entitled	to	access	free	primary	healthcare	services	provided	at	local	health	centres,	as	well	as	Accident	and	Emergency	care	(A&E).	 In	both	contexts,	 the	right	 to	receive	primary	care	 is	based	on	the	recognition	of	a	patient’s	residence	within	a	particular	area,	which	he	or	she	has	to	prove	by	providing	more	or	less	specific	documentation.	In	Spain	this	is	generally	done	through	the	obligatory	inscription	in	the	municipal	register,	which	constitutes	 the	 primary	 requirement	 for	 all	 residents	 to	 benefit	 from	 any	 public	service	provided	at	the	local	level.	A	senior	official	of	CatSalut	put	it	this	way:		The	issue	of	[municipal]	registration	is	a	way,	I	think,	also	to	formalise	the	residence;	 it	 is	 to	say:	 ‘You	are	entitled	to	 the	provision	of	health	services	
because	you	form	part	of	the	population	of	this	territory'	(bcnA17).		In	contrast	to	other	parts	of	Spain,	irregular	migrants	who	have	been	registered	in	Catalonia	for	at	least	three	months43	and	earn	less	than	the	official	minimum	income	(‘Renta	Mínima	de	Inserción’,	RMI)	can	apply	for	a	health	card,	which	gives	access	
																																																								43	Notably,	this	temporal	limitation	is	being	justified	as	a	necessary	measure	against	(mostly	European)	‘health-tourism’,	rather	than	preventing	irregular	residents	from	accessing	these	services.	
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(for	 one	 year,	 after	 which	 it	 can	 be	 renewed)	 to	 free	 primary	 care,	 any	 urgent	treatment,	as	well	as	health	programmes	 ‘in	 the	 interest	of	public	health’	such	as	HIV/Aids	 screening	 and	 most	 vaccinations.	 In	 principle,	 applications	 are	 made	directly	 at	 the	 local	 health	 centre	 (‘Centro	 de	 Atención	 Primaria’,	 CAP),	 where	applicants	 have	 to	 produce	 a	 document	 obtained	 from	 the	 National	 Institute	 of	Social	Security	(INSS)	certifying	that	they	are	not	covered	under	the	national	system,	an	official	 confirmation	of	 their	 registration	 from	 the	municipality,	 and	a	 copy	of	their	valid	passport	or	other	ID	(Ajuntament	de	Barcelona,	2013).	It	is	only	where	insufficient	 documentation	 inhibits	 this	 formal	 procedure	 that	 applications	 will	usually	be	processed	through	NGOs	like	the	Red	Cross	or	Salud	y	Familia	(see	section	5.3.3).		In	the	UK	in	contrast,	where	no	general	system	of	residential	registration	is	in	place,	anybody	who	wants	to	register	with	a	GP	has	to	provide	other	‘proof	of	address’,	usually	a	utility	bill	or	bank	statement	in	the	name	of	the	applicant	(see	sub-section	4.2.2).	 While	 all	 practices	 are	 obliged	 to	 provide	 emergency	 and	 immediately	necessary	treatment	to	any	person	within	the	practice	area,	they	can	exercise	some	degree	of	discretion	about	whether	or	not	 to	 register	a	person;	or	 to	 treat	 them	privately,	that	is,	as	self-paying	patients	(da	Lomba,	2011).	Importantly,	and	other	than	in	Catalonia,	there	is	no	specific	legislation	regulating	the	provision	of	primary	care	 to	 ‘overseas	visitors’	 and	no	 required	minimum	period	of	residence,	 so	 that	even	persons	staying	in	the	country	for	less	than	three	months	might	be	included	in	the	regular	patients	list	(or	be	registered	as	‘temporary	residents’)	(Department	of	Health,	2012).		GPs	 can	 only	 refuse	 a	 patient	 on	 reasonable,	 non-discriminatory	 grounds	 –	 for	example	 because	 they	 live	 outside	 the	 catchment	 area44 	–	 or	 if	 their	 list	 is	 full	(Aspinall,	 2014;	 Wind-Cowie	 &	 Wood,	 2014).	 Even	 regarding	 the	 widespread	practice	of	requiring	a	personal	 ID	at	registration,	 the	British	Medical	Association	(BMA,	 2013)	 advises	 practice	 staff	 that	 “[o]verseas	 visitors	 have	 no	 formal	obligation	to	prove	their	identity	or	immigration	status	to	register	with	a	practice”.																																																									44	Since	5	January	2015,	GP	practices	in	England	are	also	free	to	register	new	patients	who	live	outside	their	practice	boundary	area,	which	means	that	they	don’t	necessarily	have	to	ask	for	proof	of	address,	see:	http://www.nhs.uk/nhsengland/aboutnhsservices/doctors/pages/patient-choice-gp-practices.aspx	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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In	spite	of	 this,	as	Doctors	of	 the	World	 (DOTW,	2013)	have	denounced,	over	two	thirds	of	London’s	Primary	Care	Trusts	have	issued	guidance	that	is	incompatible	with	GPs’	legal	obligations;	 for	example,	by	advising	them	to	only	register	people	who	live	in	the	UK	lawfully	and	for	more	than	six	months.	While	according	to	the	law	this	‘ordinary	residence’	criteria	only	applies	to	secondary	care	provision,	it	is	sometimes	(falsely)	extended	to	primary	care,	as	the	account	of	one	GP	I	interviewed	in	South-East	London	reveals:		It’s	true	that	we	have	a	very	good	system	that	is	free	at	the	point	of	delivery,	but	you	still	have	to	have	an	NHS	number.	That	means	that	you	would	need	to	be	a	resident	in	the	UK	for	at	least	6	months	in	a	year.	[…]	If,	for	example,	you	are	visiting	for	a	short	time,	you	do	have	to	pay	even	to	see	a	GP.	[…]	So…	I	mean,	sometimes	we	do	try	and	help	as	much	as	possible,	[…]	but	it	depends,	of	 course.	 It’s	 different	 from	 one	 doctor	 to	 another,	 from	 one	 surgery	 to	another,	even	in	primary	care	(lonA25).		The	Department	of	Health	(2012,	p.9)	already	acknowledged	that	in	contradiction	to	current	regulations	“some	[GP]	practices	have	deregistered	or	failed	to	register	people	they	believe	to	be	‘ineligible’	in	some	way	due	to	their	immigration	status”.	As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 inconsistencies	 between	 formal	 entitlements	 and	 everyday	practice,	even	migrants	who	try	to	register	with	the	support	of	specialised	NGOs	are	often	 ambiguously	 refused.	 A	 recent	 study	 based	 on	 evidence	 and	 experiences	gathered	 by	 Doctors	 of	 the	 World	 concludes	 that	 “[t]he	 biggest	 barrier	 to	 GP	registration	is	the	inability	to	provide	paperwork”,	in	most	cases	a	valid	ID	and/or	proof	of	 address	 (DOTW,	2016,	p.9).	According	 to	 the	organisation’s	programme	director	for	the	UK,	these	are		barriers	that	are	put	in	place	by	the	system,	which	are	sometimes	deliberate	and	sometimes	not	deliberate.	 […	As]	an	undocumented	migrant	 it	 is	very	likely	that	you	won’t	have	a	valid	passport	or	utility	bills	in	your	name	and	lots	of	practices	are	very	rigid	in	terms	of	how	they	apply	these	rules,	[so]	the	system	doesn’t	recognise	that	people	may	not	be	able	to	provide	those	proofs	and	that	is	actually	a	true	barrier	to	care,	which	means	they	cannot	access	any	healthcare	(lonA03).		In	 practice,	 many	 migrants	 in	 irregular	 (or	 legally	 ambiguous)	 situations	 thus	remain	 effectively	 excluded	 even	 from	 the	most	 basic	 provisions.	 Such	 informal	exclusion	can	be	the	result	of	administrative	barriers,	a	lack	of	awareness	of	their	entitlement,	or	fear	of	being	reported	and	thus	potentially	detained	or	deported	as	a	result	of	approaching	a	public	health	service	(OHCHR,	2014).	Especially	the	latter	
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seems	to	be	a	bigger	issue	in	London	than	Barcelona,	and	particularly	among	those	migrants	who	never	had	a	residence	permit	and	are	not	in	contact	with	any	support	organisation	that	would	provide	them	with	the	necessary	information.	This	was	the	situation	of	a	young	man	from	Albania	who	I	interviewed	in	South-London,	where	he	had	been	living	for	almost	two	years:		It’s	difficult	man.	It’s	really	difficult	because	if	you	have	any	problems,	[…]	like	if	you	get	sick	or	something	like	that,	you	don’t	have	any	place	to	go,	you	don’t	have	anyone	to	care	about	you.	It’s	difficult.	[…]	I	never	even	tried	[to	register	with	a	GP]	because	I	know	how	it	works	here,	you	know.	They	will	ask	you	for	an	ID	and	I	don’t	have…	I	mean	I	have,	but	only	my	Albanian	ID	and	that	is	not	valid	for	this	country	(lonB03).	He	was	clearly	unaware	of	the	 fact	 that	even	though	his	Albanian	passport	is	not	valid	as	proof	of	legal	residence	in	the	country,	it	is	still	a	valid	form	of	identification	within	all	those	institutional	settings	where	entitlements	and	access	are	not	linked	to	 immigration	 status.	 Another	 Albanian	 citizen	who	 had	 spent	 almost	 15	 years	living	and	working	in	the	UK	also	told	me	that	he	usually	relies	on	self-diagnosis	or	private	healthcare	providers,	even	though	he	feels	he	should	be	entitled	to	access	public	services	since	he	is	paying	into	the	system:		I	do	work	hard,	and	I	pay	my	taxes	to	the	government	and	all	that,	but	I	don’t	have	the	right	to	go	to	the	doctor.	I	don’t	have	a	GP,	so	normally	I	go	to	private	health[care]…	which	 as	 you	 probably	 know	 costs	 thousands!	 […]	So	 far,	 I	have	been	trying	to	 find	things	online,	 […]	 if	 I	don’t	 feel	well	 I	read	things	online,	 trying	 to	 find	 out	 what’s	 wrong	with	me	 and	 just	 go	 and	 get	 the	medication	from	a	pharmacy	or	somewhere…	And	if	I	really	have	to	go	to	a	doctor,	I	have	to	do	it	privately.	For	example,	I	had	to	have	them	remove	my	tooth,	last	year,	which	cost	me	1500	pounds.	[…]	You	just	go	and	they	treat	you.	They	swipe	the	[credit]	card,	and	if	you	have	money	in	your	bank	they	treat	you	well	[laughs]		[Interviewer:]	…but	they	don’t	ask	anything	else?	No,	 they	 don’t	 ask	 anything.	 Only	 250	 pounds;	 that’s	 only	 for	 the	appointment,	only!	And	then	they	charged	me	1.225	for	removing	the	tooth,	which	took	them	less	than	an	hour,	right?	But	I	had	to	do	it,	because	I	was	in	pain.		[Interviewer:]	So	you	have	never	even	tried	to	register	with	a	GP?	No,	because	you	can’t	 register	with	a	normal	GP.	 I	haven’t	 even	 tried	 that	myself,	because	if	you	do,	you	get	asked	questions	and	all	that,	and	someone	[from	the	Home	Office]	might	be	there	as	well,	and	so…	it	ends	up	there.	Even	though	I	am	paying	taxes,	yeah?	(lonB08).	Such	 accounts	 explain	why	 almost	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 over	 1.500	 patients	who	were	received	during	2012	at	an	independent	health	clinic	run	by	Doctors	of	the	World	in	
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East-London	were	not	registered	with	a	GP	(DOTW,	2013).	A	representative	of	the	organisation	told	me	that	when	they		ask	 people	 for	 the	 reasons	why	 they	 haven’t	 been	 to	 the	 [regular]	 health	service	[…],	like	one	in	five	say	they	think	they	will	be	arrested	if	they	go	and	see	a	doctor;	and	we	see	people	with	symptoms	that	are	potentially	serious	or	infectious	diseases,	who	are	not	presenting	to	health	services	for	precisely	that	reason	(lonA03).		Given	the	significantly	less	‘hostile’	environment	that	irregular	migrants	generally	face	in	Spain	and	particularly	in	Catalonia,	as	I	argued	in	chapter	4,	it	is	no	surprise	that	 fear	 of	 apprehension	 represents	 much	 less	 of	 a	 barrier	 in	 Barcelona.	 A	qualitative	 study	carried	out	by	 the	 city’s	Public	Health	Agency	 (Agència	de	Salut	Pública	 de	Barcelona,	2011),	 found	no	 significant	 difference	 in	 terms	of	 the	 self-reported	experiences	of	trying	to	access	healthcare	between	migrants	in	regular	and	irregular	 situations.	 All	 the	 irregular	migrants	 I	 interviewed	 and	most	of	 those	 I	informally	 spoke	 to	 in	 Barcelona	 had	 eventually	 managed	 to	 get	 a	 health	 card,	although	many	of	 them	have	been	assisted	or	at	 least	 received	guidance	by	 local	NGOs.	Quite	interestingly,	the	only	interviewee	who	told	me	that	he	and	his	family	“had	a	lot	of	trouble	getting	integrated	into	the	system”	was	a	28-year-old	US-citizen	who	 also	 mentioned	 that	 he	 usually	 has	 no	 difficulty	 “passing	 as	 an	 American	tourist”	(bcnB03).	The	Platform	for	Universal	Health	Care	 in	Catalonia	 (PASUCAT,	2014),	 an	 umbrella	 group	 of	 health	 professionals	 and	 NGOs	 dedicated	 to	documenting	 the	 “often	 arbitrary	 application	 of	 the	 new	 health	 regulations	 in	Catalonia”,	found	72	cases	of	arbitrary	exclusion	of	migrants	over	a	period	of	two	years.	More	than	half	(54%)	of	them,	however,	were	lawful	residents,	which	equally	suggests	that	irregularity	as	such	does	not	constitute	a	significant	barrier.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 the	 relatively	 complex	 procedure	 established	 by	 the	Catalan	government	requires	all	applicants	to	approach	various	public	institutions	in	order	 to	activate	 their	 formal	entitlements.	This	premises	not	only	 substantial	knowledge	of	the	registration	process,	official	language	and	institutional	setting,	but	also	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 trust	 in	 ‘the	 system’,	 which	 migrants	 in	 irregular	situations	all	too	often	tend	to	lack.	The	following	account	of	the	above-mentioned	US-citizen	illustrates	that	in	spite	of	his	relatively	privileged	position	–	as	a	white	Westerner	 with	 a	 fairly	 stable	 job	 and	 university	 degree	 in	 translation	 –	 the	
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irregularity	of	his	stay	renders	any	encounters	with	 ‘the	state’	a	potentially	risky	endeavour	 and	 often	 requires	 careful	 differentiation	 between	 various	 kinds	 and	levels	of	authority:		Overall,	 I	 trust	 the	 offices	 of	 the	Ayuntamiento,	 [but]	 I	 am	 really	 nervous	about	going	to	Social	Security.	But	I	have	to	in	order	to	do	some	of	the	stuff	that	I	am	going	to	do,	like	in	order	to	get	health	coverage	I	think	I	have	to	go	to	Social	Security	and	get	a	letter	saying	that	I	don’t	have	the	right	to	Social	Security	[laughs]	[...]	It’s	sort	of	like,	if	I	were	working	somewhere	illegally,	those	are	the	people	that	would	come	and	inspect	me	and	then	report	me,	you	know.	And	so,	sort	of	going	willingly	and	saying	to	them	‘Hi,	I	don’t	have	any	right	to	be	here,	please	give	me	a	right	to	use	your	[healthcare]’	[laughs]	…	it’s	so	contradictory!	So	that	makes	me	nervous,	but	people	do	it.	That’s	
what	you	are	supposed	to	do.	So,	if	that’s	what	you	are	supposed	to	do,	I’ll	do	it,	but	it	makes	me	nervous	(bcnB03).		The	fact	that	at	least	he	knew	what	he	was	supposed	to	do	reflects	one	of	the	major	differences	between	the	two	environments	I	am	comparing:	While	in	both	contexts	access	rules	to	free	primary	healthcare	formally	include	(or	at	least	do	not	exclude)	irregular	migrants,	only	in	Catalonia	is	this	entitlement	reflected	by	an	explicit	legal	framework	 and	 a	 specific	 administrative	 procedure.	 Both	 require	 and	 reflect	 a	political	decision	through	which	politicians	formally	justify	the	necessary	inclusion	of	 these	 local	 residents.	 This	 arguably	 also	 reduces	 the	 pressure	 on	 individual	providers	and	administrators	of	care,	as	the	following	accounts	of	a	receptionist	(1)	and	a	family	doctor	(2)	of	a	CAP	in	Ciutat	Vella	suggest:		(1)	It	is	simpler	for	us	[to	register	a	person	with	regular	papers]	because	it	is	very	automatic	and	easier	to	introduce	them	[into	the	system].	But	well,	now	that	we	have	this	type	of	health	card	[for	persons	in	irregular	situations]	–	which	 we	 didn’t	 have	 before	 –	 also	 in	 their	 case,	 once	 they	 fulfil	 the	requirements,	we	automatically	put	them	on,	we	assign	them	a	doctor,	give	them	appointments,	and	so	on	(bcnA13).		(2)	Look,	for	me	they	simply	appear	on	the	list	of	patients	that	I	am	going	to	see	on	that	day,	whether	in	a	regular	consultation	or	as	an	urgent	case	[…]	So	this	patient,	who	in	principle	is	in	an	irregular	situation,	appears	on	my	list,	and	I	don’t	question	anything	(bcnA12).		In	the	UK	in	contrast,	irregular	migrants	accessing	NHS	care	always	constitute	“an	exception	 to	 the	 rule	 that	 makes	 eligibility	 contingent	 on	 lawful	 residence”	 (da	Lomba,	2011,	p.363).	In	the	words	of	two	London-based	health	advocates	(1,	2)	and	a	GP	I	interviewed	in	Hackney	(3),	this	means	that		
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(1)	there	isn’t	a	system	here	that	you	have	to	go	through	and	get	a	certificate	from	somewhere	which	you	then	take	to	the	hospital.	So,	either	you	are	in,	and	anybody	can	be	in,	or	you	are	not	in.	But	there	is	confusion	about	who	is	in	and	who	is	not	in,	and	that’s	the	difficulty	(lonA08).			(2)	 It	 is	 not	widely	 understood	 or	 accepted	 that	 undocumented	migrants	should	have	access	to	these	services,	even	though	in	law	there	is	nothing	that	says	that	they	shouldn’t.	There	is	not	a	positive	acceptance	that	this	is	our	position	and	so	that	means	that	quite	frequently	health	staff	mistakenly	turns	people	away	because	they	think	they	are	not	eligible	(lonA03).		(3)	I	get	the	feeling	that	undocumented	migrants	[…]	do	not	have	the	backing	of	the	law.	The	law	is	made	vague	so	that	it’s	very	difficult	for	them	to	weave	their	way	through	it	(lonA11).		As	 I	will	show	 in	 the	 following	 sections	of	 this	 chapter,	 the	 legal	but	also	moral-political	ambiguities	 that	always	underlie	 the	provision	of	healthcare	to	 irregular	migrants	create	difficulties	not	just	for	service	users	but	also	the	very	institutions	and	 individual	 professionals	 providing	 or	 administering	 these	 services	 ‘on	 the	ground’.	Some	of	the	differences	in	how	these	dilemmas	are	dealt	with	in	London	and	 Barcelona,	 respectively,	 become	 more	 pronounced	 when	 extending	 this	comparison	to	the	level	of	secondary	healthcare.			
5.2.2. Irregular	migrants’	access	to	secondary	healthcare	In	practice,	primary	and	secondary	care	are	always	closely	linked	through	internal	referral	systems	and	one	cannot	fulfil	its	function	without	the	other.	However,	since	access	to	 the	 latter	usually	 implies	much	higher	costs	 to	 the	healthcare	system	it	tends	to	be	subjected	to	tighter	access	rules	and	stricter	controls.	According	to	the	legal	framework	established	in	Catalonia	in	2012,	migrants	in	irregular	situations	were	 initially	only	given	normalised	access	 to	 secondary	 care	 after	 a	 continuous	residence	 of	 one	 year.	 In	 case	 they	 requested	 or	 needed	 any	 hospital	 treatment	before	fulfilling	this	requirement,	it	had	to	be	authorised	on	a	case-by-case	basis	by	a	special	commission	within	CatSalut,	which	had	specifically	been	set	up	in	order	to	deal	with	this	situation.		While	Medicos	del	Mundo	(MdM,	2014)	criticised	the	absence	of	transparent	criteria	to	be	applied	by	the	commission	in	determining	each	individual	case,	several	of	my	
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respondents	 working	 within	 CatSalut	 perceived	 the	 whole	 procedure	 as	 mainly	creating	additional	work	as	well	as	unnecessary	delays	to	treatment,	rather	than	a	way	 of	 ensuring	 the	 effectiveness	 or	 sustainability	 of	 the	 healthcare	 system	(bcnA17,	bcnA08).	I	will	discuss	the	role	of	this	commission	in	more	detail	in	sub-section	 5.3.3,	 but	 what	 is	 important	 to	 note	 here	 is	 that	 following	 significant	pressure	 from	 professional	 associations	 such	 as	 PASUCAT,	 the	 government	eventually	abandoned	the	one-year	waiting	period	in	July	2015	through	Instruction	
8/2015.	 Since	 then,	 irregular	 migrants	 have	 access	 to	 the	 full	 range	 of	 publicly	funded	 services	 after	 only	 three	 months	 of	 (officially	 documented)	 residence	 in	Catalonia	(Blay,	2015).	Recent	developments	 in	 the	UK,	on	 the	 contrary,	point	 in	 the	opposite	direction:	Since	 2004,	when	 the	 government	 first	 introduced	 the	Overseas	 Visitors	Hospital	
Charging	Regulations,	all	foreigners	who	are	not	‘ordinarily	resident’	–	a	status	not	explicitly	defined	in	law	but	conditional,	among	other	things,	on	lawful	residence	–	are	categorised	as	‘Overseas	Visitors’	and	as	such,	in	principle,	should	be	charged	the	 full	 cost	 of	 any	 NHS	 hospital	 treatment	 they	 incur45	(Department	 of	 Health,	2013a;	da	Lomba,	2011;	Aspinall,	2014).	At	the	same	time,	however,	the	Department	of	Health	(2013b,	p.55)	also	makes	very	clear	that	where	treatment	is	considered	‘urgent’	 or	 ‘immediately	 necessary’	 it	 cannot	 “be	 delayed	 or	 withheld	 pending	payment”,	which	 again	 gives	 significant	weight	 to	 the	medical	 assessment	of	 the	patient’s	condition.		As	I	will	discuss	in	more	detail	below,	the	discretion	in	taking	these	decisions	comes	with	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 the	 medical	 profession	 and	 thus	 unavoidably	 plays	 a	significant	role	within	every	healthcare	system	(semFYC,	2012).	In	the	case	of	the	UK,	however,	where	treatment	of	‘Overseas	Visitors’	is	officially	defined	as	‘urgent’	where	it	“cannot	wait	until	the	person	can	be	reasonably	expected	to	return	home”	(Department	of	Health,	2013a,	p.43),	clinicians	are	automatically	required	to	take	into	 consideration	 the	 likelihood	 and	 possible	 duration	of	 a	 patient’s	 stay	 in	 the	country	(da	Lomba,	2011).	Both	directly	depend	on	his	or	her	immigration	status																																																									45	Until	2004,	like	in	Catalonia	between	2012	and	2015,	they	were	entitled	to	free	treatment	after	12	months	of,	even	irregular,	residence	in	the	country.	Exceptions	from	the	general	charging	regulations	are	in	place	for	certain	cases,	such	as	the	diagnosis	and	treatment	of	a	regularly	updated	list	of	communicable	diseases.		
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and	are	particularly	difficult	 to	assess	 in	 the	 case	of	 irregular	migrants,	who	are	estimated	to	represent	more	than	60	per	cent	of	the	total	 ‘chargeable	population’	(Department	of	Health,	2012,	2013a).		On	one	hand,	the	fear	of	having	to	pay	–	or	even	to	receive	a	bill	later	on	–	obviously	constitutes	 a	 significant	 additional	 barrier	 for	 many	 migrants	 in	 economically	unstable	 situations.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 is	 also	where	 the	 incentive	 for	 NHS	hospitals	to	recover	the	costs	of	the	services	they	have	delivered	starts	to	overlap	with	the	efforts	of	immigration	authorities	to	detect	irregular	residents	or	at	least	deter	their	use	of	public	services.	According	to	current	rules,	once	identified	as	an	‘Overseas	Visitor’,	the	full	costs	have	to	be	borne	by	the	patient,	or	otherwise	–	if	they	cannot	pay	–	the	individual	hospital.	While	this	is	meant	to	encourage	hospitals	to	 require	 payment	 in	 advance	 or	 otherwise	 deny	 treatment	 (where	 it	 is	 not	considered	 ‘urgent’	 enough),	 an	official	review	of	 this	policy	 recognised	a	 lack	of	incentive	to	properly	identify	chargeable	patients	in	the	first	place	(Department	of	Health,	2012).	While	the	efficiency	of	this	system	thus	hinges	on	the	participation	of	individuals	 working	 within	 each	 hospital,	 the	 structural	 proximity	 between	healthcare	 and	 immigration	 policy	 also	 becomes	 explicit	 through	 a	 formal	mechanism	that	allows		NHS	bodies	[…	to]	share	non-medical	information	with	the	Home	Office,	via	the	Department	of	Health,	on	those	[patients]	with	a	debt	of	£1,000	or	more	once	that	debt	has	been	outstanding	for	three	months,	with	a	view	to	better	collect	debts	owed.	The	Home	Office	can	then	use	that	information	to	deny	any	 future	 immigration	 application	 to	 enter	 or	 remain	 in	 the	UK	 that	 the	person	with	the	debt	might	make	(Department	of	Health,	2013a,	p.63).		Notably,	 this	 information	 exchange	 does	 not	 require	 patients’	 explicit	 consent	although	they	“should“	be	made	“aware	of	the	potential	immigration	consequences	of	 not	 paying”	 (ibid.),	 which	 for	 Wind-Cowie	 &	 Wood	 (2014,	 p.13)	 “poses	 an	enormous	ethical	challenge	for	healthcare	professionals	and	the	NHS	as	a	whole”.	A	maternity	health	advocate	I	interviewed	in	Hackney	described	this	dilemma	from	the	perspective	of	a	midwife:		Should	she	say,	‘I	will	treat	you	because	you	are	entitled	to	maternity	care,	but	I	have	to	tell	you	that	you	will	be	billed,	and	if	you	can’t	pay	the	bill,	that	information	will	be	sent	 to	 the	Home	Office’?	 I	mean,	 I	don’t	know	what	 I	would	 do	 if	 I	 was	 a	 midwife,	 but	 that	 would	 be	 the	 correct	 information	(lonA08).	
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The	 existence	 of	 such	mechanism	 together	with	 recent	media	 reports	 about	 the	Home	 Office	 routinely	 “accessing	 NHS	 records	 to	 help	 track	 down	 illegal	immigrants”	 (Ball,	 2014),	 strikingly	 highlight	 the	 lack	 of	what	 numerous	 human	rights	bodies	and	NGOs	describe	as	a	necessary	firewall	between	the	state’s	health	services	 and	 its	 immigration	 enforcement	 agencies	 (OHCHR,	 2014;	 FRA,	 2013).	
DOTW	 specifically	 criticised	 the	NHS	Health	 and	 Social	 Care	 Information	 Centre,	which	collects	data	about	everyone	accessing	NHS	health	or	social	care,	for	sharing	personal	information	of	individual	patients	–	including	the	locality	where	they	are	registered	with	a	GP	–	with	the	Home	Office	in	response	to	so-called	‘trace	requests’.	According	to	a	representative	of	DOTW,	this	“is	the	first	time	that	we	see	that	despite	reassurances	[by	the	Department	of	Health]	actually	information	is	being	shared	by	health	 services	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 immigration	 enforcement,	 and	 we	 are	 really	worried	about	that“	(lonA03).		In	several	respects	this	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	situation	in	Catalonia:	Firstly	(and	 this	 is	 the	 case	 in	 all	 of	 Spain),	 the	 unconditional	 entitlement	 of	 all	 minor	children	and	pregnant	women	to	free	healthcare	is	safeguarded	under	national	law	and	was	left	untouched	by	the	restrictive	health	reform	of	2012.	Secondly,	whether	or	not	foreign	patients	are	to	be	charged	for	the	services	they	receive	from	CatSalut	depends	on	whether	or	not	they	are	residents	of	Catalonia	and	whether	or	not	they	have	 the	economic	means	 (or	 insurance)	 to	pay,	but	not	on	 the	 ‘legality’	of	 their	presence.	In	practice,	migrants	in	irregular	situations	and	without	resources	might	still	be	issued	a	bill	and	even	the	fear	or	expectation	thereof	can	in	some	cases	pose	a	 barrier,	 as	 a	 community	 health	worker	 told	me	 from	her	 experience	 at	 one	 of	Barcelona’s	 biggest	 public	hospitals	 (bcnA10).	What	 these	patients	 are	 often	 not	aware	of,	however,	is	that	receiving	a	bill	will	remain	without	further	consequences	for	 their	 (irregular)	 stay	 in	 the	 country,	 as	 CatSalut’s	 client	 relations	 manager	clarified	in	an	interview:		This	could	happen	in	some	cases,	mostly	because	[…]	it	is	difficult	to	identify	in	a	hospital	 [whether	someone	 is	a	 tourist	and	thus	has	to	pay	or	have	a	European	health	 card;	or	an	 irregular	 resident	without	 resources],	 and	so	they	sometimes	make	a	provisional	invoice	(‘pre-factura’).	But	what	is	clear	here	is	that	we	don’t	pass	these	provisional	invoices	on	–	they	don’t	become	official	debt	–	and	if	the	patients	tell	us,	or	they	tell	the	hospital	rather,	that	they	don’t	have	resources,	these	invoices	are	cancelled,	and	the	costs	will	be	
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assumed	by	CatSalut	(bcnA17).	Thirdly,	and	related	to	the	latter,	many	of	the	health	advocates,	professionals	and	NGO	workers	I	interviewed	in	Barcelona	made	very	clear	that	public	services	play	no	 active	 role	 in	 immigration	 control,	 let	 alone	 enforcement	 (bcnA02,	 bcnA10,	bcnA12,	bcnA13).	That	said,	however,	it	is	also	important	to	differentiate	between	the	 function(s)	of	public	 institutions	and	 the	behaviour	of	 individual	 ‘street-level	bureaucrats’	(SLBs)	working	within	them,	as	a	representative	of	Caritas	Barcelona	specifically	pointed	out	to	me:		It	 is	 true	 that	going	 to	 social	 services	or	 to	 the	doctor	you	can	 find	 racist	people,	 or	 people	 who	 are	 against	 immigrants,	 and	 so	 a	 migrant	 can	 be	[treated	 wrongly].	 But	 this	 is	 an	 individual	 issue	 […]	 it	 is	 not	 that	 the	educational	 or	 sanitary	 institutions,	 or	 social	 services,	 would	 carry	 out	controls	for	the	police,	or	for	the	ministry	of	the	interior,	no.	It	doesn’t	exist	and	nobody	would	defend	that	or	say	that	it	should	exist	(bcnA03).		Partly	 in	order	to	bridge	the	conceptual	gap	between	 individual	and	 institutional	practices,	my	subsequent	analysis	focuses	on	what	I	have	introduced	in	chapters	2	and	3	as	‘organisational	roles’.	That	is,	the	particular	positions	and	corresponding	functions	that	individuals	occupy	within	certain	institutional	settings	(Webb,	2006;	Scott,	2001;	Lipsky,	1987).	In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter,	I	will	look	for	instances	where	the	professional	or	administrative	duties	that	come	with	these	‘roles’	reflect	the	 intersection	 of	 two	 ‘functional	 imperatives	 of	 the	 state’:	 the	 provision	 of	healthcare	and	the	control	of	immigration.			
5.3. Negotiating	the	effective	limits	of	access,	medical	urgency	and	
immigration	control:	the	role(s)	and	agency	of	healthcare	workers	As	discussed	in	sub-section	3.1.3,	my	analysis	differentiates	between	the	roles	and	functions	of	three	broader	categories	of	actors:	i)	general	administrative	personal,	ii)	professional	service	providers,	and	iii)	those	actors	more	specifically	responsible	for	 managing	 migrant	 irregularity	within	 a	 certain	 sphere	 of	 the	 public	 welfare	system.	 This	 will	 allow	 for	 a	 systematic	 comparison	 of	 their	 varying	 degrees	 of	power,	 discretion	 and	 involvement	 with	 immigration	 control	 and	 enforcement	across	different	sectors	of	service	provision.		
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5.3.1. Administrators	of	healthcare	Whether	 in	 a	 hospital,	 health	 centre	 or	 GP	 practice,	 most	 service	 users’	 first	encounter	with	 the	 public	 healthcare	 system	 is	 through	 reception	 staff,	who	 are	usually	responsible	for	providing	information,	registering	new	patients,	assigning	them	to	a	doctor	and	arranging	their	appointments	or	referrals	to	other	services.	The	main	focus	here	is	on	patient	registration,	whereby	they	implement	the	formal	access	rules	outlined	earlier	and	thus	apply	the	criteria	established	through	laws	and	regulations.	The	receptionist	of	a	health	centre	in	the	Raval,	the	multicultural	heart	of	Barcelona,	put	it	this	way:		They	[the	politicians]	are	the	ones	telling	us	how	we	must	work,	in	principle,	no?	This	is	to	say:	the	system	functions	a	bit	according	to	what	they	tell	us.	But	OK,	then	we	know	for	ourselves	how	we	can	mould	it	[‘moldearlo’].	We	
are	 part	 of	 this	 as	 well,	 but…of	 course,	 sometimes	 they	 put	 us	 a	 lot	 of	obstacles,	so	we	are	unable	to	do	our	best	possible	work,	no?	Sometimes	we	would	like	to	do	more	but	it’s	not	possible	because	they	don’t	let	us	(bcnA13).		Even	though	the	formal	rules	and	limitations	to	individual	agency	are	the	same	for	all	practices	within	a	certain	territory,	the	outcomes	of	these	negotiations	can	vary	significantly.	The	experience	of	a	social	assistant	working	for	the	Catalan	Refugee	
Aid	Commission	in	Barcelona	confirms	this:		What	we	have	detected	a	 lot	here	 is	 that	 it	depends	on	the	CAP	[…]	and	 it	depends	on	the	person.	That’s	it.	It	depends	on	the	person	that	happens	to	be	at	the	counter	and	that	is	more	or	less	sensitive	to	these	issues...	you	know?	It	depends	on	the	will	[of	that	person],	that’s	how	it	is.	But	the	legislation	is	this,	at	the	moment	(bcnA04).		It	is	not	surprising,	then,	that	even	in	Catalonia	where	the	rules	are	clearer	and	tend	to	be	communicated	more	openly	than	in	the	British	context,	many	migrants	at	least	initially	 struggle	 to	 gather	 the	 correct	 information,	 as	 one	 of	 my	 interviewees	remembers:		[D]ealing	with	the	health	system	is	one	of	those	things	where	you	go	into	an	office	and	every	time	they	tell	you	something	different,	or	every	person	tells	you	 something	 different.	 [...]	 So	 basically,	 it’s	 a	 question	 of…	 I	 need	 to	probably	go	to	a	different	[health	centre	–	where	nobody	remembers	him]	and	 lie.	 And	 say,	 ‘I’m	 a	 student	 but	 my	 visa	 has	 lapsed,	 and	 I	 am	 here	irregularly,	I	don’t	have	the	money	for	insurance,	bla	bla	bla…	please!’	And	then	cross	my	fingers	and	hope	that	I	found	the	right	person	(bcnB03).		This	account	also	reflects	a	strong	awareness	of	the	fact	that	finding	the	right	person	
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can	make	a	significant	difference.		At	the	same	time,	however,	individual	attitudes	and	responses	to	irregular	migrants	and	their	claims	also	have	to	be	understood	within	their	 legal-political	as	well	as	institutional	 context.	 For	example,	 several	of	 the	people	 I	 interviewed	 in	London	directly	related	the	less	favourable	attitudes	they	were	experiencing	on	the	part	of	some	healthcare	workers	to	the	central	government’s	‘hostile	environment’	policy	and	rhetoric.	A	caseworker	for	DOTW	put	it	this	way:		Some	of	 them	are	perfectly	nice	and	want	to	help	and	do	understand	that	people	are	in	a	difficult	situation	and	just	need	healthcare;	but	others,	truly,	are	 feeling	 that	 by	 refusing	 to	 register	 an	 irregular	 migrant	 they	 are	protecting	their	country	and	they	see	themselves	as	part	of	the	Home	Office	by	checking	immigration	statuses,	which	is	not	their	job.	But,	yeah,	I	think	that	it’s	more	about	the	general	climate	that	was	created	over	the	past	few	years	(lonA12).	In	 addition,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 case	 in	 both	 cities,	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 (sometimes	informal)	discretion	about	how	strictly	particular	rules	are	to	be	applied	in	everyday	practice	can	also	be	exercised	by	the	health	centre	management.	In	the	Catalan	case	this	was	most	apparent	with	respect	 to	 those	patients	who	do	not	(yet)	 fulfil	 the	three-months-residence	requirement	and	are	thus	categorised	as	potential	‘health	tourists’.	One	receptionist	told	me	that	in	the	CAP	where	she	works,		[…]	they	have	even	given	us	informal	orders	to	be	able	to	attend	to	this	type	of	person,	[…because]	if	we	were	to	comply	with	the	regulations	we	would	have	to	charge	them	for	their	visit.	But	this	for	example…	we	just	don’t	do	it	[‘lo	pasamos’]	(bcnA13).		According	 to	 the	 same	 interviewee,	 the	 rules	 tend	 to	 be	 applied	more	 strictly	 in	other	parts	of	Barcelona	where	immigration	and	irregularity	are	less	common,	so	that	 administrative	 personal	 themselves	have	 to	 find	ways	 to	 “make	 exceptions”	where	 to	 them	 it	 seems	 necessary	 or	 simply	 convenient.	 For	 example,	 they	 can	provisionally	 arrange	 a	 first	 appointment	 with	 reference	 to	 some	 “pending	documentation”	that	the	patient	“is	still	in	the	process”	of	obtaining	(bcnA13),	or	–	as	another	administrator	told	me	–	by	recording	the	appointment	under	a	slightly	later	 date	 so	 that	 it	 falls	 within	 the	 period	 of	 the	 patient’s	 formal	 entitlement	(bcnA08).	Interestingly,	the	second	interviewee	also	mentioned	that	when	migrants	try	to	register	a	 family	member	(usually	a	child)	who	is	not	present	 in	person,	 “I	
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always	tell	them:	‘no,	you	will	need	to	bring	your	child,	because	I	don’t	know	if	your	child	 is	still	 in	your	 country’”	 (bcnA08).	Both	 instances	 can	be	 seen	as	 strategies	employed	by	individuals	–	the	receptionist	in	one	case	and	the	child’s	parent	in	the	other	–	 to	circumvent	the	same	temporary	 limitation	 imposed	by	 law	in	order	to	more	strictly	regulate	access	to	the	Catalan	healthcare	system.		In	this	sense,	the	situation	is	not	too	different	from	that	in	London,	where	at	least	some	GP	practices	 are	 aware	 that	 a	 too	 rigorous	 interpretation	of	 official	 access	rules	might	infringe	their	legal	obligations	towards	local	residents	and	thus	opted	for	 an	 explicitly	 lenient	 interpretation	 of	 these	 rules.	 When	 I	 asked	 the	 head	receptionist	of	a	GP	surgery	 in	Hackney	what	kind	of	documentation	she	and	her	team	would	usually	ask	for,	she	was	keen	to	emphasise	that	
here	we	don’t	take	anything	–	no	more.	We	used	to	ask	for	proof	of	address,	but	for	the	last	3	or	4	months	we	were	told	[that]	we	are	not	allowed	to	require	any	proof	of	 address.	 So	 if	someone	says	 ‘I	 live	 there’,	 that’s	 it.	 If	 it’s	 in	 the	catchment	area	we	just	allow	them	to	register	without	any	proof	[…].	We	don’t	ask	for	any	kind	of	proof,	ID,	or	anything	like	that	(lonA14).		From	her	own	perspective	as	reception	staff,	however,	she	also	recognised	that	what	she	described	as	“our	doctors’	decision”	–	to	not	(anymore)	verify	the	patients’	home	address	or	even	 identity	–	does	 create	more	work	 for	her	and	can	make	 it	more	difficult	to	administer	any	continuous	or	follow-up	treatment:		I	am	not	saying	that	we	should	[ask	for	proof	of	address]	but	it	also	helps	it	to	 be	 easier.	 At	 least	we	wouldn’t	 have	 a	 lot	 of	 people	 registering	 at	 one	address	and	then	when	the	health	authority	sends	out	their	medical	card,	it	comes	back	as	‘not	known’.	Because	that	also	means	that	it’s	a	lot	more	work	this	way,	but	it’s	not	my	decision	so	I	don’t	really…	I	just	go	along	with	it.	[...]	I	also	think	that	a	lot	of	other	surgeries	ask	for	proof	of	ID	just	to	make	sure	
that	 the	 patients	 are	 who	 they	 say	 they	 are	 and	 that	 they	 are	 registered	
correctly,	because	[here]	you	can	come	and	change	your	name	the	next	day	and	say	I	am	someone	else.	So	[...]	how	do	you	know	that	the	care	that	you	are	giving	is	actually	for	that	particular	person?	So	this	is	where	I	would	find	it	a	little	bit	conflicting,	but	as	I	said,	it’s	not	my	decision	(lonA14).		Quite	clearly,	it	is	mostly	the	administration	of	public	healthcare	–	rather	than	its	actual	provision	by	doctors	and	nurses	–	 that	 is	rendered	more	complicated	by	a	lack	 of	 official	 documentation.	 This	 has	 also	 been	 noted	 by	 respondents	 in	Barcelona,	where	minor	children,	for	example,	are	entitled	on	the	sole	basis	of	their	age	and	independent	of	the	place,	length	or	‘legality’	of	their	residence.	Asked	how	
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a	 patient’s	 age	 is	 assessed	 in	 case	 no	 documentation	 is	 presented,	 the	 reception	manager	of	one	CAP	said:		I	just	believe	it.	When	I	am	in	doubt	I	just	believe	[them].	Also	because,	let’s	say,	they	have	the	face...	OK,	someone	who	is	20	can	fool	me	and	say	s/he	is	18.	But	there	are	not	so	many,	you	know,	if	that	happens	once,	in	one	year,	it	will	not	affect	us	very	much.	Now,	if	that	would	happen	a	lot,	then	some	kind	
of	control	would	be	needed	(bcnA08).  Importantly,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 official	 identification	 documents	 such	 as	 the	passport,	it	is	only	a	small	step	from	verifying	a	patient’s	identity	or	age	to	(also)	checking	their	immigration	status.	A	recent	report	by	DOTW	(2016)	shows	that	13	per	cent	of	the	recorded	refusals	of	GP	registration	in	England	were	due	to	reception	staff	mistakenly	requiring	proof	of	legal	 immigration	status,	which	the	applicants	were	unable	to	provide.	Neither	in	the	UK	nor	in	Catalonia	does	the	receptionist’s	role	 involve	a	duty	 to	 systematically	 check	 immigration	statuses,	but	only	 in	 the	latter	 context	 did	 those	 I	 interviewed	 generally	 seem	 to	 question	 their	 own	authority	to	do	so,	as	one	of	them	emphasised:		Well,	sometimes	when	I	ask	for	their	documentation	they	tell	me	they	don’t	have	[any],	and	so,	of	course,	you'll	have	to	believe	it.	I	cannot	force	anyone	to	
show	me	[a	passport].	If	s/he	tells	you	that	s/he	doesn’t	have	one,	you	believe	it.	And	then	later	it	sometimes	comes	out	that	s/he	actually	has	a	passport;	that	also	happens.	But	I	cannot	refuse	[registration]	by	demanding	that	they	show	me	something	(bcnA15).			At	the	same	time,	and	in	both	cities,	some	of	the	reception	staff	I	interviewed	were	convinced	 that	 being	 ‘laxer’	 or	 having	 ‘more	 open’	 access	 policies	 than	 other	practices	within	the	same	area	would	automatically	divert	people	–	and	particularly	those	 perceived	 as	 administratively	 ‘difficult	 cases’	 –	 to	 them,	 as	 the	 head	receptionist	I	interviewed	in	Hackney	pointed	out:	I	don’t	know	why	[the	other	practices]	have	made	those	kinds	of	decisions,	but	what	 I	 am	saying	 is	 [that]	because	we	stick	out,	people	will	 come	here	
more,	because	we	don’t	ask	for	proof	of	address.	So	a	lot	of	our	services	will	
probably	 get	 overloaded;	 because…	 sometimes	 it	 goes	 through	 word	 of	mouth,	 so	 someone	 would	 say	 ‘hey,	 you	 don’t	 need	 to	 provide	 proof	 of	address	here,	just	say	you	live	here’	(lonA14).		This	clearly	echoes	a	familiar	argument	about	immigration	that	is	almost	as	widely	accepted	 as	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 substantiate	 or	 quantify:	 that	 comparatively	 liberal	access	policies	but	also	stronger	protection	or	better	visibility	of	existing	rights	and	
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entitlements	 granted	 to	 foreign	 residents	 will	 automatically	 attract	 further	‘unwanted’	immigration.	As	Schrover	&	Schinkel	(2013,	p.1130)	put	it,	“no	country	wants	to	be	accused	of	being	less	humanitarian	than	neighbouring	countries,	but	no	country	wants	to	attract	migrants	with	too	much	humanitarianism	either“.	Both	at	the	 level	 of	 states	 and	 that	 of	 health	 centres,	 this	 so-called	 ‘pull-effect’	 is	 often	suspected	 of	 leading	 to	 some	 kind	 of	 ‘overload’,	 unless	 it	 is	 countered	 through	effective	gatekeeping	mechanisms.		Within	the	health	centre,	a	lot	of	the	gatekeeping	responsibility	is	borne	by	front-line	 staff.	 The	 above-cited	 report	 on	 GP	 registration	 in	 England	 specifically	highlights	that	in	32	per	cent	of	all	refusals	the	responsible	practice	manager	was	not	 available	 to	 confirm	 the	 receptionists’	 decision	 (DOTW,	 2016).	 The	 latter	thereby	informally	exercise	a	kind	of	discretion	that	is	not	explicitly	foreseen	under	the	current	legal	framework,	although	it	arguably	is	fostered	by	its	ambiguity.	Here	it	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	 individual	 gatekeepers	 can	 also	 use	 their	discretion	to	facilitate	access	to	a	service	they	administer,	as	becomes	clear	from	the	following	account	of	a	reception	manager	I	interviewed	in	the	district	Sant	Martí	of	Barcelona:		When	I	refer	someone	[to	secondary	care]	and	tell	[the	hospital]	that	s/he	is	an	 irregular	migrant	who	does	 not	 have	 anything	 [no	money]	 ...	 then	 the	hospital	will	charge	it	to	CatSalut.	Now,	if	the	person	arrives	at	a	hospital	and	has	not	 passed	 through	me,	 they're	going	 to	give	him/her	a	bill.	 […]	They	always	 have	 to	 go	 through	primary	 care,	 because	 I	 am	 the	 one	who	 sends	
them.	 So,	 if	 I	 send	 them,	 they	 will	 not	 be	 billed	 and	 everything	 will	 be	processed	via	CatSalut	(bcnA08).		Independent	 of	 whether	 it	 bars	 or	 facilitates	 someone’s	 access	 to	 something,	gatekeeping	always	involves	the	exercise	of	a	certain	from	of	power	that	comes	with	a	particular	role.	While	the	power	and	responsibility	to	refer	someone	(or	not)	to	a	hospital	 actually	 lies	with	 the	 family	doctor	–	 rather	 than	 the	 receptionist	 –	 it	 is	important	 to	 remember	 that	 both	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 in	 Spain	 all	 patients	 (including	citizens)	 are	 subject	 to	 this	 very	 kind	 of	 gatekeeping:	 If	 they	 want	 to	 receive	 a	treatment	 that	 is	 publicly	 funded,	 they	 have	 to	 go	 through	 primary	 care	 and	 be	assessed	by	their	family	doctor	or	GP	as	being	in	need	of	this	particular	treatment.		Throughout	this	thesis	I	argue	that	gatekeeping	and	other	practices	of	inclusion	or	exclusion	can	only	constitute	a	legitimate	exercise	of	power	or	discretion	as	long	as	
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they	are	based	on	the	internal	logic(s)	of	the	very	(sub-)system	which	in	order	to	effectively	fulfil	its	function	for	society	requires	this	particular	power	to	be	vested	in	a	particular	role.	As	soon	as	receptionists	or	other	healthcare	workers	(have	to)	follow	or	take	into	account	the	external	logic	of	immigration	control	when	exercising	their	power	or	discretion	over	a	patient,	they	become	deputies	of	the	immigration	regime.	 The	 same	 is	 also	 true	 for	 medical	 professionals	 whose	 role	 and	responsibility	towards	their	patients	is	even	more	likely	to	conflict	with	the	logic	of	immigration	control.			
5.3.2. 	Professional	providers	of	healthcare	When	 talking	 about	 irregular	 migrants’	 access	 to	 healthcare,	 many	 of	 my	interviewees	in	both	cities	referred	to	the	moral	obligations	and	professional	values	attached	to	being	a	doctor	or	nurse.	Quite	often	they	pointed	at	a	certain	tension	or	even	 outright	 contradiction	 between	 these	 values	 and	 duties	 on	 one	 hand,	 and	immigration	 law	 or	 the	 corresponding	 administrative	 procedures	 on	 the	 other.	Especially	healthcare	 professionals	 themselves	were	 very	 often	 concerned	 about	instances	or	mechanisms	of	selective	exclusion	 towards	 certain	groups	of	people	from	the	services	they	provide.	A	family	doctor	working	in	Ciutat	Vella	(Barcelona)	put	it	this	way:	We	have	our	own	deontological	code	[…which]	is	necessary	to	ensure	good	
practice	 and	 the	well-functioning	 of	 [the	 healthcare	 system],	 right?	 So	we	cannot	 distinguish	 people	 by	 religion,	 and	 just	 as	 we	 don’t	 deny	 health	services	 to	 a	 person	 who	 is	 of	 a	 particular	 religion,	 also	 a	 particular	administrative	 situation	 […]	would	 not	 be	 a	 cause	 [for	 exclusion].	We	 are	very	 aware	 of	 this,	 but	 obviously	 the	 government’s	 policies	 are	 often	
antagonistic…	contrary	to	our	deontological	code.	And	so	we	enter	in	a	kind	of	moral	 conflict,	 or	 they	 intend	 that	we	 enter	 into	 a	moral	 conflict	 –	 into	which	we	do	not	really	enter	because	[for	us]	it’s	life	above	all	else,	taking	care	of	and	helping	[the	patient]	above	all	else	(bcnA12).		On	 the	 basis	 of	 these	 principles	 in	 combination	 with	 a	 particular	 expertise	 and	bolstered	by	a	strong	professional	standing	within	society,	 their	 job	gives	them	a	significant	 amount	 of	 individual	 discretion.	 This	 is	 most	 obvious	 where	 health	professionals	 are	 expected	 to	 decide	 whether	 a	 particular	 case	 constitutes	 an	‘emergency’	and	which	types	of	care	should	be	considered	as	‘necessary’	(DOTW,	
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2013;	 OHCHR,	 2014).	 The	 responsible	 doctor	 of	 another	 CAP	 in	 the	 centre	 of	Barcelona	rather	proudly	maintained	that	the	ambiguity	of	these	concepts	together	with	the	legal	protections	they	afford	allows	him	to	basically	treat	anyone	without	breaking	the	law:		We	[as	doctors]	can	decide	that,	and	that	opens	a	door	for	us	to	make	different	
exceptions	when	we	 think	 it	 is	 appropriate	 from	a	medical	point	of	 view.	 […]	According	 to	 the	 law	 you	 can	 treat	 any	 urgent	 [case],	 someone	 that	 you	consider	 is	 an	 urgent	 case.	 And	 I	 can	 consider	 that	 everything	 that	 comes	through	the	door	is	an	urgent	case	(bcnA14).		That	said,	he	also	acknowledged	that	depending	on	the	workplace	and	specific	role	within	the	healthcare	system,	certain	administrative	rules	and	requirements	more	or	less	easily	get	in	the	way	of	doctors’	professional	freedom46.	While	he	generally	appreciated	that	“under	the	law	that	they	made	in	Catalonia	you	can	sort	out	most	[cases]	 pretty	 well”	 (bcnA14),	 he	 also	 noted	 that	 the	 recent	 introduction	 of	 a	computerised	system	for	prescribing	medication	has	limited	the	flexibility	that	he	used	to	have	when	writing	all	prescriptions	by	hand.		At	the	same	time,	the	accounts	of	health	professionals	I	interviewed	in	Barcelona	and	London	also	reflected	their	awareness	of	the	fact	that	public	funds	are	limited,	and	 their	decisions	as	public	 servants	 thus	need	 to	be	 justified.	As	one	doctor	 in	Barcelona	put	it,	this	usually	involves	weighing	the	costs	of	a	particular	treatment	against	its	perceived	necessity:		[It	depends	on]	the	cost	that	it	represents	[to	the	healthcare	system]	and	even	if	we	suppose	that	I	see	[one	additional	patient]	each	day	–	which	is	not	even	the	case	–	 they	will	still	pay	me	the	same,	and	so	 it	will	not	be	 felt	by	the	administration	[…]	or	by	society.	[It	will	make	a	difference]	just	for	me,	but	not	beyond.	So	I	am	not	sure…	but	of	course	the	funds	are	limited	and	come	from	everyone	[…]	and	so	I	think	that	it	would	need	a	solution	that	involves	
the	whole	society	and	not	just	one	professional.	But	in	any	case,	I	have	to	say	that	I	don’t	know	what	I	would	do,	I	really	don’t	know.	If	it	were	a	serious	disease	I	would	treat	it	for	sure.	If	someone	comes	just	because	they	have	[…]	a	cold,	I	would	possibly	tell	them…	I	don’t	know	(bcnA09).		The	‘deontological	code’,	institutional	logic	and	expert	knowledge	that	underlie	and	justify	 a	 doctor’s	 discretion	 are	 essentially	 the	 same	 whether	 s/he	 works	 in	Barcelona	or	London.	The	somewhat	tighter	rules	that	the	UK	government	has	put																																																									46	For	example,	family	doctors	will	encounter	different	barriers	in	their	everyday	dealings	with	their	patients	than	doctors	working	in	A&E.		
		
124	
in	place,	however,	can	make	it	more	difficult	for	healthcare	professionals	to	‘sort	out’	individual	 cases,	 as	 the	 following	 statements	 of	 a	 nurse	 (1)	 and	 a	 GP	 (2)	 I	interviewed	in	London	indicate:		(1)	There	is	a	little	loophole	because	anything	that	is	urgent	or	immediately	necessary	 is	 free	 at	 the	 point	 of	 delivery.	 So,	 if	 there	 are	 patients	 [in	 an	irregular	situation]	and	it	is	kind	of	life	threatening	or	critical…	so	if	you	can	argue	that	without	an	intervention	they	will	be	even	more	unwell,	then	that’s	a	 loophole.	 But	 obviously	 not	 everything	 can	 be	 argued	 like	 that,	 and	 it	depends	which	healthcare	provider	you	are	arguing	with	(lonA13).			(2)	I	mean	I	personally	would	like	to…	to	do	that…	I	mean,	I’d	probably	try	and	help	patients	to	get	[the	treatment	they	need],	even	though	sometimes	they	are	not	eligible,	so	it’s	probably	not	right…	but…	it’s	difficult.	I	think	it’s	sometimes	 the	 right	 thing	 to	 do	 [if]	 it’s	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 patient	(lonA25).			In	addition,	and	closely	related	to	individual	discretion,	the	medical	profession	also	brings	with	it	a	significant	degree	of	responsibility	for	the	wellbeing	of	the	patient,	so	that	doctors	in	particular	–	even	if	personally	they	were	‘against	immigration’	–	could	not	 simply	 choose	 to	 ignore	 their	duty	of	 care	without	potentially	 “risking	their	career”,	as	several	of	my	interviewees	explicitly	emphasised	(bcnA08,	lonA08,	lonA11).	Arguably,	 it	 is	precisely	because	 the	 nature	of	 their	 job	 forces	 them	“to	attend	 to	 the	 persons	 and	 not	 to	 their	 administrative	 status”	 (bcnA10)	 –	 as	 a	community	health	worker	in	Barcelona	put	it	–	that	medical	professionals	usually	tend	to	be	shielded	from	having	to	perform	gatekeeping	functions	that	are	not	based	on	 medical	 necessity	 but	 administrative	 criteria	 like	 local	 residence,	 income	 or	immigration	 status.	 In	 both	 cities,	 several	 professionals	 and	 NGO	 workers	 I	interviewed	assured	me	that		doctors	and	nurses	themselves	don’t	put	up	barriers.	[…]	I	am	speaking	as	a	nurse	myself	 and	having	 lots	of	medical	 colleagues	 I	don’t	 think	we	see	 a	problem	with	our	patients	being	from	abroad	or	with	our	patients	not	having	papers.	We	see	a	patient	from	the	point	of	view	that	they	are	sick	and	unwell,	and	they	need	our	medical	help.	I	think	the	problem	comes	in	the	people	before	
they	see	the	doctor	or	nurse	(lonA13).		The	UK	Department	of	Health	(2010,	p.27),	however,	also	recognised	“the	crucial	role	that	GPs	already	play	in	committing	NHS	resources	through	their	daily	clinical	decisions	–	not	only	 in	 terms	of	referrals	and	prescribing,	but	also	how	well	 they	
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manage	 long-term	 conditions,	 and	 the	 accessibility	 of	 their	 services”	 (emphasis	added).	Behind	what	appears	to	reflect	purely	economic	considerations	lies	a	clear	tendency	 of	 healthcare	 staff	 increasingly	 being	 expected	 to	 (help)	 police	 the	government’s	immigration	rules,	which	at	the	same	time	are	becoming	ever	more	restrictive	 and	 complex.	 Especially	 GPs	 (as	 well	 as	 certain	 A&E	 staff)	 could	 –	according	to	official	guidelines	–	systematically	“identify	in	the	referral	letter	any	patient	whom	they	believe	may	be	an	overseas	visitor,	which	the	relevant	NHS	body	could	 then	 check“	 (Department	 of	 Health,	 2013a,	 p.52).	 Individual	 doctors	 are	thereby	increasingly	put	in	a	difficult	position,	as	a	GP	in	London	pointed	out	to	me:		If	that	happens	–	because	there	has	been	also	talk	about	that	we	should	be	one	of	the	first…	well…	to	put	barriers,	and	we	should	actually	identify	people	–	it	can	be	difficult	with	confidentiality.	If	for	example,	someone	comes	in	and	they	are	an	 ‘illegal’	 immigrant	and	I	see	them	as	an	emergency	and	they	say,	 ‘oh	please	don’t	say	I	am	[irregular]’,	then	this	is…	I	don’t	know	what	to	do	in	that	situation.	I	wouldn’t	know	(lonA25).		But	even	without	this	‘suggestion’	having	yet	become	a	formal	obligation	for	doctors	and	 nurses,	 the	 same	 interviewee	 later	 also	 acknowledged	 that	 already	 now	she	sometimes	considers	that	the	best	advice	she	can	give	to	a	foreign	patient	is	to	leave	the	UK:		I	mean,	of	course,	if	it	is	an	emergency	they	will	get	the	help,	but	if	someone	needs	 continuous	 treatment	 […]	 and	 it’s	 sometimes	 something	 that	 takes	years…	so	I	mean,	we	have	to	give	the	patient	the	best	advice,	and	sometimes	really	 the	 best	 advice	 is	 actually	 not	 to	 be	 here	 if	 they	 have	 a	 difficult	situation…	because	that	means	that	they	cannot	get…	the	care	would	not	be	
continuous,	it	would	not	be	very	effective	(lonA25).		Arguably,	her	account	suggests	that	she	not	only	considers	advising	certain	patients	to	 better	 leave	 the	 UK	 ‘voluntarily’,	 but	 that	 she	 also	 anticipates	 their	 likely	deportation	 in	 case	 they	 do	 not	 –	which	 is	what	 in	 fact	would	 then	 disrupt	 the	treatment.	Even	without	being	legally	obliged	to	do	so,	she	thereby	already	assumes	her	designated	role	for	the	immigration	regime	and	almost	seems	to	have	accepted	her	place	within	the	‘hostile	environment’	through	which	the	government	aims	at	precisely	 that:	 encouraging	 return.	 This	 is	 also	 a	 good	 example	 of	 how	 the	increasingly	 negative	 media	 and	 public	 discourse	 –	 whether	 focused	 on	 ‘health	tourism’	 or	 the	 imperative	 to	 discourage	 ‘illegal’	 immigration	 more	 generally	 –	threatens	to	undermine	not	only	the	patients’	legal	entitlements	but	also	individual	
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doctors’	 duty	 of	 care	 (DOTW,	 2013).	 In	 addition,	 it	 puts	 in	 jeopardy	 the	confidentiality	and	trust	that	is	not	only	essential	to	the	doctor-patient	relationship	but	also	necessary	for	a	correct	diagnosis	and	successful	treatment	(Wind-Cowie	&	Wood,	2014;	Kilner,	2014).		As	will	become	clearer	in	the	next	sub-section,	also	hospital	doctors	are	increasingly	expected	 to	 at	 least	 consider	 the	 immigration	 status	 of	 foreign	 patients	 when	assessing	their	medical	needs.	The	following	quote	of	a	nurse	working	in	the	A&E	department	of	a	hospital	in	North-London	highlights	the	underlying	contradiction:		[The	patient’s	immigration	status]	shouldn’t	make	a	difference.	It	would	not	be	 ethical	 if	 it	 did	make	 a	 difference	 to	 the	 [doctor’s]	 decision	 [of	which	treatment	is	‘urgent’].	Because	they	should	be	seeing	the	patient	solely	based	on	 what	 is	 wrong	 with	 the	 patient,	 not	 on	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 patient	 is	entitled	to	free	healthcare	(lonA13).		The	UK	government	is	aware	of	the	inherent	problem	and	noted	that	“[c]linicians	are	not	expected	to	take	on	the	role	of	immigration	officials,	but	they	are	often	well	placed	to	identify	visitors	who	are	chargeable”	(Department	of	Health,	2013b,	p.17).	However,	as	long	as	immigration	status	is	the	main	criterion	for	charging	someone	and	NHS	staff	–	even	if	not	necessarily	clinicians	themselves	–	have	to	identify	who	is	 chargeable,	 they	 will	 effectively	 be	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 controlling	 immigration.	Importantly,	this	is	not	just	a	question	of	ethics,	but	also	of	correspondence	between	the	allocation	of	competences	and	adequate	training,	as	the	GP	I	quoted	above	also	emphasised:		I	mean	people	will	have	different	opinions	[but]	I	personally	don’t	think	that	as	healthcare	workers	that	is	our	job.	We	are	not…	I	don’t	feel	we	should	be	border	control.	[…]	I	think	this	kind	of	checking	and	border	control	should	be	done	by	other	people	and	not	by	healthcare	workers.	Public	health	shouldn’t	be	involved	in	it.	Sometimes	it	is	very	difficult	for	us	as	healthcare	workers	to	ascertain	that	someone	is	an	illegal	immigrant,	[…]	because	it’s	not	something	
that	we	are	trained	to	do	(lonA25).		What	 she	 refers	 to	 is	 primarily	 the	 checking	 of	 relevant	 documents	 in	 order	 to	establish	someone’s	immigration	status,	or	what	I	have	called	‘having	to	know’	when	I	introduced	my	analytical	framework	in	chapter	2.	But	also	the	second	dimension	of	this	framework	and	of	being	implicated	in	immigration	control	–	‘having	to	tell’	–	has	an	 impact	on	how	individual	healthcare	workers	 interact	with	their	patients,	and	vice	versa.	The	A&E	nurse	I	interviewed	in	London	put	it	like	this:		
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If	doctors	or	nurses	have	to	disclose	the	status	of	their	patients	all	the	time,	it	will	be	affecting	the	treatment	that	they	give	them,	and	nothing	should	affect	the	treatment	that	you	are	getting	from	a	doctor	or	a	nurse.	[…]	It	will	affect	[it]	because	the	patient	would	not	engage	as	much	with	the	services	if	they	are	thinking	‘oh,	the	Home	Office	is	going	to	find	out’,	or	‘I	will	need	to	pay’.	It’s	going	to	be	too	stressful,	they	are	not	[even]	going	to	come	to	a	doctor	or	nurse	(lonA13).		Given	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 personal	 data	 that	 healthcare	 staff	 in	 general	 and	professionals	in	particular	are	handling	in	their	everyday	work,	confidentiality	and	data	protection	requirements	play	an	important	role	in	the	area	of	healthcare	and	constitute	a	crucial	element	of	individuals’	professional	duty.	While	several	of	my	respondents	in	both	cities	were	not	sure	whether	or	not	there	was	a	specific	law	or	regulation	that	explicitly	prohibits	passing	immigration	related	information	about	their	patients	to	other	agencies,	almost	all	of	them	–	and	doctors	in	particular	–	made	very	clear	that	they	would	never	do	so:		I	think	doctors	will	consider	it	as	just	another	issue	of	professional	secrecy.	It's	 the	 same	 as	 if	 someone	 tells	 you	 that	 s/he	maintains	 high-risk	 sexual	relationships	or	anything	 like	that...	and	so,	well,	 it's	a	secret.	 I	don’t	know	how	this	would	be	considered	from	an	administrative	point	of	view,	but…	[…]	I	think	that	as	doctors	we	don’t	consider	ourselves	to	be	the	police	for	anything;	but	actually	the	contrary,	in	this	sense	(bcnA09).		This	last	statement	of	a	family	doctor	I	spoke	to	in	Barcelona	strikingly	coincides	with	the	following	–	made	by	a	GP	in	London	–	in	that	both	make	a	similar	distinction	between	doctors	on	one	hand	and	administrative	staff	on	the	other.			[…]	 The	 General	 Medical	 Council	 [GMC]	 rule	 states	 that	 I	 may	 not	 even	disclose	that	a	patient	is	registered	here,	[…nor]	any	information	whatsoever,	without	 their	consent.	Now	that	applies	 to	doctors.	But	our	managers	here	would	 not	 do	 it	 either,	 and	 our	 receptionists	 obviously	 know	 not	 to	 give	information	 to	anybody	over	 the	phone.	 […]	But	once	somebody	 from	 the	Home	Office	did	phone	our	manager	and	said	‘well,	we	need	this	information’,	and	she	said	‘well,	I	am	quoting	you	the	GMC	rule’,	and	he	or	she	said	back	‘oh…	 but	 some	 doctors	 choose	 to	 give	 this	 information’,	 which	was	 fairly	horrifying,	that	apparently	some	doctors	are…	Now,	they	may	be	doing	it	in	an	innocent	way,	or	they	may	not	even	realise	(lonA11).		Whereas	 professional	 providers	 and	 administrators	 of	 mainstream	 public	healthcare	often	rather	inadvertently	come	to	play	a	certain	role	within	the	overall	management	of	migration,	both	the	British	and	Catalan	cases	demonstrate	that	the	internalisation	of	control	also	creates	the	need	for	new	institutional	structures	and	
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personnel	 that	 specifically	 deals	with	migrant	 irregularity	within	 the	 healthcare	system.			
5.3.3. ‘Managers’	of	irregularity	within	the	healthcare	system	The	UK	Department	of	Health	(2013b,	p.13)	emphasises	that	all	“[r]esidency	based,	tax-funded	systems	rely	on	the	identification	of	those	who	are	not	entitled	rather	than	those	who	are,	with	the	onus	on	staff	to	identify	those	who	should	be	charged.”	While	 this	 leaves	 open	 at	 which	 stage,	 by	 whom,	 and	 on	 what	 basis	 such	identification	should	be	carried	out,	it	is	pertinent	not	only	to	the	UK	context	but	also	 for	 the	 Catalan	 health	 system.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 an	 important	 difference	becomes	apparent	here:	Whereas	in	the	case	of	Catalonia	the	level	of	any	particular	patient’s	 entitlement	 (depending	 on	 income,	 employment	 status	 and	 length	 of	residence)	is	clearly	indicated	on	their	personal	health	card,	‘Overseas	Visitors’	in	the	UK,	once	they	are	registered	with	a	GP,	hold	exactly	the	same	kind	of	NHS	card	as	any	other	patient.	This	 lack	of	specification	of	 the	holder’s	entitlement	beyond	primary	and	emergency	care	 is	a	remainder	of	 the	system’s	universalistic	origins	and	makes	it	difficult	for	hospitals	to	comply	with	the	legal	obligation	that	is	now	placed	directly	on	them,	“to	determine	whether	the	Charging	Regulations	apply	to	any	overseas	visitor	they	treat”	(Department	of	Health,	2013a,	p.16).		At	 the	hospital	 level,	 this	mismatch	has	 created	 the	need	 for	a	particular	kind	of	administrative	 personnel	 –	 that	 is,	 a	 new	 organisational	 role	 –	 responsible	 for	identifying	who	is	chargeable.	It	is	not	surprising	that	from	the	perspective	of	these	so-called	Overseas	Visitors	Managers	(OVMs)	one	of	the	major	problems	of	the	NHS	is	that	people	too	easily	‘slip	through	the	system’,	as	the	OVM	of	a	mid-sized	hospital	in	South-East	London	explained	to	me:	[…]	and	the	reason	why	they	can	slip	through	the	system	[...]	is	that	anybody	
can	obtain	a	national	health	number.	[…]	All	they	do,	actually,	is	go	to	a	GP,	ask	the	GP	to	register	them,	and	the	GP	registers	them	and	gives	them	an	NHS	number	(lonA09).		On	one	hand,	this	reflects	what	according	to	one	of	the	GPs	I	interviewed	has	become	a	 common	 view	 within	 the	 NHS:	 that	 GP	 registration	 itself	 constitutes	 “an	underground	 route	 to	 secondary	 care”	 (lonA11).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 OVM	
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acknowledged	that	even	though	“by	law,	we	have	to	check	every	new	patient	that	comes	 into	 the	 hospital,	 […]	 that	 is	 physically	 impossible,	 and	 it	 would	 cost	 an	absolute	fortune”	(lonA09);	which	is	why	in	practice	her	department	focuses	mainly	on	the	areas	of	women’s	health	and	orthopaedic.	Asked	for	the	reasons	behind	this	selection,	she	explained	that	it	was	“principally	because	a	lot	of	people	come	over	here	to	give	birth,	and	orthopaedic	because	it	is	quite	an	expensive	area”,	but	she	also	mentioned	that	“we	have	also	good	staff	that	we	could	encourage	to	participate	in	those	sections“	(lonA09).	The	exact	meaning	of	this	comment	only	became	clear	to	me	when	 she	 later	 received	 a	 phone	 call	 from	 the	 hospital’s	maternity	ward	notifying	her	about	the	arrival	of	a	new	patient,	after	which	she	explained	to	me:		In	that	case	I	would	be	very	very	surprised	if	that	person	is	entitled	to	NHS	care.	So	we	will	go	up	to	see	her,	we	will	ask	her	to	see	her	documentation.	I	mean	she	is	on	the	labour	ward,	so	I	don’t	think	that’s	the	right	time	to	ask,	personally,	so	I	will	probably	leave	that	and	go	after	she	has	given	birth.	We	will	ask	to	see	her	documentation,	we	will	ask	her	relatives	to	bring	in	that	documentation.	It	could	be	that	she	has	got	leave	to	remain.	It	may	have	been	that	 she	 just	 came	 to	 see	 her	 family	 and	 just	 came	down…	you	 know,	we	cannot	guarantee	it	but	that	case	we	would	class	as	suspicious	(lonA09).		Her	account	is	a	good	example	of	how	“NHS	staff	often	have	to	make	assumptions	about	 government	 [immigration]	 policy	 in	 their	 work”,	 as	Wind-Cowie	 &	Wood	(2014,	p.55)	have	noted;	but	it	also	highlights	the	level	of	direct	implication	of	her	role	 in	 the	 actual	 enforcement	 of	 this	 policy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 very	 subtle	 kind	 of	discretion	(as	to	whom,	when	and	how	to	check)	that	she	thereby	employs.	Asked	what	happens	 in	 case	a	patient	 is	not	able	 to	prove	 their	 entitlement,	or	even	 to	produce	a	valid	passport,	my	interviewee	replied	that		they	have	to	produce	their	passport,	which	[…]	will	have	a	stamp	in	it,	so	that	will	show	whether	that	person	is	entitled	or	not.	From	there,	once	we	have	identified	her,	we	will	raise	an	invoice.	If	she	doesn’t	pay…	again:	we	have	to	treat	 this	 patient,	 but	 if	 she	 doesn’t	 pay,	 then	 in	 three	months’	 time	 that	invoice	will	be	going	over	to…	we	will	inform	the	Department	of	Health	[…]	who	then	filter	it	and	would	let	the	Home	Office	know	(lonA09).		Interestingly,	while	she	clearly	perceived	her	role	within	the	hospital	and	the	NHS	as	one	of	control,	she	did	not	readily	acknowledge	that	what	she	 is	controlling	 is	immigration.	 Instead,	 when	 I	 asked	 her	 how	 she	 felt	 about	 ‘quasi’	 acting	 as	 an	immigration	officer,	her	answer	was	rather	ambiguous:			
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I	don’t	think	we	do.	I	mean,	if	you	were	an	immigration	officer	you	would	be	informing	 immigration	 [authorities],	 you	would	 be	 informing	 the	 borders	agency.	 And	we	will	 work	with	 the	 borders	 agency,	 and	we	will	 let	 the…	Department	 of	 Health	 know	 of	 patients	 that	 owe	 us	 money.	 Now:	 it’s	 the	Department	of	Health	that	then	would	possibly	pass	that	information	to	the	Home	Office,	and	it	would,	you	know,	then	put	it	on	a	system	so	that	perhaps	these	people…	but	they	are	not	traced	here!	It’s	normally	the	people	that	try	to	get	back	[into	the	UK]	that	we	are	stopping.	[…]	So	personally	I	don’t	think	that	we	work	 as	 an	 immigration	 officer…	maybe	wrongly,	 perhaps	 we	 do	(lonA09).	She	 clearly	 emphasised	 that	 she	 and	 her	 team	 are	 not	 targeting	 immigration	offenders	but	patients	who	owe	the	hospital	money.	At	the	same	time,	however,	she	is	 aware	 that	 her	 role	 –	 together	with	 the	mechanism	 that	 ‘lets	 the	Home	Office	know’	–	plays	a	decisive	part	in	the	government’s	broader	efforts	to	limit	irregular	residence,	but	also	unwanted	immigration	more	generally:		I	believe	that	that	is	a	deterrent,	and	I	think	what	it	is	doing	is	stopping	a	lot	of	people	getting	their	Leave	to	Remain.	What	we	are	also	finding	is	that	some	of	the	patients	that	have	gone	home,	wherever	that	might	be…	the	Caribbean,	Africa,	Asia…	you	know;	 they	have	gone	home	with	a	debt	but	when	 they	apply	for	another	visa	they	are	being	told	that	they	can’t	get	it (lonA09).		Such	 outstanding	 NHS	 debt	 can	 thereby	 function	 as	 an	 effective	 barrier	 to	regularisation,	 even	 where	 an	 applicant	 would	 otherwise	 meet	 the	 legal	requirements	 I	 outlined	 in	 chapter	 4.1.	 Importantly,	 the	 connection	 between	healthcare	and	immigration	control	also	works	the	other	way	around,	so	that	even	doctors	are	increasingly	expected	to	take	their	patients’	immigration	situation	into	account	when	assessing	their	medical	needs.	When	I	asked	the	OVM	whether	the	hospital	doctors	were	aware	of	these	regulations,	she	said:		Well	they	don’t	need	to	know,	do	they?	We	will	send	them	a	letter	saying	that	their	patient	has	been	identified	as	not	entitled	to	NHS	treatment,	and	that	we	would	therefore	like	to	get	confirmation	from	them	as	to	how	they	wish	to	proceed.	[Interviewer:]	So	a	patient	having	or	not	having	LTR	could	influence	
their	assessment?	–	Yes,	it	will.	It	has	got	to	(lonA09).		Also	the	Catalan	health	system	necessarily	relies	on	certain	ways	to	identify	patients	who	should	(and	can)	be	charged	for	the	treatment	they	receive,	whether	directly	or	 via	 their	 insurance	 if	 they	 have	 one.	 In	 principle,	 this	 happens	 at	 the	 level	 of	
CatSalut,	where	the	patient	information	recorded	by	health	centre	receptionists	is	
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centralised	 and	 screened	 for	 potential	 fraud,	 as	 a	 community	 health	 worker	explained	to	me:			Once	CatSalut	receives	the	documents	of	the	person,	there	is	an	additional	filter.	 That’s	where	 they	 investigate	whether	 this	 person	 is	 a	 tourist	who	comes	 to	 take	 advantage	 of	 the	 health	 system	 or	 is	 a	 person	 without	resources.	 […]	So	not	everyone	who	has	applied	 for	a	health	card	has	also	been	 granted	 one.	Not	 everyone.	 Because	 they	 saw	 that	 there	 are	 [some]	persons	who	are	not	in	this	situation	of	vulnerability.	But	others,	however,	really	need	 it	because	they	are	 in	an	extreme	situation.	So,	 they	[CatSalut]	evaluate	this	quite	well,	I	think	(bcnA02).		
CatSalut	thus	generally	tries	to	draw	a	line	between	residents	who	(mostly	because	of	their	immigration	status)	are	excluded	from	the	national	insurance	system	but	also	unable	to	pay	privately,	and	non-residents	suspected	of	‘health	tourism’.	For	the	UK	system,	in	contrast,	both	of	them	are	‘Overseas	Visitors’	and	thus	automatically	placed	in	the	same	administrative	category,	which	not	only	blurs	two	very	distinct	social	 realities	 (Wind-Cowie	 &	 Wood,	 2014)	 but	 also	 renders	 even	 those	entitlements	 that	 irregular	 migrants	 theoretically	 have	 less	 visible	 (Schweitzer,	2016).		In	Catalonia,	as	mentioned	in	sub-section	5.2.2,	those	relatively	few	cases	of	patients	who	were	identified	as	entitled	to	free	primary	but	not	(yet)	secondary	care	had	to	be	 managed	 individually	 by	 a	 special	 commission	 within	 CatSalut,	 as	 the	organisation’s	client	relations	manager	explained	to	me	in	May	2015,	less	than	two	months	before	the	access	rules	were	simplified	and	the	commission	dissolved:		The	 so-called	Commission	of	Exceptional	Access	 to	Programmed	Specialised	
Care	 was	 created	 to	 deal	 with	 those	 cases	 that	 did	 not	 have	 access	 to	specialised	care	but	because	of	their	illness	had	to	be	treated;	and	[of	those]	we	have	had	60	or	70	cases	a	year...	that	is,	there	are	very	few	people	who	are	asking	us	[…]	to	be	treated	or	admitted	to	a	hospital	during	that	first	year.	[…]	[Interviewer:	And	what	is	the	decision	of	this	commission	based	on,	then?]	The	decision	 is	based	on	a	clinical	report	 issued	by	a	hospital,	saying	 'this	person	with	this	diagnosis	would	have	to	be	provided	access	to	specialised	care’.	 And	 so	 there	 is	 this	 commission	 formed	 by	 a	 lawyer,	 a	 purchasing	specialist,	a	hospital	doctor,	a	member	of	the	Client	Relations	Department,	and	 there	 is	 also	 a	 pharmacist...	 and	 between	 these	 professionals	 they	analyse	the	case	and	then	say	yes	or	no.	Basically	in	all	the	cases	presented	–	I	think	99	per	cent	–	they	said	yes	(bcnA17).		In	 accordance	 with	 this	 account,	 one	 of	 the	 health	 centre	 staff	 I	 interviewed	 in	
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Barcelona	remembered	“only	one	or	two	non-urgent	cases”	where	patients	had	to	wait	until	they	fulfilled	the	one-year	residence	requirement	(bcnA08),	whereas	in	all	other	cases	they	did	receive	the	treatment	that	 the	 family	doctor	had	deemed	necessary.	In	practice,	the	administrative	categorisation	and	corresponding	levels	of	eligibility	that	had	been	put	in	place	in	order	to	at	least	temporarily	limit	irregular	migrants’	access	to	secondary	public	healthcare	had	thus	routinely	been	overruled	by	professional	assessments	of	what	the	patient’s	medical	condition	required	to	be	done.	The	responsibility	and	power	to	manage	this	particular	aspect	of	irregularity	has	thereby	remained	in	the	hands	of	local	actors	primarily	committed	to	the	logic	of	 providing	 healthcare	 (and	 shielded	 from	 that	 of	 immigration	 control),	 which	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	role	and	duties	of	Overseas	Visitors	Managers	in	the	UK	context.		Another	kind	of	actors,	which	are	often	crucial	for	the	management	of	irregularities	that	public	welfare	systems	face	are	NGOs	and	private	associations.	Their	functions	range	from	information,	awareness	raising	and	advocacy	to	the	actual	provision	of	complementary	or	even	alternative	services	to	particularly	vulnerable	groups.	Their	relationship	 to	 mainstream	 services	 can	 thereby	 be	 more	 or	 less	 formalised.	 In	Catalonia,	 for	 example,	 they	 have	 become	 responsible	 for	 supporting	 the	registration	 of	 those	 patients	 who	 cannot	 provide	 the	 otherwise	 necessary	documentation,	as	the	administrator	of	a	CAP	explained	to	me:		Before,	 those	who	 came	without	 anything,	 without	 papers,	 were	 handled	here.	There	was	an	application	form	for	all	those	who	came	without	papers	and	we	 processed	 them	here.	 But	with	 the	 new	 law	 this	 group	 has	 been	diverted	to	associations	that	are	dedicated	to	doing	just	that.	[Interviewer:]	
So	the	law	itself	establishes	that	these	associations	have	this	role?	Well,	 it	 has	 been	 agreed	 between	 CatSalut	 and	 these	 associations.	 The	instruction	[10/2012]	simply	says	that	these	people	without	papers	will	be	attended;	that’s	what	CatSalut	says	[...]	but	the	procedure	of	how	we	apply	this	is	now	that	these	associations	are	doing	it	(bcnA08).			It	is	important	to	emphasise	that	here	‘without	papers’	refers	to	the	lack	of	a	patients	means	of	identification,	not	the	‘illegality’	of	his	or	her	residence,	which	per	se	does	not	hinder	their	inclusion	into	the	mainstream	system,	as	the	same	interviewee	later	clarified:		For	me,	 the	undocumented	 are	 those	who	come	by	boat	 [‘en	patera’]	with	what	they	have	on	them,	with	no	identification	or	anything,	and	these	come	
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through	the	associations.	But	those	who	came	by	plane	[i.e.	on	a	tourist	visa,	which	they	overstay]	and	have	a	passport	...	I	can	attend	them	and	process	their	application	without	any	problem	(bcnA08).		More	specifically,	in	2015	CatSalut	signed	an	agreement	with	the	Red	Cross,	which	empowers	the	organisation	to	certify	–	in	cases	of	exceptional	vulnerability	and	for	the	 sole	 purpose	 of	 issuing	 a	 health	 card	 –	 that	 someone	 is	 residing	 within	 a	municipality	 of	 Catalonia	 even	 though	 s/he	 is	 not	 officially	 registered	 (La	
Vanguardia,	2015).	For	CatSalut’s	client	relations	manager,	this	was	a	step	that	“has	helped	us	to	close	that	little	gap	that	had	been	left	unresolved	[by	the	law],	because	obviously	 it	was	 not	 the	 fault	 of	 these	 persons	 that	 in	 some	municipalities	 they	wouldn’t	 allow	 them	 to	 register	 [without	official	 proof	 of	 address,	 for	 example]”	(bcnA17).		Also	 the	 representative	 of	 Salud	 y	 Familia	 mentioned	 that	 associations	 like	 this	regularly	contact	CatSalut	on	behalf	of	vulnerable	patients	to	ensure	that	they	are	not	charged	for	any	treatment	received	in	a	hospital	(bcnA02).	At	the	same	time,	and	even	 though	 these	 organisations	 do	 not	 perceive	 it	 as	 their	 role	 to	 provide	complementary	 services,	 they	 are	 sometimes	 seen	 as	 a	 last	 resort	where	 public	provision	reaches	its	limits,	as	the	administrator	of	a	CAP	suggested:		Where	[CatSalut]	denies	a	specialised	treatment	that	a	person	needs	but	that	is	not	urgent	...	well,	we	send	them	there,	to	see	if	they	...	because	there	are	doctors	who	are	volunteers	and	such	...	and	so	they	can	sometimes	provide	this	[...]	to	this	type	of	people	(bcnA13).	Overall,	however,	the	most	usual	and	crucial	function	of	the	Third	Sector	in	the	case	of	 Barcelona	 is	 the	 facilitation	 of	 access	 to	 mainstream	 services,	 often	 by	accompanying	vulnerable	individuals	to	the	hospital	or	health	centre.	Several	of	my	interviewees	have	noted	that	without	the	help	of	a	friend	or	support	group,	many	migrants	in	irregular	situations	would	not	be	receiving	the	care	they	are	entitled	to.	In	 some	 cases,	 this	 facilitation	works	 through	 personal	 contacts	 that	NGOs	 have	established	with	individual	doctors	(or	reception	staff),	as	the	experience	of	a	19-year-old	migrant	from	Gambia	demonstrates:		When	I	didn’t	have	my	health	card,	in	the	flat	where	I	was	staying	they	[the	NGO	which	provided	the	flat]	had	some	contact	with	a	doctor	at	[a	particular	CAP],	and	so	I	went	there	to	do	an	analysis	[…]	and	it	was	before	I	had	the	three	months	of	local	registration.	[Interviewer:	So,	it	is	known	that	(this	CAP)	
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is	a	place	where	you	can	go	even	without	a	health	card?]		Well,	you	cannot	go	alone.	Alone	not,	my	[social	worker]	took	me	there	but	if	I	would	have	 gone	 alone…	no.	 If	 someone	 is	with	 you	or	 anyone	 has	 any	contact,	then	they	can	call	and	[…it	will	work]	(bcnB02).			Of	 the	 numerous	 humanitarian,	 community	 and	 migrant	 organisations	 and	initiatives	that	are	active	(and	usually	based)	in	London,	one	particularly	stands	out	in	 the	 area	 of	 health:	Doctors	 of	 the	World	 (DOTW)	UK	 has	 for	many	 years	 been	operating	a	drop-in	clinic	in	East-London	(run	by	volunteer	doctors	and	nurses),	an	advice	line	for	people	experiencing	difficulties	registering	with	GPs,	and	a	nation-wide	advocacy	programme	dedicated	to	the	promotion	of	equal	rights	to	healthcare.	Since	December	2014,	DOTW	is	also	running	a	second	clinic	in	Hackney,	which	was	commissioned	 and	 funded	 (initially	 as	 a	 six-month	 pilot	 scheme)	 by	 the	 City	 &	
Hackney	Clinical	Commissioning	Group	(CCG).	In	a	press	release	the	local	NHS	body	confirmed	 that	 “Doctors	 of	 the	World	 received	 £50,000	 to	 provide	 support	 and	advocacy	for	patients	in	vulnerable	situations	in	Hackney,	making	sure	they	are	able	to	register	with	a	GP	and	overcome	other	barriers	to	healthcare”	(City	&	Hackney	CCG,	2015).	What	it	did	not	mention	is	that	for	roughly	70	per	cent	of	the	persons	that	DOTW	receive	–	including	many	pregnant	women	and	other	medically	urgent	cases	–	the	barrier	is	their	immigration	status.		In	 practice	 it	 can	 often	 only	 be	 overcome	 by	 volunteers	 doing	 “a	 lot	 of	 work	 to	persuade	people	that	[going	to	a	doctor]	is	the	right	thing	to	do	and	that	it’s	safe,	or	at	 least	 likely	 to	 be	 safe”,	 as	 the	 organisation’s	 programme	 director	 told	 me	(lonA03).	The	volunteers	I	interviewed	did	not	perceive	this	work	as	a	political	act	or	even	statement,	because	“the	law	says	that	they	can	be	linked	in	with	a	GP,	so	we	are	just…	I	don’t	want	to	say	enforcing	the	law…	but	we	are	kind	of	just	taking	what’s	already	laid	out	and	just	applying	it”	(lonA12).	Also	here,	the	aim	is	thus	not	to	set	up	a	parallel	system	for	a	certain	group	of	people	but	to	direct	them	to	mainstream	care,	 which	 according	 to	 one	 nurse	 who	 regularly	 volunteers	 for	 DOTW	 often	requires	individual	solutions,	since		barely	 any	 of	 the	 patients	 we	 see	 in	 this	 clinic	 have	 photographic	identification	[...],	but	doctors’	surgeries	normally	need	that	[...].	So	we	do	a	lot	 of	 negotiating	 here	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 trying	 to	 provide	 letters	 for	 proof	 of	identification	and	address,	and	some	GPs	accept	that	and	are	very	kind,	and	
		
135	
others	make	a	bit	of	a	fuss	(lonA13).	Her	experience	reflects	an	important	difference	between	the	two	environments	in	terms	of	how	Third	Sector	organisations	relate	to	and	collaborate	with	mainstream	services	 even	 though	 in	 both	 contexts	 they	 fulfil	 a	 similar	 function.	Whereas	 in	Catalonia	 their	 mediating	 role	 has	 largely	 been	 formalised	 through	 official	agreements,	in	the	UK	it	seems	to	work	in	a	rather	ad-hoc	manner	and	thus	again	hinges	on	the	willingness	of	individual	healthcare	staff	to	accept	it.		The	 empirical	 data	 I	 presented	 so	 far	 allows	 to	 draw	 some	 general	 conclusions:	firstly,	 the	 nature	 of	 public	 healthcare	 inevitably	 leaves	 significant	 scope	 for	individual	 discretion;	 secondly,	 every	 patient	 is	 automatically	 subjected	 to	 such	discretion,	which	can	have	exclusionary	as	well	as	inclusionary	effects;	and	thirdly,	this	 discretion	 becomes	 problematic	 where	 it	 is	 not	 just	 based	 on	 medical	indications	but	also	the	(il)legality	of	the	patients’	residence	in	a	given	state.	In	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	I	will	summarise	my	findings	and	visualise	the	various	positions	 that	 different	 kinds	 of	 healthcare	 workers	 in	 London	 and	 Barcelona	occupy	in	relation	to	the	respective	immigration	regimes.			
5.4. Healthcare	workers	becoming	border	guards?	The	positions	of	various	
organisational	roles	vis-à-vis	immigration	control	and	enforcement	The	initial	idea	behind	the	framework	I	have	developed	for	my	analysis	of	the	micro-
management	of	migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	was	that	individual	actors	and	the	roles	they	play	within	a	particular	organisational	field	could	be	differentiated	and	 compared	 according	 to	 their	 specific	position	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 immigration	regime.	One	of	the	aims	was	to	thereby	visualise	the	different	kinds	of	their	being	or	becoming	implicated	in	immigration	control	and/or	enforcement	efforts.	Figure	5	shows	the	results	of	this	exercise	for	the	area	of	healthcare,	based	on	the	empirical	findings	presented	in	this	chapter.				
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 									Each	 of	 the	 six	 rectangles	 represents	 one	 of	 the	 three	 role-categories	 –	
administrators,	(medical)	professionals	and	managers	of	irregularity	–	for	one	of	the	two	environments.	This	enables	comparison	between	different	kinds	of	roles	in	the	same	 context	 as	 well	 as	 similar	 roles	 across	 contexts.	 Their	 position	 within	 (or	between)	the	four	sectors	of	the	diagram	indicates	whether	or	not	they	are	formally	required	or	generally	expected	to	know	(and	thus	somehow	check)	the	immigration	status	of	a	patient	and/or	to	tell	the	immigration	authorities	if	they	thereby	find	out	(or	 otherwise	 suspect)	 that	 someone	 is	 in	 an	 irregular	 situation.	 Their	 relative	position	to	each	other	thereby	reflects	minor	variations	in	terms	of	how	concrete	and	compelling	these	rules	or	expectations	are	in	everyday	practice,	according	to	the	perceptions	and	reported	experiences	of	my	interviewees.		Both	in	London	and	Barcelona,	administrators	of	healthcare	are	generally	expected	to	(at	least	try	to)	find	out	the	immigration	status	of	a	patient	who	wants	to	register.	Although	it	is	not	their	primary	role	to	systematically	‘check	passports’,	they	need	to	do	so	in	order	to	establish	a	patient’s	identity	and	eligibility	for	publicly	funded	services.	Since	they	will	not	normally	convey	this	information	to	the	immigration	authority	 they	are	placed	 in	sector	 ‘C’	of	 the	 framework.	That	 those	 in	Barcelona	appear	further	to	the	right	thereby	reflects	two	aspects:	their	stronger	awareness	
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Figure	5:	The	positions	of	different	categories	of	healthcare	workers	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity	and	its	control.		
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that	they	cannot	‘force’	patients	to	actually	prove	their	immigration	status;	and	the	fact	that	irregularity	generally	constitutes	less	of	a	barrier	to	registration.	That	those	in	 London	 are	 closer	 to	 sector	 ‘A’	 reflects	 the	 (not	 completely	 unfounded)	 fear	among	irregular	migrants	themselves	that	dealing	with	healthcare	administrators	might	trigger	immigration	enforcement.		Healthcare	 professionals	 working	 in	 London	 and	 Barcelona	 share	 the	 same	‘deontological	 code’	 and	 values,	 and	 thus	 a	 strong	 conviction	 that	 immigration	control	is	not	part	of	their	job.	They	are	generally	shielded	from	most	gatekeeping	functions	and	are	not	expected	 to	 check	 the	eligibility	or	documentation	of	 their	patients	 themselves.	Their	work	 requires	higher	 standards	of	 confidentiality	and	data	protection,	which	explicitly	prohibit	them	to	pass	any	personal	information	of	their	patients	to	other	agencies,	unless	they	have	the	patient’s	consent.	In	neither	of	the	two	cities	are	they	 formally	required	to	know	 the	 immigration	status	of	 their	patients,	 or	 to	 tell	 the	 relevant	 authorities	 if	 they	 happen	 to	 discover	 their	irregularity.	 They	 are	 thus	 both	 placed	 in	 sector	 ‘D’,	 whereby	 professionals	 in	London	are	 somewhat	 closer	 to	 sector	 ‘C’	 –	 since	 they	 sometimes	 (have	 to)	 take	immigration	status	into	account	when	deciding	which	kind	of	treatment	to	offer;	as	well	as	sector	‘B’	–	since	they	also	seem	more	likely	to	feel	compelled	to	share	this	information	with	the	relevant	authorities.		In	 both	 environments	 a	 certain	 management	 of	 irregularity	 becomes	 necessary	because	of	how	the	rules	and	systems	for	their	implementation	are	set	up,	which	creates	 the	 need	 for	 specific	 personnel.	 These	managers	 of	 irregularity	 are	 (per	definition)	concerned	with	the	immigration	situation	of	the	people	whose	cases	they	deal	with,	which	is	why	they	appear	on	the	left	side	of	the	diagram.	In	Barcelona,	the	special	commission	that	used	to	manage	irregular	migrants’	exceptional	access	to	secondary	care	was	not	linked	to	the	immigration	authority	and	its	decisions	were	primarily	based	on	a	medical	assessment	of	the	patient’s	situation	rather	than	their	immigration	 status.	Overseas	Visitors	Managers	 in	London,	 in	 contrast,	 also	work	within	the	healthcare	system	but	very	much	according	to	the	logic	of	immigration	control.	While	officially	committed	to	the	recovery	of	NHS	debt,	their	main	activity	is	checking	immigration	statuses.	What	arguably	(and	against	my	interviewee’s	self-perception)	puts	them	into	sector	‘A’,	however,	is	the	mechanism	through	which	the	
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knowledge	of	patients’	outstanding	debt	as	well	as	their	unlawful	presence	in	the	country	 is	 shared	 with	 the	 Home	 Office.	 For	 a	 health	 advocate	 I	 interviewed	 in	London,	 this	 “changes	 everything,	 because	 it’s	 the	 way	 that	 they	 have	 now	discovered	to	penalise”	(lonA08).		Crucial	 for	my	analysis	 is	 that	 the	underlying	policy	not	only	aims	at	disciplining	irregular	 migrants	 themselves	 but	 also	 the	 individual	 street-level	 bureaucrats	through	which	the	state	delivers	its	services.	Seen	from	this	perspective,	it	is	not	a	coincidence	that	healthcare	workers	in	London	increasingly	feel	under	pressure	to	participate	in	the	management	of	migration,	as	the	A&E	nurse	told	me:		Well	 at	 the	 hospital	 I	 don’t	 ask	 my	 patients	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 their	immigration	status,	because	if	you	[find	out],	the	hospital	unfortunately	will	have	 to	act	on	 it	 and	you	will	have	 to	 let	 your	 senior	know	and	 to	 let	 the	hospital	manager	know	[…].	So,	it	is	very	difficult	in	a	hospital	if	you	have	that	
knowledge	and	someone	knows	you	have	that	knowledge	and	then	you	don’t	pass	it	on,	you	know…	I	get	in	trouble	[...]	So	I	 tend	to	not	ask	my	patients	because	I	don’t	want	to…	I	do	not	want	to	know	(lonA13).		On	one	hand,	her	statement	reveals	her	concern	about	potentially	being	‘penalised’	herself	 for	 failing	 to	 disclose	 her	 knowledge	 about	 the	 ‘illegality’	 of	 a	 patient’s	residence	in	the	UK.	On	the	other	hand,	she	also	hints	at	one	way	of	avoiding	such	punishment:	refusing	to	know,	which	generally	appears	to	be	an	important	mode	of	resistance	against	these	developments.	At	the	same	time,	the	possibility	of	refusing	
to	know	 is	also	at	 the	centre	of	current	debates	within	the	UK	educational	sector	about	whether	or	not	schools	should	collect	information	of	their	pupils’	country	of	birth	and	nationality,	which	I	will	discuss	at	the	beginning	of	the	next	chapter.		 	
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6. Managing	irregularity	through	the	provision	of	public	
education	Similar	to	primary	healthcare,	the	right	to	receive	education	is	safeguarded	under	numerous	human	rights	instruments47	and	although	generally	limited	to	persons	of	school	age	applies	irrespectively	of	citizenship	and	immigration	status	(UNCESCR,	2003).	 The	 corresponding	 legal	 frameworks	 regulating	 the	 public	 provision	 of	education,	however,	can	vary	significantly	between	different	national	but	also	local	contexts,	and	their	inclusiveness	often	depends	on	the	particular	kind	and	level	of	education.	Importantly,	and	in	addition	to	being	a	fundamental	right,	education	also	constitutes	“the	primary	vehicle	by	which	economically	and	socially	marginalized	adults	 and	 children	 can	 lift	 themselves	 out	 of	 poverty	 and	 obtain	 the	 means	 to	participate	 fully	 in	 their	 communities“	 (UNCESCR,	 2003,	 p.7).	 Seen	 from	 this	perspective,	 public	 education	 is	 thus	 also	 intrinsically	 linked	 to	 common	understandings	of	social	and	economic	integration.		Political	debates	and	struggles	around	irregular	migrants’	access	to	education	have	recently	been	attributed	an	important	local	dimension	but	continue	to	be	portrayed	as	being	primarily	about	human	rights	(Lundberg	&	Strange,	2016).	Here	I	am	going	to	show	that	they	are	not	just	struggles	over	irregular	migrants'	rights,	but	also	their	very	possibilities	to	‘integrate	into	society’48	–	a	process	that	at	least	officially	still	tends	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 largely	 contingent	 on	 legal	 status.	 According	 to	 the	experience	of	Catherine	Gladwell,	 the	director	of	 the	Refugee	Support	Network49,	education	plays	a	crucial	role	as	a	‘normalising	routine’	for	many	families	who	are	waiting	to	be	recognised	as	refugees	or	whose	legal	status	is	otherwise	in	dispute.	Their	children’s	regular	school	attendance	not	only	structures	their	day	and	week	but	also	 constitutes	one	of	 the	 first	points	of	contact	with	other	members	of	 the	community	as	well	as	many	of	the	host	state’s	institutions.	It	thus	not	only	provides	a	source	of	hope	and	belonging,	but	also	official	prove	of	 the	 family’s	continuous																																																									47	Including	Art.	13	of	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	(ICESCR),	ratified	by	both	Spain	and	the	UK	(in	1977	and	1976,	respectively).	48	I	am	aware	of	the	conceptual	problems	surrounding	the	idea	of	(immigrant)	‘integration’,	which	is	best	understood	as	the	sum	of	social	practices	and	processes	through	which	newcomers	in	general	and	largely	independent	of	their	administrative	status	gradually	become	part	of	and	accepted	by	the	community	they	have	come	to	live	in	(cf.	Penninx	&	Garcés-Mascareñas,	2015).	49	Speaking	at	the	Conference	‘Precarious	Citizenship:	Young	people	who	are	undocumented,	separated	and	settled	in	the	UK’,	held	on	1	June	2016	at	Birkbeck	College,	University	of	London.	
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presence	in	the	country.	For	Strange	&	Lundberg	(2014,	p.201),	“[s]chool	is	both	a	‘border’	by	which	undocumented	child	migrants	are	excluded	or	 included	within	society,	but	also	where	society	can	make	itself	felt	by	the	individual	child	migrant”	and	 arguably	 also	 their	 parents	 or	 even	 extended	 family.	 Both	 as	 social	environments	 and	 bureaucratic	 institutions,	 schools	 and	 other	 educational	establishments	can	thus	significantly	shape	(irregular)	migrants’	perception	of	and	(future)	position	within	the	host	society.		Not	only	is	education	not	just	about	learning,	it	is	also	not	necessarily	about	children.	Creating	opportunities	(and	often	even	obligations)	for	adult	migrants	to	learn	the	local	 language	 and	 acquire	 or	 strengthen	 specific	 skills	 is	 generally	 seen	 as	indispensable	for	their	‘successful	integration’,	particularly	into	the	labour	market.	While	 such	measures	 obviously	 target	 and	 are	 often	 limited	 to	 those	 foreigners	holding	a	legal	residence	status,	it	is	the	situation	of	irregular	migrants	in	particular	that	 highlights	what	 several	 authors	have	 identified	 as	 an	 outright	 contradiction	between	government	approaches	toward	education	on	one	hand,	and	immigration	on	the	other	(Lundberg	&	Strange,	2016;	Sigona	&	Hughes,	2012;	Arnot	et	al.,	2009).	While	the	former	necessarily	seek	to	foster	equality	and	social	inclusion,	the	latter	–	especially	where	targeting	irregular	migrants	–	explicitly	aim	at	exclusion.		In	this	chapter	I	will	show	how	both,	the	centrality	of	education	for	local	integration	outcomes	and	the	understanding	of	education	in	terms	of	preparing	young	people	or	newcomers	for	gainful	employment,	can	bolster	arguments	for	the	exclusion	of	irregular	migrants	from	educational	opportunities.	I	will	thereby	 follow	the	same	structure	as	the	previous	(and	subsequent)	chapter.			
6.1. Between	human	rights	and	unwanted	integration:	Ambivalent	legal-
political	contexts	for	the	provision	of	public	education	to	irregular	
migrants		In	May	2016	the	UK	Department	 for	Education	(DfE)	announced	plans	to	 include	information	 about	 pupils’	 nationality	 and	 country	 of	 birth	 in	 the	 National	 Pupil	Database	(NPD).	The	NPD	had	been	introduced	in	2013	to	provide	a	comprehensive	“evidence	base	for	the	education	sector”,	whereby	data	can	also	be	shared	with	third	
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parties	 “for	 the	purpose	of	 promoting	 the	 education	 or	well-being	 of	 children	 in	England”	 (Department	 for	Education,	2015a,	p.4).	 In	practice,	 this	means	 that	 all	schools	and	colleges	across	England	are	now	required	to	request	this	data	from	the	pupils’	parents	or	guardians,	who	 in	 turn	have	been	 encouraged	by	 several	data	protection	 and	 human	 rights	 campaigns50 	to	 make	 use	 of	 their	 right	 to	 refuse	providing	such	information	(Bhattacharyya,	2016;	Gayle,	2016).		Both	the	government’s	official	justification	and	the	DfE’s	specific	guidelines	on	how	schools	should	implement	the	new	requirement	are	rather	vague:	According	to	the	latter,	“[t]he	country	of	birth	would	be	expected	to	appear	on	[…]	the	child’s	birth	certificate	or	passport	[…,	but]	there	is	no	requirement	for	the	school	to	request,	or	see,	a	copy	of	the	birth	certificate	or	passport”	(Department	for	Education,	2016b,	p.64).	The	government	claims	that	obtaining	this	information	will	help	schools	to	better	 assess	 and	 address	 “additional	 educational	 challenges”	 brought	 about	 by	immigration	 (ibid.)	 but	 has	 failed	 to	 explain	 how	 pupils’	 country	 of	 birth	 or	nationality	specifically	relate	 to	 their	educational	needs	or	attainment,	given	that	their	English	language	proficiency	is	already	being	recorded	separately.	Critics	are	concerned	that	the	newly	added	information	might	instead	be	used	for	the	purpose	of	 immigration	 control	 rather	 than	 promoting	 schools’	 or	 individual	 pupils’	educational	achievements.		This	development	comes	about	a	year	after	a	former	secretary	of	state	for	education	had	expressed	a	suspicion	that	the	attractiveness	and	accessibility	of	British	public	schools	 were	 to	 blame	 for	 what	 she	 called	 ‘education	 tourism’,	 and	 therefore	ordered	 an	 official	 investigation	 of	 the	 impact	 that	 immigration	 has	 on	 the	educational	system	(Ross,	2015).	Already	in	March	2013,	not	long	after	Theresa	May	had	first	announced	the	government’s	‘hostile	environment’	approach	to	irregular	migration,	a	series	of	 leaked	 internal	 emails	 from	several	DfE	officials	revealed	a	proposal	elaborated	by	the	 Inter-Ministerial	Group	on	Migrants’	Access	 to	Benefits	
and	 Public	 Services	 regarding	 the	 possibility	 of	 requiring	 schools	 to	 check	 the	immigration	 status	 of	 prospective	 pupils	 as	 part	 of	 their	 standard	 admissions	
																																																								50	See	for	example	Against	Borders	for	Children:	http://www.schoolsabc.net/;	or	
#BoycottSchoolCensus:	https://twitter.com/hashtag/BoycottSchoolCensus/	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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procedure,	as	reported	by	The	Guardian	(Malik	&	Walker,	2013).		Following	 widespread	 criticism,	 including	 from	 professional	 bodies	 like	 the	
National	Union	of	Teachers	(NUT),	and	given	the	government’s	awareness	that	an	outright	 exclusion	 of	 irregular	 migrant	 children	 from	 school	 would	 breach	 its	obligations	under	human	rights	law,	the	plans	were	quickly	abandoned,	and	their	concreteness	denied	by	high-ranking	government	officials	 including	Theresa	May	herself	 (ibid.).	 Since	 then,	while	 the	sphere	of	higher	education	became	a	 central	battleground	 of	 the	 government’s	 ‘fight	 against	 illegal	 immigration’,	 the	 issue	 of	irregularity	 has	 not	 featured	 very	 prominently	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 compulsory	education.	Rather	than	on	the	basis	of	administrative	status,	the	effects	of	past	and	present	immigration	on	primary	and	secondary	schools	and	school	communities	are	being	discussed	in	terms	of	growing	numbers	of	pupils	whose	first	language	is	not	English	or	whose	cultural	background	otherwise	differs	from	that	of	their	 ‘native’	peers.		Also	in	the	Catalan	context,	the	sharp	increase	of	immigration	during	the	first	half	of	the	2000s	has	recently	been	discussed	with	reference	to	its	impact	on	the	education	sector.	 For	 example,	 a	 former	 Catalan	 education	 minister	 identified	 the	 large	number	of	foreign	students	enrolled	in	Catalan	schools	as	one	of	the	main	causes	for	the	 poor	 results	 obtained	 in	 the	 OECD's	 Programme	 for	 International	 Student	Assessment	(PISA)	of	2013	(Ibáñez,	2015).	Similar	views	were	also	common	among	the	professionals	I	spoke	to,	and	whose	day-to-day	work	directly	exposes	them	to	this	 increasing	diversity.	The	head	 teacher	of	 a	primary	 school	 located	 in	one	of	Barcelona’s	most	ethnically	diverse	areas	put	it	this	way:		At	 this	moment,	and	 it	constantly	changes	because	we	enrol	new	students	almost	every	day,	we	have	about	28	different	countries	[of	origin]	and	17	or	18	different	languages.	So,	it's	almost	like	if	we	were	the	United	Nations.	[…]	But	they	progressively	develop	more	and	more	of	a	relationship,	because	you	also	 have	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that	 [initially],	 depending	 on	 their	 culture,	 for	example	 the	 fathers	 don’t	 want	 to	 have	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 the	 kids’	education	and	it’s	the	mother	who	is	responsible.	Or	the	fact	that	for	example	the	[school]	director	is	a	man...	also	helps	sometimes.	If	I	were	a	woman,	it	would	not	be	the	same.	But	with	the	help	of	 intercultural	mediators	 it	has	changed	a	lot,	it	is	changing	a	lot,	and	to	the	better	(bcnA25).		While	 such	 accounts	 portray	 the	 school	 as	 a	 site	 where	 the	 societal	 impact	 of	immigration	 is	 felt	 more	 strongly	 than	 in	 other	 spheres,	 they	 also	 highlight	 its	
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importance	as	a	place	where	integration	actually	happens	and	is	actively	promoted	on	 a	 daily	 basis.	Many	 of	my	 interviewees	 stressed	 the	 crucial	 role	 that	 schools	themselves,	as	 institutions,	can	thereby	play	 for	 the	 integration	of	newcomers,	as	reflected	 in	 the	 following	 statement	 of	 another	 head	 teacher	 I	 interviewed	 in	Barcelona:	It	is	here,	in	school,	that	children	spend	the	most	hours,	and	therefore	it	is	the	first	arena	and	context	where	they	familiarise,	right?	And	if	they	come	from	another	country	and	arrive	here,	it	is	where	the	protocol	of	reception	has	to	be	most	precise	and	as	detailed	as	possible,	because	it	is	the	first	place	to	which	they	come	and	where	they	are	received	(bcnA30).		The	question	I	am	interested	in	here	is	to	what	extent	this	 ‘protocol	of	reception’	involves	taking	into	account	the	administrative	status	that	the	national	immigration	regime	assigns	to	all	foreign	nationals	–	including	children	–	present	on	the	territory.	At	 least	within	 the	 early	 school	 environment,	 the	 equal	 right	 to	 basic	 education	should	 render	 differences	 in	 immigration,	 citizenship	 or	 economic	 status	 largely	irrelevant,	 while	 other	 categories	 such	 as	 age,	 intellect,	 motivation	 or	(mis)behaviour	tend	to	be	more	important	than	they	are	in	many	other	institutional	contexts	and	spheres	social	interaction.		Gonzales’	(2015,	p.13)	influential	study	of	migrant	irregularity	within	and	vis-à-vis	the	US	 education	 system	has	 shown	 that	 in	 shaping	 “the	 	 parameters	 	 of	 	 social		membership”	and	controlling	access	to	scarce	resources,	schools	tend	to	“make	their	own	decisions	about	deservingness,	 setting	 terms	of	 their	own	 for	 inclusion	and	exclusion”.	 The	 sphere	 of	 education	 thereby	 fits	 Luhmann’s	 (1982b)	conceptualisation	 of	 a	 functionally	 differentiated	 sub-system	 of	 society,	 within	which	 certain	 logics	 and	 categorisations	 are	 dominant	 while	 others	 –	 although	crucial	for	the	functioning	of	other	sub-systems	–	loose	much	of	their	relevance	and	regulatory	force.	As	such,	the	(ir)regularity	of	pupils’	or	their	parents’	residence	in	the	country	becomes	rather	invisible	within	the	sphere	of	education,	as	the	director	of	the	Department	for	Immigration	and	Interculturality	of	the	Barcelona	City	Council	emphasised:		It’s	not	an	 issue	whether	they	are	 irregular	or	not:	Here,	everyone	goes	to	school.	 Not	 like	 in	 France,	 where	 they	 persecute	 and	 denounce	 the	‘irregulars’…	no,	no.	Here,	 the	school	does	not…	nobody	even	knows.	 It	 is	 a	foreign	child,	an	immigrant,	but	they	[the	school	staff]	do	not	know	if	s/he	
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has	papers	or	not.	Often	this	is	only	discovered	in	high	school,	when	they	plan	the	end-of-course	trip	to	Italy,	for	example,	and	someone	who	had	spent	all	his/her	 life	 in	 the	 school	 says	 ‘no,	 I	 cannot	 go	 because	 I	 don’t	 have	papers'…only	then	they	even	discover	it	(bcnA28).	 What	he	tried	to	present	as	something	quite	particular	is	in	fact	a	characteristic	that	primary	and	secondary	 schools	 in	many	countries	 share:	They	are	 shielded	 from	even	having	to	know	the	immigration	status	of	those	individuals	whose	education	and	wellbeing	is	their	main	responsibility.		Also	in	the	UK	context,	as	a	migrant	youth	practitioner	of	the	Children’s	Society	 in	London	explained	to	me,	it	often	is		only	once	they	turn	18	or	19	that	most	of	their	rights	and	entitlements	are	actually	 affected	 [by	 their	 irregularity],	 because	 generally	 they	 can	 go	through	school.	They	can	go	through	primary	and	secondary,	and	even	6th	form	college,	and	effectively	be	the	same	as	everyone	else	among	their	peers,	but	it’s	when	they	turn	18	that	accessing	services	becomes	an	issue	(lonA16).		This	 rather	 sudden	 shift	 from	 relative	 inclusion	 to	 outright	 exclusion,	 which	accompanies	irregular	migrants’	transition	from	childhood	to	adulthood,	has	been	highlighted	 by	 a	 number	 of	 studies	 documenting	 the	 intersection	 between	irregularity	 and	 youth	 in	 different	 national	 contexts	 (Gonzales,	 2015;	 Gleeson	 &	Gonzales,	2012;	Sigona	&	Hughes,	2012).		Before	I	will	look	at	the	legal	frameworks	that	regulate	access	to	both	compulsory	and	post-compulsory	education	provided	in	London	and	Barcelona,	and	the	specific	barriers	that	irregular	migrants	are	facing	in	both	contexts,	it	is	important	to	recall	the	antagonistic	relationship	between	migrants’	‘integration’	and	their	irregularity:	What	 fundamentally	 distinguishes	 the	 situation	 of	 irregular	 residents	 (and	 their	relation	to	the	state	in	which	they	live)	from	that	of	‘regular’	immigrants	is	that	the	former	are	generally	not	expected	to	integrate	but	instead	explicitly	discouraged	or	even	effectively	barred	from	doing	so	(Schweitzer,	2017).		Compulsory	 schooling	 thereby	 seems	 to	 constitute	 one	 of	 relatively	 few	 public	realms	of	integration	that	remain	explicitly	open	to	them.	For	many	families	in	that	situation	 it	 is	 precisely	 the	 social	 and	 official	 fact	 that	 their	 child	 attends	 a	 local	school,	which	undeniably	“makes	them	part	of	the	society”	(lonA08),	as	a	migrant	rights	advocate	I	interviewed	in	London	put	it.	In	fact,	it	can	even	render	the	whole	
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family	 less	 deportable	 and/or	 strengthen	 their	 claim	 for	 regularisation.	 On	 one	hand,	the	formal	and	personal	relationships	developed	at	school	significantly	count	towards	the	private	and	family	life	that	migrants	in	irregular	situations	must	usually	prove	to	have	established	when	they	apply	 for	regularisation.	On	the	other	hand,	being	part	of	a	school	community	also	tends	to	boost	popular	support	for	campaigns	against	a	particular	family’s	deportation,	as	a	representative	of	the	London-based	advocacy	group	Right	to	Remain	explained	to	me:		Schools	and	colleges	can	be	very	supportive	if	it’s	a	young	person	that’s	part	of	a	family	that	is	being	removed	or	at	risk	[of	deportation].	I	think	schools	struggle	 sometimes	 though,	 because	 they	 don’t	 know	what	 the	 rules	 are,	what	they	have	to	tell	the	Home	Office,	and	what	the	Home	Office	is	allowed	to	 ask	 for	 and	 do.	 But	 occasionally	 a	 school	 has	 come	 out	 in	 support	 of	somebody	and	that	is	really	helpful	[for	the	success	of	a	campaign]	(lonA01).		Access	to	education	and	training	certainly	also	represents	a	crucial	means	for	the	‘integration’	of	adults	without	children.	This	is	particularly	true	for	opportunities	to	increase	 language	 proficiency	 and	 acquire	 professional	 skills	 through	 vocational	training.	 Both	 elements	 feature	 prominently	 within	 official	 integration	 policy	agendas	targeting	certain	regular	migrants	while	usually	excluding	their	irregular	counterparts.	 Many	 of	 the	 education	 workers	 I	 interviewed	 in	 London	 and	Barcelona	 highlighted	 their	 responsibility	 for	 facilitating	 all	 foreign	 students’	successful	integration	and	expressed	their	reluctance	to	thereby	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	immigration	status.	The	head	of	studies	of	an	adult	education	centre	located	in	a	central	district	of	Barcelona	put	it	this	way:		As	a	school	we	understand…	and	as	a	teacher	I	understand	that	our	role	is	to	give	them	a	course	and	thus	help	them	to	understand	and	speak	the	language,	whether	Catalan	or	Spanish,	and	that	this	will	link	them	more	and	better	to	the	neighbourhood	and	the	city	and	country	[…]	But	we	do	this	from	our	point	
of	view	as	a	school.	What	we	do	is	[…]	[giving	the	student]	more	possibilities	to	integrate	better,	because	I	believe	this	is	our	job.	Another	one	I	don’t	think	we	have	in	this	respect	(bcnA26).		This	 perspective,	 however,	 even	 though	 very	 common	 among	 the	 teaching	professionals	I	interviewed	in	both	cities,	does	not	tell	the	whole	story.	Rather,	it	contrasts	some	of	the	experiences	reported	by	migrants	and	their	advocates,	who	also	mentioned	significant	legal	and/or	administrative	barriers	complicating	their	access,	particularly	to	further	education	and	training.	While	they	usually	accepted	
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that	given	their	status	they	could	not	expect	 the	host	state	 to	 financially	support	their	education,	they	also	perceived	these	obstacles	as	yet	another	way	of	trying	to	keep	them	out	or	lock	them	into	a	marginal	position.	The	following	accounts	of	a	32-year-old	Bolivian	citizen	living	and	working	in	London	since	2004	(1),	and	a	woman	aged	27	who	came	to	Barcelona	in	2012	in	order	to	support	her	family	back	in	rural	Morocco	(2),	are	good	examples:		(1)	Before,	it	was	still	possible	to	study	but	it	was	very	expensive.	Now,	you	cannot	study	anything	anymore,	not	even	English.	I	tried	to	go	and	find	out,	but	they	asked	me	for	my	passport	and	[legal]	residence	in	the	country	and	all	that.	They	make	it	more	and	more	complicated	[to	access	education]	and	close	all	the	doors	for	us	to	stay	(lonB05).			(2)	Without	my	papers…	I	cannot	do	anything.	The	main	thing	is	the	papers:	to	be	able	to	find	some	work,	to	study,	to	do	courses	–	because	there	are	also	many	courses	that	 if	you	don’t	have	papers	you	cannot	do	them,	[…]	like	 I	want	to	become	a	nurse	or	[learn]	another	profession...	I	really	want	to	do	that,	 but	 I...	 I	 am…	 [makes	 a	 gesture	 indicating	 that	 her	 hands	 are	 tied].	 I	cannot	do	anything	(bcnB05).		Rather	than	leading	to	absolute	exclusion,	however,	these	limitations	are	part	and	parcel	of	a	legal-political	arrangement	that	channels	irregular	migrant	workers	into	a	 few	 specific	 segments	 of	 the	 labour	 market,	 some	 of	 which	 have	 become	structurally	 dependent	 on	 this	 constant	 supply	 of	 cheap	 and	 disposable	 labour	(Portes,	 1978;	 Calavita,	 2003;	 De	 Genova,	 2002;	 Mezzadra	 &	 Neilson,	 2013).	Together	with	the	administrative	hurdles	that	migrants	often	face	when	trying	to	obtain	formal	recognition	of	the	qualifications	and	skills	they	acquired	before	their	immigration,	their	limited	access	to	training	also	helps	perpetuating	the	image	of	a	predominantly	poor	and	uneducated	migrant	population	 that	 is	 likely	 to	become	dependent	 on	 state	 benefits.	 The	 condition	 of	 irregularity	 further	 reinforces	 this	effect,	as	one	of	my	interviewees	knew	from	her	experience	working	as	an	educator	for	the	CEPAIM	Foundation	in	Barcelona:		Everything	you	have	learned	during	your	life	is	not	being	taken	into	account	[…]	so	you	start	from	zero	and	are	completely	stigmatised…	Why?	Because	here	 immigrants	 generally	 occupy	 very	 concrete	 sectors	 of	 the	 labour	market,	 those	 that	 [Spanish	 citizens]	 like	 the	 least;	 and	 if	 you	 don’t	 have	papers	[…]	you	will	occupy	the	niches	that	are	even	more	hidden.	And	that	reinforces	the	image	of	the	immigrant	who	is	untrained	and	doesn’t	have	any	education…	Why?	Because	otherwise	he	wouldn’t	be	collecting	scrap	metal,	she	wouldn’t	be	taking	care	of	some	elderly	person…	But	the	thing	is	that	they	
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are	not	given	the	possibility	to	do	something	else,	right?	So,	all	this	is	like	a	circuit	that	reinforces	and	stigmatises	and	excludes	(bcnA31).		Any	debate	about	whether	to	promote,	 facilitate,	obstruct	or	even	deny	access	to	certain	kinds	of	education	for	certain	categories	of	people	is	always	also	a	debate	about	 which	 social	 and	 economic	 position	 they	 should	 be	 assigned	 or	 at	 least	allowed	to	occupy	within	society.		So	why	would	 a	 state	 offer	 any	 educational	opportunities	 beyond	 those	 that	 are	protected	by	human	rights	law	to	migrants	in	irregular	situations?	As	I	will	show	in	the	remainder	of	 this	chapter,	part	of	 the	answer	 is	 that	 their	effective	exclusion	would	 require	 various	 kinds	 of	 actors	 within	 the	 education	 sector	 itself	 to	participate	 in	 immigration	 control,	 which	 contradicts	 (some	 of)	 the	 most	fundamental	 values,	 professional	 duties	 and	 dominant	 institutional	 logics	underlying	the	provision	of	public	education.	In	addition,	and	similar	to	healthcare,	the	 latter	 is	 not	 just	 premised	 on	 individual	 rights	 but	 constitutes	 another	‘functional	 imperative’	 of	 the	 state,	 as	 the	 former	 UK	 Department	 for	 Children,	
Schools	and	Families	(2009,	p.5)	recognised	in	a	White	Paper	outlining	its	vision	of	the	country’s	future	public	education	system:		Ensuring	every	child	enjoys	their	childhood,	does	well	at	school	and	turns	18	with	 the	 knowledge,	 skills	 and	 qualifications	 that	will	 give	 them	 the	 best	chance	of	success	in	adult	life	is	not	only	right	for	each	individual	child	and	family,	it	is	also	what	we	must	do	to	secure	the	future	success	of	our	country	
and	society	(emphasis	added).			
6.2. Legal	frameworks,	formal	entitlements	and	practical	barriers	for	
irregular	migrants’	access	to	public	education	provided	in	London	and	
Barcelona	
6.2.1. Access	to	compulsory	education	and	related	services	According	to	both	British	and	Spanish	national	 law,	education	 is	compulsory	and	free	of	charge	for	all	children	of	school	age51	who	reside	in	the	country.	The	rather	subtle	 difference	 is	 that	 Spanish	 legislation	 explicitly	 extends	 this	 right	 and	
																																																								51	Generally	from	the	age	of	five	(in	the	UK)	or	six	(in	Spain)	and	until	16.		
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obligation	to	children	in	irregular	situations52,	whereas	the	legal	framework	in	the	UK	simply	does	not	exclude	 them	 from	 the	general	 entitlement	of	 all	 children	 to	access	primary	and	secondary	education	(Spencer	&	Hughes,	2015).	In	spite	of	their	formal	 entitlement,	 however,	 a	 range	 of	 potential	 barriers	 can	 prevent	 irregular	migrants	 from	 registering	 their	 children	 for	 school	 or	 constrain	 their	 regular	attendance	or	educational	achievement.	These	include	the	inability	to	fulfil	specific	documentary	 requirements	 established	 either	 by	 the	 responsible	 government53,	local	 educational	 authority	 (LEA)	 or	 individual	 school;	 limitations	 on	 access	 to	funding	for	extra-curricular	expenses	like	transport,	books	or	school	meals;	and	the	fear	that	dealing	with	the	education	system	might	somehow	reveal	their	irregularity	to	the	immigration	authority.		The	first	contact	with	the	school	administration	usually	happens	in	the	course	of	the	admission	and	enrolment	process.	According	to	Spanish	immigration	law,	education	is	not	only	a	right	but	also	an	obligation	of	all	foreigners	until	the	age	of	sixteen	and	irrespective	of	their	immigration	status,	which	also	puts	a	duty	on	their	parents	to	register	 them	with	a	 local	school.	 In	order	to	be	able	 to	enrol	a	child,	however,	a	number	 of	 documentary	 requirements	 have	 to	 be	 satisfied,	 since	 the	 education	system	generally	 requires	proof	of	 the	parents’	 identity,	 the	age	of	 the	 child,	 the	family	relationship	(or	legal	guardianship)	and	the	place	of	residence.	The	official	documents	that	will	be	requested	include	an	official	ID	(DNI,	NIE	or	passport)	of	the	parents	(as	well	as	the	child,	if	older	than	14)	and	a	copy	of	the	family	register	(‘libro	
de	familia’)	or	other	official	certification	of	their	relationship	to	each	other	and	to	the	child.	In	addition,	schools	will	normally	ask	for	an	official	immunisation	record	of	 the	 child 54 ,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 registration	 certificate	 or	 other	 official	 proof	 of	address55.	The	latter	is	crucial	because	school	places	are	allocated	on	the	basis	of																																																									52	Point	3	of	Article	10	of	Organic	Law	1/1996	on	the	Legal	Protection	of	Minors	establishes	that	all	“foreign	minors	who	are	present	in	Spain	have	the	right	to	education	[…]	under	the	same	conditions	as	Spanish	minors”.		53	In	both	countries	some	of	the	general	admission	procedures	and	funding	rules	vary	between	different	regions	(PICUM,	2011a,	2011b);	I	only	deal	with	those	that	apply	to	England	and	Catalonia,	respectively.	54	Otherwise	they	make	a	referral	to	a	health	centre	in	order	to	establish	the	immunisation	status,	as	a	school	administrator	explained	to	me	in	an	interview	(bcnA24).		55	As	listed	in	an	official	information	sheet	elaborated	by	the	Catalan	Education	Department	and	available	online	in	17	different	languages.	See:	http://xtec.gencat.cat/ca/projectes/alumnatnou/acollida/informacio2	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).	
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residence	 within	 the	 immediate	 vicinity	 or	 predefined	 catchment	 area	 of	 any	particular	school.		The	British	Education	Act	of	1996	establishes	a	comparable	entitlement	along	with	the	 corresponding	duty	of	 every	 local	 (education)	authority	 to	provide	 the	 same	standard	of	primary	and	secondary	education	for	all	persons	who	reside	within	the	area	and	are	either	“of	compulsory	school	age”	or	“of	any	age	above	or	below	that	age	[but]	registered	as	pupils	at	schools	maintained	by	the	authority”56.	This	 last	provision	underlines	the	important	role	and	relative	autonomy	of	individual	schools	and	 LEAs	 in	 establishing	 the	 concrete	 admission	 procedures	 and	 requirements,	which	 can	 thus	 vary	 considerably	 from	one	 school	 or	 local	 authority	 to	 another	(Sigona	 &	 Hughes,	 2012).	 The	 formal	 documentary	 requirements	 that	 parents	always	have	to	fulfil	when	applying	for	a	school	place	in	England,	however,	are	fewer	than	in	the	Catalan	case,	since	they	merely	comprise	official	proof(s)	of	the	family’s	residential	address	and	the	child’s	date	of	birth.		For	 example,	 the	 Hackney	 Learning	 Trust	 (HLT)	 –	 the	 LEA	 responsible	 for	 the	London	Borough	of	Hackney	–	annually	publishes	an	Admission	Guide	for	Parents,	which	lists	three	kinds	of	documents	that	should	accompany	an	application	(usually	made	online)	for	a	place	in	a	Hackney	school:	‘Proof	of	Address’	should	be	provided	in	 the	 form	of	 “a	 copy	of	 either	a	Council	Tax	bill	 or	housing	benefit	 entitlement	letter”	as	well	as	“an	original	utility	bill	received	within	the	last	two	months”,	while	“a	copy	of	either	birth	certificate,	passport	or	medical	card”	must	show	the	child’s	date	of	birth	(Hackney	Learning	Trust,	2014,	p.27).		Other	than	in	Catalonia,	schools	and	LEAs	in	England	are	not	explicitly	required	to	systematically	 request	 and	 collect	 any	 specific	 documentation	 of	 the	 parents’	identity	 that	would	also	 reveal	 their	 citizenship	or	 immigration	status,	 such	as	a	passport.	Accordingly,	when	I	asked	one	of	my	migrant	interviewees	how	she	had	experienced	 registering	 her	 two	 UK-born	 children	 in	 school,	 she	 said	 it	 worked	“without	any	problem;	I	just	needed	a	proof	of	address	and	their	birth	certificates	when	I	registered	them…	they	didn’t	ask	for	anything	else.	Their	status	has	never																																																									56	Under	section	13A	of	the	Education	Act	1996,	available	at:	http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/56/part/I/chapter/III/crossheading/general-functions	(last	accessed	15/12/2017);	
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influenced	[this],	not	at	all"	(lonB04).		Once	allocated	a	place	in	a	particular	school,	however,	the	actual	enrolment	process	will	 usually	 encompass	 an	 initial	 interview	 with	 the	 parents,	 during	 which	 the	school	can	also	request	additional	documents	–	often	including	their	passports	–	and	information	 regarding	 the	 child’s	 previous	 educational	 achievements,	 particular	needs	 or	 GP	 registration	 (Sigona	 &	 Hughes,	 2012).	 Also	 in	 the	 case	 of	 over-subscription,	individual	schools	can	establish	their	own	criteria	according	to	which	they	will	allocate	school	places,	as	long	as	they	do	not	discriminate	on	the	basis	of	race,	religion,	disability	or	other	unlawful	grounds.	In	spite	of	such	legal	safeguards,	this	 leaves	 individual	 schools	 with	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 discretion,	 which	 can	easily	lead	to	disadvantages	for	families	in	an	irregular	situation,	who	are	least	likely	to	 file	 a	 formal	 appeal	 against	 a	 decision	 that	 they	 perceive	 as	 unfair	 or	discriminatory.	 For	 the	 head	 of	 the	HLT’s	 admissions	 department,	 this	 is	 a	 good	reason	why	school	admission,	including	in-year	admission	and	the	setting	of	over-subscription	criteria,	should	be	centralised	at	Council	level57,	as	is	the	case	in	her	Borough:		[In]	our	Borough	you	come	to	a	desk	and	we	coordinate	for	all	the	schools	where	all	the	vacancies	are,	as	up-to-date	as	we	can	be;	[whereas	in]	the	next	Borough	 you	would	 have	 to	 go	 to	 individual	 schools,	 and	 there	 is	 nobody	
regulating	those	individual	schools.	So	yeah,	once	they	realise	that	you	don’t	have	immigration	status	compared	to	the	next	parent	that	comes	in	and	[may	be]	very	well	heeled	and	speaks	fluent	English,	they	could	have	prejudices	there.	[…]		[In	Hackney]	a	school	place	will	be	assigned,	and	only	when	they	go	through	an	 induction	meeting	 in	 detail	 a	 school	 may	 pick	 up	 further	 information	about	immigration	status,	but	before	the	school	place	is	offered	they	are	not	
allowed	to	ask,	and	they	are	not	allowed	to	know;	and	we	personally	wouldn’t	convey	that	 information.	 In	any	of	 the	 forms	that	 they	have	[…]	as	part	of	their	school	admissions	criteria,	they	are	not	allowed	to	ask	questions	like	that	(lonA26).	One	reason	for	individual	schools	to	refuse	irregular	migrant	children	could	be	that	they	do	not	officially	count	towards	the	overall	number	of	children	from	low-income	
																																																								57	She	thereby	also	questioned	the	government’s	current	plans	to	progressively	transform	all	schools	into	independent	state	schools	(so-called	‘Academies’)	that	are	funded	directly	by	central	government	and	operate	with	more	autonomy	and	less	‘interference’	from	the	Local	Council	(Department	for	Education,	2016a).	See	also:	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nicky-morgan-unveils-new-vision-for-the-education-system	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).	
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families.	 The	 latter	 is	 calculated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 pupils’	 eligibility	 for	 free	 school	meals	and	determines	the	amount	of	additional	government	funding,	the	so-called	‘pupil	premium’,	a	school	will	receive	(PICUM,	2011b).		At	least	in	terms	of	school	autonomy	the	situation	in	Hackney	is	similar	to	that	in	Barcelona,	where	the	admission	and	enrolment	process	itself	is	managed	centrally	for	the	whole	municipality.	The	responsible	public	body,	the	Education	Consortium	
of	Barcelona	(‘Consorci	d'Educació	de	Barcelona’,	CEB)	was	established	in	1998	and	precisely	 in	order	to	allow	a	more	effective	coordination	of	all	relevant	 functions	and	responsibilities	 that	are	 formally	shared	between	the	municipal	and	regional	government.	Although	applications	for	admission	can	also	be	made	directly	at	a	local	school	of	the	parents’	choice,	it	is	ultimately	the	responsibility	of	the	CEB	to	check	all	applicants’	personal	information	and	documents.	The	accounts	of	a	head	teacher	(1)	 and	 a	 senior	 CEB	 official	 (2)	 indicate	 how	 this	 reduces	 the	 discretion	 of	individual	school	administrators:	(1)	When	the	students	are	referred	to	us	for	enrolment,	they	already	come	from	the	Consortium,	and	there	they	also	do	the	first	screening	and	will	also	already	inform	us	[about	application	numbers	etc.].	There	is	a	department	dedicated	 to	 directly	 attending	 the	 families,	 which	 is	 where	 all	 the	enrolments	are	formally	dealt	with	[…]	and	from	there	they	are	then	referred	to	the	schools	(bcnA30).			(2)	If	the	school	where	they	go	makes	it	difficult	for	a	family	[to	register	–	‘si	
les	ponen	problemas’],	they	come	to	the	Consortium	and	here	we	sort	it	out.	We	will	call	the	school	and	let	them	know	that	if	there	is	a	free	place	we	are	going	to	refer	the	child	(bcnA29).		While	 this	 arrangement	 thus	 helps	 to	 reduce	 disparities	 regarding	 the	 local	implementation	 of	 the	 rules	 for	 access	 and	 fair	 allocation,	 it	 cannot	 completely	forestall	more	subtle	gate-keeping	mechanisms,	as	a	college	teacher	pointed	out:		I	 know	 of	 schools	 […]	 where	 head	 teachers	 during	 the	 interviews	 with	parents	 told	them	things	 like	 'in	 this	school	we	only	speak	 in	Catalan,	and	your	son	will	have	many	difficulties...'.	They	played	this	card	so	that	 there	would	 be	 fewer	 students	 who	 had	 migrated	 [including]	 people	 without	papers.	It’s	a	mechanism	of	exclusion	(bcnA27).	Another	set	of	barriers	can	arise	where	a	family	needs	additional	financial	assistance	to	 cover	 extra-curricular	 expenses	 such	 as	 learning	 materials,	 school	 meals	 or	transport	to	and	from	school.	In	Catalonia,	the	fact	that	one	or	both	parents	are	in	
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an	irregular	situation	does	not	automatically	exclude	a	child	from	these	provisions.	Instead,	any	family’s	entitlement	to	receive	such	payments	(as	well	as	the	level	of	support)	primarily	depends	on	their	official	income	or	receipt	of	minimum	income	support	 (Consorci	 d’Educació	 de	 Barcelona,	 2015).	 Irregular	 migrants’	 general	exclusion	 from	this	state-level	welfare	provision	thus	 indirectly	complicates	 their	access	to	subsidiary	funding	that	is	provided	locally,	where	it	has	to	be	renegotiated	on	a	case-by-case	basis	(see	sub-section	6.3.1).		In	 the	UK,	 in	 contrast,	 irregular	migrants’	 formal	exclusion	 from	all	 state-funded	benefits	(see	chapter	7)	more	explicitly	extends	into	the	sphere	of	education:	While	accessing	state-funded	education	is	itself	not	considered	a	‘recourse	to	public	funds’,	irregular	migrant	children	are	generally	not	entitled	to	free	school	meals	or	financial	support	 for	 uniforms,	 books	 or	 transport 58 ,	 unless	 their	 parents	 are	 already	supported	 by	 social	 services	 (Sigona	 &	 Hughes,	 2012;	 CORAM,	 2013;	 PICUM,	2011b).	 In	 relation	 to	 school	 meals,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	
Universal	Infant	Free	School	Meals	in	September	2014	extended	this	entitlement	to	every	 child	 up	 to	 the	 age	 of	 seven	 and	 enrolled	 in	 a	 public	 school	 in	 England,	(implicitly)	including	the	children	of	irregular	migrants	(Burns,	2014).		What	migrant	irregularity	is	not	supposed	to	interfere	with,	on	the	contrary	–	and	in	 both	 contexts	 I	 am	 comparing	 –	 is	 the	 detection	 and	 assessment	 of	 learning	difficulties	 or	 any	 other	 Special	 Educational	 Need	 (SEN);	 nor	 the	 access	 to	corresponding	 additional	 support,	 as	 a	 primary	 school	 head	 teacher	 in	 London	specifically	emphasised:		You	know,	immigration	status	is	not	relevant	in	any	sense	as	far	as	the	school	is	concerned.	If	the	child	is	here,	the	family	is	here,	then	they	would	be	entitled	to	any	kind	of	support	or	intervention,	including	those	that	engage	outside	services	like	educational	or	psychological	or	speech	and	language	therapists	or	social	services,	you	know,	immigration	status	wouldn’t	have	any	bearing	on	that	at	all	(lonA28).		While	this	reflects	the	principle	that	every	child	enrolled	in	school	should	be	given	the	same	opportunities	to	learn,	assessing	a	child	as	‘in	need’	of	additional	support	by	the	state	might	even	strengthen	a	family’s	claim	for	regularisation	if	their	stay	in	the	country	is	unlawful.	Conversely,	being	assessed	as	‘not	in	need’	can	render	such																																																									58	Regulated	under	section	509	of	the	Education	Act	1996.		
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family	more	deportable,	since	the	child	could	then	also	go	to	school	 in	a	country	where	such	support	is	unavailable.	Knowledge	of	the	irregularity	of	a	claimant	might	thus	 increase	 the	pressure	on	 those	 individuals	or	 institutions	 that	 are	given	 the	power	(and	discretion)	to	make	such	assessments.		Migrants	 themselves,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 can	 easily	 perceive	 these	 decisions	 as	discrimination,	as	the	above-cited	migrant	mother’s	experience	of	how	the	school	had	dealt	with	her	older	son’s	dyslexia	suggests:			It	has	been	very	difficult	because	I	had	to	fight	a	lot	with	the	school	so	that	they	would	give	me	the	psychological	assessment	for	[my	son].	And	so	far,	no	support	has	been	given	because	the	school,	from	the	beginning,	made	it	clear	to	me	that	even	if	he	has	mild	dyslexia	there	is	no	additional	support	[...].	So	I	 talked	 to	 everyone:	 the	 director	 of	 the	 school,	 the	 director	 of	 Special	Educational	Needs	 and	 they	 told	me	 that	 […]	apparently	 they	 could	not…	because	the	assessment	costs	a	 lot	and	[they]	have	other	cases	with	more	priority	in	the	school…		[Interviewer:]	...do	you	believe	that	your	status	had	an	influence	in	some	way?	Look,	they	don’t	say	it,	because	those	things	are	not	said.	They	don’t	say	it	but...	I	think	that	if	an	English	[person]	goes	to	speak	with	the	director,	s/he	will	have	all	the	support	immediately.	I	feel	it;	it’s	something	you	feel.	And	I	don’t	have	any	complex...	it's	not	that	I	feel	less...	it's	just	realistic.	I	think	that	it	was	difficult	for	that	reason	(lonB04).		Particularly	for	migrants	in	an	irregular	situation,	any	such	dealings	with	the	school	system	 require	 a	 huge	 degree	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 institution	 and	 the	 individual	bureaucrat	 they	 face	 or	 even	 have	 to	 challenge.	 In	 the	 light	 of	 the	 recent	developments	outlined	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	it	is	no	surprise	that	fear	(or	at	least	a	lack	of	trust)	seemed	to	be	more	prevalent	in	London	than	Barcelona,	even	though	schools	and	school	staff	in	both	contexts	are	generally	keen	to	mitigate	such	fears.		The	 latter	 ultimately	 reflects	 schools’	 fundamental	 responsibility	 to	 ensure	 all	pupils’	regular	school	attendance,	as	the	head	of	the	HLT’s	admissions	department	particularly	stressed:		If	the	adults	haven’t	got	immigration	status	or	are	in	a	situation	where	they	are	 not	 feeling	 secure,	 then	 the	 child	 doesn’t	 come	 to	 school	 because	 at	primary	school	age	you	have	to	be	taken	to	school.	[…]	And	here	I	think	the	ethos	 is	 that	 they	 want	 everybody	 to	 come	 to	 school	 and	 they	 want	everybody	 to	 do	 well,	 because	 [otherwise]	 the	 head	 teachers	 are	 under	pressure	(lonA26).	
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Irregular	 migrants’	 uncertainty	 about	 existing	 entitlements	 or	 the	 risk	 that	activating	them	might	reveal	their	irregularity	is	frequently	linked	to	more	or	less	concrete	knowledge	or	fear	in	relation	to	past	or	expected	immigration	enforcement	activities	 by	 police	 or	 other	 authorities.	 Also	 in	 the	 less	 ‘hostile’	 environment	 of	Barcelona	 can	 even	 a	 rather	 vague	perception	 of	 risk	 quite	 easily	 disrupt	 school	attendance,	as	the	experience	of	one	of	my	migrant	interviewees	suggests:		There	are	a	lot	of	other	guys	who	study	with	me,	from	Africa,	from	Pakistan,	who	don’t	have	papers,	and	we	were	told	about	[…]	a	15-day	inspection	of	people	without	papers	 throughout	 the	whole	European	Union,	 to	 look	 for	people	who	don’t	have	papers...	And	so	during	this	time	we	didn’t	go	out	and	we	didn’t	come	to	school	[...]	because	we	were	afraid	(bcnB05).		This	 shows	 that	 fear	 of	 deportation	 can	 easily	 trump	 the	 pursuit	 of	 education,	irrespective	of	whether	it	is	framed	in	terms	of	a	universal	right	or	an	obligation	on	the	part	of	the	parents	or	the	school.	In	the	next	section	I	will	look	at	the	realm	of	post-compulsory	 education,	 where	 both	 legal	 entitlement	 and	 duty	 play	 a	significantly	lesser	role	but	are	not	completely	absent.			
6.2.2. Irregular	migrants’	access	to	post-compulsory	education	and	training	The	 seemingly	 clear-cut	 division	 between	 compulsory	 and	 post-compulsory	education	does	not	neatly	overlap	with	irregular	migrants’	inclusion	and	exclusion	nor	is	it	resistant	to	change	over	time.	Rather,	the	age	until	which	young	people	in	general	 are	 expected	 and	 encouraged	 to	 stay	 in	 full-time	 education	 has	 been	progressively	 increased	 since	 access	 to	 publicly	 funded	 education	 started	 to	 be	recognised	as	a	fundamental	right	of	all	children.	In	the	British	context,	where	this	happened	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 the	 so-called	 ‘education	 leaving	 age’	 is	defined	at	the	regional	level,	and	in	England	it	has	only	recently	been	increased	from	16	to	18.	This	does	not	oblige	young	people	to	stay	in	full-time	education	beyond	their	16th	birthday	but	makes	the	local	authority	responsible	for	ensuring	that	they	are	offered	a	suitable	place	in	post-16	education	or	an	apprenticeship	or	traineeship.	While	 the	 government	 has	 not	 specified	 what	 this	 exactly	 means	 for	 irregular	migrants,	 it	 might	 in	 practice	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 their	 right	 to	education	beyond	compulsory	school	age,	as	the	following	account	of	an	assistant	
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principle	at	a	college	in	Hackney	suggests:		With	the	raised	participation	age	to	18	now,	we	are	yet	to	see	whether	there	is	 any	 guidance	 on	 a	 student’s	 relationship	with	 their	 school	 being	 good	enough	 to	prove	 their	 eligibility	 for	 funding	at	 age	17	 and	18.	We	will	be	testing	that	this	year	[…]	because	if	you	are	under	18	[…]	and	you	are	new	to	the	country	you	are	going	to	have	to	be	able	to	prove,	given	the	rulebooks,	how	you	qualify	 [for	 funding],	which	 is	 fine.	But	anyone	who	had	been	 in	secondary	school	for	five	years	or	has	done	all	11	years	of	schooling,	they	are	entitled,	as	I	understand	it,	to	continue	that	education	(lonA32).		Also	a	legal	and	policy	officer	working	for	an	organisation	called	CORAM	in	London	described	 the	 limit	 of	 young	 irregular	 migrants’	 entitlement	 to	 receive	 public	education	as	rather	vague	but	ultimately	inescapable:		
It	usually	kicks	 in	at	a	certain	point.	 In	our	experience	young	people	often	don’t	realise	that	they	have	any	kind	of	immigration	status	issues	[until]	they	apply	for	a	job	when	they	are	16,	17	or	18,	or	they	apply	to	go	to	university.	It’s	at	that	point	that	they	realise	they	are	not	like	their	friends	[and]	peers…	that	they	can’t	do	what	their	teachers	told	them	they	were	going	to	be	able	to	do	if	they	worked	hard.	Sometimes	that’s	a	kind	of	turning	point	in	their	lives	(lonA10).	In	the	Spanish	context,	this	turning	point	has	shifted	in	2007	following	a	landmark	decision	 of	 the	 Constitutional	 Court.	 It	 declared	 unconstitutional	 a	 clause	 of	 the	immigration	 rules	 that	 until	 then	 had	 limited	 the	 access	 to	 post-compulsory	education	 to	 foreign	minors	who	were	 ‘resident’	 in	Spain59	and	 thus	excluded	all	those	who	 did	 not	 have	 (or	were	 unable	 to	 prove)	 legal	 residence	 rights	 in	 the	country	(PICUM,	2011a).	The	judges	concluded	that:			This	right	of	access	to	non-compulsory	education	for	foreign	minors	is	part	of	 the	 content	of	 the	right	 to	education,	 and	 its	 exercise	may	be	 subject	 to	
requirements	of	merit	and	ability,	but	not	to	other	circumstances	such	as	the	administrative	situation	of	the	minor.60		Before	the	law	was	changed	accordingly,	young	people	in	irregular	situations	had	been	barred	from	accessing	college	(‘Bachillerato’)	and	professional	training,	and	in	many	 cases	 could	 not	 even	 obtain	 the	 official	 certification	 of	 their	 high	 school	leaving	exam	(Morán,	2004).	The	current	law,	in	contrast,	not	only	entitles	them	to	continue	their	education	until	the	age	of	18,	but	also	explicitly	allows	them	to	finish																																																									59	Article	9.3	of	Organic	Law	4/2000	of	January	11.		60	Under	point	8	of	Judgement	236/2007,	full	text	available	online:	http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/6203	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).			
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any	course	they	started	before	turning	18,	 to	obtain	the	corresponding	academic	qualifications,	and	to	benefit	from	public	funding	in	the	same	conditions	as	Spanish	citizens61.		The	exercise	of	these	rights,	however,	can	still	be	obstructed	by	practical	barriers	such	as	the	inability	to	fulfil	the	documentary	requirements	for	college	enrolment	(which	 are	 not	 always	 consistent	 with	 the	 legal	 framework)	 or	 to	 evidence	insufficient	means	to	self-finance	one’s	education;	as	well	as	difficulties	(or	delays)	in	obtaining	official	recognition	of	previous	academic	qualifications	(PICUM,	2011a).	The	latter	is	particularly	important	given	that	selection	for	post-obligatory	studies	primarily	depends	on	previous	qualifications,	as	the	head	of	studies	of	a	public	high	school	in	the	centre	of	Barcelona	highlighted	in	an	interview:			[They]	do	the	pre-registration	online	and	so	we	have	a	list	of	persons	who	obviously	have	 to	have	a	degree	 from	 their	 country	of	origin,	 that	 is,	 they	have	to	have	completed	their	secondary	education	or	done	an	entry	test.	And	based	on	this	previous	degree	and	their	online	application	they	are	ranked	according	to	their	grades	and	then,	well,	from	1	to	30	they	can	be	enrolled,	and	after	that	there	is	the	waiting	list	(bcnA32).		Beyond	 the	 realm	 of	 formal	 education,	 current	 Spanish	 legislation	 also	 gives	irregular	migrants	the	right	to	access	vocational	training	including	temporary	work	placements,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 signed	 agreement	 between	 the	 employer	 and	 the	school,	which	certifies	 that	 the	objective	 is	not	employment	but	 training	(PICUM,	2011a).	Such	arrangements,	however,	also	raise	a	number	of	practical	issues	that	can	easily	frustrate	employers’	willingness	to	offer	such	an	opportunity	to	someone	who	is	not	fully	covered	by	the	national	insurance	system,	for	example,	as	an	NGO	representative	pointed	out	to	me:		[Imagine]	 you	 have	 a	 youngster	 […]	 learning	 in	 a	 kitchen	 and	 they	 burn	themselves...	The	way	[these	placements]	are	designed,	they	are	designed	for	people	with	documentation.	They	are	not	suited	to	undocumented	people;	that	 is	 just	 not	 thought	 of.	 Somehow...	 I	 don’t	 want	 to	 say	 that	 they	 are	punished,	right,	but	nothing	is	facilitated,	absolutely	nothing	(bcnA31).	In	the	UK,	in	contrast,	irregular	migrants’	access	to	further	education	and	training	is	not	just	‘not	being	facilitated’,	but	in	most	cases	deliberately	obstructed,	both	in	law	
																																																								61	In	2010,	the	National	Assembly	removed	the	general	obligation	for	foreigners	to	present	a	residence	permit	in	order	to	receive	state	funding	for	non-compulsory	education	(PICUM,	2011a).		
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and	 practice.	 As	 the	 Platform	 for	 International	 Cooperation	 on	 Undocumented	
Migrants	(PICUM,	2011b)	has	repeatedly	criticised,	they	are	generally	denied	access	to	 non-compulsory	 education	 including	 vocational	 training	 and	16-18	 education,	whereby	the	transition	to	the	latter	is	particularly	problematic	if	it	involves	a	change	of	schools.		A	simple	and	fairly	effective	mechanism	of	exclusion	is	to	make	pupils’	eligibility	for	state	funding62	contingent	on	their	legal	residence	in	the	country,	which	thus	has	to	be	 verified	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 enrolment	 process:	 According	 to	 the	 Education	
Funding	Agency’s	 (2014,	p.11)	guidelines,	 “[t]he	main	basis	 for	assessing	 student	eligibility	is	their	ordinary	residence”,	which	means	that	“the	student	must	have	the	legal	 right	 to	 be	 resident	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 at	 the	 start	 of	 their	 study	programme”63.	As	 I	will	discuss	 in	more	detail	in	section	6.3,	however,	 individual	college	administrators	are	given	 some	discretion	when	processing	 the	necessary	‘evidence’,	 whereas	 access	 to	 university	 education	 is	 strictly	 contingent	 on	 the	student’s	legal	residence.		In	accordance	with	these	rules,	young	migrants	who	are	not	‘ordinarily	resident’	in	the	 UK	 are	 also	 strictly	 barred	 from	 entering	 any	 employment-like	 relationship,	even	for	training	purposes.	For	example,	when	in	December	2014	the	local	authority	of	 Lewisham	 advertised	 various	 (paid)	 apprenticeships	 to	 the	 young	 (16-25)	population	of	 the	Borough,	 it	made	very	clear	 that	potential	candidates	must	not	only	be	residents	of	Lewisham	but	also	“have	full	residency	entitlement	[…]	in	the	UK”,	and	that	in	order	to	prove	this	“all	successful	candidates	will	need	to	produce	their	 passport”64.	 	 For	 a	 lawyer	working	 for	Praxis	 Community	 Projects,	 an	 NGO	based	in	East	London,	instances	like	this	are	part	and	parcel	of		this	whole	culture	of	making	immigration	gatekeepers	of	people,	[which	also]	means	that	people	are	sometimes	refused	services	when	actually	 they	are	entitled,	like	refusing	people	the	opportunity	to	volunteer	as	well,	because	people	 think	 that	 they	 are	 not	 allowed	 to,	 which	 is	 rubbish,	 you	 know.																																																									62	Funding	is	provided	either	directly	to	the	educational	institution	or	via	the	responsible	Local	Authority.		63	In	addition,	it	is	established	that	“[a]ny	person	subject	to	a	Home	Office	deportation	order	will	ordinarily	be	ineligible	for	funding	until	their	situation	has	been	resolved	to	the	satisfaction	of	the	Home	Office,	as	funding	should	only	be	claimed	for	students	who	can	complete	their	programmes”	(Education	Funding	Agency,	2014,	p.11).	64	See:	http://www.lewisham.gov.uk/mayorandcouncil/counciljobs/apprentices/Pages/Who-is-eligible-for-an-apprenticeship.aspx	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).	
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Anyone	can	volunteer,	regardless	of	his	or	her	immigration	status	(lonA17).	Her	 reference	 to	 volunteering	 is	 particularly	 important	 given	 that	 active	engagement	 within	 the	 local	 community	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 proof	 of	‘integration’	 and	 thus	 often	 features	 prominently	 in	 public	 campaigns	 and	 legal	cases	against	the	deportation	of	local	residents.	A	(perceived)	lack	of	such	efforts	or	opportunities,	in	turn,	not	only	helps	to	reproduce	irregular	migrants’	isolation	from	society	but	also	renders	them	less	deserving	for	regularisation.		Probably	 the	most	widely	 accepted	 proof	 of	 ‘successful	 integration’	 is	migrants’	knowledge	and	use	of	the	local	language.	It	is	therefore	important	to	underline	how	different	 the	two	environments	 I	compare	are	 in	 terms	of	 the	opportunities	 they	provide	for	migrants	in	irregular	situations	to	learn	English	or	Spanish	and	Catalan,	respectively.	In	the	UK,	as	with	other	educational	opportunities	for	adult	learners,	almost	all	access	to	publicly	funded	English	courses	is	strictly	contingent	on	legal	residence.	In	a	report	titled	‘English	language	for	all’,	the	GLA	not	only	recognised	the	 importance	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 provision	 of	 English	 for	 Speakers	 of	 Other	Languages	 (ESOL)	 but	 also	 the	 problems	 that	 many	 refugees	 and	migrants	 face	when	trying	to	access	such	courses	in	London.	As	an	example	of	good	practice	the	report	specifically	highlighted	that	less	formalised	courses	offered	by	NGOs	like	the	
Migrant	 Resource	 Centre	 are	 “inclusive	 of	 people	 regardless	 of	 gender,	 age,	immigration	 status,	 employment	 or	 benefits	 status”	 (Greater	 London	 Authority,	2012,	 p.34).	 Similarly,	 the	Hackney	 ESOL	 Advice	 Service	 which	 coordinates	 ESOL	provision	within	Hackney	reported	that	in	the	period	of	2014-15	“6%	of	learners	did	not	or	could	not	specify	their	immigration	status”	and	that	this	meant	that	”they	could	 only	 be	 directed	 to	 provision	 with	 funding	 which	 did	 not	 specify	 any	immigration	related	restrictions65”	(Hackney	Learning	Trust,	2015,	p.33).		This	is	in	line	with	the	perception	of	a	senior	policy	officer	at	the	GLA,	who	told	me	in	an	informal	conversation	that	ESOL	provision	funded	by	the	central	government	explicitly	excludes	irregular	residents,	which	according	to	her	ultimately	reflects	the	broader	aim	of	these	programmes:	“to	get	people	into	employment”	(lonC04).	She	
																																																								65	In	that	year	this	was	only	the	case	with	funding	coming	from	the	Big	Lottery	Fund	as	well	as	one	specific	programme	of	the	Department	for	Communities	and	Local	Government,	called	“English	My	Way”	(ibid.).		
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also	noted	that	private	or	Third	Sector	providers	were	often	unsure	whether	they	could	offer	a	course	or	other	service	to	migrants	in	irregular	situations,	which	also	becomes	clear	 from	the	 following	quote	of	a	representative	of	a	 local	community	organisation	in	Lewisham:	“[As]	a	publicly	funded	organisation	[we]	cannot	be	seen	
to	support	people	without	the	right	to	be	in	this	country.	I	don’t	know	what	would	happen…	if	we	would	lose	our	funding…	or	if	it	would	be	a	crime	to	support	them,	I	am	not	sure”	(lonC01).		Also	in	Catalonia	 irregular	migrants’	access	 to	further	education	and	training	can	depend	on	how	and	by	whom	it	is	financed.	When	I	asked	the	administrator	of	an	adult	occupational	training	centre	(run	by	a	national	trade	union)	about	their	access	criteria,	he	told	me	that	it	is	always	a	question	of	funding:	“The	students	have	to	fulfil	the	requirements	that	come	with	the	subsidies	we	receive	for	offering	our	courses,	because	 what	 we	 offer	 is	 [publicly]	 subsidised	 training”	 (bcnC02).	 Where	beneficiaries	are	 required	 to	be	officially	registered	as	unemployed,	 for	example,	irregular	migrants	automatically	remain	excluded	“because	they	cannot	fulfil	that	requirement,	 just	 like	 retired	 persons	 are	 also	 excluded”,	 he	 added.	 Also	 the	president	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 Pakistani	 Workers,	 which	 offers	 legal	 and	occupational	advice	as	well	as	publicly	funded	language	courses	to	one	of	the	oldest	immigrant	communities	in	Barcelona,	acknowledged	the	broader	logic	underlying	these	limitations:		They	are	also	right	because,	of	course,	for	an	immigrant	to	take	a	course	for	a	year…	the	government	will	have	spent	a	lot	of	money	to	offer	this	course	and	the	next	day	the	police	may	pick	him	up	and	send	him	to	his	country...	What	happens?	This	money…	the	government	loses	 it.	For	 this	reason,	 the	courses	are	only	for	those	who	have	papers.	But	Catalan	courses	yes,	you	can	learn	the	language,	that	you	can	(bcnA11).		He	thereby	hints	at	the	fact	that	in	Catalonia,	in	contrast	to	the	UK	context,	at	least	language	courses	are	widely	available	and	explicitly	open	to	migrants	in	irregular	situations.	On	one	hand,	this	relates	to	a	crucial	component	of	Spanish	immigration	law,	according	to	which	at	least	basic	knowledge	of	the	local	language	constitutes	one	of	the	formal	requirements	for	regularisation,	as	discussed	in	section	4.1.		On	the	other	hand,	it	arguably	also	reflects	the	very	particular	status	of	the	Catalan	language	as	not	only	a	vehicle	for	local	integration	but	also	an	important	symbol	of	
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regional	autonomy	and	argument	for	potential	independence	from	Spain.	The	head	of	the	Catalan	government’s	General	Directorate	for	Immigration	made	no	secret	of	this	relationship:		[Somebody	speaking	Catalan]	creates	an	empathy	that	does	not	exist	with	Spanish,	because	we	are	a	 country	 that	historically	has	been	 screwed	and	jeopardised	by	everyone	but	that	has	its	own	language,	which	is	a	language	that	is	not	exclusive	to	the	autochthonous	[population]	but	is	readily	shared.	There	 are	 always	 Catalan	 courses	 offered	 everywhere,	 and	 people	 are	
grateful	to	the	newcomers,	to	the	strangers,	who	speak	Catalan	or	who	learn	it	(bcnA16).		In	this	very	particular	historical	and	political	context,	the	additional	value	attributed	to	promoting	the	local	language	–	also	as	a	symbol	of	cultural	distinctiveness	from	the	 rest	of	 Spain	–	 seems	 to	 tip	 the	balance	 in	 favour	of	 even	 irregular	migrants	inclusion.	An	adult	 language	teacher	who	works	 in	 the	Raval	also	referred	to	the	cost-benefit	 calculations	 that	 otherwise	 often	 underpin	 irregular	 migrants’	exclusion	from	public	services	and	integration	measures:		For	me	this	is	a	problem	of...	what	do	you	invest	in?	[…]	Either	in	training	or	otherwise...	of	course,	in	social	exclusion,	that’s	a	bit	what	you	invest	in.	Is	it	more	expensive	or	cheaper?	Well	maybe	 it	 is	actually	cheaper	 if	you	[take	into	account]	 the	social	exclusion	of	people	who	have	not	been	able	 to	get	trained	(bcnA26).			Also	the	experiences	of	the	migrants	I	interviewed	in	both	cities	largely	reflect	the	rather	distinct	conditions	for	learning	the	local	language.	A	42-year-old	mother	of	four	daughters	found	it	quite	easy	for	her	and	her	family	to	learn	both	Spanish	and	Catalan	since	they	arrived	from	Uzbekistan	in	2011:			They	do	ask	for	documents	that	identify	you,	that	you	are	you,	which	is	the	passport	 of	my	 country	 –	 the	 only	 thing	 I	 have.	 Always	 […]	 I	 go	with	my	passport;	they	take	a	copy	and	use	that	for	[any	procedure].	They	have	no	problem	with	 that.	 They	 don’t	 ask	 for	 a	 [residence]	 permit.	 Without	 any	permit	you	can	study,	not	work,	but	study	you	can	(bcnB01).		This	 stands	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 experiences	 that	 one	 of	my	 interviewees	 in	London	has	made	since	she	entered	the	UK	in	2001	with	a	false	Spanish	passport	after	the	Home	Office	had	denied	her	application	for	a	student	visa:		When	I	realised	that	I	couldn’t	study	in	my	own	name	I	went	to	a	college	and	
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registered	with	the	Spanish	name,	because	I	really	wanted	to	study,	one	way	or	the	other.	And	so,	I	was	studying	English	for	a	few	months,	until	someone	told	me	that...	if	I	kept	studying	like	that,	I	was	going	to	acquire	knowledge,	but	it	would	not	do	me	any	good	to	get	the	certificates	because	they	wouldn’t	really	be	in	my	name.	That	discouraged	me	a	lot	and	so	I	started	to	look	for	work.	 I	 started	 to	work	 all	 day	 and,	 well,	 had	 to	 forget	 about	my	 studies	(lonB04).	So	she	dropped	out	of	college	and	instead	started	working	as	a	cleaner,	while	her	partner	 found	 cash-in-hand	 jobs	 in	 construction	 before	 he	 started	working	 for	 a	large	cleaning	firm.	In	contrast	to	the	situation	in	Barcelona,	many	migrants	I	spoke	to	 in	London	said	 it	was	much	easier	 for	 them	to	 find	 informal	employment	than	(even	self-funded)	educational	opportunities	that	would	allow	them	to	build	their	future.		As	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 I	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 people	 who	administer	or	provide	publicly	funded	education	in	London	and	Barcelona,	in	order	to	 highlight	 how	 they	 perceive	 and	 navigate	 the	 formal	 opportunities	 and	 legal	frameworks	I	have	outlined	so	far.				
6.3. Negotiating	the	effective	limits	of	access,	educational	need	and	
immigration	control:	the	role(s)	and	agency	of	education	workers	While	most	ethnographic	research	on	 irregular	migrants’	access	 to	education	has	approached	the	 issue	primarily	 from	the	migrants’	own	perspective	(Bloch	et	al.,	2011;	 CORAM,	 2013;	 Gleeson	&	Gonzales,	 2012;	 Bloch	&	 Schuster,	 2005;	 Sigona,	2012;	Sigona	&	Hughes,	2012;	Bloch	&	Sigona,	2009),	some	studies	also	hint	at	the	crucial	role	of	institutions	and	individual	professionals.	Arnot	et	al.	(2009,	p.251)	have	argued	that	local	authorities	as	well	as	individual	schools	in	the	UK	are	“left	with	 the	micro-social	 costs	 of	 immigration	 policy”	 since	 they	 “have	 to	 cater	 for	children	whose	families	can	be	denied	access	to	the	social,	political	and	economic	rights	 of	 a	 citizen”.	 In	 the	 US	 context,	 Gonzales	 (2015,	 p.199)	 has	 shown	 that	individual	 school	 administrators,	 counsellors	 and	 particularly	 teachers	 can	sometimes	 “offset,	 delay[ed],	 and	 accelerate[d]	 the	 impact	 of	 illegality”,	 often	depending	 on	 the	 academic	 potential	 they	 see	 in	 individual	 students.	 I	 was	particularly	 interested	 in	how	different	kinds	of	 education	workers	perceive	and	
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deal	with	the	contradictions	between	the	responsibilities	of	their	job	and	the	logic	of	immigration	control.			
6.3.1. Administrators	of	public	education	and	related	services	The	admission	and	enrolment	procedure	constitutes	the	most	obvious	instance	of	intersection	with	immigration	control,	since	it	involves	checking	at	least	potentially	immigration-related	 documents	 by	 the	 administrative	 staff	 of	 educational	institutions.	According	to	a	senior	official	of	the	Education	Consortium	of	Barcelona,	the	general	requirement	for	parents	to	show	(and	submit	a	copy	of)	their	passport	when	registering	their	child	for	school	is	necessary	and	unrelated	to	immigration	control:		For	the	educational	system	it	is	important	to	identify	the	person.	One	thing	is	whether	or	not	 they	have	a	passport;	 the	other	 is	 if	 they	have	a	residence	permit.	 But	 that	 is	 another	 administration...	 and	 each	 part	 of	 the	
administration	should	take	care	of	its	own	[matters]	(bcnA29).			In	a	similar	sense,	he	also	argued	that	proof	of	residential	registration	is	required	“simply	because	[school]	places	are	given	to	children	who	live	in	the	vicinity	of	the	school”	 and	 that	 a	 lack	 of	 such	 proof	 would	 “only	 mean	 fewer	 points	 for	 their	application”	but	not	inhibit	their	enrolment	(bcnA29).	According	to	NGO	staff	who	are	regularly	involved	in	helping	refugee	and	(irregular)	migrant	families	to	enrol	their	children	in	local	schools,	however,	it	is	sometimes	precisely	their	initial	failure	or	inability	to	register	their	residence	within	the	municipality	that	later	significantly	delays	their	children’s	access	to	education	(bcnA04,	bcnA05).	This	suggests	that	in	local	everyday	practice	individual	administrators	often	misunderstand	registration	as	an	absolute	requirement	for	being	allocated	any	school	place.	Interestingly,	also	my	interviewee	at	the	Hackney	Learning	Trust	emphasised	this	particular	issue	as	a	potential	obstacle:		If	we	ask	somebody	for	Council	Tax	[bills]	as	a	standard	document	for	proof	of	address	[…]	it	could	make	us	aware	that	more	individuals	than	are	meant	to	be	living	there,	are	living	there.	But	even	though	we	are	part	of	the	Council,	we	 don’t	 pass	 that	 information	 on	 to	 housing	 benefits	 or	 the	 council	 tax	[department],	[…]	but	we	usually	try	and	get	around	it	somehow.	We	might	take	a	bank	statement…	and	we	deal	with	them	on	an	individual	basis,	[…]	because	sometimes	if	you	apply	for	very	popular	schools	we	have	to	be	really	
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stringent	 on	 the	 address	 to	 make	 sure	 you	 really	 live	 there,	 because	
everybody	 is	 trying	to	 live	as	close	as	possible	 to	get	 into	the	school.	 It’s	not	really	 that	 we	 are	 trying	 to	 highlight	 their	 living	 arrangements	 or	 their	immigration	status	(lonA26).		Given	that	at	least	in	the	sphere	of	compulsory	education	these	requirements	are	not	formally	related	to	immigration,	administrators	tend	to	find	out	about	a	family’s	immigration	 status	 not	 because	 the	 law	 requires	 them	 to	 do	 so,	 but	 rather	 ‘by	chance’,	as	 the	director	of	a	primary	school	 in	Barcelona	put	 it:	 “when	we	do	the	registration	we	ask	for	all	the	documentation,	and	there	the	family	already	tells	us	their	situation,	or	when	we	enrol	them	or	when	they	ask	for	scholarships	or	support	for	school	lunch…	also	there	they	sometimes	tell	us”	(bcnA30).	While	there	is	also	no	obligation	or	even	expectation	for	them	to	pass	such	information	on	to	any	law	enforcement	agency,	a	lack	of	even	just	one	of	 the	required	documents	can	cause	significant	delays	to	enrolment	even	for	compulsory	education.	The	secretary	of	a	primary	school	located	in	a	suburb	of	Barcelona	with	relatively	little	immigration,	remembered	the	case	of	a	Chinese	family:		The	family	didn’t	have	papers	and	of	course	the	first	thing	we	ask	for	is	the	family	register,	to	verify	that	it	is	really	their	child,	even	if	they	don’t	have	documentation.	 So,	 what	 happened	was	 that	 they	 requested	 an	 affiliation	document	from	China,	which	[had	to	be]	signed	by	a	notary	[...].	So	of	course,	what	happens	in	these	cases	is	that	the	process	becomes	very	long,	it	is	very	slow;	and	the	child	stays	out	of	school	[…	because	of]	an	administrative	issue,	an	issue	of	legal	bureaucracy,	which	shouldn’t	be	detrimental	for	the	child	(bcnA24).			In	such	situations	it	is	often	the	school	that	takes	a	lead	in	trying	to	solve	the	problem	by	liaising	with	other	agencies	at	the	local	level,	as	the	same	interviewee	went	on	to	describe:		With	the	enrolment	of	a	child	in	school	–	at	least	in	the	area	where	I	work	–	they	 are	 very	 strict66.	 So,	 if	 any	 of	 the	 documentation	 that	 is	 required	 is	missing,	 there	 is	no	enrolment.	 […]	 If	 they	 lack	 the	 registration	 certificate	from	 the	 municipality,	 [the	 school]	 contacts	 the	 City	 Council	 or	 makes	arrangements	with	 social	 services.	 	 [In	 her	 school]	we	 don’t	 have	 a	 lot	 of	immigrants,	maybe	4%	of	 the	 students,	but	what	we	do	have	are	 cases	of	family	 breakdown,	 we	 have	 enough	 of	 that,	 many	 children	 with	 quite	dysfunctional	family	structures,	and	so	we	have	a	fairly	fluid	communication																																																									66	Here	she	refers	to	school	inspectors	(sent	by	the	Education	Consortium);	at	a	different	point	of	the	interview	she	specifically	noted	that	it	“also	depends	on	the	educational	inspection	you	have,	because	the	inspector	may	require	certain	documentation	or	not”.		
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with	social	services	(bcnA24).		Her	 account	 also	 suggests	 that	 in	practice	 a	 lack	 of	 documentation	will	 trigger	 a	similar	 procedure	 as	 other	 symptoms	 of	 a	 ‘difficult’	 family	 background	 (such	 as	destitution	or	a	suspicion	of	domestic	violence),	which	usually	entails	a	referral	to	social	services.	This	parallels	an	important	finding	of	Gonzales’	(2015,	p.167)	study	in	the	US,	where	young	people	in	irregular	situations	often	“benefited	from	student	service	offices	developed	to	assist	low-income	and	first-generation	students”,	which	also	“bolstered	their	feelings	of	belonging	and	claims	to	membership”.		Not	 only	 school	 administrators	 but	 also	 some	 of	 the	 migrants	 I	 interviewed	 in	Barcelona	described	the	 involvement	of	mainstream	social	services	as	crucial	 for	accessing	other	public	services	including	healthcare	and	education.	Quite	often	it	is	thereby	 a	 social	 workers’	 individual	 assessment	 and	 written	 report	 –	 in	 lieu	 of	missing	documentation	–	that	allows	these	systems	to	deal	with	and	eventually	even	‘sort	out’	a	client’s	irregularity,	or	at	least	a	certain	aspect	of	it.	In	fact,	the	Catalan	Education	Department	 specifically	 notes	 that	 “in	 extraordinary	 cases,	 alternative	documents	 or	 reports	 elaborated	 by	 social	 services	 will	 be	 considered	 valid”	(Departament	d’Ensenyament,	n.d.,	p.3).		In	principle,	also	local	social	services	in	the	UK	have	this	role,	as	I	was	told	at	the	HLT:		 If	a	child	comes	into	the	country	and	we	can’t	define	their	age	[…]	we	will	call	on	social	services	to	determine	their	age.	From	an	admissions	point	of	view,	we	 have	 done	 that	 a	 few	 times	 because	 […]	 the	 age	 that	 the	 adults	 are	claiming	is	incorrect,	because	a	lot	of	times	they	might…	push	the	age	down	a	 couple	of	 years	 to	keep	 them	 in	education	and	keep	 them	 in	 the	English	
system	longer.	But	we	need	to	know	their	exact	age	in	order	for	them	to	mix	with	their	appropriate	age	group.	So	yes,	we	do	have	people	from	children’s	services	that	work	in	the	building	and	attendants	in	schools	will	call	on	other	agencies	to	work	with	them	as	and	when	needed	(lonA26).		The	 quite	 significant	 difference	 between	 both	 environments,	 however,	 is	 that	irregular	migrants	in	the	UK	seem	much	more	eager	to	avoid	any	contact	with	social	services.	 For	 example,	 Sigona	 and	 Hughes	 (2012)	 have	 found	 several	 instances	where	 parents	 would	 push	 their	 kids	 to	 go	 to	 school	 even	 when	 they	 are	 sick,	precisely	because	absence	 from	school	might	raise	attention	 from	social	 services	who	in	turn	might	find	out	and	divulge	their	irregular	status	to	the	Home	Office	(see	
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chapter	7).		Apart	 from	 admission	 and	 enrolment,	 school	bureaucrats	 also	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	negotiating	a	family’s	access	to	financial	help	with	extra-curricular	expenses,	which	is	another	instance	where	irregular	migrants’	exclusion	from	public	funds	conflicts	with	the	school’s	aim	to	make	sure	that	every	child	participates	fully	and	benefits	equally	from	public	education.	The	following	accounts	of	two	head	teachers	give	an	idea	 of	 how	 school	 administrations	 in	 Barcelona	 struggle	 to	 deal	 with	 but	 –	 in	collaboration	 with	 social	 workers	 –	 manage	 to	 reconcile	 these	 contradictory	objectives:		[In	order]	to	receive	grants	and	so	on...	I	believe	that	a	residence	permit	is	required.	With	all	the	grants	that	a	family	may	need…	I	do	think	that	there	is	some	filter,	but	I	am	not	sure.	For	example,	there	is	a	grant	for	school	meals	from	the	state	and	a	grant	for	school	meals	from	the	Generalitat	(bcnA27).		Often	it	is	only	when	they	need	to	apply	for	[financial]	help	that	you	would	find	out	[about	their	irregularity],	because	obviously	in	that	case	you	need	a	social	report,	and	thereby	it	may	come	out	that	there	are	15	people	registered	in	the	same	apartment,	and	so	the	whole	issue	becomes	apparent.	And	so,	we	automatically	 […]	 refer	 them	 to	 social	 services,	 for	 them	 to	 begin	 to	investigate	about	the	issue,	and	then	we	try	to	solve	it	[…]	because	the	child	has	the	right	to	be	in	school	and	to	be	attended	[…]	so	there	is	the	possibility	that	based	on	a	 report	 from	a	 social	 assistant	explaining	 the	situation	 […]	such	support	can	still	be	provided	(bcnA25).		In	the	Catalan	context,	this	administrative	barrier	can	thus	be	circumvented	on	the	basis	of	an	individual	assessment	of	the	child’s	needs,	which	requires	a	referral	to	social	 services	 but	 ultimately	 allows	 the	 family’s	 entitlement	 to	 be	 determined	irrespective	of	their	status.	However,	it	also	represents	an	instance	where	a	lack	of	information	 and	 uncertainty	 on	 the	 part	 of	 individual	 bureaucrats	 can	 easily	undermine	irregular	migrants	access	to	a	public	service	that	they	might	be	entitled	to	receive.			In	 contrast	 to	 that,	 UK	 legislation	 does	 not	 foresee	 (let	 alone	 prescribe)	 any	procedure	 through	which	 a	 LEA	 or	 individual	 school	 could	 overcome	 this	 strict	limitation	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	as	the	senior	official	of	the	HLT	also	stressed:		If	you	don’t	have	a	national	insurance	number	and	you	are	not	working	you	don’t	have	any	income	but	you	are	not	entitled	to	benefits,	so	you	wouldn’t	be	entitled	to	free	school	meals.	So,	in	Hackney,	and	in	most	Boroughs,	there	
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is	an	 income	criterion,	and	 if	you	meet	 that	you	are	entitled	to	 free	school	meals.	 But	 if	 your	 immigration	 status	 affects	 your	 potential	 to	 earn	 an	[official]	income,	then	that	does	make	it	difficult,	because	then	we	can’t	offer	
you	free	school	meals	because	you	have	got	no	national	insurance	number.	So	we	 can’t	 do	 an	 Inland	Revenue	 check	 on	 your	 salary,	 because	 there	 is	 no	salary	(lonA26).		At	 least	 in	principle,	 this	 form	of	 social	 assistance	 is	 –	 like	 in	Catalonia	–	means-
tested,	i.e.	triggered	by	an	assessment	of	the	claimant’s	insufficient	financial	means.	As	 soon	as	 such	assessment	either	presupposes	 the	 claimant’s	 fiscal	status	 to	be	officially	recognised	by	the	state,	or	even	potentially	entails	his	or	her	immigration	status	being	revealed	to	enforcement	agencies,	however,	irregularity	automatically	becomes	a	barrier	–	whether	that	is	specifically	intended	or	not.	This	dilemma	will	become	more	apparent	when	looking	the	provision	of	social	assistance	per	se	(see	chapter	7).		The	higher	the	level	of	education,	the	sharper	become	the	differences	between	the	roles	and	immigration-related	responsibilities	that	local	school	administrators	have	in	the	two	environments	I	compare:	In	Barcelona,	the	only	immediate	change	from	compulsory	to	post-compulsory	education	is	that	access	to	the	latter	presupposes	previous	academic	qualifications,	while	immigration	status	continues	to	essentially	be	a	non-issue,	as	a	high	school	administrator	emphasised:		The	administrators,	what	do	they	do?	Well,	 they	are	 following	 this	 list	 [of	student	 applications	 ranked	 according	 to	 their	 grades],	 regardless	 of	 the	[residence]	permits	and	all	 that.	There	 is	no	place	where	 this	 information	would	appear	[…]	and	a	person	is	the	4th	or	the	7th	[on	that	list]	not	because	s/he	has	an	ID,	but	[…because	of]	academic	criteria.	[…]	Also	the	computer	application	we	use,	when	you	put	in	a	[foreign]	passport	number	it	accepts	it;	it’s	not	that	it	[refuses]	and	says	'that’s	not	a	NIE',	but	it	accepts	perfectly.	That	means	that	the	computer	application	has	been	set	up	to	accept	it,	because	it	could	also	require	a	NIE. [...]	We	also	haven’t	received	instructions	on	this…	about	what	we	have	to	do	or	must	 not	 do	 [...]	 or	 that	 would	 tell	 us:	 'no,	 it	 has	 to	 be	 a	 person	 with	 a	residence	permit'.	No,	 they	are	persons	 interested	 in	 the	 course	 that	 they	want	to	enrol	in,	that's	all.	[...]	So	this	is	not	a	conflict;	it	is	not	putting	us	in	a	
difficult	or	conflictive	situation	(bcnA32).		College	administrators	in	London,	in	contrast,	are	legally	required	to	establish	every	applicant’s	eligibility	to	receive	public	funding	for	16-18-education	and	otherwise	refuse	their	admission,	as	the	vice-principle	of	a	Hackney	college	explained	to	me:		
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We	ask	each	of	our	students	to	bring	in	their	passport	[…]	when	they	come	to	enrol	with	us,	so	that	we	can	prove	who	they	are.	In	audit	terms	it’s	called	
their	‘existence	and	eligibility’,	so	that	we	are	not	falsifying	records;	and	then	we	are	making	 sure	 that	 students	are	eligible,	 in	 their	own	right,	 to	 these	public	funds	(lonA32).	According	to	official	guidelines,	the	Education	Funding	Agency	(2014,	p.31)	”does	not	require	or	expect	passports	to	be	photocopied	by	institutions,	although	passport	numbers	or	references	may	be	recorded	[…]	where	necessary”.	More	importantly,	it	establishes	 that	 “[f]or	 circumstances	 that	 only	 affect	 an	 individual	 student	 the	institution	 is	 expected	 to	 make	 any	 necessary	 decisions	 itself”	 and	 with	 due	consideration	of	not	only	“the	spirit	of	this	guidance”	but	also	“the	best	interest	of	their	 students”	 (Education	 Funding	 Agency,	 2014,	 p.8).	 This	 effectively	 does	 put	individual	administrators	in	a	difficult	position,	but	also	leaves	significant	room	for	their	interpretation	and	discretion,	as	my	interviewee	went	on	to	explain:		If	you	read	the	guidance,	we	are	supposed	to	make	sure	that	the	place	we	offer	a	student	 is	a	place	that	 they	are	able	 to	complete.	So,	 if	 they	are	an	asylum	seeker	at	 threat	of	deportation,	 immanent	deportation,	we	are	not	supposed	 to	 enrol	 them,	 because	 it’s	 unlikely	 that	 they	 can	 finish	 the	program…	Ahm,	it’s	an	interesting	one,	and	we	do	get	students	who	come	in	with	letters	saying	that	they	have	been	refused,	or	that	their	first	claim	has	been	refused	but	is	being	appealed.	And	I	think	then	we	just	take	the	view	that	you	are	still	under	18,	you	are	a	child,	and	we	will	continue	to	educate	you	 until	 the	 point	 at	which…	 […]	 So	we	would	 take	 a	 very	 broad-brush	approach,	because	 the	 rules	also	 say	 you	are	not	 supposed	 to	 interrupt	 the	
education	of	someone	because	of	 their…	ahm…	immigration	status	and	the	fact	that	it	might	change	(lonA32).		Asked	how	in	practice	his	team	would	thus	deal	with	such	cases,	he	told	me	that	they	had	 basically	 been	 relying	 on	 an	 earlier	 response	 from	 the	 Education	 Funding	Agency	to	a	previous	request	regarding	one	specific	case:	 They	 basically	wrote	 back	 and	 gave	 us	 a	 carte	 blanche	 by	 saying:	 ‘If	 you	expect	the	student	to	be	able	to…	you	know,	if	the	student	has	an	application	in	or	if	the	student	is	here	with	a	parent,	you	can	reasonably	assume	that	the	student	is	allowed	or	will	be	allowed	to	stay.	[…]	So	if	there	is	an	expectation	that	he	would	be	allowed	to	stay	then	we	can	just	say	‘yes,	you	are	funded’.	So,	 it	was	good	 to	make	 the	query	and	get	something	back	 that	was	more	
general	than	answering	the	question	being	asked;	that	was	good.	And	we	still	use	it	(lonA32).		On	one	hand,	this	confirms	Gonzales’	(2015,	p.166)	observation	that	“a	lack	of	clear	guidelines	[can	work]	in	the	students’	favor”;	on	the	other,	it	suggests	that	not	only	
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official	policy	documents	can	serve	street-level-bureaucrats	as	“a	form	of	shield	[…]	in	negotiation	between	institutions	and	government”,	as	Jones	(2013,	p.28)	argued,	but	 also	 more	 informal	 guidance,	 as	 long	 as	 it	 comes	 from	 the	 responsible	government	agency.			
6.3.2. Professional	providers	of	public	education	According	 to	 the	 UK	 Department	 for	 Education	 (2011),	 “[t]eachers	 make	 the	education	of	their	pupils	their	first	concern,	and	are	accountable	for	achieving	the	highest	possible	standards	in	work	and	conduct”.	A	crucial	part	of	their	professional	duty	is	to	promote	the	emotional	and	cognitive	development	as	well	as	the	safety	and	 wellbeing	 of	 every	 child	 in	 school.	 Where	 a	 family’s	 immigration	 status	 is	precarious,	this	very	duty	acquires	an	additional	meaning,	as	the	head	teacher	of	a	primary	school	in	Hackney	described:		Obviously	once	a	child	is	admitted	to	the	school	we	have	that	duty	to	act	in	their	best	interest.	Now,	we	interpret	this	as	[a	duty]	to	minimise	disruption	to	
their	life	generally.	If	the	child	has	arrived	here	the	basic	assumption	is	that	the	family	has	chosen	to	be	here…	maybe	not	freely	chosen,	but	actually	this	is	where	they	have	ended	up.	And	so,	you	know,	we	just	see	it	as	our	duty	to	provide	 some	 kind	 of	 stability	 […]	 and	 that	 includes	 minimising	 the	disruption	in	their	life,	which	obviously	would	be	the	case	if	there	were	a	big	struggle	about	their	status…[so]	we’d	always	support	them	in	that	(lonA28).	Arnot	et	al.	(2009,	p.258)	argued	that	any	“involvement	of	teachers	with	the	issue	of	immigration	redefines	[their]	relationship	[…]	to	 the	state”	and	particularly	 their		“protecting	[of	asylum-seeking	and	refugee]	youth,	encouraging	their	abilities	and	helping	them	settle	into	the	school	community	positions	teachers	in	opposition	to	state	immigration	policy”	(emphasis	added). The	teaching	professionals	I	spoke	to,	however,	 tended	 to	 frame	 their	 role	 as	 less	 political	 and	more	 pragmatic,	 as	 the	quote	above	as	well	as	the	following	accounts	of	a	primary	school	teacher	(1)	and	a	language	instructor	(2)	I	interviewed	in	Barcelona	suggest:		(1)	You	have	to	understand	that	for	a	teacher	a	child	in	an	irregular	or	regular	situation	is	the	same.	In	fact,	the	teacher	doesn’t	even	have	to	know,	because	it's	a	thing	of	the	secretary	and	the	management.	For	the	teacher	it	doesn’t	matter	if	[a	child]	has	papers	or	doesn’t	have	papers,	we	don’t	even	consider	that	(bcnA30).			
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(2)	In	my	class	I	don’t	know	who	has	papers	and	who	doesn’t,	and	I	don’t	care.	They	are	students	who	are	in	my	class	and	want	to	learn	Spanish	or	want	to	learn	 Catalan,	 and	 if	 they	 are	 at	 [the	 right]	 level	 I	 teach	 them	 the	 class	(bcnA26).	In	the	UK,	on	the	other	hand,	several	advocates	for	the	rights	of	migrants	or	children	in	 general	 also	 noted	 that	 immigration	 status	 is	 becoming	 more	 of	 an	 issue	 in	schools,	and	that	“the	very	heated	national	rhetoric	about	irregularity	is	absolutely	to	blame	for	that”	(lonA02).	The	fact	that	in	response	many	teachers	deliberately	disengage	themselves	from	any	potential	immigration	issue	can	also	have	negative	consequences	 for	 a	 child,	 as	 a	 representative	 of	 the	Children’s	 Society	 in	 London	noted:		
It’s	just	not	picked	up	there,	and	that	is	another	reason	why	it’s	not	recognised	at	an	early	stage.	Because	actually	if	a	teacher	realises	when	a	child	is	12	that	they	were	born	here	but	aren’t	actually	British,	then	they	could	help	them	to	try	and	register	[for	British	citizenship]	and	avoid	any	issues	further	down	the	 line,	 but	 I	 guess	 […]	 there	 is	 a	 bit	 of	 reluctance	 sometimes	 from	
professionals	 to	 delve	 into	 anything	 to	do	with	 immigration.	They	are	 a	 bit	scarred	 of	 approaching	 this	 subject	 and	 […]	 there	 can	 be	 quite	 a	 lot	 of	misunderstanding	 about	 families’	 rights	 […and	 so]	 they	 are	 like:	 ‘I	 don’t	really	know	what	to	do	with	this,	so	I’m	just	going	to	not	look	at	it,	I’m	just	going	 to	 concentrate	 on	 the	 other	 things	 that	 I	 can	 have	 an	 influence	 on’	(lonA16).		It	clearly	lies	beyond	the	limits	of	any	teacher’s	professional	duty	to	‘solve’	a	family’s	immigration	 problems,	 but	 particularly	 head	 teachers	 can	 sometimes	 even	contribute	to	that.	Their	particular	role	combines	the	strong	professional	ethos	of	teachers	 with	 important	 administrative	 and	 managerial	 functions	 and	responsibilities:	 They	 oversee	 the	 admission	 of	 new	 pupils	 and	 allocation	 of	specialised	services,	liaise	with	families	and	external	agencies,	and	deal	with	issues	around	student	behaviour.	On	the	basis	of	the	latter	they	may	even,	under	certain	circumstances,	refuse	the	admission	of	a	child	into	a	particular	class,	as	one	of	my	interviewees	noted	(lonA28).	Especially	in	London	Boroughs	where	the	allocation	of	school	places	is	not	centralised	(as	it	is	in	Hackney)	but	decided	at	the	level	of	schools,	 the	 room	 for	 individual	discretion	 is	 substantial	 and	 local	practices	 “can	vary	 significantly	 between	 different	 local	 authorities,	 even	 to	 the	 extent	 where	access	is	dependent	on	a	particular	head	teacher”	(Sigona	&	Hughes,	2012,	p.30).		Also	in	Barcelona,	as	already	indicated,	can	the	attitude	of	individual	head	teachers	
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(as	well	as	school	 inspectors)	 facilitate	or	delay	a	child’s	enrolment	and	effective	participation	 in	class.	A	recent	resolution	by	the	Catalan	Education	Department67	determines	that	 the	head	teacher	may	decide	to	accept	 ‘alternative	documents’	 if	parents	 are	 unable	 to	 completely	 fulfil	 the	 documentary	 requirements	 for	admission.	Also	the	head	teachers	I	interviewed	myself,	both	in	Barcelona	(1)	and	London	(2),	seemed	to	be	aware	of	their	room	for	discretion	in	this	regard:		(1)	From	the	outset,	when	they	come	to	enrol	a	child,	the	first	thing	we	do	is	to	enrol	the	child,	regardless	of	whether	s/he	has	all	the	papers	or	doesn’t	have	 papers.	 They	 come	 with	 their	 passport	 and	 we	 register	 [the	 child]	(bcnA25).			(2)	 We	 have	 had	 cases	 in	 the	 past	 of	 families	 from	 Africa,	 where	documentation	just	wasn’t	available,	so	we	couldn’t	even	get	a	confirmation	of	the	date	of	birth,	as	there	was	no	birth	certificate,	and	no	kind	of	status,	but	we	would	still	admit	a	child	into	school	(lonA28).	Given	 their	 far-reaching	 responsibilities,	 head	 teachers	 also	 tend	 to	 become	personally	involved	with	the	families	and	sometimes	also	their	immigration	cases,	as	the	one	working	in	London	particularly	highlighted:		We	know	our	families	pretty	well	and	those	families	where	there	are	clearly	big	challenges	we	know	them	very	well	because	we	have	to	be	involved.	And	my	job	is	to	make	sure	that	the	provision	that	needs	to	be	there	is	there,	and	that	within	 increasingly	 limited	resources.	 […]	So,	 I	am	not	saying	that	we	should	have	a	kind	of	completely	open	door	policy,	but	you	know,	where	the	case	is	very	strong	for	LTR	to	be	granted	it	should	be	granted.	And	I	mean,	I	am	obviously	speaking	from	the	perspective	of	somebody	working	with	the	
families	and	getting	to	know	them	as	individuals,	getting	to	know	the	kids,	seeing	the	kids	grow	up,	you	know,	so	I	am	not	going	to	take	a	more	kind	of	formal,	 sort	 of	 legal	 view	 of	 it,	 you	 know,	 I	 take	 a	 much	 more	 personal	
perspective	(lonA28).		It	is	because	of	this	close	personal	relationship	with	the	families	in	combination	with	their	 strong	 (professional)	 standing	 within	 society	 that	 individual	 teachers	 can	sometimes	 even	 influence	 court	 decisions	 on	 immigration	 cases.	 According	 to	Kathryn	 Cronin,	 the	 Head	 of	 Chambers	 at	 the	 Garden	 Court	 Chambers 68 ,	 cases	involving	children	are	often	won	on	the	basis	of	oral	evidence	provided	by	a	teacher	
																																																								67	Resolution	ENS/280/2015,	of	February	18,	see:	http://www.educacio.novaciutadania.bcn.cat/es/documentaci%C3%B3n-que-debe-presentarse_7374	(last	accessed	15/10/2016).	68	Speaking	at	the	‘Precarious	Citizenship’	conference	in	London,	on	1	June	2016.		
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about	 their	 good	 behaviour	 in	 school	 or	 the	 negative	 consequences	 that	 their	precarious	status	or	even	deportation	would	have	for	their	development.	Among	the	(head)	 teachers	 I	 interviewed,	only	 those	working	 in	London	were	aware	of	 this	potential	 intersection	of	 their	own	role	with	 the	 rules	 and	 logics	 of	 immigration	governance:			Often	 I	 am	 asked	 to	 write	 a	 letter,	 basically	 to	 confirm	 that	 the	 child	 is	attending	 the	 school…	 and	most	 of	 the	 time	 that’s	 for	 a	 solicitor	 who	 is	making	some	kind	of	application.	And	most	times	I	don’t	hear	anything	more,	so	I	guess	in	many	cases	applications	are	successful.	But	there	are	a	few	that	keep	coming	back	and	 it’s	clear	 that	 these	 families	are	having	a	particular	struggle,	but	 I	am	not	sure	what	 the	difference	 is,	you	know.	[…]	From	my	
point	of	view,	I	am	just	trying	to	confirm	to	the	authority	[…]	that	the	child	is	in	school	regularly,	that	the	parents	are	very	responsible	and	whatever…	But	also	that,	you	know,	having	to	 leave	would	be	a	massive	upheaval	 for	 that	child,	[…]	so	I	am	just	trying	to	argue	the	case	(lonA28).		Also	some	of	the	practitioners	I	interviewed	in	Barcelona	mentioned	that	reports	from	 schools	 are	 sometimes	 used	 to	 support	 applications	 for	 regularisation	 or	renewal	 of	 residence	 permits	 (bcnA25).	 Particularly	 language	 schools	 (and	teachers)	as	well	 as	NGOs	 that	deliver	officially	 certified	 language	 courses	play	a	much	more	formal	role	within	the	management	of	irregularity	–	and	thereby	also	its	control,	as	the	following	account	of	a	language	teacher	reveals:		We	have	many	students	who	come	to	school	because	they	are	interested	–	apart	from	learning	Catalan	or	Spanish	–	in	the	certificate	so	that	they	can	obtain	papers,	regularisations	and	all	these	things.	[…]	One	of	the	things	that	the	administration	requests	is	a	course	of	a	few	hours	of	Catalan	or	Spanish.	[...]	So	when	they	come	to	class	we	make	them	sign.	The	teacher	controls	[…]	how	many	days	and	how	many	hours	they	have	done	and	[certifies	these],	because	there	are	some	who	want	the	certificate	but	don’t	come	to	class.	But	we	say	'No,	chico,	if	you	want	the	certificate,	I'll	give	it	to	you	for	the	hours	you've	come	to	class'	[...]	In	this	we	want	to	be	[strict	–	hits	the	table]	[...]	As	a	
teacher	 I	 don’t	 care	 if	 you	need	 it	 […]	because	you	are	 from	one	 country	or	
another,	if	you	have	papers	or	don’t	have	papers,	I	don’t	care.	But	what	I	do	want	 is	 [that]	you	come	 to	my	class	and	participate,	otherwise	no.	What	 I	can’t	do	is	a	false	[certificate]	that	this	guy	has	come	to	class	if	he	hasn’t	come.	We	can’t	do	that,	and	I	don’t	want	to	do	that!	(bcnA26).	It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 specific	 kind	 of	 control	 that	 individual	 teachers	exercise	in	this	context	largely	corresponds	with	their	very	own	professional	logic,	as	the	same	interviewee	later	convincingly	emphasised:		For	us	it’s	[like	this]:	If	they	come	to	class	they	will	learn	more	languages	and	
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integrate	better.	That	is,	let's	say,	our	thinking.	It's	not	so	much	'I'm	going	to	force	them	to	comply	with	the	administration'...	no:	I	don’t	care	about	that.	
Want	I	want	is	to	have	them	in	class,	because	I	firmly	believe	that	if	they	come	to	class,	they	will	learn	more,	and	if	they	learn	more,	it’s	better	for	them.	That	is	 the	classic	position	of	any	teacher;	 it’s	 in	 the	DNA	of	a	 teacher,	 this	 idea	(bcnA26).		While	he	acknowledged	that	the	(external)	obligation	imposed	on	his	students	by	immigration	 law	 often	 incentivises	 their	 attendance	 in	 class,	 he	 was	 keen	 to	emphasise	that	by	exercising	this	kind	of	control	he	 is	not	 taking	over	the	state’s	responsibility	to	regulate	immigration:		The	administrative	situation…	should	be	dealt	with	by	the	state,	and	in	this	aspect,	we	are	not	state,	we	are	school.	And	I	think	this	is	how	the	majority	here	thinks.	And	so	the	administration...	I	don’t	think	it	wants...	to	somehow	obtain	information	[from	the	school],	because	they	know	that	they	won’t	get	it,	because	there	is	no	predisposition	on	the	part	of	the	teachers,	or	those	who	
work	 in	 this,	 to	give	such	information.	What	we	want	 is	what	 I	was	saying:	schooling.	And	the	administration	should	deal	with	other	things,	their	own	[issues].	So	 I	won’t	get	 involved	 in	whether	the	administration	decides	[to	require]	45	hours	or	60,	or	[previous	residence]	of	3	months	or	6	months,	[…]	I	don’t	know,	it’s	not	my	topic.	But	in	return,	my	topic	is	schooling	and	in	
that	we	want	our	freedom,	in	a	certain	way	(bcnA26).		He	 thereby	 relates	 teachers’	 professional	 freedom	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 firewall	between	schools	and	‘the	state’,	at	least	in	relation	to	the	immigration	situation	of	their	students.	While	 the	 latter	has	become	much	more	of	an	 issue	 in	 the	British	context,	the	general	tendency	to	refrain	from	controlling	immigration	–	as	well	as	other	 administrative	 matters	 –	 was	 essentially	 the	 same	 among	 teachers	 I	interviewed	in	London.	One	of	them	put	it	this	way:			If	the	immigration	authority	rang	me,	just	hypothetically,	and	said	‘can	you	tell	me	what	you	know	about	this	or	that	family’,	I	would	just	refuse	to	say	anything	obviously,	but	then	I’d	be	thinking	‘I	need	to	take	some	advice	on	this’.	I	mean	I	don’t	know	where	I	would	stand	with	that.	But	it’s…	we	know	that	we	have	families	here	that	falsely	claim	benefits,	or	that	have	been	giving	false	details	about	their	address	to	gain	access	to	education	 in	this	or	 that	particular	school,	you	know…	And	I	don’t	know	what	other	head	teachers	do	but	I	have	never	reported	any	of	that,	because	I	just	feel,	well,	people	do	what	they	have	to	do	to	kind	of	manage.	And	I	am	sure	families	would	not	want	to	divulge	 that	 kind	 of	 information	 to	me	 as	 a	 kind	 of…	 you	 know,	 obvious	representative	of	the	establishment	and	the	authority,	but	we	hear	about	this	and	that,	whatever	it	is,	but	I	have	never	actually	acted	upon	that	(lonA28).		This	reluctance	arguably	reflects	his	awareness	that	being	involved	in	controlling	
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aspects	 of	 his	 pupils’	 or	 their	 parents’	 lives	 that	 are	 not	 directly	 related	 to	 his	professional	 role	 and	 function	 as	 a	 (head)	 teacher	 could	 compromise	 the	 crucial	relationship	with	them,	and	thereby	undermine	his	ability	to	effectively	do	his	job.	In	the	next	sub-section,	I	will	argue	that	the	need	to	shield	teaching	professionals	from	having	to	control	 their	students’	 immigration	status	can	thereby	also	partly	explain	 the	 emergence	 of	 dedicated	 immigration	 departments	 within	 British	universities,	where	even	more	of	this	responsibility	has	been	effectively	transferred	to	individual	institutions	and	their	employees.			
6.3.3. ‘Managers’	of	irregularity	within	the	education	system	Other	than	in	Spain,	where	a	foreigner’s	admission	to	university	generally	precedes	(and	is	administratively	unrelated	to)	the	granting	or	refusal	of	a	student	visa	by	the	immigration	authority,	admission	to	study	at	a	UK	university	is	strictly	contingent	on	 legal	 residence	 in	 the	 country	 and	 both	 processes	 are	 closely	 linked.	 In	 fact,	universities	themselves	are	given	a	fundamental	role	in	determining	international	students’	eligibility	for	a	student	visa.	Before	the	latter	can	even	make	an	application	to	the	Home	Office,	 they	have	to	request	a	Confirmation	of	Acceptance	 for	Studies	(CAS)	statement	from	their	prospective	university,	which	thereby	officially	confirms	its	intention	to	‘sponsor’	the	student’s	visa	application.	Only	institutions	holding	a	sponsor	 licence,	which	has	to	be	renewed	annually	by	the	Home	Office,	can	 issue	CAS	 statements	 and	 thus	 recruit	 international	 students.	 Following	 a	 series	 of	incidents	where	universities	were	accused	of	having	enrolled	‘bogus’	students	and	therefore	lost	their	licences,	the	government	further	tightened	these	rules	in	201469.		In	principle,	the	issuing	of	a	CAS	statement	is	at	the	university's	discretion,	but	it	should	be	refused	if	a	student	is	(or	has	been	in	the	past)	in	breach	of	immigration	rules	or	where	the	university	deems	any	of	the	documents	submitted	or	declarations	made	 by	 the	 student	 to	 be	 fraudulent.	 According	 to	 the	 Immigration	 Policy	 and	Guidance	Manager	of	a	mid-sized	university	in	London	this	puts	a	lot	of	pressure	on																																																									69	Since	November	2014	universities	risk	losing	their	licence	to	sponsor	overseas	students	if	10%	(previously	20%)	or	more	of	the	individuals	they	have	offered	a	study	place	are	refused	a	visa.	See:	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-measures-to-tighten-up-the-immigration-system	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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institutions,	but	also	individual	members	of	staff:		We	have	to	get	that	balance	right,	and	we	won’t	always	get	it	right.	There	will	be	instances	where…	you	know,	we	would	have	said	‘no’	to	the	student	when	actually…	we	might	have	been	able	to	be	a	little	bit	more	flexible	with	them.	[…]	So	it’s	very	difficult,	and	I	think	also	the	guidance	that	comes	up	from	the	Home	Office	to	education	providers	[…]	about	what	you	can	and	can’t	accept,	isn’t	always	helpful.	And	therefore,	there	is	a	lot	interpretation,	and	a	lot	of	discretion,	 and	 of	 discrepancy	 across	 the	 education	 sector	 in	 particular,	[with]	people	like	myself	having	to	say	what	this	or	that	particular	rule	means	(lonA29).		She	 also	 highlighted	 the	 intricate	 power	 relation	 between	 universities	 and	 the	government,	which	has	clearly	facilitated	this	shift	of	responsibility:		We,	 as	 a	 sector,	 are	 responding	 to	 the	 Home	 Office	 because	 we	 have	 to,	because	 we	 need	 international	 students	 because	 it’s	 such	 a	 big	 financial	incentive.	We	have	to	have	those	students	to	operate,	and	that’s	the	same	for	most	universities	 in	 the	UK,	 and	 so	 in	a	way	any	changes	 that	 they	make,	while	we	will	complain	about	them	across	the	sector,	and	we	will	lobby	for	them	to	be	slightly	different,	ultimately	those	changes	will	go	ahead	and	[in	order	to]	continue	to	sponsor	students	[…]	we	will	have	to	comply	with	them	(lonA29).		Also	here	the	logic	of	internal	immigration	control	seemingly	converges	with	some	of	the	universities’	own	functional	logics,	while	the	intersection	of	both	also	creates	certain	conflicts	and	contradictions,	as	the	following	two	statements	illustrate:		We	don’t	have	 that	many	obligations	 that	 are	border-control-like.	We	 just	need	 to	 know	 that	 the	 students	 we	 have	 got	 here	 should	 be	 here,	 and	
everything	else	is	what	you	would	expect	to	do	as	a	normal	university	anyway;	you	 know,	 check	whether	 your	 students	 are	 attending	 classes…	 that’s	 not	
about	immigration	control,	that’s	about	your	students	[…]	getting	what	they	are	paying	for.	[…]	They	have	the	right	that	if	they	are	not	attending	classes	somebody	knows	 that	and	 is	 asking	why,	 so	 that	kind	of	overlap	between	good	pastoral	care	and	regulating	university	life	and	Home	Office	intelligence	is…	you	know,	there	is	a	bit	of	a	blurred	line	with	that,	I	think	(lonA29).		The	 difficulty	 is	 that	 that	 often	 [conflicts]	 with	 the	 kind	 of	 academic	assessment	about	whether	somebody	is	suitable	for	a	particular	course.	For	example,	 somebody	 might	 apply	 to	 study	 with	 us	 and	 the	 academic	department	 might	 say	 ‘we	 really	 want	 that	 student’,	 but	 we	 have	 to	 say	whether	or	not	we	are	going	to	be	able	to	sponsor	them	for	a	visa,	and	if	we	can’t	 then	obviously	we	can’t	go	ahead	with	the	process.	 […So]	you	almost	
want	that	to	be	separate	from	the	academic	because	a	student	should	be	made	an	 offer	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 academic	 suitability,	 and	 all	 the	 other	 stuff	should	 come	 next.	 But	 because	 of	 the	way	 the	 process	works	we	have	 to	
consider	 that	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 and	 that’s	 often	 difficult	 for	 students	 to	
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understand,	and	academic	colleagues	as	well	because	they	are	only	interested	
in	the	academic	situation	(lonA29).		The	position	of	academic	staff	in	relation	to	such	obligations	is	clear:	Even	more	than	most	schoolteachers	they	try	to	shield	themselves	from	any	control	responsibility	beyond	the	academic,	as	a	lecturer	of	another	London	university	emphasised:		The	 idea	that	universities	are	now	the	gatekeepers	 is	something	they	hate	because	 they	 don’t	 think	 it’s	 their	 job,	 and	 I	 think	 they	 are	 right.	 It’s	 the	government’s	job	and	the	government	is	outsourcing	immigration	control	to	a	whole	variety	of	people	[…]	It	certainly	increases	the	workload,	which	is	why	[…]	it’s	now	all	being	done	by	bureaucrats	because	they	have	to	do	it	like	that,	it	has	to	be	centralised,	and	that	makes	sense	to	me,	because	otherwise	
it	would	just	be	a	pain	in	the	neck	(lonA24).		What	she	seems	to	hint	at	is	the	necessity	of	(prospective)	students’	immigration	issues	to	be	negotiated	and	‘managed’	centrally	–	if	not	by	central	government	then	at	least	by	especially	trained	bureaucrats	working	within	the	university.	According	to	 organisation	 theory,	 one	way	 in	which	organisations	 tend	 to	 respond	 to	 such	internal	logic	incompatibilities	is	”by	developing	a	cadre	of	organisational	members	who	are	less	strongly	attached	to	particular	logics”	(Besharov	&	Smith,	2013,	p.376).	Most	UK	universities	have	established	dedicated	teams	of	advisors	who	check	all	foreign	 students’	 eligibility	 and	 assist	 them	with	 any	 visa	 issue.	While	 these	 are	officially	certified	(to	give	immigration	advice)	by	the	central	government’s	Office	of	
the	Immigration	Services	Commissioner	(OISC),	they	are	‘buffered’	from	some	of	the	logics	that	otherwise	dominate	organisational	action	within	universities.	The	way	the	Immigration	Policy	and	Guidance	Manager	 justified	the	role	of	her	own	team	clearly	indicates	this:		We	try	to	be	consistent,	and	actually	the	fact	that	it	comes	through	one	team	means	that	those	decisions	are	consistent.	So	before	my	team	existed	these	decisions	might	have	been	taken	by	different	colleagues	depending	on	who	is	involved,	so	it	might	have	been	the	academic	department	even…	And	so	there	was	room	for	different	decisions	based	on	personalities,	and	there	was	no	record	of	those	decisions,	it	was	a	bit…	of	a	mess.	So,	this	allows	us	to	be	
consistent	and	to	apply	the	same	rules	to	all	of	our	students;	[…	because]	there	is	not	so	much	awareness	of	the	actual	technicalities	and	the	rules	and	so	on,	you	know,	[…]	I	wouldn’t	expect	admissions	to	understand	that	necessarily;	because	their	job	is	to	process	an	application,	and	an	academic’s	job	is	to	teach	
somebody	(lonA29).		Crucial	 to	my	analysis	 and	 framework	 is	 that	 this	organisational	 adjustment	also	
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facilitates	a	closer	cooperation	between	part	of	the	university’s	own	administration	and	the	immigration	authorities.	As	my	interviewee	explained,	her	team	has	“names	and	contacts	at	the	Home	Office”	and	“where	we	are	concerned	about	a	student’s	status	[or]	if	the	student	is	telling	us	things	and	we	need	more	information,	with	the	students	consent	we	can	actually	contact	the	Home	Office	for	what’s	called	a	‘student	eligibility	check’”	(lonA29).		Importantly,	what	she	initially	described	as	a	mechanism	through	which	the	Home	Office	 can	 ‘help’	 them	 to	 deal	with	 complex	 cases	 also	puts	 a	 legal	obligation	on	individual	student	advisors	to	inform	the	Home	Office	“if	we	categorically	know	that	somebody	is	in	breach	of	their	visa	condition”	(lonA29). The	way	she	and	her	team	tend	 to	handle	 such	encounters	with	 (potential)	 irregularity	 in	practice	 suggests	that	 they	 regularly	 struggle	 with	 and	 sometimes	 try	 to	 bypass	 this	 particular	obligation:		If	I	am	completely	honest,	where	we	suspect	that,	we	would	from	an	advisory	point	of	view	make	the	student	aware	[…]	that	they	are	potentially	in	breach	and	that	if	we	found	out	that	they	were	we	would	have	a	legal	obligation…	But	we	wouldn’t…	we	wouldn’t	just	say	‘we	think	you	are	in	breach’	and	tell	the	 Home	 Office.	We	 would	 kind	 of	 engage	 with	 the	 individual	 to	 try	 and	
encourage	them	to	stop	doing	what	we	think	they	are	doing,	but	ultimately,	we	
wouldn’t	want	to	kind	of	police	that	because	that	puts	an	unrealistic	kind	of	
burden	on	us.	[…]	We	did	have	an	application	once	from	a	student	who…	was	a	failed	asylum	seeker,	and	had	gone	kind	of	underground,	so	to	speak,	and	so	obviously	if	we	would	 have	 suddenly	 sent	 this	 student’s	 eligibility	 check	 to	 the	Home	Office,	we	would	be	flagging	up	that	this	student	is	here,	that	we	have	their	address,	we	had	all	that	information…	And	that	doesn’t…	that’s	not	what	we	
are	there	to	do,	we	are	there	to	assess	a	student’s	ability	to	study	with	us,	not	to	 say	 to	 the	Home	Office	 ‘we	 found	 this	 failed	asylum	seeker	and	here	 is	where	they	are’	(lonA29).		Ultimately,	this	reflects	her	awareness	of	the	consequences	that	such	information	exchange	with	the	immigration	authority	could	potentially	have	for	a	student’s	stay	in	the	country,	but	also	that	immigration	enforcement	as	such	lies	beyond	what	she	perceives	as	her	core	responsibility.				
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6.4. Education	workers	becoming	border	guards?	The	positions	of	various	
organisational	roles	vis-à-vis	immigration	control	and	enforcement	Following	 my	 discussion	 of	 the	 intersections	 of	 immigration	 control	 with	 the	provision	of	public	healthcare	(chapter	5),	the	aim	of	this	chapter	was	to	identify	equivalent	 roles	 and	 mechanisms	 in	 relation	 to	 public	 education.	 Figure	 6	summarises	 the	 empirical	 findings	 presented	 above	 by	 positioning	 these	 roles	within	 the	 same	 analytical	 framework,	 based	 on	whether	 or	 not	 the	 individuals	occupying	them	in	each	environment	are	obliged	or	expected	to	(i)	know	students’	(or	 their	 parents’)	 immigration	 status	 and/or	 (ii)	 to	 share	 such	 knowledge	with	immigration	authorities.													Other	 than	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 healthcare,	 the	 local	 administrators	 of	 (at	 least	compulsory)	 education	 are	 not	 expected	 to	 find	 out,	 record	 or	 reveal	 the	immigration	status	of	the	students	they	enrol	for	school.	Just	in	relation	to	additional	state	 support	 for	 extra-curricular	 expenses	 can	 irregularity	 become	 an	 issue	 for	them	and	thus	–	particularly	in	the	UK	context	–	represent	a	barrier	to	equal	access,	which	is	otherwise	well	protected	by	strong	human	rights	provisions	as	well	as	the	dogma	that	school	is	not	the	right	place	for	immigration	control.	In	relation	to	post-
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Figure	6:	The	positions	of	different	categories	of	education	workers	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	
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compulsory	education	and	training,	however,	and	again	particularly	in	the	UK,	the	role	 of	 street-level	 bureaucrats	 dealing	with	 student	 admissions	 can	 involve	 the	checking	of	immigration	status.	This	is	reflected	in	their	position	between	sectors	‘C’	and	‘D’	of	the	diagram,	whereby	those	working	in	London	appear	further	to	the	left	and	top.		The	professional	providers	of	education	are	–	similar	 to	doctors	and	nurses	 in	 the	case	of	healthcare	–	effectively	shielded	from	any	responsibility	to	either	know	or	
tell	the	immigration	situation	of	the	persons	they	teach,	even	though	their	individual	confidentiality	is	not	as	firmly	protected	as	that	between	health	professionals	and	their	patients.	This	also	extends	into	the	sphere	of	post-compulsory	and	even	adult	education	and	is	true	for	both	environments	studied.	Those	teaching	professionals	who	also	have	managerial	responsibilities	(like	head	teachers)	are	more	likely	to	get	personally	 involved	 with	 a	 particular	 family’s	 immigration	 case,	 but	 in	 no	 way	expected	 to	 know	 and	 often	 particularly	 reluctant	 to	 tell	 anything	 related	 to	immigration	status.		Specifically	 dedicated	 managers	 of	 (potential)	 irregularity	 –	 comparable	 to	 the	Overseas	Visitors	Managers	in	UK	hospitals	–	only	seem	to	be	necessary	within	UK	universities,	whereas	elsewise	the	control	of	(ir)regularity	is	carried	out	–	if	at	all	–	by	 regular	 administrative	 staff.	 The	 establishment	 of	 immigration	 advice	departments	within	universities	also	represent	the	only	instance	where	no	explicit	
firewall	 is	 in	place	and	 information	exchange	with	 immigration	authorities	 forms	part	of	individual	managers’	work	routine,	which	is	why	they	are	placed	in	sector	‘A’	of	the	framework.		That	the	existence	of	a	firewall	is	particularly	crucial	in	the	sphere	of	education	has	also	become	apparent	from	the	heated	public	debate	I	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	(regarding	the	content	and	use	of	the	National	Pupil	Database	in	the	UK).	Notably,	it	was	not	so	much	about	students’	immigration-related	information	being	included	in	a	national	database	than	the	fact	that	this	would	potentially	make	this	sensible	information	accessible	to	other	state	agencies.	While	the	government	has	assured	that	this	data	would	not	be	used	for	immigration	enforcement	purposes	(Gayle,	2016),	a	spokesman	of	the	education	department,	quoted	in	Schools	Week,	admitted	 that	 “[w]here	 the	 police	 or	 Home	 Office	 have	 clear	 evidence	 of	 illegal	
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activity	or	fear	of	harm,	limited	data	including	a	pupil’s	address	and	school	details	may	be	requested”	(Whittaker,	2016).	Given	that	this	has	already	happened	in	the	past70,	the	general	secretary	of	the	National	Union	of	Teachers	said	in	a	press	release	that	the	union	could	only	agree	to	the	collection	of	such	data	if	given	“a	guarantee	from	 the	Government	 that	 personal	 information	will	 not	 be	 passed	 to	 the	Home	Office,	so	that	it	is	clear	that	schools	are	not	part	of	policing	immigration”71.		What	schools	to	a	large	degree	are	responsible	for,	and	where	individual	teachers	thus	are	required	to	report	any	suspicion	to	relevant	agencies	including	the	police,	however,	 is	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 of	 every	 child	 in	 school,	 as	 many	 of	 my	interviewees	 assured	 me.	 This	 ultimately	 highlights	 the	 rather	 close	 connection	between	 education	 and	 (social)	 control	more	 generally,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 potential	usefulness	of	 this	connection	 for	 immigration	enforcement.	Already	 in	2010,	 in	a	White	 Paper	 titled	 Protecting	 our	 Border,	 Protecting	 the	 Public,	 the	 UK	 Border	Agency	 revealed	 (under	 the	heading	 ‘Child	Protection’)	 that	 it	has	 initiated	 “joint	projects	on	the	exchange	of	data	and	intelligence	with	schools	[…]	in	order	to	aid	consistent	 support	 to	 migrant	 children	 whose	 families	 abscond	 or	 avoid	immigration	 compliance	 controls”	 (UKBA,	 2010,	 p.18).	 From	 the	 theoretical	perspective	of	my	study,	such	projects	must	be	interpreted	as	a	deliberate	effort	to	develop	 and	 justify	 new	 forms	 of	 immigration	 control	 by	 abusing	 its	 potential	overlap	with	the	protection	of	vulnerable	individuals	against	abuse,	negligence	or	destitution.	This	will	become	more	obvious	in	the	next	chapter,	where	I	look	at	the	challenges	that	underlie	the	local	provision	of	social	assistance	to	persons	who	are	not	only	in	need	of	support	or	protection	but	also	subject	to	immigration	control.			 	
																																																								70	A	Freedom	of	Information	Request	from	July	2016	revealed	that	the	Home	Office	has	submitted	20	requests	for	information	to	the	National	Pupil	Database	since	April	2012;	see:	https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/pupil_data_sharing_with_the_poli#incoming-846569	(last	accessed	3/08/2016).	See	also:	http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2016-10-13/48635/		(about	Home	Office	requests	made	since	July	2015,	last	accessed	15/12/2017).			71	See:	https://www.teachers.org.uk/news-events/press-releases-england/school-census-data	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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7. Managing	irregularity	through	the	provision	of	social	
assistance		Policies	and	measures	of	social	 assistance	and	protection	 represent	 the	 core	and	ultimate	 safety	 net	 of	 the	 welfare	 state.	 Their	 aim	 is	 to	 reduce	 the	 social	 and	economic	vulnerability	of	the	poor	or	otherwise	marginalised	members	of	society	by	mitigating	the	risks	associated	with	old	age,	illness	or	disability,	but	also	a	sudden	loss	of	employment	or	other	sources	of	income.	Compared	to	the	provision	of	(and	access	 to)	 public	 healthcare	 and	 education,	 these	 targeted	 provisions	 arguably	constitute	 a	 more	 explicit	 link	 between	 the	 state	 and	 a	 particular	 individual	 or	household,	 since	 they	 often	 involve	 a	 direct	 transfer	 of	 public	 funds.	 Like	 other	forms	 of	 public	 welfare,	 social	 protection	 systems	 are	 thereby	 based	 on	 the	contributions	–	either	employment-related	or	through	general	taxes	–	of	potential	beneficiaries,	and	thus	hinge	on	a	sense	of	trust	and	solidarity	among	all	members	of	 the	 ‘community’	 (Banting,	 2000;	 Alesina	 &	 Glaeser,	 2004).	 Following	 T.H.	Marshall’s	(1950)	classic	conceptualisation	of	national	citizenship	as	the	successive	conferral	of	civic,	political	and	only	then	also	social	rights,	Esping-Andersen	(1990,	p.21)	 emphasised	 that	 “social	 citizenship	 constitutes	 the	 core	 idea	 of	 a	 welfare	state”.		Not	only	but	particularly	in	advanced	European	welfare	states,	immigration	has	thus	instinctively	been	perceived	and	 treated	 as	a	 potential	 threat	 to	existing	welfare	arrangements,	 due	 to	 an	 increased	 competition	 of	 ‘outsiders’	 for	 employment,	public	services	and	other	resources	(Sainsbury,	2012;	Banting,	2000;	Borjas,	1999).	Quantitative	analyses	of	opinion	data	suggest	an	inverse	relationship	between	the	inflow	 of	 newcomers	 –	 particularly	 if	 they	 are	 relatively	 low-skilled	 or	 poorly	integrated	 into	 the	 labour	 market	 –	 and	 the	 level	 of	 support	 among	 ‘native’	populations	 for	 policies	 aiming	 at	 redistribution	 and	 social	 protection	 (Burgoon,	2014;	 Gaston,	 2015).	 It	 has	 also	 been	 argued	 that	 “a	 political	 backlash	 against	immigration	 and	 multiculturalism	 might	 help	 fuel	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 neo-liberal	attack	on	the	welfare	state”	(Banting,	2000,	p.22).	Notably,	the	growing	anti-immigrant	rhetoric	–	traditionally	associated	with	right-wing	political	parties	–	has	indeed	become	part	and	parcel	of	how	many	governments	are	justifying	welfare	cuts	that	 ultimately	 affect	 not	 just	 immigrants	 but	 also	 the	 ‘native’	 poor.	 The	 same	
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argument	has	also	been	turned	on	 its	head	by	studies	suggesting	that	strong	and	inclusive	welfare	policies	can	also	reduce	popular	hostility	towards	immigrants	by	decreasing	 their	 (visible)	marginalisation	and	thus	stigmatisation	 (PICUM,	2015)	and	lowering	overall	social	inequality	as	well	as	the	general	risk	of	poverty	(Artiles	&	Meardi,	2014).	Banting	(2000)	therefore	suggested	that	expansive	welfare	states	based	 on	 (near-)universal	 social	 insurance	 systems	 are	 better	 suited	 to	 guard	against	 anti-immigrant	 backlashes	 than	 slim	welfare	 states,	 which	 are	 generally	more	prone	to	welfare	chauvinism.		Openness	 for	 immigration	 ultimately	 involves	 the	 extension	 of	 social	 rights	 to	foreign	 residents	 (Ruhs,	 2008;	 Soysal,	 1994)	 and	 their	 more	 or	 less	 equal	representation	in	public	and	political	discourse	(Papadopoulos	et	al.,	2008).	From	a	strictly	economic	perspective,	Ruhs	&	Martin	(2008)	posited	an	obvious	trade-off	between	the	overall	number	of	immigrants	allowed	to	enter	and	stay	in	a	given	host	country	 and	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 rights	 afforded	 to	 them.	 In	practice,	 and	 in	order	 for	 immigration	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 compatible	 with	 relatively	 extensive	national	welfare	provisions,	any	level	of	openness	must	be	mediated	through	ever	more	complex	and	stratified	systems	of	immigration	statuses	and	correspondingly	differentiated	rights	(Morris,	2002).	Irregular	migrants’	position	at	the	very	bottom	of	this	hierarchy	and	their	explicit	lack	of	formal	membership	further	exacerbate	the	underlying	frictions	and	make	their	inclusion	a	particularly	contested	matter.	It	has	also	been	noted,	however,	that	“the	denial	of	the	most	basic	social	rights	could	create	more	economic	costs	than	benefits	for	the	existing	population”	(Ruhs,	2008,	p.420).	This	is	obviously	true	for	any	category	of	residents	and	irrespective	of	the	(il)legality	of	their	presence	(PICUM,	2015),	and	can	thus	justify	universal	access	to	not	only	(necessary)	healthcare	and	(compulsory)	education,	but	also	basic	social	assistance	and	protection	measures.		In	this	chapter	I	therefore	look	at	how	migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	interact	with	 the	 various	mechanisms	 of	 inclusion	 and	 exclusion	 that	 underpin	 the	 local	provision	of	social	assistance	and	protection	measures	in	London	and	Barcelona.	As	in	previous	chapters	 I	 thereby	 focus	on	the	perspective	of	welfare	bureaucracies,	which	have	long	been	attributed	a	decisive	role	in	(re)negotiating	immigrants’	social	rights	and	access	to	such	services	(Guiraudon,	2000;	Van	Der	Leun,	2006).	It	is	the	
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third	area	of	public	service	provision	where	individual	street-level	bureaucrats	have	to	manage	 certain	 contradictory	 logics	 and	 obligations	 following	 from	 their	 own	professional	responsibilities	on	one	hand,	and	immigration	law	on	the	other	(Cuadra	&	Staaf,	2014;	Price	&	Spencer,	2015).			
7.1. Public	support	for	non-members:	Ambivalent	legal-political	contexts	
for	the	provision	of	social	assistance	and	protection	to	irregular	
migrants	While	the	provision	of	public	assistance	primarily	aims	to	achieve	social	inclusion	and	 thus	preserve	 the	overall	 cohesion	of	 society,	 it	 always	also	entails	 a	 certain	element	of	exclusion,	since	not	every	claimant	will	meet	the	legal	and	moral-political	criteria	 of	 eligibility	 and	 deservingness	 (Hemerijck	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Unless	 it	 is	understood	as	a	truly	universal	right,	access	to	social	assistance	and	protection	is	granted	or	denied	either	on	the	basis	of	need	(such	as	absolute	or	relative	poverty	or	evidence	of	destitution),	previous	contributions	 (in	 the	 form	of	 taxes	or	 social	insurance	 premiums)	 or	membership.	 Possible	 loci	 of	 control	 and	 regulation	 of	access	by	non-members	are	either	the	territorial	border	of	the	nation	state	or	the	internal	 boundaries	 of	 its	welfare	 system	or	 formal	 labour	market.	 The	 negative	consequences	of	welfare	exclusion	as	well	as	the	immediate	costs	of	providing	such	services,	however,	can	also	be	felt	at	the	local	level.		Both	 in	 Britain	 and	 Spain	 this	 is	 partly	 because	 the	 gradual	 decentralisation	 of	competences	and	 responsibilities	 in	 this	 realm	of	 service	provision	has	not	been	matched	 by	 a	 corresponding	 redistribution	 of	 public	 funds.	 In	 Spain,	 the	 quite	substantial	shift	of	powers	(starting	in	the	1980s)	from	central	to	both	regional	and	municipal	governments	has	resulted	in	a	rather	fragmented	system	of	cash	benefits	and	 social	 care	 services	 delivered	 at	 various	 administrative	 levels	 (Moreno	 &	Bruquetas,	 2011;	 Rodríguez-Cabrero,	 2011).	 Not	 only	 for	 (irregular)	 migrants	 –	whose	 eligibility	 often	 precisely	 depends	 on	 which	 level	 of	 the	 administration	finances	a	particular	service	–	it	is	difficult	to	discern	the	various	components	(and	corresponding	competences)	of	this	system.	The	following	account	of	the	director	of	a	migrant	community	organisation	in	Barcelona	reflects	this	complexity:		
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There	are	support	measures	[‘ayudas’]	from	City	Hall	that	are	different	from	those	 of	 the	 Generalitat;	 [whereas]	 the	 minimum	 income	 support	 [RMI]	doesn’t	really	come	from	the	Generalitat	but	from	[the	central	government].	What	happens	is	that	the	Generalitat	de	Catalunya	administers	the	RMI,	but	all	the	other	benefits,	like	let’s	say	the	grant	for	the	children	to	eat	at	school,	the	help	to	pay	the	rent,	to	pay	the	electricity...	all	these	are	local	measures	
that	the	city	can	decide	to	whom	they	are	given	and	to	whom	not	(bcnA01).		While	 the	 influence	 of	 local	 government,	 and	 thus	 also	 the	 variation	 between	different	 municipalities	 in	 this	 regard,	 has	 increased	 during	 the	 years	 of	 fiscal	consolidation,	 both	 the	 central	 government	 and	most	 Autonomous	 Communities	have	 rigorously	 reduced	 their	 expenditure	 in	 all	 areas	 of	 social	 policy	 (Moreno,	2007;	 Moreno	 &	 Bruquetas,	 2011;	 Rodríguez-Cabrero	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Empirical	research	has	shown	that	irregular	migrants	have	been	particularly	affected	by	the	economic	downturn,	which	coincided	with	various	government	proposals	to	restrict	their	access	to	basic	services	and	employment	(Manzanedo	&	Fabre,	2009).		In	Britain,	the	devolution	of	competences	in	the	field	of	social	policy	has	been	less	far-reaching	 but	 like	 in	 Spain	 it	 was	 accompanied	 by	 significant	 cuts	 to	 central	government	 funding	 for	 local	authorities	(LAs)	 to	provide	social	services	to	 their	residents	 (Hastings	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 Almost	 all	 of	 the	 local	 administrators	 and	practitioners	I	interviewed	in	London	mentioned	insufficient	resources	as	the	most	significant	barrier	to	an	effective	provision	of	social	care	and	support	services.	As	the	immigration	advisor	of	a	local	Citizens	Advice	Bureau	emphasised,	this	is	not	only	an	issue	in	relation	to	the	specific	needs	of	irregular	residents	but	also	other	parts	of	the	population	and	areas	of	provision:		There	is	this	tension	between	the	central	government	and	the	LA	as	to	who	is	responsible	for	these	very	vulnerable	people.	And	that	plays	out	aside	from	immigration,	 isn’t	 it?	 I	mean	 that’s	 also	with	 the	 cuts;	 the	 government	 is	cutting	 LAs’	 budgets	 and	 is	 expecting	 them	 to	 do	 more	 and	 better	 work	(lonA19).	The	central	government	has	lately	been	discussing	the	re-introduction	of	a	specific	funding	 stream	 –	 previously	 called	 ‘Migration	 Impacts	 Fund’	 (2009-2010)	 –	 that	would	help	LAs	to	deal	with	“the	impacts	of	immigration	on	local	communities”	and	on	 locally	 provided	 services	 in	 particular.	 The	 new	 ‘Controlling	 Migration	 Fund’	would	essentially	aim	to	achieve	the	same	goal,	but	mainly	by	reducing	the	number	of	unlawful	residents,	which	in	turn	requires	a	closer	cooperation	between	LAs	and	
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the	 UK	 Home	 Office	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 additional	measures	 of	 immigration	enforcement	(Department	 for	Communities	and	Local	Government,	2016).	At	 the	centre	of	 these	developments	are	 the	 legitimate	 claims	of	 increasing	numbers	of	immigrant	families	–	in	mostly	irregular	but	also	certain	regular	situations	–	who	according	 to	 immigration	 rules	 have	 no	 recourse	 to	 public	 funds,	 but	 still	 a	fundamental	 right	 to	 receive	 support	 from	 their	 local	 Council	 if	 otherwise	 they	would	become	destitute	and	that	would	constitute	a	breach	of	a	child’s	human	rights	(Price	&	Spencer,	2015).		At	the	same	time,	and	in	both	countries	under	study,	social	services	are	increasingly	expected	 to	 fulfil	 much	 of	 their	 function	 by	 ‘(re-)activating’	 people	 for	 gainful	employment,	 i.e.	 channelling	 them	 (back)	 into	 the	 formal	 labour	 market.	 While	certainly	not	a	new	trend	(nor	specifically	related	to	the	management	of	migration),	it	underpins	another	 important	mechanism	of	excluding	 irregular	residents	 from	longer-term	 social	 assistance.	 Since	 at	 least	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 1990,	 British	welfare	 policy	 has	 been	 characterised	 by	 a	 strong	 reliance	 on	 employment	 and	‘employability’	as	the	central	elements	of	so-called	‘workfare’-	and	later	‘welfare-to-work’-approaches	to	reducing	poverty	and	social	exclusion	(Hemerijck	et	al.,	2013).	The	same	trend	has	also,	although	more	recently,	become	apparent	in	Spain,	where	“activation	 has	progressively	 become	 a	 key	 element	 in	 the	 new	social	 assistance	schemes,	as	well	as	in	the	reforms	introduced	to	unemployment	programs	since	the	early	2000s”	(Rodríguez-Cabrero	et	al.,	2015,	p.14).		State	support	is	thereby	increasingly	made	contingent	on	clients’	active	and	often	full-time	 job	 seeking,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 participation	 in	 official	 training	 and	 job	qualification	measures.	The	 following	account	of	a	social	worker	 I	 interviewed	 in	Barcelona	 shows	 that	 this	 logic	makes	 it	more	difficult	 to	 ‘successfully’	do	 social	work	with	a	 client	who	 is	unlikely	 to	eventually	enter	 the	 formal	 labour	market,	whether	because	there	are	generally	no	jobs	available	or	because	that	person	has	no	permission	to	work:		[Irregular	migrants]	are	usually	more	linked	to	Caritas	than	to	social	services	because	Caritas	can	provide	this	more	assistential	support.	[…]	But	we	are	in	
another	logic	now,	more	[about]	promotion	of	the	person,	which	is	something	
you	 cannot	 do	with	 these	 people	 because	 the	 promotion	 happens	 through	work.	[…]	Well,	the	reality	is	that	we	are	in	a	society	that	is	based	on	work.	
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So	 you	 are	 independent	 and	 autonomous	 and	 you	 promote	 yourself	 as	 a	function	for	employment.	[But]	if	there	are	no	jobs,	what	the	hell	are	we	going	to	do?	Obviously,	the	irregular	person	is	the	most	brutal	case,	the	clearest,	most	paradigmatic,	but	this	is	also	happening	with	people	who	are	Spanish	or	are	regular	immigrants:	What	do	we	do	if	there	is	no	work?	(bcnA21)	Like	in	the	areas	of	healthcare	and	education,	the	inclusion	of	irregular	residents	in	the	local	provision	of	social	assistance	and	protection	requires	the	reconciliation	of	contradictory	 legal	 frameworks	and	 institutional	 logics,	which	 in	 turn	can	 lead	to	rather	unexpected	outcomes	and	alliances.	The	next	section	outlines	these	formal	frameworks	and	highlights	some	of	 the	contradictions	and	practical	barriers	 that	arise	 in	 the	 course	 of	 their	 implementation.	 I	 thereby	 differentiate	 –	 as	 in	 the	previous	chapters	–	between	the	provision	of	basic	and	more	substantial	or	longer-term	support.			
7.2. Legal	frameworks,	formal	entitlements	and	practical	barriers	for	
irregular	migrants’	access	to	social	assistance	provided	in	London	and	
Barcelona	
7.2.1. Irregular	migrants’	access	to	basic	support	Basic	forms	of	social	assistance	and	protection	aim	to	alleviate	the	most	immediate	and	pressing	symptoms	of	destitution,	such	as	street-homelessness	or	the	inability	to	 cover	 alimentary	 or	 other	 essential	 needs.	 They	 address	 temporary	 hardship	through	emergency	social	care	services	including	night	shelters,	food	banks	or	soup	kitchens,	 but	 also	 individual	 counselling	 and	 street	work.	 Such	measures	 do	 not	involve	 substantial	 cash	 transfers	 and	 are	 often	 accessible	 to	 any	 person	 who	exhibits	a	specific	need.	Both	in	the	UK	and	Spain,	the	principle	responsibility	for	providing	these	services	to	particularly	vulnerable	individuals	and	families	lies	with	the	LA,	i.e.	the	city	or	Borough	where	they	(officially)	reside.		That	 said,	 also	 charities	 and	 church	 organisations	 have	 traditionally	 played	 an	important	role	in	this	regard	(and	in	both	national	contexts),	by	providing	additional	services	to	those	who	have	‘fallen	through	the	cracks’.	A	representative	of	Caritas	who	I	interviewed	in	Barcelona	emphasised	that	it	is	not	only	but	especially	in	the	context	of	migrant	irregularity	that	the	Third	Sector	has	to	make	up	for	generally	
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insufficient	public	provisions:		In	relation	to	irregular	immigration,	it's	just...	they	[public	services]	don’t	do	anything.	It’s	like,	I	don’t	know,	sometimes	I	wonder:	if	in	Spain	there	were	no	private	entities…	who	would	take	care	of	all	this	population?	Of	20,000	[clients	in	Barcelona]	we	have	3,600	[in	an	irregular	situation].	Where	would	these	 people	 be?	 Some	 of	 them	 we	 provide	 with	 housing,	 many	 receive	financial	 aid,	 we	 help	 them	 with	 their	 regularisation,	 and	 we	 have	psychologists	who	support	them...	because	otherwise,	where	would	all	these	people	be?	I	believe	that	the	Third	Sector	in	Spain	is	what	[prevents]	a	time	bomb,	mainly	 in	relation	to	the	[irregular]	migrant	population,	but	also	 in	general	(bcnA03).	At	 the	 national	 level,	 while	 the	 relative	 share	 of	 social	 services	 and	 benefits	addressing	basic	needs	has	 increased	 (from	33%	 in	2007	 to	50%	in	2011),	 local	governments’	 overall	 social	 expenditure	 has	 decreased	 by	 almost	 20%	 between	2010	and	2013	(Rodríguez-Cabrero	et	al.,	2015,	p.16/7).	Within	this	context,	and	in	order	 to	 counter	 social	 tensions	 and	 the	 growing	 risk	 of	 social	 exclusion	 and	disintegration,	the	city	government	of	Barcelona	has	taken	steps	to	compensate	for	the	lack	of	universality	that	increasingly	characterises	central	government	policy	in	this	field.	A	universalistic	approach	is	particularly	crucial	in	the	context	of	sustained	immigration,	 as	 a	 former	 City	 Councillor	 for	 social	 welfare	 wrote	 in	 an	 official	publication:		[T]he	 universal	 nature	 of	 social	 services	 is	 absolutely	 fundamental	 in	 the	medium	 and	 long	 term	 because	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	 social	 services	 can	continue	 to	 manage	 in	 a	 sustained	 way	 the	 tensions	 generated	 by	 the	pressure	 that	 newcomers	 [put	 on	 our]	 care	 services.	 As	 long	 as	 this	universalisation	does	not	occur	[at	the	national	level],	the	City	Council	has	chosen	to	strengthen	its	network	of	primary	social	care,	so	that	the	criterion	for	attending	the	users	[can]	be	based	on	their	needs	and	not	on	their	origin	(Gomà,	2006,	p.117).	While	in	Spain	the	provision	of	primary	social	care	services	is	generally	a	municipal	competence,	 Barcelona	 occupies	 an	 exceptional	 position	 also	within	 Catalonia	 in	that	it	also	administers	specialised	social	care	services.	The	costs	of	these	provisions	should	–	according	to	official	agreements	–	be	equally	shared	between	the	state,	the	Catalan	government	and	the	municipality,	but	in	the	case	of	Barcelona	around	80	per	cent	of	the	costs	are	effectively	covered	by	the	city	alone,	a	fact	that	the	local	government	 has	 referred	 to	 as	 “the	 historical	 deficit	 in	 financing	 municipal	responsibilities	for	policies	of	inclusion”	(Ajuntament	de	Barcelona,	2005,	p.61/2).		
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For	 migrants	 who	 irregularly	 reside	 in	 Barcelona,	 this	 means	 that	 at	 least	 in	principle,	 they	 can	access	 those	elements	of	social	 service	provision	 that	directly	depend	on	the	municipality,	as	the	director	of	the	city’s	Department	for	Immigration	
and	Interculturality	assured	me:		If	 you	are	 irregular	you	cannot	work,	or	at	 least	 [not]	 legally,	 and	[...]	 you	cannot	opt	for	any	of	the	regular	economic	benefits	like	the	RMI...	But	then	on	 the	 other	 hand,	 what	 we	 do	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 Municipality	 is...	 well,	anything	that	we	are	not	forbidden	[to	provide]	by	law	we	offer	also	to	them.	So,	a	person	who	has	these	needs	and	is	irregular	can	still	go	to	social	services	and	generally,	if	s/he	really	needs	it,	will	receive	help.	If	it’s	necessary	for	food	and	other	basic	needs…	 for	 these	basic	 things	not	only	does	[the	 law]	not	prohibit	this,	but	our	Social	Services	Law	says	very	clearly	that	everyone	has	
to	be	attended,	regardless	of	their	legal	status	(bcnA18).		The	 legal	 basis	 for	 this,	 however,	 is	 not	 only	 laid	 out	 by	municipal	 law	 but	 also	Spanish	immigration	 law,	which	stipulates	 that	all	 “foreigners,	regardless	of	 their	administrative	status,	are	entitled	to	basic	social	services	and	benefits”72.	For	the	director	of	one	of	the	city’s	40	social	service	centres	(SSC)	it	is	obvious	that	what	justifies	this	comparatively	open	access	for	irregular	migrants	is	the	immanent	link	between	an	individual’s	access	to	this	particular	kind	of	service	and	his	or	her	social	inclusion:		Of	course,	all	financial	aid	that	[comes]	from	the	City	Council	[…]	is	geared	towards	 inclusion.	 So,	 it	 addresses	 situations	 in	 which	 a	 family	 or	 an	individual	needs	support	for...	well,	to	be	able	to	function.	It	aims	at	[their]	social	 inclusion.	Obviously,	 these	 aids	 always	have	 to	 be	 linked	 to	 a	 basic	need,	or	more	or	less	basic,	such	as	the	Solidarity	Card	[‘Tarjeta	Solidaria’],	which	is	for	food,	so	very	basic;	but	there	could	also	be	some	help	to	buy	new	glasses,	for	example	(bcnA20).		Like	with	other	local	services,	what	ultimately	gives	access	to	such	support	is	the	claimant’s	 official	 –	 even	 though	 not	 necessarily	 legal	 –	 residence	 within	 the	municipality.	As	an	NGO	representative	who	also	works	as	intercultural	mediator	within	the	public	health	and	social	care	system	explained	to	me,	however,	the	lack	of	 specific	 documentation	 certifying	 local	 residence	 often	 constitutes	 a	 practical	barrier:		In	the	case	of	social	services,	whether	or	not	someone	has	access	to	a	benefit																																																									72	Art.	14(3)	of	Organic	Law	4/2000,	of	11	January,	on	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	foreigners	in	Spain	and	their	social	integration,	see:	http://noticias.juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/lo4-2000.t1.html#a14	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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–	whatever	type	of	benefit	–	is	strictly	conditional	on	[local]	registration.	It’s	not	enough	to	arrive	with	your	documentation,	 let's	say	the	national	 ID	of	Romania.	You	will	be	required	to	be	registered	and	show	the	certificate	of	regular	residence	[in	Barcelona]	[…].	And	if	you	don’t	meet	this	requirement	you	cannot	access	the	service	(bcnA10).	This	also	means	that	even	though	 irregular	migrants’	 formal	entitlement	to	basic	social	services	is,	in	principle,	uniform	across	the	country,	much	depends	on	where	exactly	they	live.	Since	the	immediate	costs	of	welfare	provision	tends	to	increase	with	 its	 inclusiveness,	 financial	 constraints	 often	 preclude	 this	 kind	 of	 local	investment	in	social	cohesion,	especially	in	the	wake	of	an	economic	crisis	and	if	it	means	spending	money	on	people	whose	deservingness	is	increasingly	questioned.	The	 following	 accounts	 of	 a	 social	 worker	 (1)	 and	 a	 migrant	 community	representative	 (2)	 reflect	 these	 limitations	 as	 well	 as	 the	 distinctiveness	 of	Barcelona	in	this	respect:		(1)	It	is	also	true	that	the	City	of	Barcelona	in	recent	years	has	stood	out	for	having	more	money	than	other	City	Councils.	The	law	says	that	local	support	
depends	on	each	city,	so	each	city	invents	what	it	wants.	In	recent	years,	during	the	crisis	[…],	we	have	disposed	of	money	to	be	able	to	do...	and	cover	things	that	in	other	municipalities,	smaller	or	with	another	economic	situation	[...]	could	 not	 be	 done.	 I	 have	 colleagues	 in	 the	 Prat	 [a	 municipality	 next	 to	Barcelona]	who	don’t	even	attend	[irregular]	immigrants	at	all.	But	this	is	not	so	much	a	policy	of	migration,	but	a	policy	of	‘there	is	no	money	for	almost	anything’	(bcnA20).		(2)	What	they	did	[in	Barcelona]	was	the	opposite:	raise	this	provision	so	that	all	the	people	who	used	to	receive	[support]	continue	to	receive	it	and	apart	from	that	the	ones	below	also	receive.	[...]	You	put	so	much	more	money	that	everyone	can	get	the	food	scholarship.	What	for?	So	that	the	one	who	had	it	and	would	 lose	 it	 does	 not	 blame	 the	 immigrants	 that	 now	he	 no	 longer	receives	it	because	of	them	(bcnA01).	Whereas	 in	 Spain	 and	 even	 within	 Catalonia	 irregular	migrants’	 access	 to	 basic	assistance	can	thus	significantly	vary	from	one	municipality	to	the	next,	in	the	UK	they	officially	have	‘No	Recourse	to	Public	Funds’	(NRPF)	wherever	they	live.	NRPF	is	a	condition	defined	under	 immigration	legislation	that	renders	certain	persons	who	are	‘subject	to	immigration	control’	ineligible	to	receive	any	public	support	or	benefit,	including	services	administered	directly	by	local	authorities	like	temporary	
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housing,	homelessness	support	or	basic	attendance	allowances73	(NRPF	Network,	2011;	Stephens	et	al.,	2010).	While	it	also	applies	to	increasing	numbers	of	‘regular’	immigrants	holding	a	temporary	residence	permit,	it	is	clearly	a	central	element	of	the	 government’s	 ‘hostile	 environment’	 approach	 to	 irregular	 migration.	 The	underlying	 rationale	 is	 that	 by	 increasing	 their	 risk	 of	 destitution,	 unlawful	residents	 including	 many	 refused	 asylum	 seekers	 might	 be	 persuaded	 to	 leave	‘voluntarily’,	even	though	a	growing	body	of	evidence	suggests	that	this	is	generally	not	the	case	(CORAM,	2013;	Crawley	et	al.,	2011;	Refugee	Council,	2012).		The	resulting	legal	framework	only	acknowledges	very	few	and	narrowly	defined	situations	–	mostly	if	minor	children	are	involved	–	in	which	unlawful	residents	can	avail	themselves	of	public	assistance:	if	a	family’s	asylum	claim	has	been	refused	but	there	are	 legal	or	practical	barriers	 impeding	 their	 removal,	 they	 can	 qualify	 for	(very	limited)	support	from	the	HO74.	Irregular	migrants	with	minor	children	who	have	never	claimed	asylum	but	are	destitute	(or	about	to	become	destitute)	might	instead	be	eligible	for	support	provided	directly	by	the	LA,	which	has	a	duty	under	Section	17	of	 the	Children	Act	1989,	 to	 ensure	 the	welfare	of	 every	 child	 in	need	within	its	jurisdiction	(CORAM,	2013;	NRPF	Network,	2011).	It	is	important	to	note	that	LAs	are	only	allowed	to	support	unlawful	residents	where	withholding	such	support	would	result	 in	a	breach	of	 the	child’s	(or	a	vulnerable	adult’s75)	human	rights.	Where	it	is	assessed	that	a	LA	is	responsible	for	a	particular	family,	however,	support	tends	to	go	well	beyond	the	rather	basic	and	fragmented	provision	that	local	social	services	in	Barcelona	would	be	able	to	offer	in	a	comparable	situation.		Another	policy	element	that	significantly	determines	the	effective	accessibility	of	a	service	 for	 unlawful	 residents	 and	 which	 clearly	 sets	 both	 cases	 apart	 is	 the	existence	(in	Spain)	and	lack	(in	Britain)	of	an	effective	firewall	between	local	social	services	 and	 national	 immigration	 enforcement	 agencies.	 Unlike	 in	 Spain,	 UK	immigration	law	places	a	legal	duty	on	local	authorities	“to	supply	information	for	the	purpose	of	establishing	where	a	person	is	if	the	Secretary	of	State	reasonably																																																									73	According	to	Section	115	of	the	Immigration	and	Asylum	Act	1999.	Primary	and	emergency	healthcare	and	compulsory	education	are	not	classified	as	‘public	funds’	in	this	respect.		74	Under	Section	4	or	95	of	the	Immigration	and	Asylum	Act	1999	(see	CORAM,	2013,	pp.14–16).		75	The	Care	Act	of	2014	establishes	a	similar	duty	towards	particularly	‘vulnerable	adults’,	whose	needs	do	not	just	arise	from	their	destitution	but	from	a	mental	or	physical	illness	or	disability	(NRPF	Network,	2015).		
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suspects”	 that	 a	 (former)	 resident	 of	 that	 area	 has	 committed	 an	 immigration	offence 76 .	 More	 specifically,	 the	 same	 law	 also	 requires	 the	 LA	 to	 inform	 the	immigration	 enforcement	 agency	 if	 an	 unlawful	 resident	 requests	 support	 from	social	services	(NRPF	Network,	2011).	The	therefore	often	well-founded	fear	on	the	part	 of	 irregular	 migrant	 families	 represents	 a	 significant	 additional	 barrier	 to	accessing	or	even	approaching	a	 service	 that	 they	might	well	be	entitled	 to,	 as	a	practitioner	working	for	the	Children’s	Society	in	London	asserted:		There	 is	 a	bit	of	 reluctance	 that	 sometimes	you	 find	with	 families	 to	even	approach	social	services	in	the	first	place.	So	even	when	we	sit	down	with	them	and	explain	the	situation	and	the	kind	of	support	 that	 they	might	be	able	to	provide	to	them,	and	that	it	is	the	LA’s	duty	to	support	them,	then	they	are	still	quite	reluctant.	And	I	think	that’s	because	they	don’t	want	the	Home	Office	finding	out.	And	we	always	have	to	[…]	explain	that	the	Home	Office	will;	you	know,	if	we	refer	a	family	to	social	services	it	will	be	reported	to	the	Home	Office	in	one	way	or	another	(lonA22).		Also	 several	 other	 interviewees	 suggested	 that	 what	 they	 perceived	 as	 varying	degrees	of	reluctance	among	migrant	families	generally	seems	to	correspond	with	their	actual	deportability	and	their	legal	prospects	of	eventually	being	regularised.		Among	the	people	I	interviewed	in	Barcelona,	in	contrast,	the	respective	firewall	was	generally	perceived	as	intact.	In	combination	with	the	comparatively	smaller	overall	chance	of	irregular	residence	leading	to	deportation	(see	section	4.1),	this	explains	the	much	lower	level	of	fear	among	irregular	migrants	to	approach	social	services	in	 the	 first	 place.	 The	 following	 accounts	 of	 two	 social	 workers	 I	 interviewed	together	(1)	and	a	recent	 irregular	 immigrant	from	Morocco	(2)	seem	to	confirm	this:		 (1)[Social	worker	1:]	 I	 think	that	 they	come	here	 fairly	calm	in	this	sense.	Some	are	rather	demanding	sometimes,	it’s	rather	the	other	way	around:	that	they	are	mounting	quite	a	show,	and	they	are	very	demanding	at	times…		[Social	 worker	 2:]	 I	 think	 they	 are	 very	 aware	 that	 everything	 that	 is	immigration	depends	on	the	central	government	and	[that]	we	are	only	the	City	Council.	Another	thing	is	the	level	of	exigency	that	they	exhibit	because	of	this	message	that	they	receive…	that	they	are	citizens	of	BCN...	(bcnA20).		(2)	 [At	social	services]	 they	nonetheless	help	people.	Before,	 I	didn’t	 think	this	service	was	for	people	like	me...	because	we	don’t	have	that	[in	Morocco].																																																									76	Section	129	of	the	Nationality,	Immigration	and	Asylum	Act	2002,	see:	http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/41/section/129	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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I	had	no	idea	that	there	are	people	who	help	other	people	who	don’t	have	papers.	You	understand	me?	But	thanks	to	God,	Spain	has	this;	[…]	I	didn’t	know	anything	about	the	rights	in	this	country,	[…but]	little	by	little	you	find	out	(bcnB05).		In	 the	UK,	no	equivalent	right	exists	per	se,	but	can	only	be	activated	under	very	particular	 circumstances	 and	 trough	 a	 statutory	 assessment	 procedure	 that	automatically	 reveals	 the	 claimant’s	 situation	 to	 the	 national	 immigration	authorities.	As	a	result,	most	of	irregular	migrants’	needs	in	terms	of	ad-hoc	support	either	 have	 to	 be	 covered	 within	 their	 own	 kinship	 or	 community	 networks	 or	picked	up	by	the	Third	Sector.	The	former	tends	to	be	unsustainable	and	due	to	a	lack	 of	 scrutiny	 can	 increase	 already	 vulnerable	 individuals’	 risk	 of	 exploitation,	mistreatment	 and	 abuse.	 The	 latter,	 in	 turn,	 puts	 additional	pressure	on	 already	over-burdened	local	community	organisations	and	charities	struggling	to	provide	mainstream	poverty	relief,	food	hand-outs	or	night	shelters	(Butler,	2016).	During	my	time	as	a	volunteer	for	the	Hackney	Migrant	Centre,	the	rapidly	growing	demand	for	the	weekly	advice	and	support	service	repeatedly	made	it	necessary	to	replace	the	open	drop-in	session	with	a	system	that	required	‘visitors’	to	queue,	sometimes	for	more	than	an	hour,	in	order	to	be	seen	by	a	professional	advisor.	It	also	became	increasingly	difficult	to	refer	people	to	other	agencies	and	services	(both	private	and	public),	and	this	was	quite	often	precisely	due	to	their	unsettled	immigration	status.			
7.2.2. Irregular	migrants’	access	to	substantial	and	longer-term	support	Both	 in	 Britain	 and	 Spain	 most	 mainstream	 social	 benefits	 are	 under	 central	government	 control	 –	 by	 the	 (UK)	 Department	 for	 Work	 and	 Pensions	 or	 the	(Spanish)	 Ministry	 of	 Work	 and	 Social	 Security,	 respectively	 –	 which	 generally	excludes	 foreigners	 in	 irregular	 situations.	 This	 is	 true	 for	 the	 pension	 system,	regular	unemployment	support	and	the	provision	of	social	housing	as	well	as	child,	family	and	other	benefits	or	tax	credits.	In	Spain,	the	public	welfare	net	also	relies	significantly	on	minimum	income	(support)	schemes	administered	at	the	level	of	the	17	Autonomous	Communities,	which	also	determine	the	corresponding	eligibility	criteria	and	payment	rates.	This	non-contributory,	means-tested	but	generally	low	
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financial	 support77	precisely	aims	at	 the	 social	 inclusion	of	 those	not	 (or	not	any	more)	 covered	 by	 the	 national	 unemployment	 and	 social	 security	 system.	 In	exchange	 for	 support	 the	 beneficiaries	 are	 obliged	 to	 work	 towards	 their	occupational	(re-)integration.		The	Catalan	Minimum	Insertion	Income	 (‘Renta	Mínima	de	 Inserción’,	RMI)	can	be	claimed	 by	 anyone	who	 can	 prove	 a	 lack	 of	 financial	means	 and	 social	 security	coverage	as	well	as	continuous	registration	in	Catalonia	during	the	preceding	two	years.	 In	addition,	 and	unlike	ad-hoc	 support	by	 social	 services,	 eligibility	 is	 also	strictly	contingent	on	legal	residence	in	Spain78.	 In	this	case	it	is	Catalan	law	that	explicitly	extends	irregular	migrants’	exclusion	from	the	contributory	into	the	non-contributory	sphere	of	mainstream	social	security;	and	from	the	national	to	the	local	level	of	service	delivery.	Interestingly	however,	while	this	puts	clear	legal	limits	on	the	 provision	 of	 more	 substantial	 services	 and	 resources	 to	 migrants	 living	irregularly	 in	Barcelona,	 the	 logic	 of	 local	 residence	 as	 the	 principal	 criterion	 of	eligibility	 is	 thereby	 not	 completely	 dismissed.	 A	 social	 worker	 gave	me	 a	 good	example	of	this:		The	 RMI	 is	 regulated	 by	 law,	 like	 unemployment	 benefits,	 and	 the	 first	requirement	is	to	have	been	registered	for	two	years	in	Catalonia	and	have	permission	[to	reside]	at	the	time	of	the	application.	In	other	words	–	and	I	did	have	cases,	especially	where	permits	are	obtained	because	of	a	serious	illness	[…]	which	is	a	residence	permit	but	no	work	permit	–	once	they	have	the	residence	permit	and	[if]	they	have	been	living	in	Catalonia	for	two	years,	they	can	[apply	for]	the	RMI,	from	the	first	day	they	have	their	NIE	in	hand.	But	it’s	a	legal	requirement	[to]	have	a	NIE.	If	you	don’t	[…]	you	cannot	access	it	(bcnA22).	This	means	that	irregular	but	officially	registered	residence	in	a	locality	does	count	towards	the	minimum	residence	period	required	by	Catalan	law.	The	length	of	this	residence	 is	measured	via	 the	municipal	register,	which	does	not	even	record	 its	lawfulness	under	national	immigration	law.	What	matters	is	the	effective	previous	residence	in	a	place.	It	also	shows	that	the	idea	of	irregular	residents	nonetheless	being	‘citizens	of	Barcelona’	is	not	just	an	empty	message	they	receive	–	as	one	of	the	 social	 workers	 quoted	 earlier	 had	 called	 it	 –	 but	 one	 that	 is	 accommodated	
																																																								77	Rates	vary	but	remain	significantly	below	the	national	minimum	income	threshold.		78	Explicitly	set	out	in	Art.	6.1(b)	of	Ley	10/1997,	de	3	de	juli,	de	la	Renta	Mínima	de	Inserción.		
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within	 the	 legal	 framework	 itself	 and	 can	 thus	 be	 made	 effective	 in	 everyday	practice.		In	 the	UK	context,	 the	official	message	that	 irregular	migrants	–	as	well	as	public	service	providers	who	are	confronted	with	their	needs	–	receive	is	very	different:	They	are	very	explicitly	not	considered	citizens	(neither	of	London	nor	the	UK)	and	their	accessing	of	any	state	support	or	social	assistance	–	even	if	provided	locally	–	can	only	constitute	an	exception	from	the	general	rule	that	demands	their	absolute	exclusion.	In	this	sense,	the	(administrative)	function	of	certain	migrants’	having	‘No	
Recourse	 to	Public	Funds’	 is	 also	a	 symbolic	one,	 as	 it	demonstrates	 to	 the	wider	public	that	because	of	their	irregularity	(or	limited	right	of	residence)	they	cannot	benefit	from	any	public	spending.	It	not	only	hides	the	fact	that	they	do	have	access	to	schooling	and	basic	healthcare,	for	example,	but	also	generates	confusion	about	the	 relationship	 between	 NRPF	 and	 so-called	 Section-17-support	 for	 vulnerable	families	 in	 irregular	 situations.	 The	 following	 quotes	 from	 interviews	 with	 a	representative	of	 the	Children’s	 Society	 (1)	and	a	 local	Councillor	 responsible	 for	social	policy	and	housing	(2)	demonstrate	this:	(1)	I	still	hear	all	the	time	from	[LAs’]	Duty	and	Assessment	teams	that	‘oh	no,	no,	we	can’t	support	them,	they	are	NRPF’;	and	when	you	say,	 ‘oh	well,	that’s	not	correct,	you	need	to	look	into	it	and	do	a	human	rights	assessment’,	they	don’t	know	what	we’re	talking	about	and	they	are	just…	they	are	very	much	like	‘Oh	no,	no,	no,	we	can’t	support,	if	they’ve	got	NRPF	we	can’t	provide	
any	support’	(lonA22).			(2)	We	have	got	 this	 issue	 in	[the	Borough],	which	 is	happening	 in	 lots	of	other	London	Boroughs	as	well,	where	you	have	people	who	have	come	here,	who	 don’t	 have	 Leave	 to	 Remain	 but	 are	 still	 here,	 and	 there	 is	 some	 EU	
legislation	which	I	am	sure	you	are	aware	of,	where	if	they	have	children	that	are	born	here,	then	they	can	claim	money	while	their	cases	are	being	sorted	out	(lonA21).		Fact	is	that	neither	does	the	child	have	to	be	born	in	the	UK	(or	be	a	British	or	EU	citizen)	nor	 is	 it	EU	 law	 that	 establishes	 this	 entitlement;	but	what	 these	quotes	show	quite	well	is	how	difficult	it	is	–	even	for	expert	practitioners	and	politicians	working	in	this	field	–	to	understand	that	UK	legislation	not	only	allows	but	can	even	demand	 the	 provision	 of	 social	 assistance	 to	what	 the	 government	 keeps	 calling	‘illegal	immigrants’	with	‘No	Recourse	to	Public	Funds’.	This	is	in	line	with	findings	of	Price	&	Spencer	 (2015,	p.29)	whereas	 the	NRPF-label	 increases	 the	 likelihood	of	
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certain	physical	or	mental	health	needs	and	even	child	protection	concerns	to	be	inadequately	addressed	by	statutory	services.	Quite	clearly,	the	exclusion	of	certain	migrants	threatens	to	undermine	the	important	role	that	social	services	have	to	play	for	society	as	a	whole.		It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 recall	 that	 Section-17-support	 is	meant	 to	 be	 a	 transitory	measure	until	certain	irregularities	of	a	client’s	situation	can	be	resolved	and	his	or	her	needs	then	covered	by	mainstream	support	or	benefits.	The	legally	complex	and	protracted	 situation	 that	 irregular	 migrant	 families	 usually	 find	 themselves	 in,	however,	often	means	a	quite	substantial	and	rather	persistent	financial	burden	for	the	 responsible	LA.	Data	 collected	by	Price	&	 Spencer	 (2015,	p.51)	suggests	 that	more	than	one	third	of	NRPF	cases	remain	in	LA	support	for	between	one	and	three	years.	In	the	absence	of	any	additional	support	from	the	community	or	charities,	the	LA	 is	 supposed	 to	 cover	 the	 full	 costs	 of	 living	 (including	 privately	 rented	accommodation)	 until	 the	 immigration	 case	 is	 resolved,	 i.e.	 the	 family	 is	 either	regularised	or	deported.	Support	cannot	be	refused	solely	on	the	basis	of	insufficient	municipal	 funds,	nor	will	 the	LA	be	 reimbursed	by	 the	 state	 for	 these	additional	expenditures	(NRPF	Network,	2011).	Based	on	the	argument	that	this	would	create	an	additional	pull-factor	for	irregular	immigration	to	the	UK,	the	Home	Office	has	repeatedly	rejected	various	local	authorities’	requests	for	reimbursement	(Price	&	Spencer,	2015,	p.23).		This	 represents	 an	 additional	 challenge	 for	 LAs,	 not	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 their	responsibilities	towards	their	(regular)	residents	but	also	as	organisations	whose	legitimacy	hinges	on	democratic	elections,	as	one	Council	worker	emphasised:		There	is	a	skewing	of	resources	away	from	the	types	and	categories	of	people	that	 those	 legislations	 were	 originally	 designed	 to	 help,	 towards	 people	whose	only	 reason	 [for]	 approaching	support	 is	 that	 the	government	says	they	can’t	work	and	they	can’t	claim	benefits.	And	that	is	problematic	for	a	political	organisation,	and	particularly	at	a	 time	when	 it	has	to	make	huge	cuts	 in	 budgets.	 We	 have	 to	 be	 mindful	 of	 how	 that	 is	 received	 and	understood	by	our	electorate;	that	is	hugely	problematic	(lonA30).		Interestingly,	 what	 really	 underpins	 a	 particular	 LA’s	 statutory	 responsibility	 to	provide	Section-17-support	 to	a	destitute	 family	 is	–	 just	 like	 in	Barcelona	–	 their	effective	residence	in	the	neighbourhood,	which	is	independent	of	formal	or	political	membership.	In	practice,	however,	it	can	only	be	provided	on	the	basis	of	complex	
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assessments	of	the	family’s	destitution,	the	child’s	concrete	needs	and	the	existence	of	a	human	rights	breach	that	would	ensue	if	support	were	withheld.	This	makes	it	very	 difficult	 for	 families	 to	 enact	 their	 right	 to	 such	 support	 and	 thus	 creates	 a	significant	 divergence	 between	 law	 and	 practice,	 as	 two	 NGO	 practitioners	who	regularly	help	families	through	this	process	told	me:		There	are	a	lot	of	discrepancies	between	different	LAs	and	also	there	are	a	lot	of	families	who	just	don’t	know	that	they	can	access	that	support.	[…]	And	if	they	do	know	about	it,	they	might	still	be	denied	and	wouldn’t	necessarily	get	the	legal	support	to	challenge	the	LA	to	be	able	to	actually	exercise	their	rights.	So	that’s	the	kind	of	area	where	I	think	you	see	the	legislation	is	there,	
but	the	practice	is	a	very	mixed	picture	(lonA10).			[LAs]	are	going	to	want	evidence	of	immigration	status,	so	if	you	have	put	in	a	claim	[for	LTR]	they	want	the	acknowledged	letter	and	they	want	the	actual	application,	[…]	they	want	evidence	of	destitution,	so	if	you	are	being	evicted	they	will	normally	want	to	wait	until	you	get	the	eviction	warrant,	or	if	you	are	staying	with	friends	and	they	are	asking	you	to	leave	then	letters	from	the	friend	or	letters	from	people	who	have	been	supporting	you	(lonA04).		In	spite	of	how	difficult	it	is	in	practice	to	gain	access	to	this	kind	of	support,	the	overall	 financial	pressure	that	 it	particularly	 implies	 for	LAs	 in	London	has	risen	steeply	 over	 the	 last	 couple	 of	 years.	 What	 certainly	 has	 contributed	 to	 this	development	 is	 that	 many	 of	 the	 measures	 that	 the	 current	 and	 previous	governments	enacted	 in	order	to	reduce	the	number	of	unlawful	residents	 in	 the	country	have	made	it	more	difficult,	particularly	for	families,	to	support	themselves.	This	increased	the	likelihood	of	them	having	to	fall	back	on	support	from	local	social	services,	as	one	of	the	social	workers	I	spoke	to	noted:		Every	time	they	have	a	refusal	from	the	HO,	or	their	ability	to	exist	outside	contact	with	public	services	is	restricted	–	so	every	time	there	are	cuts	in	the	right	to	work,	every	time	there	are	changes	in	access	to	housing,	every	time	there	are	rules	coming	in	about	the	shadow	economy	–	it	funnels	all	down	to	the	LA.	[…]	So	the	issue	around	managed	migration	and	its	functioning	or	lack	
of	functioning	has	a	massive	impact	on	local	services	and	[is]	a	drain	on	our	
resources,	and	it’s	getting	worse	all	the	time	(lonA30).	While	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 that	 shows	 that	 this	 approach	 has	 provoked	 the	‘voluntary	 departure’	 of	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 irregular	 migrants,	 as	 the	government	hopes,	it	does	curtail	the	ability	of	local	institutions	to	protect	the	most	vulnerable	 members	 of	 society	 from	 destitution,	 abuse	 and	 social	 exclusion,	 let	alone	 support	 their	 successful	 reintegration.	 The	 following	 sections	 look	 at	 how	
		
196	
individual	 street-level	 bureaucrats	 who	 either	 administer	 or	 provide	 social	assistance	at	the	local	level	perceive	and	deal	with	these	challenges.		
 
7.3. Negotiating	the	effective	limits	of	vulnerability,	deservingness	and	
immigration	control:	the	role(s)	and	agency	of	social	assistance	
workers	
7.3.1. Administrators	of	social	assistance	and	protection	Just	like	in	the	spheres	of	healthcare	and	education,	it	is	those	actors	who	locally	administer	 social	 assistance	 and	 protection	 rather	 than	 those	 actually	 providing	them	to	the	user,	that	are	doing	most	of	the	everyday	gatekeeping.	That	said,	it	must	be	 noted	 that	 in	 the	 case	 of	 social	 assistance	 even	 the	 initial	 determination	 of	 a	client’s	eligibility	often	requires	professional	training	and	experience,	which	slightly	blurs	my	distinction	between	administrative	(e.g.	reception)	staff	and	professionals	(social	workers).		Particularly	in	the	British	context,	the	strict	formal	exclusion	of	irregular	migrants	from	 mainstream	 social	 assistance	 and	 protection	 also	 significantly	 limits	 the	discretion	 of	 local	 authorities	 and	 individual	 welfare	 workers	 to	 effectively	renegotiate	access	to	locally	funded	support	measures.	Whereas	the	municipality	of	Barcelona	has	–	with	a	view	to	maintaining	social	inclusion	and	community	cohesion	–	extended	basic	social	service	provision	beyond	the	scope	of	national	and	Catalan	law,	UK	legislation	generally	precludes	such	extension	of	local	welfare	rights79.	The	only	exception	is	where	LAs	themselves	assess	that	not	addressing	the	needs	of	a	destitute	child	(or	vulnerable	adult)	living	within	their	jurisdiction	would	amount	to	 a	 human	 rights	 breach.	 While	 these	 assessments	 open	 up	 some	 room	 for	individual	 discretion,	 the	 tremendous	 financial	 pressure	 under	 which	 such	decisions	have	to	be	taken	renders	inclusionary	interpretations	of	the	access	rules	rather	 unlikely.	 The	 following	 accounts	 of	 a	 Council	 worker	 (1)	 and	 an	 NGO	practitioner	(2)	clearly	reflect	both	of	these	aspects:		
																																																								79	Section	7(1)	of	the	Local	Authority	Social	Services	Act	1970	establishes	that	“[l]ocal	authorities	shall,	in	the	exercise	of	their	social	services	functions,	including	the	exercise	of	any	discretion	[…],	act	under	the	general	guidance	of	the	Secretary	of	State”,	see:	http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1970/42	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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(1)	There	is	a	lot	of...	opportunity	for	discretion	and	for	interpretation,	and	people	can	be	 lucky	and	perhaps	access	somebody	who	 is	 in	a	good	mood	that	day	and	who	might	feel	like	allowing	them	access	to	something	without	perhaps	 probing	 so	 deeply.	 But	more	 generally	 it	 seems	 that	 increasingly	
people	 are	meeting	 gatekeepers	 who	 are	 very	 worried	 about	 not	 exceeding	
what	they	are	allowed	to	give	and	very	concerned	about	making	sure	that	all	the	procedures	are	very	 strictly	adhered	 to;	 and	 that	 can	 result	 in	people	being	actually	excluded	from	a	service	or	a	provision	to	which	in	fact	they	were	entitled	(lonA27).		(2)	Very	often	we	see	gatekeeping	practices;	because	 the	money	 spent	on	families	through	Section	17	is	not	reimbursed	by	central	government	[but]	comes	out	of	[LAs’]	own	budgets	there	is	a	lot	of	pressure	on	them	to	kind	of	
hold	their	money	tight.	So	they	are	unwilling	to	spend	it	and	very	often	if	you	start	carrying	out	an	assessment	you	have	to	eventually	provide	support.	So,	
the	easiest	way	for	LAs	to	avoid	spending	money	is	just	to	at	the	very	first	stage	
say	 ‘there	 is	 nothing	we	 can	 do’.	 And	 they	 do	 things	 like	 threaten	 to	 take	children	 into	 care,	 saying	 it’s	 not	 their	 responsibility	 but	 another	 LA’s	responsibility,	saying	‘oh	you	have	got	NRPF,	so	we	can’t	help	you’	or	‘you	got	no	leave	to	remain’…	you	know,	whatever	it	is,	they	will	sometimes	just	think	
of	an	excuse	(lonA04).		The	study	of	Price	&	Spencer	(2015,	p.35)	highlights	the	wide	range	of	reasons	given	by	 Council	workers	 for	 rejecting	 applicants	 already	 at	 screening	 stage,	 and	 their	findings	 underline	 the	 fact	 that	 once	 a	 case	 is	 admitted	 for	 a	 statutory	 needs	assessment	the	most	likely	outcome	is	that	support	will	have	to	be	provided.	Other	reports	show	that	the	general	reluctance	of	LAs	is	also	underpinned	by	a	widespread	perception	 that	 offering	 support	 to	 a	 family	 that	 lives	 in	 the	 UK	 unlawfully	will	reduce	the	likelihood	of	them	returning	‘voluntarily’	(or	at	all)	to	their	country	of	origin	(CORAM,	2013).	One	of	the	Council	workers	I	interviewed	clearly	expressed	this	feeling:		Increasingly	LAs	are	being	seen	by	applicants	and	[their]	advisors,	to	a	large	extent,	as	a	means	by	which	someone,	particularly	if	they	have	a	child,	can	continue	 to	 remain	 in	 the	UK,	but	without	having	 to	be	 involved	with	 the	Home	Office,	and	that	is	in	itself	a	huge	issue	for	us.	Because	actually	that’s	not	our	 role,	our	purpose	 is	not	 to	 facilitate	 someone	 to	be	allowed	 to	 stay,	
when	 they	 have	 reached	 the	 end	 of	 the	 road	 as	 far	 as	 the	 Home	 Office	 is	
concerned,	 just	because	actually	removal	of	 families	 is	 technically	difficult;	and	 nor	 is	 it	 our	 role	 to	 facilitate	 them	 being	 able	 to	 make	 multiple	applications,	 which	 they	 wouldn’t	 be	 able	 to	 do	 if	 they	 weren’t	 being	supported	by	us	(lonA30).		For	most	families	in	this	situation,	however,	return	is	not	a	viable	option	and	“very	often	[they]	 just	go	and	live	 in	destitution	 in	order	to	avoid	[…]	dealing	with	this	
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[social	 service]	 department	 that	 they	 see	 as	 really	 hostile”	 (lonA04),	 as	 an	 NGO	practitioner	described	her	experience.	Those	who	do	make	such	claims	increasingly	have	 to	 be	 accompanied	 by	 a	 privately	 contracted	 lawyer	 or	 specialised	 NGO	 in	order	 not	 to	 be	 ‘put	 off	 that	 easily’,	 as	 a	 representative	 of	 the	Children’s	 Society	emphasised:		When	they’re	going	on	their	own,	those	tactics	are	often	used.	So,	what	we	do	is	we	tend	to	put	a	written	referral	in,	so	that	there	is	a	paper	trail	of	the	act	and	all	their	circumstances	have	been	documented,	it’s	written,	it’s	been	sent	in	through	the	correct	channels	and	we	can	chase	it	up	with	them	(lonA22).		Just	 like	 the	 official	 exclusion	 of	 irregular	 migrants	 living	 in	 London	 is	 not	 as	straightforward	as	their	NRPF-condition	suggests,	also	their	formal	inclusion	in	the	case	of	Barcelona	is	mediated	through	administrative	gatekeeping	practices	that	can	lead	to	(informal)	exclusion.	Basic	documentary	requirements	–	while	necessary	in	order	to	establish	service	users’	identity	–	represent	the	first	potential	barrier,	as	the	director	of	a	SSC	in	Ciutat	Vella	noted:		Well	 usually	 when	 they	 come	 to	 ask	 for	 an	 appointment	 they	 identify	themselves.	We	ask	for	a	document	to	identify	them,	to	know	who	this	person	
is.	And	so,	they	show	us	an	identity	card	[DNI],	or	their	residence	permit,	or	the	 passport.	 If	 someone	 presents	 a	 passport	 it’s	 because	 s/he	 doesn’t	 have	
anything	else,	so...	that	already	tells	you.	[...]	It	is	also	not	to	duplicate,	so	when	you	come	with	your	DNI	or	your	NIE	or	your	passport	and	we	open	your	file,	we	can	see	if	you	are	being	attended	in	[another	SSC]	at	the	same	time.	What	we	are	not	going	to	do	is	attend	you	in	two	places	at	once	(bcnA20).		While	this	is	a	common	way	in	which	welfare	bureaucrats	including	receptionists	regularly	‘happen	to	find	out’	about	the	irregularity	of	a	(potential)	client’s	residence	in	Spain,	it	does	not	prevent	them	from	normally	administering	that	person’s	access	to	at	least	the	most	basic	forms	of	support,	as	another	interviewee	clarified:		People	can	come	and	say,	'well	I'm	here	but	I	don’t	have	a	[residence]	permit,	I	only	have	a	passport',	so	they	identify	with	their	passport	and	we	open	a	file	with	the	passport	number,	just	like	someone	else	with	the	DNI	or	NIE.	And	from	 there	 they	 are	 treated	 just	 like	 any	 other	 person	 but	 within	 the	
limitations	that	the	law	imposes	(bcnA22).		What	he	also	hints	at	is	that	the	legal	framework	leaves	less	room	for	renegotiating	irregular	migrants’	 access	 to	more	 substantial	 support	 like	mainstream	benefits.	
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Only	in	some	cases	can	these	limitations	at	least	partially	be	bypassed	or	attenuated	by	individual	workers	taking	into	account	the	client’s	specific	situation	and	social	context	and	thus	interpreting	the	rules	more	flexibly,	like	in	the	case	of	mixed-status	families:		In	the	case	of	[irregular	migrants]	it	is	obviously	more	likely	that	they	remain	at	 the	 primary	 level	 [of	 support],	 because	 since	 they	will	 only	 qualify	 for	sporadic	assistance,	you	cannot	really	make	a	work	plan...	But	if	it’s	a	family	where	one	doesn’t	have	a	residence	permit	but	the	other	does,	then	you	can	make	a	work	plan,	and	you	can	even	process	a	benefit	like	the	RMI	for	the	person	who	has	 the	permit,	 even	 if	 the	other	 is	 administratively	 irregular	(bcnA21).		Local	 social	 services	 in	 Barcelona	 are	 not	 only	 ‘allowed	 to	work	with’	 clients	 in	irregular	situations,	but	they	can	also	play	a	crucial	role	within	the	process	of	their	regularisation	and	thus	the	overall	management	of	(irregular)	migration	to	Spain.	Part	of	this	role	consists	in	facilitating	municipal	registration	for	people	without	a	permanent	 address,	 as	 an	 employee	 of	 a	 CSS	 in	 another	 district	 of	 Barcelona	explained	to	me:		We	can	produce	a	document	that	says	that	we	know	that	this	person	resides	
in	the	city,	and	with	this	document	and	an	ID	–	which	can	be	their	passport	–	they	go	to	City	Hall	or	the	local	municipal	office	in	their	district	and	there	they	are	registered	‘without	fixed	abode’.	This	has	the	same	effect	as	a	registration	with	permanent	address,	only	that	 it	won’t	show	your	address	and	so	you	won’t	receive	the	letters	that	City	Hall	may	send	you.	For	example,	here	in	[the	district]	the	address	of	someone	registered	‘without	fixed	abode’	is	that	of	this	centre,	so	of	course	there	are	thousands	of	letters	that	are	lost,	except	someone	tells	you,	or	 is	well	known,	or	comes	to	collect	 them,	so	 it’s	very	complicated	(bcnA22).	While	this	arrangement	thus	creates	some	extra	work	for	local	welfare	bureaucrats	and	requires	a	certain	level	of	cooperation	and	information	exchange	with	City	Hall,	it	is	generally	not	perceived	as	part	of	immigration	control,	as	the	following	extract	from	an	interview	with	two	social	workers	indicates:		[Social	worker	1:]	Immigration	control	would	be	if	 I	were	forced	to	report	this	person	who	is	irregular	and	then	the	police	came	and	took	him...		[Interviewer:]	…but	that	doesn’t	happen?		[Social	worker	2:]	No.	That's	what	I	was	trying	to	explain:	It's	that	the	whole	issue	 of	 immigration...	 depends	 a	 lot	 on	 how	 it	 works	 in	 any	 particular	country	of	 Europe	 and	 the	 issue	 of	 social	 services	 is	 sometimes	 linked	 to	immigration,	whereas	here	it’s	a	part	that	is	disconnected	[…]	[Social	worker	1:]	And	obviously	they	would	stop	to	come;	 if	I	tell	you	that	I	
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have	to	inform	[the	police]	you	are	not	going	to	come	to	me.	Or	if	I	put	you	into	 the	 system	 and	 that	 [raises	 a	 red	 flag]	 and	 the	 police	 comes	 to	 your	house…	well,	you	better	not	come	(bcnA21).			The	 latter	 statement	 once	 again	 highlights	 welfare	 bureaucrats’	 awareness	 that	much	of	the	effectiveness	of	social	service	provision	hinges	on	the	clients’	trust	that	without	their	consent	no	information	about	their	identity,	immigration	(or	other)	status	or	whereabouts	will	be	passed	on	to	the	police	or	other	authority.		As	 already	 mentioned,	 this	 is	 what	 fundamentally	 sets	 the	 case	 apart	 from	 the	British	context,	where	no	such	 firewall	 is	 in	place.	 Instead,	 the	 legal	obligation	to	inform	 the	 immigration	 authority	 of	 any	 ‘reasonable	 suspicion’	 of	 a	 potential	immigration	offence	extends	into	the	sphere	of	local	social	service	provision,	where	it	has	important	implications	for	how	individual	gatekeepers	deal	with	this	client	group.	The	internal	guidance	from	a	London	Council’s	Safeguarding	Children	Board	on	what	it	calls	“Inter-agency	Information	regarding	NRPF	Families”	clearly	states	that	“[i]f	there	is	a	family	that	comes	to	the	attention	of	the	Local	Authority	and	it	is	discovered	 they	are	 in	 the	UK	unlawfully,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 legal	duty	on	 the	Local	Authority	 to	 inform	 the	Home	Office	of	 their	whereabouts”	 (emphasis	added).	 In	practice,	such	information	can	be	exchanged	through	so-called	 ‘local	 immigration	teams’,	which	the	UK	Border	Agency	established	in	2008	as	a	way	of	“bringing	our	people	closer	to	the	communities	we	serve”	(cit.	in	Vine,	2010,	p.7;	see	also	NRPF	Network,	 2011,	 p.12).	 In	 addition,	 and	 following	 the	 initiative	 of	 various	 LAs	 in	London,	 the	NRPF	network	 set	up	a	 computerised	 system	called	NRPF	connect80,	which	a	Council	worker	described	to	me	as	a	database	used	by	LAs	to	record	the	cases	that	they	are	supporting	and	to	share	 that	 data	with	 the	Home	Office;	 and	 indeed,	 for	 the	Home	Office	 to	provide	immigration	information	to	look	at	how	they	can	progress	cases,	so	that	you	move	them	on	towards	grants	of	status	or	indeed	move	them	on	to	removals	and	start	 family	removal	processes	[…]	where	we	feel	 that	 there	are	no	barriers	and	that	return	should	be	pursued	(lonA15).		LAs	are	charged	an	annual	fee	of	£2,000	for	using	this	system	while	the	Home	Office	contributes	to	its	maintenance.	What	already	becomes	clear	is	that	this	cooperation	
																																																								80	The	project	was	initiated	by	the	NRPF	Network	in	2006	and	by	September	2016	had	been	joined	by	a	total	of	45	local	authorities,	including	25	(of	33)	London	Boroughs,	see:	http://www.nrpfnetwork.org.uk/nrpfconnect/Pages/default.aspx	(last	accessed	15/12/2017).		
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is	not	just	based	on	a	one-way	obligation,	but	rather	seems	to	benefit	both	sides:	On	one	hand,	it	certainly	helps	the	Home	Office	to	keep	track	of	or	detect	new	cases	of	unlawful	residence,	including	people	who	have	‘absconded’	following	the	rejection	of	 their	 claims	 for	 asylum	 or	 LTR.	 On	 the	 other,	 it	 allows	 the	 LA	 to	 reduce	 the	pressure	on	its	welfare	budget	by	discouraging	potential	clients	from	even	applying	for	support.	In	addition,	they	can	verify	not	only	the	immigration	status	of	those	who	do	apply,	but	also	their	declarations	regarding	any	alternative	sources	of	support	that	could	prevent	their	destitution	and	thus	absolve	the	LA	from	its	duty	towards	them,	 as	 several	 of	 my	 interviewees,	 including	 a	 case	 worker	 for	 the	 Children’s	
Society,	mentioned:			There’s	a	few	things	that	social	services	tend	to	use	to	try	and	put	people	and	families	off,	and	the	first	one	being	that	connection	with	the	Home	Office;	[…]	and	 there	 is	 fear	 sometimes	 among	 families,	 and	 particularly	 when	 their	[immigration]	claim	is	around	them	having	family	and	friends	and	a	private	life	here	in	the	UK	and	then	they	approach	social	services	saying	‘I’ve	got	no	support,	no	family	or	friends	who	can	help	me	out’...	I	think	sometimes	there	is	that	worry	that	that	might	actually	have	a	negative	impact	on	the	outcome	of	the	claim	(lonA22).		Having	this	close	relationship	with	the	Home	Office,	in	combination	with	the	slow	decision-making	of	the	latter,	thus	seems	to	push	individual	gatekeepers	to	question	even	more	the	deservingness	of	irregular	migrant	families	and	to	treat	their	claims	as	illegitimate	or	at	least	suspicious.	The	following	accounts	of	an	NGO	practitioner	(1)	and	a	Council	worker	(2)	exemplify	this:		(1)	If	they	are	taking	four	years	to	make	a	decision	and	the	person	isn’t	able	to	access	any	services	in	the	meantime,	nor	to	access	benefits	or	work,	then	that’s	going	to	fall	on	the	LA.	And	I	think	there	is	an	incentive	in	a	way	for	the	
LA	to	inform	the	Home	Office	about	a	person	who	is	‘appeal	rights	exhausted’,	because	then	they	would	speed	up	removal	and	they	won’t	have	to	support	them	anymore	(lonA16).			(2)	Our	relationship	with	the	Home	Office	is	an	interesting	one,	because	part	
of	 it	 is	 working	 together.	We	 are	 two	 statutory	 organisations,	 […]	we	 are	spending	tax-payers’	money	on	providing	financial	support	and	we	are	keen	to	 make	 sure	 that	 if	 there	 is	 a	 ‘genuine	 claim’	 –	 well	 that’s	 Home	 Office	terminology,	but	you	know	what	I	mean	by	‘genuine	claim’	–	that	they	are	granted	[LTR],	and	of	course	if	there	isn’t	then	you	pursue	removal;	but	we	
don’t	like	limbo,	we	don’t	like	people	just	hanging	about.	[…]	So,	the	argument	for	data	sharing,	or	not	the	argument	but	the	reason,	is	that	a	LA	can’t	actually	
fulfil	 its	 statutory	 duties	 without	 knowing	 someone’s	 immigration	 status,	because	we	need	to	know	whether	those	exclusions	apply	(lonA15).		
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Since	 in	 these	 cases	 the	 immediate	 costs	of	 irregular	migrants’	 limbo	have	 to	be	borne	by	LAs,	getting	them	‘resolved’	also	becomes	their	number	one	priority,	even	though	 it	 primarily	 depends	 on	 the	 Home	 Office	 to	 sort	 out	 the	 underlying	immigration	issue.		Arguably,	this	leads	to	a	dangerous	conflation	of	the	claimants’	destitution	with	their	(potential)	 irregularity.	 In	 its	 guidance	 for	 LAs	 the	NRPF	 Network	 (2011,	 p.20)	explicitly	 highlights	 their	 duty	 to	 “consider	 resolving	 the	 family’s	 destitution	 by	offering	assistance	in	returning	the	family	to	the	parents’	country	of	origin”.	At	least	from	an	administrative	perspective	there	is	thus	a	significant	overlap	between	the	destitute	 family’s	 need	 for	 social	 protection	 and	 the	 need	 for	 more	 efficient	immigration	enforcement.	A	single	mother	from	Nigeria	whose	child	was	born	in	the	UK	after	she	had	overstayed	a	visitor’s	visa	in	2013,	experienced	this	overlap	first-hand	when	she	approached	social	services:		So,	if	it’s	their	[duty]	to	provide	for	the	baby,	why	would	they	provide	for	the	baby	without	the	mother?	What	they	are	saying	is	that	the	mother	has	to	be…	has	to	have	an	application	with	the	Home	Office,	or	have	LTR…	that’s	when	they	will	provide,	but	without	that	they	can’t	provide	[support]	for	the	baby	(lonB11).	This	 link	 plays	 a	 crucial	 part	 in	 how	 local	 welfare	 bureaucrats	 in	 the	 UK	 are	encouraged	to	see	their	clients’	immigration	situation	as	part	of	their	own	work	or	even	the	basis	for	any	dealings	with	them.	In	the	following	section	I	will	look	at	what	this	conflation	means	in	relation	to	social	work	as	a	professional	duty	rather	than	merely	a	service	to	be	financed	and	administered	on	the	basis	of	legal	entitlement.	This	will	also	expose	the	much	subtler	mechanisms	that	ensure	that	even	in	the	less	‘hostile’	 environment	 of	 Barcelona	 irregular	 migrants	 can	 never	 be	 effectively	integrated	into	local	support	systems.			
7.3.2. Professional	providers	of	social	assistance	and	protection	In	 both	 contexts,	 most	 of	 the	 professionals	 I	 spoke	 to	 did	 generally	 perceive	irregular	migrants	as	 (a	 small)	part	of	 their	 clientele,	 even	 though	not	always	as	deserving	the	same	level	of	support	as	other	local	residents.	Particularly	in	relation	to	those	quite	central	elements	of	their	work	that	do	not	involve	an	actual	transfer	
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of	 financial	 resources	 –	 like	 individual	 counselling	 and	 child	 protection	 –	immigration	status	matters	the	least	(Cuadra	&	Staaf,	2014).	This	is	also	true	for	the	generally	more	restrictive	UK	context,	as	one	social	worker	pointed	out:		For	example,	the	general	child	protection	teams	are	obviously	still	delivering	
a	service	to	everybody.	If	a	hospital	rings	up	and	says	we	have	got	a	child	who	has	been	admitted	and	they	seem	to	have	some	non-accidental	injury,	or	a	school	that	rings	up	and	says	that	a	child	comes	in	always	very	hungry	and	very	dirty	[…]	or	looks	like	it’s	being	harmed	by	its	parents…	you	know,	they	go	under	the	remit	of	the	general	safeguarding	and	child	protection	teams,	
regardless	of	any	immigration	status	(lonA27).	At	the	same	time,	and	particularly	in	Barcelona	where	these	interactions	are	much	more	 normalised,	 social	 workers	 tend	 to	 perceive	 a	 client’s	 lack	 of	 immigration	status	as	something	external	but	also	potentially	disruptive	to	the	close	and	ideally	longer-term	relationship	they	seek	to	establish	with	the	client	in	order	to	effectively	do	social	work.	The	following	extracts	from	interviews	with	two	social	workers	(1)	and	a	social	educator	working	for	a	local	NGO	(2)	reflect	this:		(1)	[Social	worker	1:]	The	whole	issue	of	irregularity	does	not	depend	on	us.	It	is	a	state	issue.	We	are	not	going	to	give	these	people	a	residence	card…	because	that	depends	on	the	state,	but	obviously...		[Social	worker	2:]	…it	 leaves	us	 in	a	very	assistentialist	position,	 from	 the	outset.	[Social	worker	1:]	Yes…	yes	exactly	(bcnA21).			(2)	[We]	have	to	initiate	a	process	with	the	person	and	[…]	that	process	has	
to	 be	 longer,	 also	 to	 be	 able	 to	 make	 our	 intervention	 a	 bit	 more	comprehensive;	 because	 if	 not,	 it	 will	 remain	 very	 assistentialist	 and	will	always	just	be	a	sporadic	relief	here	and	another	one	there…	but	it	won’t	be	
an	 intervention	 that	would	 lead	 towards	 inclusion	 and	 towards	 integration	(bcnA06).	Being	able	to	establish	an	agreed,	longer-term	‘plan’	for	working	together	with	the	client	is	important	because	it	helps	social	workers	to	justify	the	difficult	decisions	they	 have	 to	 take	 throughout	 this	 process	 about	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 grant	 any	particular	subsidy,	as	another	social	worker	explained	to	me:		When	we	say	no	[to	a	client],	it’s	normally	because	the	person	didn’t	stick	to	the	work	plan,	and	since	these	are	not	statutory	benefits	they	depend	a	little	bit	on	the	'deal'	you	make	with	the	user	in	relation	to	the	work	plan	[…].	So	if	they're	 just	going	to	come	here	and	ask	 for	money...	 then	no.	We	try	to	do	social	work	in	the	sense	of	committing	people	to	this	[work	plan]	(bcnA20).	
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An	 important	 insight	 of	 Lipsky’s	 (1980,	 p.152)	 ground-breaking	 study	 of	 the	workings	 of	 street-level	 bureaucracies	 was	 that	 “orienting	 services	 toward	cooperative	 clients,	 or	 clients	 who	 respond	 to	 treatment,	 allows	 street-level	bureaucrats	to	believe	that	they	are	optimizing	their	use	of	resources”.	A	housing	officer	I	interviewed	in	London	put	it	this	way:		Sometimes	I	do	think	that	depending	on	how	the	person	presents	–	but	this	is	 more	 generally,	 it	 isn’t	 necessarily	 to	 do	 with	 migrants	 only	 –	 does	determine	your	response	to	that	person	as	well.	So,	if	people	are	prepared	to	work	with	you	to	try	and	find	something	in	the	private	rental	sector,	to	work	with	you	to	try	and…	you	know,	to	give	you	all	the	information	you	need	and	not	to	be	obstructive	about	things,	actually	I	think	we	are	much	more	willing	
to	be	able	to	try	and	meet	more	of	their	need	in	a	certain	sense	(lonA30).		Especially	 if	 social	 services	 are	 known	 or	 expected	 to	 work	 closely	 with	 the	immigration	authority,	a	client	whose	stay	in	the	country	is	unlawful	has	a	very	good	reason	not	to	provide	all	the	information	and	is	certainly	more	likely	to	come	across	as	being	obstructive	about	things.		This	 is	 one	 reason	 why	 the	 “increasing	 connection	 between	 social	 services	 and	Home	Office	[…]	doesn’t	seem	to	sit	right	with	a	lot	of	practitioners”	(lonA22),	as	one	of	my	interviewees	put	it.	While	some	of	the	social	workers	I	spoke	to	in	London	admitted	that	the	lack	of	a	firewall	gives	them	a	certain	power	over	some	of	their	clients,	 they	 generally	 tried	 to	 play	 down	 their	 own	 role	 in	 informing	 the	Home	Office	about	a	suspected	immigration	offence:		We	say	it	right	up	front,	not	as	a	threat	but	a	piece	of	information	that	is:	‘you	need	 to	 take	 this	 into	account	as	 to	whether	you	wish	 to	proceed	or	not’.	Because	 it’s	 important	 that	 they	 know	 that	 there	 is	 a	 consequence,	potentially.	But	[…]	the	reality	of	the	situation	is	that	there	are	so	few	[family]	removals	that	they	don’t	see	that	as	much	of	a	risk,	I	don’t	think.	It	certainly	hasn’t	had	much	of	a	deterring	effect	on	people…	withdrawing	or	walking	away	from	an	application	for	assistance	from	us	(lonA30).			Personally,	 I	 have	 not	 heard	 of	 anybody	 who	 has	 volunteered	 such	information,	other	than	the	[client’s]	address,	which	is	actually	not	even	done	
by	 us	 but	 by	 somebody	 in	 the	 finance	 department	who	monitors	 the	 grant	claims,	and	occasionally	we	get	asked	a	question	 like…	if	somebody	 is	not	sure	 about	 the	 address	 or	 thinks	 that	 something	 hasn’t	 been	 recorded	correctly	 or	 whatever…	 But	 that	 isn’t	 even	 our	 job.	 That’s	 the	 job	 of	 the	finance	department	(lonA27).		Social	workers	in	Barcelona,	on	the	other	hand,	are	under	no	obligation	to	notify	
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national	 immigration	 authorities	 of	 their	 dealings	 with	 unlawful	 residents.	 The	following	dialogue	between	two	of	them	reveals	some	uncertainty	about	these	rules	but	also	highlights	 their	reluctance	to	accept	eventually	having	to	report	cases	of	irregular	 residence,	 even	 though	 they	 do	 perceive	 it	 as	 part	 of	 their	 work	 to	potentially	act	as	a	link	to	law	enforcement:		[Social	worker	 1:]	 I	 think	on	 paper	we	 should	 report	 situations	 that	 are...	illegal,	[...]	like	when	a	guy	tells	me	that	he	sells	drugs.		[Social	worker	2:]	Yes,	legally	you	have	to	report	it;	you	would	have	to	report	it.		[Social	worker	1:]	But	if	he	tells	us	'I	am	administratively	irregular'…	would	we	have	to	report	that?		[Social	worker	2:]	I	don’t	think	so.		[Social	worker	1:]	Look	[…]	we	don’t	want	to	know.	In	any	case,	I	don’t	know	if	 by	 law	we	 are	 obliged,	 but	 somehow,	 consciously	 or	unconsciously,	we	object	[‘nos hacemos objetores’].	No	one	is	going	to	report	that,	[...]	just	like	the	guy	who	says	that	he	[is	a	drug	dealer]:	I	will	not	call	the	[police]	to	tell	them…	no.	Why?	Because	I	understand	it	is	a	confidential	space.	Another	thing	is	if	someone	 tells	me	 that	 s/he	has	killed	 someone,	or	 is	being	beaten	by	 the	partner,	or	that	a	child	is	being	mistreated...	Obviously	I	am	bound	to	report	
this,	and	I	will	see	if	I	do	it	immediately	or	if	I	will	work	with	[the	client]	so	that	s/he	takes	a	series	of	decisions...(bcnA21).	The	 fact	 that	a	 firewall	prevents	exchanges	of	certain	 information	between	social	services	 and	 immigration	 authority,	 however,	 does	 not	 automatically	 mean	 that	irregular	migrants	 can	 be	 treated	 as	 ‘normal’	 services	 users.	 As	 the	 Catalan	 case	shows,	 there	are	other	mechanisms	that	ensure	that	social	workers	will	perceive	them	as	a	client	group	that	is	 ‘more	complicated’	to	deal	with.	What	according	to	most	 social	 workers	 I	 spoke	 to	 in	 Barcelona	 troubles	 their	 relationship	 with	irregular	migrants	 in	 particular	 is	 the	 general	 expectation	 that	 social	 assistance	should	be	geared	towards	finding	employment	or	at	least	enhancing	employability.	This	demand	 increasingly	pushes	 them	 to	direct	 their	own	efforts	at	 clients	who	might	find	a	job	in	the	near	future,	rather	than	those	who	are	not	even	allowed	to	work:			[Social	worker	1:]	Since	there	are	so	many	unemployed	people	and	so	many	foreigners	who	already	have	residence	permits,	to	bet	on	someone	without	a	permit...	some	time	ago	you	could	consider	doing	that,	but	now	it	has	become	a	very	remote	possibility.		[Social	worker	2:]	Yes,	it's	more	complicated	to	do	that.		[Social	worker	1:]	Because...	okay,	I'll	bet	on	you	and	offer	you	a	training,	and	then?	If	you	are	not	going	to	get	a	work	contract...	I	mean,	it’s	tough,	but	I	will	
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dedicate	my	efforts	to	another	person	who	afterwards	can	get	a	work	contract	(bcnA21).		Also	in	this	case	social	workers	thus	tend	to	‘orient’	their	services	and	resources	to	those	clients	who	can	‘respond’	to	these	measures	in	the	way	that	is	expected.	To	focus	 on	 the	 formally	 unemployed	 rather	 than	 their	 irregular	 counterparts	 thus	seems	to	make	sense	for	them,	but	it	also	makes	them	realise	the	limits	of	their	own	professional	discretion:		We	will	always	look	for	solutions	but	what	we	cannot	do	as	social	services	is	if	 someone	 doesn’t	 have	 the	 right	 to	 receive	 the	 RMI	 or	 another	 subsidy	established	by	law,	we	cannot	ignore	this.	We	can	give	them	a	grant,	generally	during	a	maximum	of	6	months	[…],	but	we	have	to	justify	this	a	lot.	To	give	someone	a	grant	to	pay	for	a	room	I	have	to	explain	very	well	and	justify	and	justify	and	be	convinced	that	after	that	there	will	be	a	solution	for	that	family,	otherwise...	So	with	those	who	have	just	arrived	and	within	the	next	three	years	[i.e.	until	they	can	apply	for	regularisation]	will	not	be	able	to	work...	I	cannot	even	consider	that;	it’s	not	going	to	be	approved	(bcnA22).		Often,	the	only	way	they	feel	they	can	help	in	these	cases	is	by	referring	the	client	to	Third	 Sector	 organisations,	 where	 they	 can	 at	 least	 enrol	 in	 language	 or	 other	training	courses	(see	chapter	6).	While	social	workers	were	rather	split	about	the	actual	 utility	 of	 these	 courses	 and	 aware	 that	 they	 sometimes	 create	 false	expectations,	they	also	saw	them	as	a	way	to	start	working	towards	regularisation.	After	all,	“the	objective	is	always	the	pursuit	of	the	documentation”	(bcnA20),	as	one	of	them	put	it.		What	became	clear	in	both	environments	is	that	professionals	dealing	with	irregular	migrants	tend	to	shift	at	least	part	of	their	attention	away	from	the	social	needs	of	these	 clients	 and	 towards	 their	 irregularity.	 In	 section	 4.1	 I	 argued	 that	 this	condition	is	always	framed	by	the	possibility	of	being	either	regularised	or	deported.	On	 one	 hand,	 social	workers	 thus	 regularly	 have	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 actual	prospects	 of	 their	 clients	 being	 granted	 a	 residence	 (and	 work)	 permit	 as	 one	possible	solution	to	their	situation.	Also	in	the	UK,	according	to	the	NRPF	Network’s	(2011,	p.37)	guidelines	for	professionals,	finding	a	solution	for	a	family	“may	also	involve	 exploring	 opportunities	 to	 apply	 for	 LTR	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	 an	immigration	 solicitor”.	 The	 following	 quotes	 taken	 from	 interviews	with	 a	 social	worker	in	Barcelona	(1)	and	an	NGO	practitioner	in	London	(2)	highlight	that	this	often	poses	the	difficult	question	of	how	long	support	can	and	should	be	maintained:		
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(1)	What	is	true	is	that	these	cases	of	people	without	papers	but	with	children	present	dilemmas.	They	present	dilemmas	 in	 the	 sense	of	until	when	you	maintain	a	situation	of	irregularity	given	the	difficulty	that	this	person	can	put	herself	in	a	process	of	regularisation...	So,	until	when	should	[we	support	them]?	(bcnA21)		(2)	We	have	a	case	at	the	moment	of	a	woman	who	has	a	child	that	will	be	seven	in	June,	and	in	June	she	will	be	able	to	make	her	application	based	on	that,	but	not	within	the	next	six	months,	so…	you	know,	what	does	she	do	until	 then?	 […]	 In	 fact,	 the	 LA	 was	 supporting	 her,	 and	 they	 terminated	support,	 and	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 she	 would	 be	 able	 to	 challenge	 that	[…because]	you	need	an	exit	 strategy.	So	 in	her	case	 it	would	probably	get	somewhere	because	it’s	only	going	to	be	six	months,	but	if	you	got	a	person	
with	 a	 two-year-old,	 they	 are	 not	 going	 to	 have	 any	 claim	 until	 the	 child	 is	
seven,	and	so	that	would	be	too	long	(lonA04).		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 social	 workers	 are	 often	 expected	 to	 (also)	 consider	 the	possibility	 and	 likelihood	 of	 their	 clients’	 returning	 or	 being	 deported	 to	 their	country	of	origin.	Particularly	in	the	UK	this	happens	quite	systematically	–	although	without	any	statutory	guidance	or	training	(Price	&	Spencer,	2015)	–	and	often	even	before	having	properly	assessed	a	family’s	actual	needs.	The	following	account	of	a	social	worker	clearly	reflects	this	nexus,	which	in	itself	becomes	an	argument	for	working	closer	with	the	Home	Office:		The	Home	Office	will	provide	information	about	whether	there	is	a	barrier	to	removal;	 that’s	 really	what	we	 are	 looking	 for	 in	 the	 information	 from	 the	
Home	Office.	If	there	is	no	barrier	to	removal,	then	you	could	be	[…]	trying	to	do	a	child-in-need	assessment	and	a	human	rights	assessment	to	offer	tickets	home,	as	an…	as	that’s	being	the	limits	of	your	powers.	But	if	there	is	a	barrier	in	place	[...]	then	it’s	not	going	anywhere,	so	you	are	not	going	to	be	able	to	discharge	your	social	services	duties	by	offering	tickets	home,	but	you	are	back	 to	 thinking	 ‘is	 the	 child	 in	need	because	 the	 child	 is	destitute?’	 So,	 it	changes	our	assessment	process;	the	information	from	the	Home	Office	will	
change	our	assessment	process	(lonA15).		Also	some	of	the	professionals	 I	 interviewed	 in	Barcelona	said	that	when	dealing	with	 irregular	migrants	 they	would	 consider	–	and	 sometimes	discuss	with	 their	clients	–	the	possibility	of	return.	They	didn’t,	however,	perceive	it	as	an	option	that	they,	as	social	workers,	could	prescribe	as	a	solution,	as	one	of	them	explained:		It’s	not	that	we	are	expulsing	these	people,	but	in	the	end,	we	have	to	make	an	 inevitable	reflection	with	the	person	of	 'what	 is	your	life	plan?	What	 is	your	migratory	project?	What	options	do	you	have?	Until	here	we	can	help	you:	you	can	get	[food	vouchers]	and	such...	but	what	about	the	future?	What	happens	 if	 you	 go	 back	 to	 your	 country?	 Is	 that	 an	 option?	Could	 you	 go	
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back...?’.	[…]	And	there	are	people	who	say,	'Well	actually,	this	is	not	what	I	have	expected'	–	'Well	we	can	help	you	to	return...	do	you	want	that?'	–	'No,	no,	because	despite	everything	I'm	better	off	here,	 I	 am	better	off	under	a	bridge	than	where	I	came	from’	–	‘Okay	then,	nothing,	we	will	try	to	do	what	we	can’;	and	that’s	it	(bcnA21).		The	crucial	difference	is	that	here	the	return	decision	is	left	to	the	client	and	will	have	no	systematic	bearing	on	their	entitlement	or	access	to	social	services;	nor	will	the	fact	that	they	receive	local	support	have	any	impact	on	how	the	state	handles	their	immigration	case.	That	irregular	migrants	thereby	tend	to	be	perceived	and	treated	as	to-be-regularised	rather	than	deported	reflects	the	very	different	ways	in	which	migrant	 irregularity	 is	 institutionalised	 in	the	UK	and	Spain,	as	 I	argued	 in	chapter	4.		That	said,	several	of	the	social	workers	I	interviewed	in	each	city	also	described	their	clients’	irregularity	as	an	additional	source	of	vulnerability,	and	thus	perceived	it	as	part	 of	 their	 professional	 duty	 to	 address	 the	 inequality	 that	 underlies	 this	condition:		When	we	are	dealing	with	a	person	who	is	undocumented,	we	know	that	s/he	is	in	a	situation	of	a	lot	of...	vulnerability.	S/he	is	much	more	vulnerable,	isn’t	s/he?	And	s/he	will	not	be	entitled	to	various	types	of	benefits…	(bcnA20).			At	the	end	of	the	day	we	have	signed	up	to	a	profession	where	we	are	meant	to	
be…	addressing	the	imbalances	of	society,	which	is	all	about	advocating	for	the	most	 vulnerable.	 Whether	 they	 happen	 to	 be	 migrants	 or	 whether	 they	happen	to	be	disabled	people	or	whatever,	isn’t	so	much	the	point.	And	we	should	 be	 pushing	 towards	 a	 rebalancing	of	 these…	 these	 discriminations	and,	 you	know,	 things	 that	people	are	experiencing,	 and	not	making	 them	worse	(lonA27).		For	Lipsky	(1980,	p.151)	it	is	one	of	the	paradoxes	of	street-level	bureaucracy	that	although	 individual	 bureaucrats	 “are	 expected	 to	 treat	 all	 people	 in	 common	circumstances	alike”	it	is	precisely	what	he	calls	‘client	differentiation’	that	enables	them	 to	 ‘rationalise’	 “the	 contradictions	 in	 their	 work”.	 That	 their	 everyday	professional	practice	often	requires	them	to	“do	for	some	[service	users]	what	they	are	unable	to	do	 for	all”	 (ibid.)	seems	particularly	 true	 for	social	workers.	Where	available	resources	are	scarce,	trying	to	ensure	a	fair	distribution	can	thereby	easily	trigger	existing	tensions	between	various	ethnic	(or	other)	groups	that	make	up	the	target	population,	as	my	interviewees	in	both	cities	were	also	well	aware:		
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We	have	to	be	careful	about	how	someone	who	has	no	right	to	be	in	the	UK	gains	access	to	social	support,	compared	to	someone	who	 is	here	[legally]	and	tries	to	make	an	application	as	homeless.	So,	we	have	to	be	careful	about	
our	judgements	as	well,	about	setting	precedents	that	appear	to	favour	groups	
that	have	arguably	less	need	and	arguably	less	entitlement	to	expect	a	service	
than	 people	who	 have	 an	 argument	 to	 expect	 a	 service.	 That	 […]	 is	 a	 very	difficult	 line	 for	us	 to	 find	on	a	 case-by-case	basis;	 it’s	hugely	problematic	(lonA30).			When	you	say	no	to	[a	client]	based	on	your	professional	judgement	[…]	you	will	either	hear	'you	are	only	giving	it	to	the	[foreigners]',	or	vice	versa,	that	you	are	a	racist.	They	will	always	tell	you	something,	and	always	normally	in	this	sense,	isn’t	it,	whether	it’s	someone	from	[here]	or	from	outside.	That’s	our	challenge	(bcnA20).	Particularly	in	the	case	of	Barcelona,	where	the	legal	framework	leaves	more	room	for	 individual	 social	 workers’	 professional	 discretion,	 these	 and	 other	 external	pressures	constantly	interact	with	their	own	strategies	for	identifying	those	clients	that	are	more	deserving	than	others.	The	following	passage	of	an	interview	with	two	social	workers	exemplifies	this:		[Social	worker	1:]	The	more	experience	you	have	[…]	and	the	more	capacity	to	 reflect	 and	 see	 the	 complexity	 of	 [a	 client’s	 situation],	 you	will	 have	 a	different	way	of	acting,	and	a	different	outlook.		[Social	worker	2:]	And	the	professional	judgement	gives	you	a	lot	of	leeway.	Depending	on	how	you	are	–	more	giving	or	less	giving	–	and	the	vision	you	have	of	social	work,	or	of	what	the	person	deserves	or	doesn’t	deserve,	or	what	s/he	has	to	do	or	shouldn’t	do,	 ...you	can	grant	lots	of	subsidies	or	you	can	grant	few.	The	subsidies	are	there,	but	you	use	them	or	don’t	use	them,	that's	the	reality	[...]	[Social	worker	1:]	Yes,	when	I	close	the	door	of	my	office,	after	all	 it’s	 the	person	with	me.	I	have	an	institution	behind	me	that	says,	 'you	can	do	this,	and	you	cannot	do	this',	but	I	am	a	professional	with	a	judgement,	and	I	have	a	 lot	 of	 autonomy	 to	 exercise	 this	 judgement,	 according	 to	 which	 I	 will	mobilise	or	not	the	resources	that	I	have	behind	me	(bcnA21).		This	 autonomy	 can	 also	 very	 easily	 be	 used	 to	 unlawfully	 exclude	 someone,	especially	if	the	likelihood	of	facing	a	legal	challenge	is	low,	as	the	same	interviewee	later	clarified:		If	I	am	hostile	and	tell	that	person	that	s/he	has	no	right	to	anything	and	that	person	accepts	it	s/he	will	go	out	through	the	door	and	will	not	appear	again,	and	no	one	will	find	out.	I	can	then	write	what	I	want	in	my	data	record	and	that's	it.	Whether	the	person	will	complain…	well,	[…]	it	will	also	depend	on	[…]	the	capacity	that	s/he	has	in	the	given	situation	to	make	a	complaint,	to	mount	a	show,	or	not	(bcnA21).	
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In	 the	 UK	 context,	 where	 the	 local	 institutions	 that	 social	 workers	 ‘have	 behind	them’	are	themselves	more	constrained	in	responding	to	irregular	migrants’	claims,	the	 room	 for	 professional	 discretion	 is	 much	 more	 limited,	 although	 never	completely	removed.	Eligibility	for	Section-17-support,	for	example,	often	hinges	on	little	 more	 than	 the	 social	 worker’s	 professional	 judgement	 of	 the	 applicant’s	credibility,	as	one	of	my	interviewees	in	London	noted:		The	problem	is	that	when	people	apply	for	‘no	recourse’,	the	burden	of	proof	initially	is	on	them	to	show	that	they	are	in	fact	destitute,	that	they	are	in	fact	who	they	say	they	are,	that	they	are	the	parent	of	the	child,	that	they	are…	all	kinds	of	things.	Now,	sometimes	[…]	there	is	very	little	evidence	that	they	can	
provide	 as	 to	who	 they	 are,	where	 they	 are	 living,	 particularly	 if	 they	 are	subletting	illegally,	etc.	And	so	there	will	be	times	when	you	are	looking	at	that	and	say,	‘what	I	have	to	do	here	is	basically	make	a	decision	on	credibility’,	because	that’s	all	there	is.	[…]	So	the	area	where	discretion	comes	in	is	that	judgement	call	(lonA30).		It	is	important	to	note	that	the	statutory	guidelines	for	social	workers	in	relation	to	the	 safeguarding	 of	 children	 do	 not	 specifically	mention	 families	with	 NRPF	 (cf.	Department	for	Education,	2015b),	nor	does	the	law	establish	the	exact	or	minimum	amount	 of	money	 to	 be	 paid	 in	 case	 support	 is	 granted.	 Since	 the	 latter	 always	depends	on	the	particular	needs	of	the	child	in	question	it	can	vary	significantly	from	one	Borough	to	the	next,	as	well	as	between	cases	(NRPF	Network,	2011).		The	amount	that	they	pay	is	not	set	in	law,	but	what	often	happens	is	that	LAs	
have	a	policy	somewhere.	They	probably	don’t	publish	it	but	somewhere	they	set	 some	 amounts;	 because	 quite	 often	 when	 you	 are	 speaking	 to	 social	workers,	they	would	say	like	[…]	‘well,	it’s	the	set	amount,	we	can’t	increase	
it’	(lonA22).		What	 this	NGO	practitioner	 interpreted	as	an	 informal	 local	policy	might	also	be	understood	as	individual	professionals	seeking	to	“deny	that	they	have	influence”	in	order	to	defend	themselves	“against	 the	possibility	 that	 they	might	be	able	 to	act	more	as	clients	would	wish”	(Lipsky,	1980,	p.149).	Interpreted	as	such,	it	is	part	of	their	trying	to	reconcile	the	two	contradictory	demands	–	immigration	control	and	social	protection	–	which	underpin	and	severely	trouble	the	application	of	Section	
17	in	the	context	of	migrant	irregularity.		At	the	same	time,	the	difficulty	of	dealing	with	these	contradictory	demands	has	also	triggered	responses	at	the	institutional	level.	As	one	of	my	interviewees	indicated,	
		
211	
many	 social	 service	 departments	 have	 changed	 their	 organisational	 structure	 in	order	to	deal	more	effectively	with	irregular	migrants’	claims:			Certain	social	service	departments	now	have	NRPF-teams	and	so	they	seem	to	have…	I	mean,	whereas	 I	would	dispute	that	 that	makes	them	better	at	judging	whether	the	child	 is	 in	need	or	not,	 they	at	 least	know	a	bit	more	about	 the	 immigration	 situation,	 and	 so	 they	 seem	 a	 little…	 they	 are	 less	
reluctant	to	get	involved	in	it	(lonA22).		As	I	will	show	in	the	last	sub-section,	this	institutional	adjustment	clearly	parallels	what	is	also	happening	in	UK	hospitals	and	universities	and	thus	appears	to	be	quite	emblematic	for	the	British	case	while	it	does	not	seem	to	occur	in	Spain	or	at	least	Catalonia.			
7.3.3. ‘Managers’	of	irregularity	within	the	social	assistance	system	For	Price	&	Spencer	(2015),	the	existence	of	a	dedicated	NRPF-team	constitutes	one	of	 three	crucial	 factors	 that	explain	the	significant	variation	 in	how	different	LAs	respond	to	claims	for	support	under	Section	17	of	 the	Children	Act81.	Specifically	tasked	to	deal	with	clients	identified	as	having	‘No	Recourse	to	Public	Funds’,	these	teams	 are	 particularly	 common	 within	 London,	 where	 the	 majority	 of	 families	receiving	Section-17-support	live82.	From	the	perspective	of	LAs,	having	such	a	team	seems	 to	 favour	 a	 more	 consistent	 application	 of	 the	 rules	 and	 more	 efficient	internal	referral	procedures,	but	also	allows	for	more	effective	gatekeeping,	as	the	manager	of	an	NRPF-team	was	keen	to	emphasise:		They	will	only	be	able	to	get	support	[…]	through	my	team,	the	‘No	Recourse	Team’,	and	then	it’s	only	provided	conditional	on	various	other	things.	So	for	example	 they	 have	 to	 be	 able	 to	 show	 that	 they	 are	 territorially	 the	responsibility	of	[this	Borough],	that	they	are	destitute,	and	that	they	have	either	an	on-going	application	with	the	Home	Office	or	are	imminently	about	to	make	one	[…]	And	that’s	the	point	about	having	the	dedicated	team,	that	when	this	function	was	spread	across	the	LA’s	social	care	and	health	service,	applicants	could	come	in	repeatedly,	and	they	still	do	that,	but	what	wasn’t	being	picked	up	across	so	many	people	was	patterns;	information	that	was																																																									81	The	other	two	being	the	strength	of	local	advocacy	networks	and	the	overall	framing	of	the	issue	among	LA	staff;		82	According	to	a	countrywide	survey,	around	60%	of	families	that	received	support	during	financial	year	2012/13	were	registered	in	one	of	the	33	London	Boroughs,	at	least	16	of	which	already	had	established	NRPF-teams	(Price	&	Spencer,	2015,	p.25).		
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spread	across	a	wide	number	of	assessments	that	meant	it	was	impossible	to	identify	 a	 scenario	 that	 had	 been	 heard	 before.	 When	 you	 have	 a	 small	discrete	team,	you	can	[…]	pick	up	patterns	of	information	that	are	out	in	the	community	[about]	what	worked,	and	that	other	people	would	then	come	in	repeating;	we	spot	that	much	more	quickly	now	(lonA30).		That	NRPF-teams	tend	to	perceive	their	role	mainly	in	terms	of	gatekeeping	rather	than	 safeguarding	 and	 providing	 social	 care	 to	 vulnerable	 residents	 reflects	 the	conditions	under	which	they	are	being	introduced.	In	the	Borough	of	Lewisham,	the	annual	costs	of	supporting	a	total	of	278	NRPF-cases	reached	more	than	6	million	pounds	by	2014	(compared	to	around	£150,000	in	the	years	before	2008).	A	review	of	how	the	Council	had	been	dealing	with	such	cases	found	the	overall	approach	to	be	 ambiguous	 and	 ineffective.	 Part	 of	 the	 identified	 problem	 was	 that	 “the	assessment	 by	 social	 workers	 prioritises	 safeguarding	 […]	 not	 NRPF	 eligibility	criteria”,	as	stated	in	the	official	minutes	of	a	meeting	where	the	review	results	were	discussed	in	November	2014.		In	order	to	address	this	deficit	a	dedicated	team	of	five	specialised	case	workers	and	one	 ‘embedded’	Home	Office	worker	was	set	up83	in	order	to	deal	with	all	NRPF-cases,	 about	 80%	of	which	 concern	migrant	 families	 in	 irregular	 situations.	 In	 a	background	paper	presented	at	the	same	meeting,	this	“robust	front	door	approach”	was	 praised	 for	 having	 already	 “started	 to	 have	 significant	 impact	 on	managing	spend	in	this	area”.	Whereas	prior	to	the	new	approach	more	than	half	of	all	cases	had	been	accepted	for	support,	only	one	of	the	96	applications	that	were	made	since	then	has	been	successful	while	eight	were	being	supported	temporarily	pending	full	assessment.	Based	on	the	average	acceptance	rates	of	9.7	(prior	to	the	pilot)	and	1.3	cases	per	month	(during	the	pilot),	another	internal	document	calculates	the	annual	saving	for	the	LA	at	2.2	million	pounds.		Quite	 clearly,	 shifting	 the	 responsibility	 for	 carrying	out	 initial	 case	 assessments	from	‘normal’	social	workers	to	NRPF-teams	(who	in	this	case	are	directly	supported	by	a	Home	Office	worker)	has	altered	the	priority	driving	the	assessment	itself.	As	an	NGO	practitioner	put	it,		there	can	be	a	bit	of	a	culture	of	looking	at	the	immigration	status	first,	or																																																									83	In	June	2014,	initially	as	a	6-months	pilot	scheme,	after	which	it	became	a	permanent	arrangement.		
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looking	at	the	adults,	and	I	think	because	it’s	not	part	of	social	services	you	don’t	get	such	child-centred	approach.	So	they	are	not	really	looking	at	‘is	this	child	in	need	and	what	are	the	needs	of	this	child’;	they	are	looking	at	‘well	this	adult	overstayed	their	visa	or	this	adult	is	somehow	to	blame’	and	you	know,	trying	to	allocate	blame	or	deciding	who	deserves	is	not	the	correct	test	(lonA04).		Also	Price	&	Spencer’s	(2015,	p.47)	study	suggests	that	those	NRPF-teams	that	consist	mainly	of	caseworkers	rather	than	social	workers	“tended	to	conceive	of	their	duties	to	these	families	as	administrative	tasks”.	According	to	the	job	description	of	an	open	position	announced	by	another	London	Council	in	spring	2017,	the	ideal	candidate	to	“manage	the	Council’s	NRPF-team”	should	have	a	degree	or	qualification	in	social	work,	 even	 though	 the	 listed	 ‘duties	 and	 responsibilities’	 comprised	 mostly	administrative	 and	managerial	 tasks.	 One	 of	 them	was	 “to	 ensure	 that	 proactive	liaison	with	the	Home	Office	 is	 taking	place	 in	relation	to	 immigration	status	and	that	cases	are	progressed	and	moved	on	wherever	possible”.	This	also	shows	that	one	crucial	function	of	NRPF-teams	precisely	consists	in	linking	local	social	service	departments	even	closer	to	the	Home	Office.	In	the	eyes	of	a	‘normal’	social	worker	I	interviewed	(together	with	the	NRPF-team	manager),	this	again	appears	to	be	a	mutual	approximation:		I	do	think	that	there	has	been	over	the	last	few	months	a	change	from	the	Home	Office	as	well,	and	I	don’t	know	whether	or	not	that’s	the	work	that	the	
No	Recourse	Team	has	been	doing,	because	they	are	much	more	open	to	us.	We	had	a	visit,	[…]	they	are	coming	and	doing	some	training	for	us	and	we	have	a	point	of	contact	if	we	have	concerns	over	any	person,	which	actually	is	 something	 that’s	 practically	 unheard	 of.	 […]	 They	 didn’t	 have	 an	 open-door-approach	at	all.	And	I	think	that	has	changed	because	they	have	seen	the	
value	of	actually	working	much	more	in	partnership;	and	we	hope	to	build	on	
that	as	well	(lonA30).		Another	 benefit	 of	 having	 a	 specially	 trained	 team	 dealing	 with	 all	 these	 cases	centrally	 is	 that	 ‘normal’	 social	 workers	 are	 thereby	 effectively	 ‘buffered’	 from	having	 to	 apply	 the	 logic	 of	 immigration	 control,	 as	 the	 same	 interviewee	 also	indicated:		…if	we	see	people	where	we	think	there	is	some	issue	around	their	status,	then	actually	we	refer	it	to	[the	NRPF-team]	for	them	to	investigate;	that’s	where	the	expertise	around	migration	 is	 […].	We	don’t	have	to	make	those	
judgements	(lonA30).		In	 addition,	more	 and	more	 social	 service	 departments	 in	 London	 either	 rely	 on	
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dedicated	Home	Office	caseworkers	‘embedded’	within	their	NRPF-teams	or	decide	to	join	NRPF-Connect.	Both	suggest	that	the	broader	development	is	not	just	about	expertise	but	also	access	to	certain	information	that	social	services	–	as	well	as	the	Home	 Office	 –	would	 otherwise	 lack.	 According	 to	 the	 NRPF-team	manager,	 the	difference	between	the	two	options	is	that		having	an	embedded	worker	is	much	more	effective;	because	the	embedded	worker	goes	straight	onto	the	system	and	is	able	to	do	a	forensic	analysis	of	what’s	happening.	So	when	we	have	walk-ins	we	get	the	answer	that	minute:	this	person	has	a	claim,	 this	person	doesn’t	have	a	claim,	 they	have	a	 long	history,	 it	 has	 been	 refused	 so	 many	 times,	 or	 they	 have	 an	 outstanding	appeal,	or	whatever.	[…]	And	likewise,	the	reason	the	Home	Office	agreed	to	this,	and	the	reason	they	are	now	extending	these	options	to	other	Boroughs,	is	because	they	have	learned	that	actually	the	quality	of	intelligence	that	they	
get	form	us,	about	patterns	more	than	to	do	with	individuals,	is	much	greater	than	 you	will	 get	 from	 just	 the	 kind	 of	 exchange	 around	 individual	 cases	[through	NRPF-Connect]	(lonA30).		While	this	again	seems	to	be	driven	by	a	mutual	interest	of	the	LA	and	the	Home	Office,	 for	 applicants	who	 are	 not	 only	 destitute	 but	 also	 ‘irregular’	 it	means	 an	almost	total	overlap	of	both	parts	of	the	administration:	the	one	that	might	be	legally	obliged	to	help	them	and	the	one	that	threatens	to	deport	them.	The	way	in	which	the	above-cited	migrant	mother	spoke	about	an	appointment	with	social	services	exemplifies	this:		I	have	to	call	and	ask	my	lawyer	now,	because	they	said	that…	they	normally	would	 invite	 immigration	 so	 that	 immigration	will	 threaten	 people…	 that	they	will	take	them	back	home…	so	now	I	have	to	call	my	lawyer	to	let	her	know…		[Interviewer:]	So	on	Monday	you	are	going	to	meet	with	your	social	worker	
and	you	think	there	will	also	be	an	immigration	officer?		Yes,	 immigration	 officers,	 that’s	 what	 they	 do.	 That’s	 what	 they	 do	 to	
threaten…	 they	will	 say	 that	 it’s	 better	 for	 them	 to	 take	 you	 back	 to	 your	country	than	just	to	leave	you	here	without	support.	[…]	But	once	I	have	sent	the	application	and	 I	have	 the	 copy	of	 the	proof	of	posting,	 that	way	 they	can’t…	(lonB11).		Her	reluctance	to	even	meet	her	social	worker	without	prior	advise	from	a	lawyer	says	a	lot	about	the	level	of	trust	she	has	in	the	former.	What	I	have	tried	to	show	in	this	sub-section	is	that	the	invention	of	NRPF-teams	has	been	crucial	for	establishing	the	 intimate	 institutional	 relationship	 between	 social	 work	 and	 immigration	enforcement,	which	ultimately	triggers	this	reluctance.		
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7.4. Social	assistance	workers	becoming	border	guards?	The	position(s)	of	
various	organisational	roles	vis-à-vis	immigration	control	and	
enforcement	In	this	chapter	 I	have	shown	that	under	certain	conditions	the	 interests	of	social	service	providers	and	immigration	officers	can	overlap	to	a	quite	significant	extent.	In	 the	 case	 of	 London,	 where	 this	 overlap	 is	 much	 more	 institutionalised,	 the	common	interest	of	both	institutions	in	‘resolving’	their	caseload	is	thereby	clearly	geared	 towards	 return	 or	 deportation	 rather	 than	 regularisation,	 as	 one	 social	worker	suggested:	Working	with	the	Home	Office	[is	not]	that	easy,	because	it’s	kind	of	like…	you	think	you	are	going	into	a	room	and	say	‘well	I’ve	got	157	families	with	Art.	8	applications,	British	children,	etc.’	–	this	is	the	stuff	that	we	deal	with,	you	know	–	 ‘so	why	don’t	 you	 just	pull	out	your	 caseworkers,	 grant	 them	status	because	you	will	never	remove	them	and	they	[…]	kind	of	meet	 the	conditions…	and	thus	help	me	reduce	my	number	of	cases?’	But	if	I	do	any	work	with	the	Home	Office	it	always	has	to	be	around	family	removals,	you	know,	that’s	their	interest	(lonA15).	My	analysis	of	the	situation	in	Barcelona	points	in	the	opposite	direction:	The	strict	institutional	separation	between	local	social	services	and	the	immigration	regime	does	represent	a	certain	contradiction,	but	it	allows	the	former	to	work	with	their	clients,	 even	 if	 the	 latter	 renders	 them	 irregular.	 Individual	 social	 workers’	engagement	with	migrants	 in	 irregular	situations	thereby	automatically	becomes	geared	towards	the	client’s	regularisation,	as	one	social	worker	indicated:		There	are	public	administrations	that	are	responsible	for	kicking	you	out	and	there	are	others,	like	social	services	and	municipalities	in	general,	who	are	in	charge	of	helping	you.	It’s	a	bit	contradictory	[...]	but	people	eventually	know	it.	[...]	It’s	something	that	spreads	through	word	of	mouth,	so	people	know	us	and	know	that	they	can	come	here	with	total	peace	of	mind;	and	we're	not	going	to	pick	on	their	administrative	situation,	but	rather	the	opposite:	we	
are	going	to	orient	them	in	how	to	solve	this	problem	(bcnA22).		As	 in	 the	 previous	 two	 chapters,	 figure	 7	 summarises	 the	 empirical	 findings	regarding	the	central	questions	of	whether	or	not	 the	individuals	working	 in	 this	field	are	obliged	or	expected	 to	 check	 their	 clients’	 immigration	status	and/or	 to	share	such	knowledge	or	suspicion	with	immigration	authorities.	As	before,	I	do	this	by	 positioning	 the	 three	 role-categories	 –	 administrators,	 professionals	 and	‘managers	of	irregularity’	–	within	the	analytical	framework	introduced	in	section	
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2.4.	The	slightly	different	positions	within	each	sector	reflect	variations	in	terms	of	how	concrete	and	compelling	the	underlying	rules	or	expectations	are	in	everyday	practice,	according	to	the	reported	perceptions	and	experiences	of	my	interviewees.													The	 diametrically	 opposed	 positions	 that	 administrators	 of	 social	 assistance	 and	protection	occupy	in	this	framework	(sector	‘A’	in	the	case	of	London;	‘D’	in	the	case	of	Barcelona)	reflect	the	very	different	implications	that	a	lack	of	immigration	status	has	for	local	residents’	general	eligibility	for	these	services.	In	London,	accessing	any	publicly	financed	social	support	(including	advice	and	counselling	services)	is	only	possible	for	legal	residents	and	thus	always	requires	an	immigration	check	at	the	point	of	first	contact.	In	the	exceptional	case	of	a	suspected	human	rights	breach	or	immediate	child	protection	concern	a	referral	to	social	services	is	possible	but	will	entail	 the	 notification	 of	 immigration	 authorities.	 In	Barcelona,	 reception	 staff	 is	required	 to	 ascertain	 applicants’	 identity	 and	 local	 residence,	 but	 not	 their	immigration	status.	It	is	then	on	the	social	worker	to	determine	how	far	support	can	go	in	any	particular	case.		The	 job	 of	 professional	 providers	 of	 social	 services	 always	 involves	 a	 significant	element	of	control	over	the	client	and	his	or	her	actions	and	behaviour.	Arguably	
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more	than	professionals	working	in	education,	and	healthcare	in	particular,	social	workers	 are	 generally	 expected	 to	 not	 only	 sanction	 certain	 wrongdoings,	 but	potentially	also	to	trigger	law-enforcement	if	they	discover	(serious)	breaches	of	the	law.	In	both	environments	this	is	mostly	in	relation	to	the	safeguarding	of	others	and	does	 not	 usually	 involve	 immigration	 control	 as	 such.	 However,	 the	 level	 of	engagement	and	the	exact	measures	through	which	they	can	provide	support	often	depend	on	 immigration	 status,	so	 that	 they	will	 at	 a	 certain	point	be	 required	 to	
know	a	client’s	(ir)regularity.	In	London	this	is	the	case	from	the	very	beginning,	but	it	is	usually	not	the	social	worker	him/herself	who	passes	this	information	on	to	the	Home	 Office.	 Social	 workers	 in	 Barcelona,	 in	 contrast,	 have	 to	 determine	immigration	 status	 only	 in	 relation	 to	 more	 formalised	 and/or	 longer-term	assistance	 and	 have	 no	 duty	 or	 incentive	 to	 inform	 immigration	 or	 any	 other	national	authorities.		Like	 in	 the	sphere	of	education,	specific	managers	of	 irregularity	only	exist	 in	 the	case	 of	 London,	 and	 here	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 so-called	 NRPF-teams,	 which	institutionalise	 the	 exact	 opposite	 of	 a	 firewall	 between	 local	 social	 service	departments	and	the	national	immigration	enforcement	agency.	Even	though	they	are	institutionally	integrated	in	the	former,	they	at	least	partly	fulfil	the	function	of	the	latter.	An	important	part	of	this	function	is	to	establish	not	only	the	immigration	status	 of	 ‘suspicious’	 clients	 (by	 checking	 their	 documentation)	 but	 also	 their	immigration	history	and	likelihood	of	being	either	regularised	or	deported.	Just	like	the	‘Overseas	Visitors	Managers’	in	NHS	hospitals	and	the	Immigration	Departments	of	public	universities,	they	thereby	act	as	an	extension	of	the	Home	Office	into	the	various	spheres	of	local	service	provision.		That	 the	 UK	 governments’	 ‘hostile	 environment’	 approach	 and	 rhetoric	 in	combination	 with	 increasing	 financial	 pressure	 significantly	 affect	 how	 migrant	irregularity	 is	 perceived	 and	 dealt	 with	 at	 the	 local	 level	 becomes	 particularly	apparent	in	the	domain	of	social	assistance,	as	a	LA	representative	emphasised:		It	[used	to	be]	very	much	‘LAs	versus	Home	Office’	on	what	should	happen	with	this	client	group,	and	LAs	were	very	much	like	‘well	if	there	is	a	child	in	need,	we	must	act’.	And	so	it’s	just	like	a	warning	thing	for	me	at	the	moment	[…]	 that	 in	 fact	 you	 are	 now	 struggling	 to	 maintain	 a	 kind	 of	 consensus	amongst	 the	 LAs	 on	 how	 they	 perceive	 the	 client	 group.	 And	 if	 they	
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undermine	the	client	group	by	calling	them	fraudsters	or…	you	know,	talking	mainly	 about	 the	 criminality	 of	 their	 situation,	which	 is	 a	 discussion	 that	
seems	to	be	coming	out	from	all	sides	at	the	moment,	you	kind	of	undermine	[LAs’]	ability	to	[…]	stave	off	some	of	the	more	hostile	immigration	policies	(lonA15).	Instead	 of	 resisting	 central	 government	 policies	 that	 undermine	 their	 ability	 to	serve	 the	 communities	 they	 are	 responsible	 for,	 many	 local	 social	 service	departments	 in	London	are	developing	strategies	 that	allow	them	to	evade	those	already	very	 limited	 statutory	 responsibilities	 that	 they	might	 still	have	 towards	destitute	local	residents	in	irregular	situations.	Even	more	than	health	centres	and	hospitals,	 and	 certainly	 more	 than	 schools,	 these	 local	 institutions	 are	 thus	becoming	part	and	parcel	of	the	‘hostile	environment’	that	the	government	seeks	to	create	for	this	category	of	people.	In	the	worst	case,	this	means	that	legislation	like	the	UK	Children	Act	only	effectively	protects	the	human	rights	of	those	children	in	irregular	 situations	 whose	 parents’	 immigration	 claim,	 i.e.	 their	 prospects	 for	regularisation,	are	strong	enough	to	ensure	that	they	will	not	be	deported	as	a	result	of	 trying	 to	 activate	 these	 rights.	 For	 one	 of	 the	 social	workers	 I	 interviewed	 in	London,	LAs	are	thereby	deliberately	given	a	task	on	which	they	are	bound	to	fail:		Ultimately	it	is	the	LA	that	will	do	the	assessment	about	whether	something	is	a	breach	of	human	rights	or	not.	And	that	is	something	that	was	never	ever	
meant	to	be	our	role,	and	it’s	not	something	we	are	resourced	to	do.	We	just	
had	to	become	experts	at	it,	because	we	have	been	handed	that	responsibility,	which	is	a	responsibility	that	really	should	lie	on	central	government.	And	because	they	have	been	failing	on	it,	they	simply	wanted	to	transfer	the	arena	
of	failure	from	themselves	to	the	LAs.	And	then,	somewhere	down	the	line,	it	will	be	‘look,	how	awful	LAs	are’,	because	they	are	failing	on	them	(lonA30).		 	
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8. Conclusion	In	most	everyday	social	and	economic	relations	migrant	irregularity	manifests	itself	–	if	it	does	at	all	–	only	due	to	certain	practices	or	mechanisms	that	actively	detect	and	 exclude	 (or	 prevent	 full	 inclusion	 of)	 some	 people	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	immigration	status.	For	Bommes	&	Sciortino	(2011b,	p.218)	it	is	“an	old	sociological	truth”	 that	 “modern	 society	does	not	provide	 societal	 inclusion	on	 the	basis	of	 a	totalising	 social	 status,	 but	 rather	 a	 bundle	 of	 differentiated	 conditions	 for	participation	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 social	 contexts	 structured	 by	 different	 modes	 of	inclusion”.	Throughout	this	thesis	I	have	tried	to	show	that	the	same	can	also	be	said	about	irregular	residents’	exclusion	from	society:	It	is	neither	absolute	nor	uniform,	nor	 does	 it	 happen	 automatically.	 In	 order	 to	 become	 effective,	 it	 has	 to	 be	specifically	enacted	by	(some	of)	 the	people	who	work	within	the	corresponding	institutions.	The	internal	logics	of	these	institutions	thereby	often	tend	to	conflict,	but	can	also	partly	converge,	with	the	logic	of	immigration	control.			
8.1. A	three-dimensional	comparison	of	street-level	bureaucrats’	
involvement	in	the	micro-management	of	migrant	irregularity	and	its	
control	The	 empirical	 data	 and	 analysis	 presented	 in	 this	 thesis	 allow	 systematic	comparisons	to	be	drawn	across	(i)	two	rather	distinct	legal-political	environments,	(ii)	 three	 crucial	 spheres	 of	 public	 service	 provision	 and	 (iii)	 three	 different	categories	of	welfare	workers.	The	first	provide	the	context	and	legal	foundation	for	what	 I	call	 the	micro-management	of	migrant	 irregularity.	That	 is,	 they	 frame	but	cannot	 fully	 determine	 the	 local	provision	or	non-provision	of	 different	 kinds	of	services	to	foreigners	who	are	part	of	the	local	population	but	lack	formal	residence	rights	and	from	the	perspective	of	the	immigration	regime	should	therefore	either	be	regularised	or	deported.			
8.1.1. Public	service	provision	between	regularisation	and	deportation		What	most	 fundamentally	sets	 the	 two	environments	apart	 is	 that	 in	 the	British	
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context	the	sometimes	overlapping	aims	and	interests	of	the	immigration	agency	on	 one	 hand	 and	 welfare	 institutions	 on	 the	 other	 tend	 to	 be	 geared	 towards	irregular	 residents’	 return	 or	 deportation	 rather	 than	 their	 regularisation.	 As	 I	described	 in	section	4.1,	 there	 is	not	only	a	clear	 lack	of	political	support	 for	 the	latter,	 but	 also	 very	 limited	 opportunities	 provided	 by	 the	 British	 immigration	regime.	 In	 addition,	 the	 government’s	 explicit	 ‘hostile	 environment’	 policy	 and	rhetoric	help	to	undermine	the	necessary	firewalls	separating	the	various	parts	and	levels	 of	 the	 public	 administration	 and	 instead	 command	 or	 incentivise	 active	cooperation	with	the	immigration	authority.	A	government	official	quoted	by	The	
Telegraph	put	it	this	way:		It	is	important	for	every	government	department	to	play	their	part	in	tackling	immigration	 […].	 As	 we	 have	 a	 cross-governmental	 focus	 on	 reducing	immigration	and	tackling	illegal	immigration,	it	is	right	that	we	look	at	what	role	the	education	system	is	playing	(cit.	in	Ross,	2015).	In	order	for	all	sectors	to	effectively	work	together	and	towards	the	same	goal,	the	immigration	regime	needs	to	impose	its	own	functional	logic	and	codes	upon	several	other	societal	subsystems	and	spheres	of	everyday	life,	as	I	argued	in	section	2.3.	This	 is	 easier	within	what	 Robert	 K.	Merton	 (1973,	 p.265/6)	 called	 ‘totalitarian	structures’	than	it	is	in	‘liberal	structures’:		The	differences	 in	 the	mechanisms	through	which	 integration	[of	different	spheres,	 logics,	 etc.]	 is	 typically	effected	permit	 a	greater	 latitude	 for	self-determination	and	autonomy	to	various	institutions,	including	science,	in	the	liberal	than	the	totalitarian	structure.	[...]	Incompatible	sentiments	must	be	insulated	 from	one	another	or	 integrated	with	each	other	 if	 there	 is	 to	be	social	stability.	But	such	insulation	becomes	virtually	impossible	when	there	exists	 centralised	 control	 under	 the	 aegis	 of	 any	 one	 sector	 of	 social	 life,	which	 imposes,	 and	attempts	 to	enforce,	 the	obligation	of	adherence	 to	 its	
values	 and	 sentiments	 as	 a	 condition	 of	 continued	 existence.	 In	 liberal	structures,	the	absence	of	such	centralization	permits	the	necessary	degree	of	insulation	by	guaranteeing	to	each	sphere	restricted	rights	of	autonomy	and	thus	enables	the	gradual	integration	of	temporarily	inconsistent	elements	(emphasis	added).		In	this	sense,	the	case	of	Spain	represents	a	more	‘liberal	structure’,	within	which	migrant	 irregularity	 is	 institutionalised	 as	 a	 temporary	 inconsistency	 that	 can	eventually	 be	 resolved	 through	 regularisation	–	 in	 principal,	 after	 three	 years	 of	officially	registered	residence	in	the	country.	An	important	finding	of	my	study	is	that	regularisation	thereby	appears	as	a	solution	not	only	for	migrants	themselves	
		
221	
but	also	the	people	and	institutions	that	(have	to)	deal	with	them	on	a	more	or	less	regular	basis,	since	it	is	ultimately	this	interaction	that	becomes	regular.	Both	the	more	liberal	Spanish	immigration	law	and	the	more	pragmatic	framing	of	irregular	migration	and	residence	make	it	easier	for	individual	and	institutional	actors	at	the	local	level	to	deal	with	at	least	some	of	irregular	migrants’	claims.	These	actors	are	thereby	enabled	to	temporarily	resolve	some	of	the	underlying	ethical	conflicts	and	legal	 or	 practical	 contradictions	 that	 otherwise	 complicate	 their	 work	 and	 keep	them	from	fulfilling	their	function	for	society.		As	 I	 have	 shown,	 it	 is	 both	 easier	 and	more	 common	 for	 public	 institutions	 and	individual	workers	in	Barcelona	–	compared	to	those	working	in	London	–	to	‘micro-regularise’	the	situation	of	irregular	residents	in	order	to	facilitate	at	least	their	own	specific	interactions	with	them.	For	example,	the	Catalan	healthcare	system	found	a	way	 to	 treat	 all	 residents	 who	 need	 medical	 assistance	 and	 fulfil	 certain	documentary	 requirements	 as	 regular	 patients	 without	 depending	 on	 the	immigration	regime	to	formally	‘sort	out’	their	status,	as	a	senior	healthcare	official	(1)	and	a	family	doctor	(2)	explained	to	me:		(1)	Regularisation	is	a	policy	of	the	state;	but	here	[at	the	local	level]	it	is	us	who	have	to	act,	that	is,	to	address	the	reality	that	exists.	[...]	And	what	I	think	the	[health	system]	is	doing	is	to	say	‘well,	the	[immigration]	policies	will	be	applied	whenever	they	will	be	applied,	but	as	long	as	we	have	people	here	who	are	in	an	irregular	situation	but	who	are	here,	we	are	going	to	care	for	them.	So,	the	health	system	has	no	responsibility	to	regulate	immigration,	but	
its	role	is	to	provide	assistance	to	the	people	who	are	here	(bcnA17).			(2)	 In	the	case	of	Catalonia	[…]	 it	was	decided	to	give	them	[health]	cards	with	 different	 levels:	 […]	 A	 first	 level	 that	 gives	 access	 to	 the	 general	practitioner,	 certain	 specialists	 and	some	concrete	analyses;	 and	a	 second	level	 in	 which	 the	 patient	 is	 not	 anymore	 irregular,	 and	 therefore	 can,	 in	principle,	 access	any	 type	of	health	treatment,	whether	 specialised	or	not,	and	all	kinds	of	examinations	(bcnA12).		In	 this	 case,	 the	 healthcare	 system	 successfully	 converts	 irregular	 residents	 into	regular	 patients.	 More	 often	 than	 not,	 however,	 the	 legal	 frameworks,	 formal	policies	and	official	discourses	through	which	governments	try	to	manage	irregular	migration	 and	 residence	 significantly	 limit	 or	 undermine	 the	 ability	 of	 public	institutions	to	‘micro-regularise’	unlawful	residents.	This	generally	happens	at	two	different	levels:		
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At	 the	 institutional	 level,	 law	 and	 policy	 determine	 whether	 or	 not	 migrants	 in	irregular	situations	are	formally	entitled	to	access	any	particular	service	for	free	and	can	 approach	 the	 relevant	 institutions	 without	 thereby	 increasing	 their	 risk	 of	deportation.	Based	on	 the	 two-dimensional	 analytical	 framework	 I	 introduced	 in	section	2.4,	 figure	8	 illustrates	how	the	two	environments	differ	in	both	of	 these	respects:	Access	to	the	kinds	and	levels	of	services	that	appear	on	the	left	side	of	each	diagram	is	formally	linked	to	immigration	status,	whereas	those	on	the	right	can,	 at	 least	 in	 principle,	 be	 accessed	 irrespectively.	 Their	 positions	 along	 the	vertical	 axis	 of	 the	 diagrams	 indicate	 whether	 the	 corresponding	 institutions	thereby	exchange	information	with	the	immigration	regime	or	are	separated	from	it	 through	 a	 firewall:	 The	more	 systematic	 this	 institutional	 link	 the	 closer	 they	appear	to	the	top;	the	more	effective	the	firewall	the	closer	they	are	to	the	bottom.															Both	kinds	of	 linkages	have	direct	 implications	 for	 irregular	migrants’	ability	and	likelihood	to	access	a	service	they	think	they	need:	Where	access	hinges	on	 legal	
A	 -	Formal	exclusion	from	service	-	Contact	increases	deportability	 B	 -	Informal	exclusion	from	service	-	Contact	may	increase	deportability		 	 	 	C	 -	Formal	exclusion	from	service	-	Contact	does	not	affect	deportability	 D	 -	Formal	inclusion	-	'Micro-regularisation'	
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Figure	8:	The	positions	of	different	kinds	of	services	provided	in	London	and	Barcelona,	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	
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residence	 (sectors	 ‘A’	 and	 ‘C’)	 they	are	 formally	excluded,	but	only	 if	 there	 is	no	firewall	in	place	(‘A’)	will	even	an	attempt	to	access	the	service	also	increase	their	deportability.	Where	access	is	formally	independent	on	immigration	status	(‘B’	and	‘D’),	 the	 lack	of	a	 firewall	 (‘B’)	still	acts	as	a	deterrent	and	can	effectively	 lead	to	informal	exclusion;	whereas	the	existence	of	such	firewall	(‘D’)	ultimately	permits	irregular	 migrants’	 formal	 inclusion	 through	 ‘micro-regularisation’.	 Overall,	 the	chances	 that	 migrant	 irregularity	 not	 only	 precludes	 service	 provision	 but	 also	triggers	immigration	enforcement	are	significantly	higher	in	London	than	they	are	in	Barcelona.		At	 ‘street-level’,	 the	 same	 legal	 frameworks	 and	 policies	 also	 circumscribe	 how	individual	public	employees	perceive	and	deal	with	migrant	irregularity	within	their	respective	institutional	spheres,	such	as	primary	schools	or	health	centres.	At	the	end	 of	 each	 of	 the	 chapters	 on	 healthcare,	 education	 and	 social	 assistance	 I	summarised	the	main	differences	between	the	two	environments	in	terms	of	how	they	position	various	categories	of	workers	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity	and	its	 control.	 Figure	 9	 aggregates	 the	 findings	 from	 all	 three	 sectors	 of	 service	provision	 for	each	environment,	 in	order	 to	better	 illustrate	not	only	 the	overall	differences	between	these,	but	also	variations	between	the	three	sectors	(different	colours)	as	well	as	the	three	role-categories	(different	patterns).										 		
LONDON	 BARCELONA	A	 B	
C	 D	Yes						 	 No	
Should	I	know? 
Sh
ou
ld
	I	
te
ll?
	
N
o	
	
Ye
s HEALTH	Manag.	
HEALTH	Admin.	
EDUC	Manag.	
EDUC	Admin.	
ASSIST	Admin.	
ASSIST	Manag.	
HEALTH	Prof.	
EDUC	Prof.	
ASSIST	Prof.	
A	 B	
C	 D	
Sh
ou
ld
	I	
te
ll?
	
N
o	
	
Ye
s 
Yes						 	 No	
Should	I	know? 
HEALTH	Manag.	HEALTH	Admin.	
EDUC	Admin.	ASSIST	Admin.	HEALTH	Prof.	EDUC	Prof.	
ASSIST	Prof.	
Figure	9:	The	positions	of	different	kinds	and	categories	of	street-level	bureaucrats	working	in	London	and	Barcelona,	in	relation	to	migrant	irregularity	and	its	control	
		
224	
Overall,	the	positions	of	most	street-level	bureaucrats	range	from	segments	‘D’	to	‘C’	of	the	framework,	and	only	in	London	also	into	segment	‘A’.	The	latter	represents	the	closest	cooperation	of	individual	workers	with	the	immigration	regime,	whereas	‘D’	represents	the	greatest	distance.	As	I	explained	in	section	2.4,	the	stronger	the	concrete	incentive,	legal	obligation	or	practical	necessity	for	someone	to	know	the	immigration	status	of	potential	service	users,	the	further	they	are	placed	towards	the	left	of	the	framework.	The	relative	position	along	the	vertical	axis	indicates	the	degree	to	which	someone	is	expected	or	obliged	to	notify	the	immigration	authority	of	potential	encounters	or	dealings	with	irregular	migrants.		Across	 both	 environments	 and	 all	 role-categories,	 those	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	provision	 of	 social	 assistance	 generally	 appear	 closer	 to	 sector	 ‘A’,	 whereas	healthcare	and	education	workers	tend	to	be	closer	to	‘D’.	Across	all	three	spheres	of	provision,	the	so-called	‘managers	of	irregularity’	are	–	unsurprisingly	–	closest	to	‘A’,	followed	by	administrative	roles,	whereas	professionals	tend	to	be	closest	to	‘D’84.	It	is	important	to	note	that	their	various	positions	within	the	framework	not	only	reflect	the	contextual	differences	between	the	two	environments,	but	also	the	distinctive	nature	of	each	welfare	sector	as	well	as	the	concrete	responsibilities	and	level	 of	 autonomy	 attached	 to	 different	 organisational	 roles,	 like	 that	 of	 a	receptionist,	doctor	or	school	administrator.			
8.1.2. Different	kinds	and	categories	of	street-level	bureaucrats	and	their	
various	positions	vis-à-vis	the	immigration	regime	The	patterns	that	appear	in	figures	8	and	9	illustrate	another	important	finding	of	my	 study:	 that	within	 both	 environments	 some	 sectors	 of	welfare	 provision	 and	certain	categories	of	workers	generally	seem	more	likely	to	internalise	the	logic	of	immigration	control	than	others.	At	least	four	aspects	explain	these	variations:		First	of	all,	depending	on	the	kind	of	service	and	the	level	of	provision,	the	inclusion	or	 exclusion	 of	 irregular	 residents	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 distinctive	 mix	 of	
																																																								84	This	is	true	for	all	but	the	case	of	social	assistance	in	Barcelona,	where	the	access	to	particular	services	that	require	legal	status	(like	the	RMI)	can	only	be	granted	or	denied	by	social	workers	who	therefore	–	unlike	administrative	staff	–	have	to	know	the	immigration	status	of	a	client.		
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rationales:	International	human	rights	norms,	for	instance,	are	more	powerful	in	the	spheres	of	(compulsory)	education	and	(basic	or	urgent)	healthcare	than	with	regard	 to	 (even	 basic)	 social	 assistance.	 While	 access	 to	 any	 of	 the	 three	presupposes	local	residence,	especially	the	last	is	also	linked	to	national	conceptions	of	membership,	belonging	or	deservingness,	which	tend	to	favour	the	exclusion	of	formal	 non-members	 (see	 chapter	 7).	 The	 closely	 related	 claim	 that	 unlawful	residents	simply	should	not	benefit	from	welfare	provisions	that	are	financed	with	taxpayers’	money	 is	more	or	 less	effectively	counterbalanced	by	other	pragmatic	arguments	 such	 as	 the	 negative	 long-term	 effects	 that	 their	 rigorous	 exclusion	would	 have	 for	 public	 health	 and	 safety,	 individual	 integration	 or	 overall	 social	cohesion.	The	idea	that	‘integration’	necessarily	implies	or	even	presupposes	lawful	residence	is	particularly	salient	in	the	UK,	where	irregular	migrants	are	therefore	explicitly	 excluded	not	only	 from	official	 ‘integration’	 policies	 but	 also	more	 and	more	spheres	of	everyday	interaction.		Secondly,	each	sector	of	welfare	provision	is	characterised	by	its	own	functional	
and	organisational	 logics.	These	 require	 the	 inclusion	or	exclusion	of	potential	service	 users	 to	 be	 based	 primarily	 on	 intrinsically	 relevant	 aspects	 of	 their	circumstances	 rather	 than	 their	 immigration	 status.	A	 comprehensive	healthcare	system	must	be	accessible	for	anyone	exhibiting	pathological	symptoms	and	be	able	to	 offer	 the	 corresponding	 treatment,	 including	 regular	 preventive	 care,	 to	 any	member	of	the	public.	The	education	system	generally	accepts	pupils	on	the	basis	of	their	age	and/or	previous	educational	qualifications	and	is	committed	to	providing	equal	opportunities	to	all	students.	Social	assistance	is	provided	precisely	with	the	aim	 of	 compensating	 existing	 socio-economic	 inequalities	 and	 is	 thus	 normally	triggered	by	 symptoms	of	marginalisation	and	exclusion	–	which	 is	 exactly	what	internal	immigration	control	creates	for	irregular	migrants.		The	resulting	contradictions	are	thus	often	sector-specific	and	tend	to	become	most	evident	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 professionals,	 who	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 specific	training	and	experience	in	a	way	‘embody’	the	functional	logics	of	their	respective	institution.	For	example,	one	of	my	interviewees	insisted	that	“it’s	in	the	DNA	of	a	teacher”	 (bcnA26)	 that	 students	 should	 regularly	attend	and	participate	 in	 class,	which	is	also	a	good	example	for	how	certain	internal	logics	tend	to	converge	with	
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external	 logics	of	control:	As	discussed	 in	chapter	6,	school	or	university	records	officially	 certifying	 students’	 attendance,	 home	 address	 or	 other	 personal	information	can	also	be	(ab)used	for	other	purposes	including	immigration	control.	Since	the	 individual	 teachers	or	 lecturers	who	compile	 these	records	are	thereby	‘only	 doing	 their	 job’,	 no	 additional	 incentive	 or	 obligation	 is	 usually	 needed	 to	ensure	their	(often	unconscious)	participation.		Thirdly,	 different	 organisational	 roles	 involve	 different	 kinds	 and	 degrees	 of	
power	 and	 control	 that	 the	 individuals	occupying	 them	 routinely	 exercise	 over	service	 users.	 A	 high	 level	 of	 administrative	 or	 professional	 discretion	 thereby	generally	reflects	a	significant	degree	of	specialisation	and	often	goes	hand	in	hand	with	a	particularly	strong	standing	within	society	and	vis-à-vis	certain	aspects	of	the	law.	The	doctor	who	told	me	that	he	“can	decide	that	everyone	who	comes	through	this	door	 is	 an	urgent	 case”	 (bcnA14)	and	can	 thus	be	 treated	without	 regard	 to	immigration	law	is	a	good	example	for	this.	Across	both	environments	and	all	three	sectors	I	have	compared,	it	is	the	administration	of	public	services,	rather	than	their	actual	 provision,	 that	 is	 rendered	more	 complicated	 by	migrant	 irregularity	 and	more	likely	to	overlap	with	its	control.		This	 is	 because	 migrant	 irregularity	 only	 manifests	 itself	 in	 the	 lack	 of	 specific	documents,	 like	 a	 national	 identity	 card	 or	 social	 insurance	 number,	 while	someone’s	health	condition,	educational	achievement	or	social	needs	may	well	be	affected	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 immigration	 status	 but	 certainly	 cannot	 prove	 it.	 Whereas	welfare	 administrators	 thus	 routinely	 handle	 potential	 evidence	 of	 irregularity,	welfare	 professionals	 tend	 to	 be	 quite	 explicitly	 shielded	 from	 dealing	 with	immigration	issues.	This	shielding	ensures	their	close	attachment	to	the	dominant	functional	 logic	of	 their	 institution	 and	 is	 necessary	 because	 their	 job	 requires	 a	trustful	 relationship	 with	 potential	 service	 users.	 After	 all,	 neither	 doctors	 nor	teachers	nor	social	workers	can	successfully	do	their	job	without	the	trust	of	their	patients,	students	or	clients.		Fourthly,	the	kind	and	degree	of	control	that	street-level	bureaucrats	exercise	over	service	 users	 as	 part	 of	 their	 role	 not	 only	 sets	 professionals	 apart	 from	administrators	but	also	varies	across	different	professions:	As	my	data	suggests,	doctors	 and	 nurses	 can	 themselves	 hardly	 be	 expected	 to	 control	 aspects	 of	 a	
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patient’s	life	that	have	no	direct	bearing	on	their	health,	whereas	teachers	typically	control	their	students’	presence	and	behaviour	to	ensure	their	educational	success.	Both	 thereby	 fiercely	 resist	 any	 abuse	 of	 their	 records	 for	 other	 purposes,	particularly	immigration	enforcement.	Social	workers,	on	the	other	hand,	routinely	exercise	control	over	significantly	more	aspects	of	their	clients’	economic,	private	and	family	life	and	thereby	have	to	deal	with	more	complex	eligibility	criteria	that	are	often	directly	linked	to	legal	residence.	This	arguably	helps	to	explain	why	the	social	workers	I	interviewed	generally	seemed	less	reluctant	than	most	doctors	and	teachers	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 helping	 to	 control	 not	 only	 immigration	 but	 also	 other	‘irregularities’,	like	informal	employment,	tax	evasion	or	benefit	fraud.			
8.1.3. The	difference	between	‘having	to	know’	and	‘having	to	tell’	A	 third	 significant	 finding	 of	my	 study	 is	 that	 the	 internalisation	 of	 immigration	control	works	 quite	 differently	 for	 each	 of	 the	 two	 dimensions	 of	my	 analytical	framework:	Compelling	or	encouraging	welfare	workers	to	notify	the	immigration	authority	of	any	 interaction	with	 irregular	migrants	(‘having	to	tell’)	 involves	the	removal	or	undermining	of	some	sort	of	firewall,	and	is	thus	primarily	a	legal	and/or	technical	matter.	Particularly	in	the	UK	context	it	is	thereby	quite	often	the	welfare	institution	that	requests	immigration-related	information	about	individual	service	users	from	the	Home	Office	in	order	to	be	able	to	correctly	assess	their	eligibility.	As	the	programme	director	of	Doctors	of	 the	World	UK	 emphasised	 in	an	 interview,	however,	it	is	difficult	to	allow	one	side	of	this	exchange	while	effectively	preventing	the	other:		
In	order	to	see	whether	people	are	eligible	or	not	for	free	care	they	want	to	connect	 the	NHS	 IT	 system	with	 the	Home	Office	 IT	 system,	 and	 the	 idea	would	be	[to]	simply	pull	data	to	see	what	your	immigration	status	is	[…];	but	our	biggest	concern	is	that	the	Home	Office	will	use	that	connection	to	have	a	
two-way	 stream	 of	 information	 and	 use	 that	 for	 immigration	 enforcement	(lonA03).		Notably,	 also	 the	Catalan	health	 service	 relies	on	an	automatic	digital	 link	 to	 the	National	Institute	of	Social	Security	in	order	to	verify	claimants’	insufficient	income	or	other	economic	means	and	thus	their	eligibility	for	receiving	free	healthcare;	but	no	 information	 is	 thereby	 exchanged	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 immigration	 control	
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(chapter	5).		The	analytically	more	interesting	question	is	whether	or	not	(and	for	what	reason)	individual	street-level	bureaucrats	should	even	obtain	this	kind	of	knowledge	about	potential	service	users.	My	study	shows	that	their	reasons	for	‘having	to	know’	can	often	be	traced	to	some	functional	overlap	between	their	own	job	within	the	public	welfare	 system	 and	 the	 government’s	 efforts	 to	 (more	 effectively)	 control	immigration.	 Many	 service	 administrators,	 for	 example,	 almost	 ‘automatically’	become	involved	in	immigration	control	as	soon	as	immigration	status	becomes	part	of	the	basis	for	their	assessment	of	potential	service	users’	eligibility.	In	order	for	immigration	 status	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account,	 however,	 it	 first	 of	 all	 has	 to	 be	systematically	 determined	 by	 someone	 working	 within	 the	 corresponding	institution.	My	 findings	 suggest	 that	 individual	workers	 are	 thereby	 often	 led	 to	believe	 that	 what	 they	 are	 controlling	 –	 by	 checking	 someone’s	 passport,	 for	example	–	 is	something	else	than	immigration,	 like	the	person’s	 identity,	place	of	residence	or	previous	tax	or	other	financial	contribution	to	the	welfare	system.		This	reflects	the	governmental	nature	of	the	power	relation	between	street-level	bureaucrats	and	the	government,	which	also	renders	the	deputisation	of	the	former	much	less	straight-forward:	Unable	to	 fully	control	every	aspect	of	 their	complex	everyday	 dealings	with	 the	 population,	 governments	 rather	 tend	 to	modify	 their	ascribed	 roles	 in	order	 to	 create	a	 specific	 reason	 for	 them	 to	also	participate	 in	certain	aspects	of	immigration	control.	Individual	workers	are	thus	often	”doing	it	in	 an	 innocent	 way,	 or	 they	 may	 not	 even	 realise”	 (lonA11),	 as	 one	 of	 my	interviewees	put	 it.	 Importantly,	 they	sometimes	also	 ‘do	it’	because	 it	seemingly	makes	 their	 own	work	 easier	 or	helps	 to	 reduce	 their	workload.	 Administrators	working	in	either	of	the	two	environments	and	across	all	three	sectors	of	service	provision	described	rather	similar	instances	where	allowing	or	facilitating	irregular	residents’	access	to	a	service	tended	to	increase	or	complicate	their	own	work,	often	as	a	result	of	having	to	accept	and	deal	with	incomplete	or	unofficial	documentation.		The	work	 of	most	 professional	 providers	 of	welfare	 services,	 in	 contrast,	 is	 not	immediately	 rendered	 more	 difficult	 or	 complex	 by	 a	 service	 user’s	 lack	 of	immigration	status;	nor	does	the	latter	automatically	warrant	any	special	treatment.	This	is	particularly	true	for	doctors	and	teachers,	who	even	in	the	UK	context	tend	
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to	 be	 most	 effectively	 shielded	 from	 having	 to	 deal	 with	 immigration	 issues,	 as	shown	 in	 figure	 9.	 That	 said,	 also	 some	 of	 the	medical	 professionals	mentioned	instances	–	 like	a	change	 in	 immigration	 law	(in	the	UK)	or	 the	 introduction	of	a	computerised	 system	 for	 managing	 patient	 referrals	 and	 prescriptions	 (in	Catalonia)	–	that	suddenly	limited	their	own	individual	discretion	and	thus	also	their	possibility	 to	 fully	 disregard	 their	 patients’	 immigration	 status.	 Across	 both	environments	 it	 was	 most	 common	 among	 social	 workers	 to	 describe	 migrant	irregularity	as	a	significant	obstacle	to	their	own	work,	since	it	interferes	with	two	crucial	aspects	of	it:	the	social	worker’s	ability	to	develop	a	close,	trustful	and	ideally	longer-term	relationship	with	 the	 client,	 and	 the	 client’s	possibility	 to	eventually	(re)enter	the	formal	labour	market	(see	chapter	7).		It	is	also	important	to	keep	in	mind,	however,	that	all	street-level	bureaucrats	almost	inevitably	 employ	 some	 form	 of	 what	 Lipsky	 (1980,	 p.152)	 called	 ‘client	differentiation’,	whereby	“unsanctioned	distinctions	between	worthy	and	unworthy	clients	narrow	the	range	of	clients	for	whom	street-level	bureaucrats	must	provide	their	 best	 efforts”.	 Seen	 from	 this	 perspective,	 immigration	 status	 can	 also	 be	‘helpful’	in	providing	a	distinction	that	is	not	only	unsanctioned,	but	very	often	has	“the	sanction	of	 the	state	behind	[it]”,	as	Bowen	et	al.	 (2013,	p.3)	put	 it.	My	own	analysis	shows	that	the	systematic	incorporation	of	this	distinction	into	the	various	parts	 of	 the	welfare	 system	 requires	 not	 only	 individual	workers	 to	 adjust	 their	actions	 towards	 certain	 service	 users	 but	 has	 also	 prompted	 responses	 at	 the	institutional	level.				
8.1.4. Organisational	responses	to	internalised	control	A	last	crucial	finding	of	my	study	is	that	the	sometimes	rather	unconscious	or	at	least	not	 fully	 intentional	 collaboration	 between	 local	 welfare	 workers	 and	 the	immigration	agency	can	be	further	encouraged	through	incentive	mechanisms	that	operate	at	the	organisational	rather	than	individual	level	and	often	trigger	a	certain	institutionalisation	of	this	overlap.	The	most	obvious	example	for	such	mechanisms	is	the	financial	pressure	put	on	organisations	that	seem	particularly	‘well	placed’	to	exercise	 some	kind	of	 immigration	 control	but	are	not	 sufficiently	 ‘interested’	 in	
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assuming	 this	responsibility.	Particularly	 in	 the	UK,	 this	kind	of	 leverage	 is	quite	openly	 used	 against	 organisations	 that	 directly	 depend	 on	 central	 government	funding,	like	NHS	hospitals	(chapter	5)	and	local	welfare	departments	(chapter	7):	The	more	their	funding	is	cut,	the	bigger	the	incentive	to	identify	those	patients	who	can	 be	 charged	 privately	 or	 those	 claimants	who	 can	 legally	 be	 denied	 support	because	of	their	immigration	status.	The	same	mechanism	works	slightly	differently	in	the	case	of	UK	universities,	which	financially	depend	on	being	allowed	to	‘sponsor’	non-European	students	who	they	can	charge	significantly	higher	tuition	fees.	The	government	 only	 renews	 a	 university’s	 sponsor	 licence,	 however,	 if	 its	 own	admission	 system	 not	 only	 takes	 into	 account	 prospective	 students’	 academic	credentials	 but	 also	 their	 likelihood	 of	 being	 granted	 a	 student	 visa	 or	 other	residence	right	(chapter	6).		In	 all	 three	 cases	 the	 responsibility	 for	 immigration	 control	 has	 been	 partly	transferred	to	the	 local	 level,	where	 it	created	the	need	for	specific	 ‘managers’	of	potential	 irregularity	 to	work	within	 the	 corresponding	 organisations.	 As	 I	 have	shown	in	chapters	5,	6	&	7,	these	managers	not	only	perceive	it	as	(part	of)	their	role	to	know	the	immigration	status	of	their	clients,	but	also	tend	to	be	obliged	or	at	least	more	 inclined	 to	 tell	 the	 immigration	 authority	 about	 it.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 precisely	through	so-called	‘Overseas	Visitors	Managers’,	‘Student	Immigration	Advisors’	and	‘NRPF-teams’	that	the	UK	government	has	been	able	to	not	only	raise	but	also	quite	effectively	patrol	the	“protective	wall	[…]	around	the	key	institutions	of	the	welfare	state”,	as	Broeders	&	Engbersen	(2007,	p.1595)	called	it.	As	a	result,	and	other	than	in	 Catalonia,	 this	 wall	 does	 not	 anymore	 just	 surround	 these	 institutions	 but	increasingly	runs	right	through	them.		According	 to	 organisation	 theory,	 such	 structural	 adjustments	 to	 a	 new	 set	 of	external	requirements	represent	a	common	way	for	organisations	to	avoid	internal	conflicts	between	the	dominant	and	other	logics	that	compete	to	guide	their	actions,	as	 I	 discussed	 in	 section	 2.3.	 Precisely	 in	 order	 to	 more	 effectively	 deal	 with	contradictory	 external	 demands	 it	 arguably	 makes	 sense	 for	 local	 welfare	institutions	 to	 develop	 what	 Besharov	 &	 Smith	 (2013,	 p.376)	 called	 “a	 cadre	 of	organisational	members	who	are	less	strongly	attached	to	particular	logics”.	While	the	various	‘managers	of	irregularity’	have	certainly	come	to	play	an	important	role	
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within	the	UK	government’s	‘hostile	environment’	approach,	their	creation	has	not	been	explicitly	demanded	by	central	government.	Instead,	it	was	the	need	to	ensure	their	 own	 (cost-)effective	 functioning	 that	 encouraged	 the	 various	 organisations	themselves	 to	 introduce	a	 certain	element	of	 immigration	 control	 into	 their	own	institutional	 structures	 and	 operations.	 These	 structural	 adjustments	 have	 also	helped	 to	 systematically	 undermine	 the	 necessary	 firewall	 between	 immigration	enforcement	and	public	service	provision,	and	arguably	rendered	this	overlap	less	visible	to	the	general	public	and	less	exposed	to	internal	and	external	resistance	and	contestation.			
8.2. Problematising	migrant	irregularity	together	with	its	control	From	 a	 historical	 perspective,	 Park	 (2013,	 p.10)	 argued	 that	 the	 “problems	 of	illegality	[…]	tell	us	a	great	deal	about	how	law	might	be	viewed	from	the	bottom	up,	from	the	perspective	of	people	who	were	subject	to	the	law	and	then	resisted	it	in	complex,	disquieting	ways”.	The	increasing	internalisation	of	immigration	control	ultimately	means	 that	 ever	more	 people	 –	who	 in	 numerous	ways	 interact	with	irregular	migrants	on	a	more	or	less	regular	basis	–	will	themselves	become	subject	to	 immigration	 law.	This,	 in	 turn,	might	 increase	 the	potential	 for	resistance.	My	findings	show	that	while	street-level	bureaucrats	quite	often	prefer	not	to	know	and	sometimes	effectively	 refuse	 to	know	service	 users’	 immigration	 status,	 they	are	often	 given	 other	 reasons	 for	 checking	 documentation	 that	 –	 like	 a	 passport	 –	‘happens’	to	not	only	certify	their	identity,	age	or	local	residence	but	also	the	legality	of	their	presence	on	the	national	territory.		Once	 street-level	 bureaucracies	 have	 agreed	 to	 know	 and	 more	 or	 less	systematically	incorporated	immigration	checks	into	their	own	work,	the	outcome	of	 their	 involvement	 becomes	 a	 matter	 of	 how	 migrant	 irregularity	 is	 officially	framed	and	how	effectively	it	is	being	addressed	through	measures	of	regularisation	and/or	deportation.	If	it	is	presented	as	a	serious	breach	of	law	that	can	(and	will)	only	be	‘corrected’	through	deportation	or	return,	as	in	the	British	case,	street-level	bureaucrats	 are	 given	 a	 strong	 argument	 for	 also	 sharing	 immigration-related	information	(that	is	already	‘available’	to	them)	with	the	relevant	authority	in	order	
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to	help	‘resolve’	the	problem	of	irregular	migration.	If	depicted	and	institutionalised	as	a	temporary	administrative	irregularity	that	is	more	likely	to	be	resolved	through	eventual	regularisation,	as	in	Spain,	there	is	less	need	for	street-level	bureaucrats	to	put	 in	 jeopardy	the	trust	and	confidence	of	parts	of	 their	clientele	by	helping	the	immigration	regime	to	exclude,	detect	or	even	deport	irregular	residents.		McDonald	 (2012,	 p.133)	 argued	 that	 “a	 challenge	 to	 these	 governmentalised	borders	can	also	pose	a	challenge	to	processes	of	migrant	illegalisation,	and	thus	to	the	production	of	migrant	illegality	itself”.	I	certainly	hope	that	the	insights	that	this	study	provides	will	contribute	to	a	better	understanding	and	more	comprehensive	problematisation	 of	 not	 only	migrant	 irregularity	 itself,	 but	 also	 its	 control.	 The	underlying	argument	can	be	summarised	in	the	following	way:		
Firstly,	 the	 concrete	 challenges	 that	 irregular	 migration	 poses	 for	 receiving	societies	are	provoked	by	the	condition	of	irregularity	itself,	not	the	person	that	has	been	assigned	the	irregular	status.	The	expiry	of	a	residence	permit,	for	example,	does	not	make	 its	holder	a	different	person	nor	does	 it	 immediately	 change	 that	person’s	behaviour.	What	it	does,	however,	is	render	many	of	his	or	her	ordinary	activities	 and	 interactions	 suddenly	 unlawful	 and	 thus	 subject	 to	 state	 control.	Irregularity	 is	 thus	 first	 of	 all	 a	 social	 rather	 than	 a	 legal	 problem;	 and	 its	consequences	are	not	only	felt	by	the	person	lacking	the	permit,	but	also	those	who	even	potentially	come	in	contact	with	her.		
Secondly,	 these	 consequences	 become	 particularly	 apparent	 and	 often	 most	problematic	at	 the	 local	 level,	where	the	 implementation	of	national	 immigration	law	 intervenes	 in	many	 different	 areas	 of	 social	 policy	 and	 spheres	 of	 everyday	interaction,	 including	 the	 provision	 of	public	 services.	What	 thereby	 complicates	these	fundamental	social	relations	is	not	that	some	local	residents	are	foreigners	or	that	some	foreigners	live	in	the	country	without	the	government’s	permission,	but	that	other	people	have	to	translate	this	lack	of	permission	into	everyday	exclusion.	The	 problem	with	 this	 translation	 is	 that	 the	 underlying	 legal	 distinction	 is	 too	simplistic	 to	match	a	social	reality	where	 irregular	migrants	are	also	neighbours,	patients,	students	and	so	on.		
Thirdly,	 the	 moral	 and	 practical	 contradictions	 caused	 by	 this	 mismatch	 are	
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particularly	 profound	 for	 those	 individuals	 and	 institutions	 on	which	 the	 health,	education	 and	 social	 security	 of	 the	 entire	 population	 depends	 to	 a	 very	 large	degree.	In	order	to	detect	and	exclude	irregular	migrants	they	have	to	adapt	at	least	some	 of	 the	 rules	 and	 established	 practices	 according	 to	 which	 they	 normally	provide	these	services.	The	more	effective	a	public	welfare	system	thereby	becomes	at	controlling	immigration	the	less	effective	it	tends	to	become	at	providing	public	welfare.		Most	of	 the	street-level	bureaucrats	 I	 interviewed	 in	London	and	Barcelona	were	aware	 of	 this	 danger,	 although	 many	 of	 them	 also	 supported	 the	 idea	 that	‘immigration	should	be	 controlled	better’.	Extending	 immigration	 control	 to	ever	more	spheres	of	everyday	life	will	almost	certainly	increase	its	overall	effectiveness,	but	also	create	significant	costs	for	the	corresponding	institutions	and	the	people	who	work	there.	My	analysis	shows	that	instances	where	the	logic	of	immigration	control	 thereby	 converges	 with	 internal	 logics	 are	 the	 exception	 but	 can	 play	 a	significant	 role	 in	undermining	 internal	 resistance.	 For	most	 of	my	 respondents,	however,	 the	 internalisation	 of	 immigration	 control	 constituted	 part	 of	 the	underlying	problem	rather	than	its	solution.		Just	 like	many	 recreational	drugs	 continue	 to	be	used	widely	although	 they	have	long	been	declared	‘illegal’	and	put	under	stricter	state	control	than	others,	some	irregularity	 will	 always	 accompany	 state	 efforts	 to	 regulate	 the	 cross-border	mobility	of	people.	Both	are	efforts	to	enforce	certain	limits	on	a	human	behaviour	that	in	liberal	societies	cannot	be	fully	controlled;	and	both	are	based	on	artificial	distinctions	that	are	relatively	easy	to	put	in	law	but	difficult	to	uphold	in	everyday	practice.	Any	 successful	management	of	 the	actual	 consequences	 that	 (ir)regular	migration	 and	 drug	 (ab)use	 can	 have	 for	 individuals	 and	 society	 as	 a	 whole	necessarily	 involves	 a	 whole	 range	 of	 specialised	 institutions	 and	 professional	services,	including	those	providing	education,	healthcare	and	social	assistance.	It	is	precisely	their	effective	collaboration	in	this	management	that	ultimately	requires	a	clear	limitation	of	state	control	rather	than	its	further	expansion	and	diffusion.			 	
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10. Appendix	
10.1. List	of	Abbreviations	
A&E	 	 Accidents	an	Emergency	(Services)	BMA	 	 British	Medical	Association	CAP	 	 Primary	Heath	Centre	(Centro	de	Atención	Primaria)	CAS	 	 Confirmation	of	Acceptance	for	Studies	CatSalut	 Catalan	Health	Service	(Servei	Català	de	la	Salut)	CCAR	 Catalan	Refugee	Aid	Commission	(‘Comissió	Catalana	d'Ajuda	al	Refugiat’)		CEAR	 Spanish	Refugee	Aid	Commission	(‘Comisión	Española	de	Ayuda	al	Refugiado’)		CEB	 	 Education	Consortium	of	Barcelona	(Consorci	d'Educació	de	Barcelona)	DfE	 	 Department	for	Education	DLR	 	 Discretionary	Leave	to	Remain	DNI	 National	Identification	Document	(Documento	Nacional	de	Identidad)	DOTW	 	 Doctors	Of	The	World	(Medicos	del	Mundo	–	MdM)	EMN	 	 European	Migration	Network	ESOL	 	 English	for	Speakers	of	Other	Languages	EU	 	 European	Union	FRA	 	 European	Union	Agency	for	Fundamental	Rights		GDP	 	 Gross	Domestic	Product	GLA	 	 Greater	London	Authority	GMC	 	 General	Medical	Council	GP	 	 General	Practitioner		HLT	 	 Hackney	Learning	Trust	ID	 	 Identification	Document	ILR	 	 Indefinite	Leave	to	Remain	INSS	 National	Institute	of	Social	Security	(Instituto	Nacional	de	Seguridad	Social)		IOM	 	 International	Organisation	for	Migration	LA	 	 Local	Authority	LEA	 	 Local	Education	Authority	LTR	 	 Leave	To	Remain	MRI	 	 Migrant	Rights	International	MRN	 	 Migrants’	Rights	Network	NGO	 	 Non-Governmental	Organisation	NHS	 	 (UK)	National	Health	Service	NIE	 Foreigners’	Personal	Identity	Number	(Número	de	Identidad	de	Extranjero)	NPD	 	 National	Pupil	Database	NRPF	 	 No	Recourse	to	Public	Funds	NUT	 	 National	Union	of	Teachers	OHCHR	 	 Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	OVM	 	 Overseas	Visitors	Manager		PASUCAT		 Platform	for	Universal	Health	Care	in	Catalonia	(Plataforma	per	una	Atenció	
Sanitaria	Universal	a	Catalaunya)	PICUM	 	 Platform	for	International	Cooperation	on	Undocumented	Migrants	RMI	 	 Minimum	Insertion	Income	(Renta	Mínima	de	Inserción)	SAIER	 Service	Centre	For	Immigrants,	Emigrants	And	Refugees	(Servei	d'Atenció	a	
Immigrants,	Emigrants	i	Refugiats)	SEN	 	 Special	Educational	Need	SSC	 	 Social	Service	Centre	TSI	 	 Individual	Health	Card	(Tarjeta	Sanitaria	Individual)	UK	 	 United	Kingdom	UNCESCR		 United	Nations	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights	US	 	 United	States		 	
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10.2. List	of	Interviews		LONDON	–	Non-migrants:	
Interview	 Respondent	
Code	 Date	 Role/profession	 Affiliation/workplace	
lonA01	 05/08/14	 Campaign	coordinator	 Right	To	Remain	
lonA02	 07/08/14	 Policy	director	 Migrants’	Rights	Network	
lonA03	 09/10/14	 UK	Programme	director	 Doctors	of	the	World	
lonA04	 22/10/14	 Lawyer/case	worker	 Project	17	
lonA05	 23/10/14	 Director	&	refugee	health	worker	 Hackney	Refugee	Council	&	Healthwatch	Hackney	
lonA06	 24/10/14	 Reverend	 St.	Mary’s	Church	Lewisham	
lonA07	 29/10/14	 Reverend	 St.	Mary’s	Church	Hackney	
lonA08	 29/10/14	 Health	advocate/volunteer	 Maternity	Action	&	Hackney	Migrant	Centre	
lonA09	 31/10/14	 Overseas	Visitors	Manager	 NHS	hospital	in	London	
lonA10	 03/11/14	 Legal	and	Policy	Officer	 CORAM	Migrant	Children’s	Project	
lonA11	 10/11/14	 General	Practitioner/doctor	 Health	centre	in	NE-London	
lonA12	 10/11/14	 Case	worker	 Doctors	of	the	World	
lonA13	 10/11/14	 A&E	Nurse		 NHS	hospital	in	E-London	
lonA14	 19/11/14	 Head	receptionist	 Health	centre	in	NE-London	
lonA15	 19/11/14	 Social	worker		 Local	Council	
lonA16	 21/11/14	 Young	Migrants	Practitioner		 The	Children’s	Society	
lonA17	 25/11/14	 Legal	advisor	/	project	leader	 Praxis	Community	Projects	
lonA18	 25/11/14	 Community	Engagement	Officer	 Healthwatch	Lewisham	
lonA19	 02/12/14	 Specialist	immigration	advisor	 Southwark	Citizens’	Advice	Bureau	
lonA20	 03/12/14	 (1)	Reverend	(2)	Community	worker	 Deptford	Church	Lewisham	
lonA21	 03/12/14	 Local	Councillor	&	cabinet	member	(area	of	housing)	 Local	Council	
lonA22	 16/01/15	 Case	worker	 The	Children’s	Society	
lonA23	 29/01/15	 School	teacher	&	representative	of	the	local	teachers	union	 Primary	school	in	Hackney	&	Hackney	Teachers	Association	
lonA24	 04/02/15	 University	lecturer	 University	of	London	
lonA25	 05/02/15	 General	Practitioner/doctor	 Health	centre	in	SE-London	
lonA26	 12/02/15	 Head	of	Admissions	department	 Hackney	Learning	Trust	
lonA27	 21/02/15	 Social	worker	 Local	Council	
lonA28	 23/02/15	 Head	teacher	 Primary	school	in	Hackney	
lonA29	 24/02/15	 Immigration	Policy	and	Guidance	Manger	 University	of	London	
lonA30	 26/02/15	 (1)	NRPF	service	manager	(2)	Housing	officer	 Local	Council	
lonA31	 28/02/15	 Imam	 Local	mosque	and	community	centre	
lonA32	 02/03/15	 Head	of	Admissions	 6th	Form	College	in	NE-London		
lonA33	 03/03/15	 Local	Councillor	 Local	Council			
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BARCELONA	–	Non-migrants:			
Interview	 Respondent	
Code	 Date	 Role/profession	 Affiliation/workplace	
bcnA01	 13/04/15	 Vice	president	 Barcelona	Municipal	Immigration	Council	(CMIB)	
bcnA02	 16/04/15	 Intercultural	mediator	 Association	Salud	y	Familia	
bcnA03	 17/04/15	 Head	of	the	‘migration’	division	 Caritas	Barcelona	
bcnA04	 28/04/15	 Case	worker	&	head	of	‘Integra’	project	 Catalan	Refugee	Aid	Commission		
bcnA05	 30/04/15	 Lawyer/legal	advisor	 Catalan	Refugee	Aid	Commission	
bcnA06	 30/04/15	 Project	coordinator	 Espai	d'Inclusió	i	Formació	Casc	Antic	
bcnA07	 06/05/15	 Commissioner	for	Immigration	and	Social	Action	 Municipality	of	Barcelona		
bcnA08	 07/05/15	 Reception	manager	 Local	health	centre	in	Sant	Martí	
bcnA09	 07/05/15	 Family	doctor	/pediatrician	 Local	health	centre	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA10	 14/05/15	 Community	health	worker	&	intercultural	mediator	 Hospital	Vall	d’Hebron	&	Association	Salud	y	Familia	
bcnA11	 15/05/15	 President	 Association	of	Pakistani	Workers	
bcnA12	 18/05/15	 Family	doctor	 Local	health	centre	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA13	 18/05/15	 Administrator/receptionist	 Local	health	centre	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA14	 19/05/15	 Doctor	&	medical	director	 Specialised	health	centre	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA15	 19/05/15	 Head	of	admissions	 Specialised	health	centre	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA16	 19/05/15	 Director	 General	Directorate	for	Immigration	of	the	Catalan	Government	
bcnA17	 04/06/15	 Head	of	the	Client	Relations	department	 Catalan	Health	Service	(CatSalut)	
bcnA18	 10/06/15	 (1)	Director	(2)	Case	worker	 Department	for	Immigration	and	Interculturality	of	the	Municipality	
bcnA19	 11/06/15	 Head	of	the	Immigration	division	 Red	Cross	Barcelona/SAIER	
bcnA20	 29/06/15	 (1)	Social	worker	/	director	(2)	Social	worker	/	director	 (two	different)	local	social	service	centres	(CSS)	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA21	 09/07/15	 (1)	Psychologist	&	service	coordinator	(2)	Social	worker	 Local	social	service	centre	(CSS)	in	Sant	Martí		
bcnA22	 13/07/15	 Social	worker/educator	 CSS	is	Sant	Andreu	
bcnA23	 14/07/15	 Lawyer/Solicitor	 MigraStudium	&	Barcelona	Bar	Association	(ICAB)	
bcnA24	 17/09/15	 Secretary	 Pre-	and	primary	school	in	Sant	Andreu	
bcnA25	 22/09/15	 Head	teacher	/	director	 Primary	school	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA26	 25/09/15	 Head	of	Studies		 Adult	education	centre	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA27	 25/09/15	 Teacher	 College	(‘Instituto’)	in	Ciutat	Vella	
bcnA28	 28/09/15	 (New)	Director	 Department	for	Immigration	and	Interculturality	of	the	Municipality	
bcnA29	 29/09/15	 Senior	official	 Education	Consortium	of	Barcelona	
bcnA30	 02/10/15	 Head	teacher	/	director	 Pre-	and	primary	school	in	Sant	Martí	
bcnA31	 05/10/15	 Educator	 Cepaim	Foundation	
lonA32	 06/10/15	 Head	of	Studies	 College	in	Ciutat	Vella		
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LONDON	-	Migrants:	
Interview	 Respondent	
Code	 Date	 Age	 Sex	 C/o	origin	 Arrived	 Immigration	situation	
lonB01	 08/08/14	 26	 m	 Albania	 2013	 Entry	with	false	documents;	no	contact	with	authorities	
lonB02	 03/09/14	 50	 m	 DRC	 1995	 Initial	asylum	application	rejected;	pending	application	for	DLR	
lonB03	 25/09/14	 24	 m	 Albania	 2013	 Undocumented	entry;	no	contact	with	authorities	
lonB04	 26/09/14	 32	 f	 Colombia	 2001	 Entry	with	false	documents;	pending	application	under	family	rules	
lonB05	 30/09/14	 32	 m	 Bolivia	 2004	 Overstayed	student	visa;	no	contact	with	authorities	
lonB06	 30/11/14	 36	 m	 Algeria	 2004	 Entry	with	false	documents;	later	asylum	application	rejected;	ordered	to	leave;	
lonB07	 04/12/14	 34	 f	 Zimbabwe	 2005	 Overstayed	visitors'	visa;	pending	application	for	DLR	
lonB08	 17/01/15	 30	 m	 Albania	 2000	 Undocumented	entry;	several	deportations	and	re-entries;		
lonB09	 20/01/15	 40	 f	 Nigeria	 2006	 Overstayed	a	visitor's	visa	to	join	husband	
lonB10	 17/02/15	 20	 f	 US/	Nigeria	 2004	 Overstayed	a	visitor’s	visa	(unknowingly)	when	she	was	a	child	
lonB11	 17/02/15	 35	 f	 Nigeria	 2013	 Overstayed	a	visitor's	visa	
lonB12	 23/02/15	 n.d.	 f	 Jamaica	 2000	 Overstayed	a	tourist	visa;	subsequent	application	under	Art.8	rejected		BARCELONA	-	Migrants:	
Interview	 Respondent	
Code	 Date	 Age	 Sex	 C/o	origin	 Arrived	 Immigration	situation	
bcnB01	 05/05/15	 42	 f	 Uzbekistan	 2011	 Overstayed	tourist	visa;	asylum	application	rejected	
bcnB02	 14/05/15	 19	 m	 Gambia	 2013	 Unlawful	entry	as	unaccompanied	minor	
bcnB03	 15/05/15	 28	 m	 US	 2013	 Overstayed	student	visa;	no	contact	with	authorities	
bcnB04	 15/05/15	 34	 M	 Morocco	 1987	 Unable	to	renew	residence	permit	due	to	lack	of	employment	
bcnB05	 04/06/15	 27	 F	 Morocco	 2012	 Undocumented	entry	(by	boat)	
bcnB06	 01/08/15	 29	 m	 Philippines	 2013	 Overstayed	tourist	visa;	no	contact	with	authorities	
bcnB07	 05/08/15	 31	 M	 Senegal	 2006	 Undocumented	entry	(by	boat);	regularised	in	2012	but	unable	to	renew	permit	in	2013	
bcnB08	 19/09/15	 26	 f	 Honduras	 2006	 Overstayed	a	visitor's	visa	
bcnB09	 08/10/15	 36	 m	 Senegal	 2013	 Overstayed	a	visitor's	visa			 	
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10.3. Examples	of	interview	guides		Example	of	interview	guide	–	Street-level	bureaucrats	(GP/doctor):		
	
Interview	no.	Axx				:	 	 	 ,	GP/Doctor,	 	 	 	 [date	of	interview]		
	
Questionnaire:			Access	to	healthcare…		 - How	do	you	perceive	the	position	of	irregular	migrants	vis-à-vis	the	UK	health	system	(in	general)?		
o (has	it	changed	over	time?)		 - How	would	you	describe	the	relationship	between	formal	rules	and	restrictions	and	their	implementation	at	the	level	of	hospitals/health	centres/GPs/..?		
o How	would	you	describe	the	general	level	of	awareness/knowledge	of	formal	entitlements?			 - Do	you	see	a	tendency	of	the	area	of	public	health	becoming	a	potential	site	for	immigration	control?			 - In	what	sense	can	that	be	problematic?	(Why)	Should	irregular	migrants	have	access	to	these	services?			 - What	does	their	limited	access	to	mainstream	healthcare	services	mean	for	undocumented	migrants’	position	(or	prospects)	within	society	at	large?			
o What	does	it	mean	for	the	rest	of	British	society?			…from	your	personal	perspective	as	a	GP:				 - How	often	do	you	come	in	contact	with	migrants	in	that	situation?	Who	determines	the	status	of	a	patient?		- How	does	their	status	affect	your	relationship	with	them?		 - Are	there	any	formal/informal	guidelines	on	how	to	deal	with	a	person	not	formally	entitled	to	reside	in	the	UK?			 - Do	you	feel	you	are	supposed	to	not	serve/help/support	migrants	who	are	staying	in	the	country	‘illegally’?		 - What	kind	of	difficulties	does	that	create	for	you?		 - Do	you	–	or	other	health	professionals	that	you	know	–	perceive	treating	people	without	leave	to	remain	as	a	political	act?	(a	way	of	contesting	/criticising	official	government	policies?)			More	generally,	how	would	you	judge	the	effectiveness	of	the	government’s	approach	to	irregular	migration?			
à	Is	there	anything	else	that	you	think	could	be	relevant	for	my	study?			[à	Contact	other	health	professionals?]		
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Example	of	interview	guide	–	NGO	representatives	(Children’s	Society):	
			
Interview	no.	Axx:		 [interview	name/position]	 The	Children's	Society	 										[date	of	interview]			
Questionnaire:		
	Can	you	briefly	describe	your	organisation	and	your	own	role	within	it?			General:			
- How	would	you	describe	the	situation	of	children	whose	(parents’)	immigration	status	in	this	country	is	irregular	or	unclear?		
o Has	that	changed	over	time?			
- What	kind	of	rights	do	you	see	as	most	fundamental	in	the	case	of	undocumented	migrant	children?	
- What	are	the	most	significant	barriers	to	the	realisation	of	these	rights?			
- How	do	perceive	the	relationship	between	formal	rules	and	entitlements	and	their	actual	application	at	the	local	level?	(Council	workers/schools/health	centres)	
o Level	of	awareness?		
- What	does	the	curtailment	of	these	rights	mean	for	(undocumented)	migrants’	position	in	society,	and	their	interactions	with	other	people/institutions?			
- Do	you	feel	that	the	sphere	of	(children’s)	rights	or	the	area	of	education	is/could	become	a	site	for	immigration	control?				Children’s	Society’s	work:		
- In	relation	to	your	advice	services,	do	families	in	irregular	situations	often	use	them?		
- With	which	specific	problems	do	they	usually	come	to	you?		
- What	advice	/	help	can	you	give	them?			
- Can	claiming	their	rights	threaten	their	stay	in	the	country?			
- How	is	your	relationship/cooperation	with	local	councils	/	schools	/	etc.?		Children’s	Centres	in	Lewisham:			
- What	are	your	experiences	there?	
- Can	(a	lack	of)	immigration	status	play	a	role	in	terms	of	access,	special	needs,	etc.	?				Do	you	perceive	helping	people	without	leave	to	remain	as	a	political	act?	(a	way	of	contesting	/criticising	official	government	policies?)		More	generally,	how	would	you	judge	the	effectiveness	of	the	government’s	approach	of	creating	a	‘hostile	environment’	for	irregular	migrants?			
à	Anything	else	that	you	think	could	be	relevant	for	my	study?		
à	Any	relevant	contacts	(schools/teachers/children’s	centres)	that	you	could	refer	me	to?		
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Example	of	interview	guide	–	Migrants	in	irregular	situations:		
			
Interview No. ___ , Name*:__________(Place of Interview:________________) 
(1) Sex    m □    f □ 
(2) Age:  
(3) C/o origin or nationality:  
(4) Family situation: 
(5) First arrived in the UK: 
(6) Immigration history: 
 
(7) For how long have you been living in this country/city? 
- Have you been ‘without papers’ all this time? / How did that happen? 
- When you decided to migrate, did you see this as a possibility? 
(8) Why exactly did you choose to move to London/the UK? 
- What do you like about London / the UK?  
- What do you don’t like? What makes life difficult?  
- Did you ever experience racism or discrimination while living in the UK?  
(9) What does it mean (for you) to live in the country ‘illegally’?  
- What impact does this have on your daily life? 
- How often do you think about not having papers?  
- In which situations is that?  
- What kind of situations do you try to avoid (because of that)?  
- Do you think you should have the right to stay and work in the UK?  
(10) What is your current living/housing situation? 
- How did you find this place? / who helped you to arrange it? 
(11) How do you usually move around in the city? 
(12) Do you currently work? / How do you earn your living?  
- How did you find that job? How difficult was that? 
- Are you satisfied with this job? / Looking for something else? 
- Does your status influence your working conditions / salary / job security? 
- Do you have a bank account? / difficulties?  
(13) Do you have many friends (or any family) in London?  
- How did you get to know them? / Where do you usually meet them? 
- How many people know about your legal situation? Does your family know? / With 
whom do/can you talk about this? 
- Do you feel that your status affects your relationship with friends/work 
colleagues/family back home/other people? In what way?  
- Does it affect your use of the internet? / the way you connect with friends on FB?  
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Example	of	interview	guide	–	Migrants	(continuation):		
			
(14) What do you do in your free time?  
- Do you sometimes do sports / ‘go out’ / other leisure activities? 
- Have you been to the local community centre / migrant organisations / church / 
etc.? / Why not? 
- Where do you feel ‘safe’ / ‘unsafe’?  
(15) Did you ever think of trying to regularise your stay?  
- If yes, how? / Why wasn’t that successful? If no, why not?  
- Would you say you are a political person?  
- Did/would you participate in any kind of political activism? (e.g. street or online 
protests, labour union involvement, etc.) – influenced by (lack of) status?  
(16) Have you ever come in contact with the police / immigration authority? 
(17) How do feel / what do you do if you see police on the street?  
- What do you think would happen to you if the police stop you?  
- Do you know of anybody ho has been/will be deported? How did it come to that?  
- How do you avoid getting known to the authority?  
(18) Healthcare:  
- Are you registered with a GP? / Why not? 
- When was the last time you went to the hospital / see a doctor?  
(19) Did/do you ever need any kind of support (social, financial, legal, etc.)?  
- If yes, where do you go? 
- Have you ever been to the local council? /  
- Are you aware of organisations in your area where you can get support?  
(20) ‘Integration’:  
- What does ‘integration’ mean for you?  
- Would you say you ‘belong’ here?  
- Do you feel you are able to participate in your local community / neighbourhood? 
(21) Do you ever think about / are you planning to leave this country?  
- If yes, why? Where else would you go? 
- What would make you want to leave? / What would have to change?  
- What would you tell a friend back home who wants to come as well and do the 
same as you?  
- Would you say it was worthwhile coming to London? Would you do it again? 
(22) What ‘plan’ do you have for your future?  
- Where do you think you will be in 5 years? 
- Do have any dreams?  
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10.4. Participant	information	sheet	&	consent	form		Participant	information	sheet	given	to	all	‘non-migrant’	respondents:		
	
Information sheet for key informants, 2nd version (London) 15 July 2014 Page 1 of 2 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET – Key Informants 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to 
take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others 
if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. You will be given a copy of this information sheet. 
 
STUDY TITLE:  
Local, everyday integration of irregular migrants living in London and Barcelona. 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? 
The aim of this doctoral research project is to better understand the role and consequences 
of irregular immigration status for local processes of everyday integration within society. In 
contrast to those foreigners who are legally admitted to stay in the country, irregular migrants 
(i.e. those not officially entitled to reside in the UK) are usually neglected in political and 
public discourses on integration, and many Western states increasingly restrict their access 
to basic social rights and services. In practice, however, they do not live in complete isolation 
from the host society: they make friends, have relationships, learn the official language, find 
work, go shopping, see doctors and participate in social, cultural or sporting events.  
By looking at the various relationships and everyday interactions of irregular migrants with 
state as well as non-state actors and institutions, I want to highlight the discrepancy between 
their absolute exclusion from some spheres of society, and their relative inclusion in others. 
In particular, I want to draw attention to the inherent contradictions between the overall logic 
of (immigration) control and various more fundamental functions of society, including the 
provision of public health and education, the prevention of crime, or the maintenance of local 
community cohesion. Since different national and particularly local contexts create distinctive 
constraints and opportunities for irregular migrants’ integration, I am carrying out fieldwork in 
two European cities, first in London (July 2014 – February 2015), then in Barcelona (March – 
August 2015).  
 
WHY HAVE I BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
You have been selected based on your affiliation with a relevant organisation or institution, 
and/or your particular expertise, experience and knowledge in relation to the situation of 
(irregular) foreign residents in London. 
 
DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART? 
No. It is completely up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take 
part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If 
you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ME IF I TAKE PART? 
If you agree to take part, we will arrange a location and time for an individual interview. 
During this interview you will be asked about the meaning and (potential) effects of 
(irregular) migration status within your area of work and/or expertise. No personal data will 
be collected, however, if you agree, you will be mentioned by name and/or function in the 
PhD dissertation resulting from this research. 
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Participant	information	sheet	(continuation):		
			
Information sheet for key informants, 2nd version (London) 15 July 2014 Page 2 of 2 
Interviews will last approximately one hour, and will be recorded for the benefit of the 
researcher only. The audio recordings of the interview will be used only for analysis within 
the framework of this specific project. No other use will be made of them without your written 
permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access to the original recordings. 
The recordings will be stored safely and will be destroyed upon completion of the 
dissertation. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES AND RISKS OF TAKING PART? 
No risks or disadvantages are anticipated by your taking part in the interview. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF TAKING PART? 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it is 
hoped that this work will contribute to a better understanding of migrant irregularity and a 
more nuanced perception and discourse on irregular migration and residence in Europe.  
 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY? 
The results of this study will be used for my PhD dissertation in the field of Migration Studies, 
at the University of Sussex, School of Global Studies. If you are interested in obtaining a 
copy of my work, once finished, you can contact me  
 
CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
Doctoral researcher: Reinhard Schweitzer, PhD candidate at the Department of 
Geography, University of Sussex;  
email: R.Schweitzer@sussex.ac.uk, mobile: 07778 247078.  
 
If you have any concerns about the way in which the study is being conducted, please 
contact my supervisor: Dr. Michael Collyer, Reader in Geography, University of Sussex; 
Email: M.Collyer@sussex.ac.uk, phone: 01273 872772 or 01273 877238.  
 
 
 
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO READ THIS INFORMATION SHEET. 
Your help makes my research possible! 
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Consent	form	–	‘non-migrant’	participants	only:	
	
Written consent form, final version, 5 September 2014 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
PROJECT TITLE: Local, everyday integration of irregular migrants living 
in London and Barcelona.  
Project Approval 
Reference: 
 
ER/RS398/1 
    
 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet, which I 
may keep for records. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to:  
- Be interviewed by the researcher 
- Allow the interview to be audio taped 
 
I understand that I have given my approval for my name and/or the name of my 
organisation or workplace to be used in the final report of the project, and in further 
publications. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being 
penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study.  I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and 
handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
 
Name: 
 
 
 
Signature 
 
 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
